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A SHORT HISTORY OF BRITISH EXPANSION

* * *

THE MODERN EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH

BY

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AUTHOR OF 'MARITIME ENTERPRISE, 1485-1558,' ETC.

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION, 1930

SINCE this book was first written in 1919-21 many things have become clear that were then undefined in the history and constitution of the modern British Empire. Political developments in the post-War decade have been far-reaching, and international relations have assumed a new aspect. There has been great activity in the study of the Empire and Commonwealth, and books upon it have been published which exceed in number and importance the output of any previous period of similar length. It has therefore seemed desirable not merely to revise but to rewrite the story of British expansion after 1783. It now contains seventeen chapters in place of the former eight, and about three-fourths of the text is new. The arrangement adopted is to relate the foundation of the units of the modern Empire in separate chapters, and then to continue the history as that of the Empire and Commonwealth as a whole.

The author is greatly indebted to Sir Charles Lucas, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., for his kindness in reading the first edition and criticizing it in detail soon after its first publication ; to Professor A. P. Newton, of King's College, London, whose knowledge and experience have been so freely at the disposal of the members of his group at the Institute of Historical Research ; and to many friends and correspondents who have offered suggestions and corrections.

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PART V

THE FOUNDATION OF THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH

CHAPTER I

THE CHANGING WORLD : THE BRITISH ISLES, 1783-1870

(i) *The Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions*

WHAT are the characteristics of an imperial nation? The question obviously does not admit of a cut and dried answer, but it is worth considering at the opening of a history of the second British undertaking in external expansion. First, it is necessary to define the term expansion. The word may mean the extension of the dominant state through regions contiguous with it, and offering no great contrast in climate and natural conditions, regions by consequence which, if peopled, contain inhabitants who require no radically different legislation and administration from those of the exploiting nation, and which may be assimilated by methods long familiar to their new rulers. Alternatively the word expansion may stand for the occupation or control of distant lands, separated by sea from the centre of empire, widely different from it in climate, resources and native inhabitants, and calling for various and flexible treatment in all departments of state activity. The distinction may be roughly simplified to that between land expansion and sea expansion; but the two types are hardly ever cleanly separated, and there are some markedly overlapping examples.

If we turn to the empires or expanding polities of which European history bears witness, we may place clearly in the first or land category those of ancient Rome, modern Russia and the United States. None of these are empires of the British type, and they may here be dismissed with the remark that their essential condition has been the magnitude and strength of the original population. Russia had this magnitude from the time of her consolidation in the sixteenth century. Rome lacked it at the outset but quickly attained it by her talent for assimilating neighbours similar in origin to herself and by transmuting their energy into military power. The United States of 1783 had a population small in absolute numbers, but sufficient in relation to its task of occupying an empty continent, capable of enormously rapid multiplication, and continuously recruited by swarms of immigrants of its own type. The United States of to-day is the fruit of applied manpower subjugating nature rather than its fellow-men.

Of sea expansion there are four pure examples, all of which have now ceased to exist or are long past their prime. They are ancient Greece, Portugal, the Dutch Empire, and the old colonial Empire of England. Of these it may be observed that, by contrast with the land empires already noticed, the expansion was based upon a small original population—small, that is, in comparison with the numbers existing in adjacent countries. Smallness of numbers precluded the chance of military conquests by land in territories already strongly occupied, and not one of these small imperialist nations found itself in the exceptional position of the United States, with empty country waiting to be occupied on its borders. Sea adventure was therefore the only outlet for their vigour, and it was conditioned by that initial paucity of numbers. That brings us to a statement of the essential difference between land-power and sea-power. The former rests primarily upon weight of numbers. The latter is indifferent to that factor, for even in the most maritime of nations it has never been more than a small minority of the whole that has actually made its living by the sea. Sea-power proceeds from the sea-talent of a select fraction of a people, giving scope to the industrial and commercial talents of the land-living majority, and evoking in them qualities not commonly produced by military expansion, the qualities, that is, of adaptability, a sense of liberty and a dislike of formal discipline.

The Spanish Empire, in this analysis, must be reckoned as a hybrid, essentially a land empire expanding across the sea. Spain in the sixteenth century had a population strong enough for military expansion in Europe, and when fortune, coupled with a relatively small effort on her own part, placed the American continent at her disposal, she occupied it by the methods of a land-power, and neglected to develop the maritime possibilities of her acquisition. Spain never produced a great mercantile marine or an efficient ocean navy. For her the Atlantic was a shaky bridge to a land empire, a bridge maintained in a low state of efficiency because the nation was not really interested in it for its own sake. And as for the larger aspects of sea-talent, we have only to imagine what world-wide strategy of commerce the Portuguese or the Dutch would have based on the possession of Panama and then to consider the meagre record of Spanish enterprise in the Pacific, to realise that Spain was never a genuine sea-power.

France also cannot be placed definitely on the one side or the other of our classification. But she has not always been, like Spain, a hybrid; she has alternated between one category and the other. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the French were primarily a maritime nation, their small sea-going minority developed a high standard of talent, and the concomitant qualities among the landsmen are noticeable, even to excess; there was certainly enough of individualism and repudiation of restraint in the France of the Valois and the Cardinals. So France founded her colonies in the Atlantic and felt her way towards the East. Then, from Louis XIV. to Napoleon,

land expansion predominated, militarism modified character, and France ceased to be a typical sea-power. In the past century France has again crossed the seas, but she has done so in the military manner of early Spain, and her African empire is a modern and more competent version of the Spanish occupation of America.

Germany, in her brief forty years of imperial adventure, sought to achieve both kinds of empire simultaneously. She went to the tropics and the islands of the Pacific in the sea-going manner of the Portuguese and the older French and British expansions, and she exhibited genuine sea-talent in her navy and her mercantile marine. At the same time she played for the land expansion congenial to a teeming military population, for the *Mittel Europa*, stretching to the Bosphorus and thence through the Near East to the Persian Gulf. And now, for our time at least, it is all over, for reasons on which it is needless to dwell. But she has left an example of her type. Japan is, in material if not in moral essentials, the Germany of the Far East.

How can the conclusions of this survey be applied to the modern British Empire? Certainly not, as has been said, in any definite manner like the laws of physical science. But indications and tendencies may be stated; valuable if it is admitted that they are approximate only and subject to modification by many indefinable factors. It is only with that limitation that any part of human history is a science. It would seem then that (with Germany as a short-lived exception) the first essential of a maritime empire, based upon sea talent and the national qualities that go with it, is a relatively small and unmilitarized home population. Without that deficiency in numbers and military training there is an almost unavoidable temptation to expansion by land. In any nation, it must be repeated, it is only a small minority that understands the problems of sea-power, whereas in a military nation the great majority can understand the principles of land-power. Where militarism exists it is likely therefore that its exponents will monopolize the ear of the nation and of its statesmen, and that land activities will push sea activities into a secondary position. In this reasoning the non-military Americans of the United States fall into line with the militarist Romans and Russians, for their exceptional land opportunities have diverted them in the last half-century from the attainment of efficiency at sea; Mahan has been a prophet more honoured in other countries than in his own. The scantiness and the temperament of the population have been the underlying conditions of the second British Empire as of the first.

But, it will be answered, the population of the British Isles has not been scanty in the period of the modern Empire, it has grown enormously and is second only to that of Germany among the peoples of central and western Europe. True, but for this purpose the test is not that of density to the square mile but that of numbers translated into military force and considered in relation to adjacent powers. In this respect the British of the nineteenth century were one of the

small populations of Europe. In 1914, with three-fourths of the civilian numbers of Germany we could not put one-tenth as many soldiers into the field, and no one but Lord Kitchener dreamed that we could substantially alter the proportion.¹ There was thus no scope for land ambitions, and it was a case of sea expansion or none. In the early nineteenth century, therefore, the British set out for the second time to found a sea-going empire, and the maritime aspect of it has to this day made the principal appeal to the people of the mother country. But before very long the growth of British numbers did begin to modify the nature of the enterprise. Emigration and multiplication of the colonial stock began to transform British North America from a fringe of maritime possessions into a territorial nation. The same processes acted more unexpectedly in South Africa, where the Cape Colony had been taken over purely as a naval station on the route to the East. The coasts of Australia, occupied for a special administrative purpose, attracted emigrants who likewise spread into the interior. New Zealand was forced open by the same movement, acting in opposition to the wishes of the imperial government. So, in four distinct areas there grew up expansions of the American type, the overflow of a growing population into unoccupied borderlands. The process was somewhat out of harmony with the maritime instincts dominating English thought, and it is not surprising that it was sometimes coldly viewed by British statesmen. In India again, and later in tropical Africa, there has been land expansion based not on emigration but on military force, and in its early stages that also was generally distasteful to the central government. But, it must be remembered, the activities proper to purely maritime expansion were all the time going on—the occupation of trading stations, naval bases and similar strategic points—and they attracted fully as much public attention. The acquisition of Hong-Kong and the opening of the Chinese treaty ports are an example. They were promoted by statesmen who viewed the annexation of New Zealand with distaste, although the military liabilities they involved were quite as serious.

To recapitulate the argument so far as it concerns the second British Empire, we may say that that undertaking was in its origin maritime like the first; that it was inspired by the energy of a small non-military population, with sea-talent based upon a love of liberty and a spirit of commercial enterprise; and that growth of population and local opportunities have superposed land expansions upon the framework of sea connexions. The complicated structure thus evolved presents a field of study in which politics, economics, and the social sciences are intertwined.

Ideas and material circumstances in the mother country thus lie at the roots of the second British expansion. The material circumstances

¹ In September, 1914, Sir Henry Wilson, certainly no unimaginative dullard, wrote that Kitchener with his twenty-five projected army corps was the laughing-stock of the soldiers of Europe (including those of England).—*Life of Sir H. Wilson*, by Sir C. E. Callwell, London, 1927, i. p. 178.

may be grouped round the processes known as the Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions, of which the outlines must now be considered. The play of ideas may be conveniently postponed to a later section.

The Industrial Revolution was the quickening of a process implicit in the opening of the oceans by Columbus and Vasco da Gama. From the late fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries oceanic trade increased in proportion to the more local trades of Europe, exotic products and raw materials developed from luxuries into necessities, manufacture for distant markets was increasingly undertaken, long-distance transport was improved, and quantities of gold and silver were imported until capitalistic organization on a large scale became possible. Concurrently the Renaissance, of which the geographical discoveries were themselves a manifestation, led to increasing liberty of thought and alertness of intellect, and a soil was prepared in which invention could take root. Out of such conditions, and out of no others in the previous history of the white races, could spring the mechanical engineer, the most peculiar product of modern social life. All these factors were intensified in the course of the eighteenth century.

During that century Great Britain and France were the chief ocean-trading countries, the Dutch having fallen relatively behind. British and French manufactures supplied most of the demands of North America, the West Indies and India, and indirectly of Spanish and Portuguese America. They were beginning to penetrate also the more distant markets of China and the Asiatic archipelago, and they were long established in the Levant and the nearer East. The growing population of North America called for an increased supply of manufactures in general—the support of this market to the potteries of Staffordshire is an example—but the most remarkable growth of trade was with the tropical and sub-tropical regions of the earth. These could supply Europe with raw materials like cotton and dyestuffs, and with comestibles such as sugar, tea and coffee. These things changed from occasional luxury trades to a regular traffic in bulk, and Europe had to find a manufacture with which to balance them. Woollen cloth, the ancient textile of Europe, was unsuitable for the tropical market, but cotton cloth was acceptable. And therefore we find the Industrial Revolution beginning not with changes in an existing industry but with the development of a virtually new one; for it is with the cotton trade that its early records are involved. So far as demand was concerned, the factory work in cotton might have begun equally in France and in England. But there were reasons why France should lag behind. One was that the machine-driven factory was attractive chiefly because it enabled a given number of hands to produce a greater output, and France, with an ocean trade about equal to that of England, but with a home population three times as great to supply it, felt the incentive less keenly. Another was that financial organization and legislation were less advanced in France, and capital was less mobile for the purpose of invigorating factory enterprise. But probably

the deciding factor was that, before the Industrial Revolution was fairly begun, a period of twenty-two years of Anglo-French warfare set in, and British naval supremacy closed the world-markets to its rival and monopolized them for itself.

Although Englishmen were new to the manufacture of cotton cloth on a large scale, they had long known its commercial value. The East India Company brought native-made cottons from India, and although their sale was prohibited in England they were re-exported to West Africa, the West Indies and Latin America.¹ It is possible that the Indian wars of the mid-eighteenth century restricted this supply and stimulated the home manufacture; but the argument should not be pressed too far, since none of these wars affected more than a small part of India at any one time. The expansion of the tropical market was indubitable, and so also was that of the home market as English fashions changed and the prohibition of wearing cotton was repealed in 1774. Before and after that date inventions rendered possible the mechanical spinning of cotton, and in the decade from 1785 the factory system in this trade began to make headway. As with other textiles, the weaving continued to be a hand-worked domestic industry for some time after the factories had monopolized the spinning, and the revolution of cotton-weaving may be assigned to the first two decades of the nineteenth century. The advance of this trade (with its implications of the employment of people and shipping) may be illustrated as follows. In 1751 3 million pounds of raw cotton were imported; in 1782, 12 million pounds; in 1800, 56 million pounds; in 1810, 132 million pounds; and in 1830, 260 million pounds.² The war-time increase is remarkable; we were blockading our chief rival, and there was no neutral in a position to seize the advantage.

A factory organization was conceivable, and was in some businesses established, without the use of power-driven machines, but power was obviously an advantage and was adopted as soon as inventions made it practicable. In the first phase the machines were driven by water-power, for whose installation a class of trained mechanics already existed in the millwrights. The early machinery was largely constructed of wood, but an increasing amount of iron was in demand for details, and the British iron output expanded in the same rapid ratio as the cotton import. In 1740 the country produced 48,000 tons of iron; in 1806, 150,000 tons; in 1840, 1,400,000 tons.³ Iron smelting called for large supplies of coal, and the demand was emphasized by the increasing shortage of wood for domestic fuel as the eighteenth century advanced. Miners had therefore to dig deeper, and the need for pumping water out of the workings led to the use of primitive steam

¹ L. C. A. Knowles, *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions*, London, 1924, p. 43.

² Knowles, p. 241. The cotton import of 1751 may be reckoned as equivalent to the cargoes of 7 or 8 average merchantmen of the period; the import of 1830 would represent the lading of some 300 of the generally larger vessels of that date.

³ *Cambridge Mod. History*, x, 734.

engines from the beginning of the century. In 1776 and 1782 James Watt made radical improvements in the steam engine, which then became theoretically available for supplying power to the factories. But in practice the innovation was retarded by the lack of mechanical engineers to make and work the engines, and it is reckoned that as late as 1800 there were less than 300 steam engines in use. After that date the advance was more rapid, good mechanics and accurate machine-tools became common, and in the decade 1830-40 steam became the normal source of power.

The need for moving coal, iron and factory produce in bulk reacted upon methods of transport. Internal communications had always been neglected by English governments, a strange circumstance in a period when the regulation of trade had been considered a cardinal duty of the state, and when an elaborate code of laws had been created in the interests of sea transport. The roads were the care of local authorities unwilling to spend money for the benefit of through traffic, with the consequence that in many districts wheeled transport was impossible and goods had to be carried on pack-horses, a most wasteful method. In the late eighteenth century an improvement set in, effected solely by private enterprise. Turnpike companies undertook the care of the main roads and recouped themselves by charging tolls, and England began, for the first time since the Roman occupation, to learn the possibilities of metalled highways. Almost simultaneously canals were constructed for the conveyance of the heaviest merchandise, and rivers were improved to the same end. The period of canal-cutting extended into the 1840's, when the advent of railways put an end to it. Railways, germinating from the use of wooden rails for horse-drawn vehicles in collieries, adopted the steam locomotive and emerged from the experimental stage with the opening of the Manchester and Liverpool line in 1828. By 1850 the system of main lines throughout the country was sketched out, and both roads and canals were superseded. The dawn of the railway period had a great effect upon the increase of the iron output already noted, and upon the general efficiency of steam-power. Artificial docks were now created to supplement the natural harbours hitherto thought sufficient. Liverpool constructed docks in the eighteenth century, and London began to do so in the first decade of the nineteenth. Ships were enlarged and improved in design, and steam vessels came into limited use. But, until after 1850, steamers were economical only for passengers and mails on very short routes, and the sailing ships carried the bulk of the world's trade until the eighties. Cheap transport was the life of the Industrial Revolution, which would have been ineffective without it, and transport, as will be shown, had also a considerable influence upon the contemporaneous revolution in agriculture.

The transference of the wool industry from the domestic to the factory system was both later and slower than the rise of the cotton manufacture. Woollen cloth, with centuries of tradition behind it, had been

the staple manufacture of the older England, and a large proportion of the people were trained from childhood in the ancient hand processes. One incentive to the establishment of power-driven factories—the shortage of operatives—was therefore lacking, and after the demobilization of the forces in 1815 there were more wool weavers than could find employment. There was nevertheless another incentive, the demand of the long-distance trades for uniform and regular supplies of stuff; and the domestic manufacture, largely a bye-industry of those employed in agriculture, was hopelessly diverse and irregular in its methods. Capitalists were therefore slow to instal the wool industry in factories, but they did ultimately do so. Wool-spinning gradually became a factory trade in the early nineteenth century, but wool weaving was not definitely so until after 1850.¹ The vast supplies of raw material available from Australia after 1830 stimulated the final stage of the transference. Other textiles, such as linen, lace, and hosiery, became factory trades after the middle of the nineteenth century. The manufacture of chemicals in bulk grew up as an accessory business, and the iron and steel trades, by creating and supplying new wants, ramified in directions unimagined in an earlier age. A vivid description of the impression made upon a contemporary observer by the new industrialism may be read in the third chapter of Macaulay's *History of England*. That account is chiefly devoted to a picture of England in 1685, but it introduces for comparison many facts about the state of affairs in the 1840's, and it is instructive for its expression of the outlook of an able public man of that time.

By 1840 England had become industrialized in the modern sense of the word. Lowland Scotland had shared in the process, but it had left Ireland untouched. The continental countries of Europe were only entering upon the same transformation and were not yet serious competitors with Great Britain in the larger industries. For ourselves, the period of national self-sufficiency in essential products, with external trade yielding additional profits for luxuries—the ideal of the older mercantile economists—was now at an end, and the period of world-economy and inevitable dependence upon other countries had set in. That conclusion was early reached by British thinkers and faced by statesmen, with important consequences to the fortunes of the new overseas empire then coming into existence.

The Agricultural Revolution, like that of industry, was a many-sided process. It comprised a multiplicity of detailed changes in the cultivation of crops, the more economical use of the land, and the breeding of animals. It availed itself of the improvements in transport to convert what had been largely a series of local economies into a national economy of agriculture. And to effect its purposes it swept away the substantial survivals of the semi-communal open-field system of ownership which remained over from the Middle Ages.

Scientific as contrasted with traditional methods became prominent

¹ Knowles, *op. cit.* pp. 55-56.

before the middle of the eighteenth century and were increasingly studied as time went on. It is probably correct to say that right up to the end of that period the country at large was more conscious of the agricultural than of the industrial developments that were taking place; they certainly fill a larger place in contemporary literature and political debates. It is here unnecessary to enter into particulars, but the broad result was that existing arable land was made to give a greater yield, and much new land, hitherto untouched, was brought into use. The latter process was stimulated by the growth of population during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, a time in which the country was compelled to rely upon its own corn production. Scientific breeding and feeding likewise increased the output of flesh food. Smithfield records show a great growth in the average size of carcases between the beginning and the end of the eighteenth century, and many ancient practices, such as the driving of huge herds of cattle from Scotland to the London market, gradually became uneconomic.

The population of London had long been so large as to draw into its economy a wide circle of the surrounding country. This was the largest agricultural unit of England. Elsewhere the dearth of transport had made local economies much smaller in their scope, and in consequence bitter scarcity had sometimes prevailed in one part of England whilst there was comparative plenty in another. The transport revolution tended to level the conditions, and national fluctuations of comfort took the place of the more violent local ones. The result was a general improvement.

The aspect of the Agricultural Revolution which has attracted most attention was the decline of the open-field system by which all the land of a manor was worked on a common time-table and for a uniform purpose. It was necessary to end this system before enterprising persons could be at liberty to introduce the improved methods. The open-field was by no means universal at the beginning of this period. It was of Anglo-Saxon origin and had never taken root in the Celtic borderlands of the west of England; and already in the sixteenth century it had been almost abolished in many purely English counties, notably in those near London. By 1740 it probably covered less than half of the total area of the country. From that date until 1840 it was rapidly eliminated, and the time of Parliament was largely occupied during that century in the passing of some thousands of enclosure acts, of which a separate one was needed for the transformation of each manor. On the passing of the Act the various claims to rights in the common land were assessed and the whole area was proportionately divided in full ownership, after which each proprietor enclosed his share and was free to use it as he thought fit. The economic effects were on the whole good, but to numbers of the poorer people the social consequences were bad. Many had no legal proof of their claims, and were awarded nothing, whilst many more obtained plots

too small to live upon, sold them for a lump sum which was soon spent, and then became landless labourers. The great landowners grew richer upon competitive rents, the larger farmers went up in the social scale, the smaller ones went down, and the many intermediate grades of the older time tended to disappear.

In all the changes, agricultural and industrial, the great wars of 1793-1815 were an important factor. Trade with Europe was depressed, in common with the industry depending upon it. Trade across the oceans was stimulated, for naval supremacy hampered European competitors. The demand for foodstuffs stimulated improvements in agriculture, with permanent good effects, but it stimulated also the exploitation of poor land which would not pay under peace conditions, and so paved the way for a disastrous depression after 1815. The war expenditure was vast and unprecedented and bore heavily upon national resources. The nature of the conflict begot a harsh, reactionary state of mind among those who feared a Jacobin revolution, and this, coupled with the shortage of money, endured for long after the end of the struggle and retarded the social reforms which the new conditions of life were demanding. But bad as the war was, it was nothing like so great a disaster as that of 1914-18, and it is a one-sided view which blames it for all the evils that followed in the train of the revolutions described in this chapter.

(ii) *The People*

Having considered some of the factors governing social conditions, we turn now to the state of the people themselves, the raw material of the dominions of the modern Empire. It is of the first importance to bear in mind that since the middle of the eighteenth century there has been a rapid growth of population, although during the previous three hundred years the increase had been relatively slow. No exact census was taken until 1801, but for the preceding period there are approximately accurate estimates. The figures for the population of England and Wales are as follows:—1750, $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions; 1770, $7\frac{1}{2}$; 1790, $8\frac{3}{4}$; 1811, 10; 1831, $13\frac{3}{4}$; 1851, $17\frac{3}{4}$. In Scotland the numbers were much smaller, but the increase was also marked. In 1801 there were about $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions; in 1811, $1\frac{3}{4}$ millions; and in 1851, $2\frac{3}{4}$ millions. For Ireland the statistics are not so exact, but it appears that in 1811 there were about 6 million people, nearly three times as many as at the beginning of the eighteenth century.¹ The Irish numbers increased to $8\frac{1}{2}$ million by 1845, and thenceforward declined rapidly, owing to emigration following famine and pestilence. It may be said, therefore, that the population of the British Isles was much more than doubled between 1750 and 1850, and rather less than doubled again from 1850 to the present time; and that the rate of increase was greatest during the early decades of the nineteenth century.

¹ Estimates of Irish population are collected in M. C. Buer, *Health, Wealth and Population*, London, 1926, pp. 263-4.

◁The social effects of the Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions have been diversely interpreted. Some have held that they produced a period of misery and degradation, and others that they gave rise to a steady improvement. Both theses can be maintained, if they are stated in relation to limited and not identical areas, but it is unwise to reason from a limited area to the whole country. That is a fallacy that is extensively committed, not so much by the investigators themselves as by those who comment upon their results. The condition of London, for example, has been shown to have improved enormously from 1750 to 1850,¹ but the conclusion cannot be transferred to the new industrial towns of the north and midlands, where the wealthy lacked the civic tradition, and expansion was feverish and unregulated. Among the rural part of the population the distinction must be made between classes rather than areas. The condition of all but the poorest class may be said to have improved, but the poorest were at the same time more numerous than all the others together, and their state was in some ways worse in 1830 than it had been before the Agricultural Revolution set in.

Under the old, pre-revolutionary conditions it is clear that there had been a moderate increase of the population. It is no less clear that London killed far more people than it produced, and that the other towns, although insignificant in size, had also an adverse balance between birth and death rates. The old countryside, therefore, was relatively healthy, for it sent its people to die in the towns and had still a surplus to increase the total population. Before the Industrial Revolution the people were predominantly rural, in a proportion of about 5 to 1; the change made them increasingly urban until by the mid-nineteenth century the proportion between town and country was about equal.²

The Industrial Revolution was not the primary cause of the great growth of population in the hundred years under review. That is sufficiently evident from the fact that the increase was marked whilst the industrial changes were yet insignificant. The most important factor was undoubtedly the improvement of medical skill (especially in child-birth), and still more the extension of its scope by means of hospitals and dispensaries to masses of the people whose ills had previously gone untended.³ By this advance the lives of many women and infants were saved, and epidemics were checked by the isolation and treatment of the sufferers. Another large saving of life may be ascribed to the decrease of drunkenness. The gin mania of 1720-50 killed vast numbers, especially in London, before it was checked by legislation. England in 1800 was not sober by modern standards, but it was not so insanely alcoholic as it had been sixty years before. Finally, with the improvement of transport, the cheapening of textiles, and the growth of imports like tea and sugar, there was a rise in the

¹ See M. D. George, *London Life in the Eighteenth Century*, London, 1925, *passim*.

² Buer, p. 226.

³ Buer, *passim*, especially chaps ix, x.

standards of food and dress, and here the industrial changes claim a share of the credit. Observers noted, especially how the use of cotton underclothing made for cleanliness and comfort, since cotton was washable whereas cloth was not.¹

There were, however, retarding factors. The towns, although improving on the whole, long remained man-killers; their death rates, that is to say, were higher than their birth-rates, and their population grew by immigration from the countryside. London passed out of this evil stage about 1800, but the new industrial towns of the north were slower to reform. Glasgow and Liverpool were notably pestilent, and some statistics of Preston as late as 1837-43 throw a vivid light upon conditions in a fully industrialized area. They show that the average age at death among the gentry was 47 years; for tradesmen, 31; and for the operative class, 18; 55 per cent. of the operatives' children died before the age of five, as against 17 per cent. of those of the gentlefolk.² The "gentry" of the industrial towns were not the squires and parsons of the old order with their tradition of paternal interest in their dependents. They were rather the successful captains of industry, many of them risen from the ranks, imbued with the individualism implied in *laissez-faire*, and holding that their employees were free men and masters of their own fate. There was thus no social leadership, and one who was by no means a hostile critic of the great change has remarked: "The piling of the population on new areas made an existing evil much worse, it aggravated the filth, congestion and infection, and no machinery existed to grapple with the problem."³ The child-labour, the slums, the lack of sanitation, were slowly ameliorated by the efforts of private philanthropists and by the general enlightenment which they gradually spread. From 1833 the Factory Acts began to grapple with the first-mentioned evil (earlier factory measures had been ineffective), but it was not until 1848 that the establishment of the Board of Health inaugurated sanitary reform on a national scale.

It is evident, therefore, that the mighty increase in the population sprang from the rural areas and was due at first to a slackening of the epidemic diseases that had scourged England for centuries, and secondarily to a greater abundance of necessities resulting from quickened trade and industry. It may be said, in fact, that a part of the population unconsciously sacrificed itself in the industrial slums in order that the remainder might increase and multiply. The hardships to the peasantry arising from enclosures were local rather than national, whilst the agricultural improvements were widespread. The public conscience, moreover, would not suffer masses of people to die of hunger, indifferent though it was to the slaughter by urban disease. The Speenhamland system of supplementing inadequate wages from the rates was rapidly

¹ Washable woollen fabrics had not been invented, and only the well-to-do could afford linen.

² Knowles, *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions*, p. 81.

³ Knowles, *loc. cit.*

adopted throughout the agricultural counties after 1795. The payments were based upon the size of families ; they encouraged early marriage and gave parents an interest in preserving the lives of their children. The increased numbers were employed upon the land, so long as the French wars continued, but the agricultural depression which followed the peace of 1815 revealed a great semi-pauper population, out of work, near the starvation point, but kept just above it by public relief. Much of this surplus was absorbed by the towns, slowly at first, more rapidly as trade revived and restrictions on migration were removed by changes in the Poor Law. But the revival of trade was for long on a minor scale. It was not until after 1840 that the country grew really prosperous. "The hungry forties" is a political catchword, comparatively misleading ; it was the twenties and thirties that were the truly bitter time, in town and country alike. It was then that the orgy of Napoleonic warfare took its worst toll, but even at its blackest there is reason to believe that the condition of the English people was more tolerable than that of the continental nations of Europe.

The social history of Ireland in this period runs upon different lines. The Irish had no industrial revolution, and their agricultural revolution was a large transition from pasture to the lowest form of tillage. The multiplication of petty holdings growing potatoes is held to account for the vast increase of Irish population from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. It would seem that there must also have been a fall in the death-rate similar to that in England ; but the subject is obscure, statistics are lacking, and there is little in the recorded social conditions to account for such a fall. However that may be, the growth of population was upon an unsound basis, the whole nation existed close to the starvation line even while conditions were at their best, and the stage was set for the disaster of 1845 when famine and pestilence came with the failure of the potato crop. A wholesale exodus followed the catastrophe, and even to-day the Irish population is little more than half as large as in 1845.

This review leads us to the question, who were the emigrants who expanded the United States and founded the British dominions of the nineteenth century ? Again it must be admitted that the subject awaits statistical analysis, but the trend of the available evidence is that emigration was mainly rural. It was the teeming countryside, English, Irish and Scottish alike, that filled the industrial towns and filled also the 'tween-decks of the emigrant ships. Until the forties the oversea migration was chiefly from Great Britain, although the Irish were pouring into Lancashire and roving as tramps and casual labourers throughout England. After 1840 the greater movement was from Ireland, across the Atlantic to Canada and the States, and mingled with the general British emigration to the dominions of the south. There is little evidence of an urban exodus, especially of the labouring class. One of the gravest imperial problems of our own time is that the

English people will not emigrate. Crudely stated, it appears as a new phenomenon. More accurately, it should be said that the townsmen do not emigrate, and that is nothing new. What is new, compared with a century ago, is that the English are now five-sixths of them townsmen, whereas then the proportion was one-third.

(iii) *The fundamental ideas*

In considering the ideas that lie at the bases of the modern British Empire, it must be premised that, although the main lines of constructive thought have developed continuously from the late eighteenth century to the present day, they have done so through two different and successive media or phases of the national attitude. The first of these may be termed that of evangelical Christianity, during whose predominance the acceptance and practice of a simple religious faith among all the diverse units of the Empire was made the test of public policy. The second phase may be described as that of a pervading scientific attitude, the term being used to cover not merely the physical sciences, but also such human and moral sciences as anthropology, psychology, politics and ethics. There is no definite point of division between the two phases; elements of the second are discernible throughout the period of the first, whilst elements of the first remain influential to the present day. The change from one to the other is a shifting of emphasis. It is none the less real, and its recognition is vital to an understanding of the Empire's history. A specific example may serve to clarify this rather hazy attempt at defining the intangible. The hatred of oppression, the sense of a duty of trusteeship towards the more backward peoples of the world, has been active from the reign of George III. to our own time. During the earlier phase it manifested itself most prominently in the religious form, in the doings of Wilberforce and the Clapham Sect, of Exeter Hall, and of the missionary societies. During the later phase it has been more active in the study of physical conditions, of native psychology, of tropical disease and sanitation, and of types of administration and education as best suited to local environment rather than as related to an absolute standard. The approach of the earlier leaders to their task was preconceived and idealistic, that of the later workers is experimental and realistic. The career of Livingstone covers the transition: he set out as a preaching missionary, and in his later years he became a geographical explorer, although his motive, the rescue of the African from barbarism, was throughout unchanged. We may assign the period about 1870 as that of the shifting of the emphasis in the record of the Empire at large. The date can be only approximate, but it will be found to strike an average for many different branches of activity—the progress of the nation at home, the handling of imperial relationships, commercial development, the applications of science to imperial ends;—in these and many other matters we find ourselves in different atmospheres

before and after 1870. The present section will review the earlier period.

The idealists of the century from 1770 to 1870 performed a great work. It was moreover a necessary work, indispensable to advance in the later period, and the workers should not be disparaged because they were of a type that is out of harmony with present thought. The truth is that they were so successful that the need for their activities is no longer felt. They had to awaken the nation from the hard materialism of the early eighteenth century, to cast doubts upon a patriotism of swaggering ascendancy, to overthrow abuses and institutions that encumbered freedom, to assert equality of opportunity as an ideal to be accepted. They had the faults of their qualities, they exaggerated and were often unjust, some of them perverted altruism until it became itself a sort of tyranny, and they were prone to pursue principles to logical conclusions, a dangerous practice in the science of human affairs. But few men can be just judges in their own cause, however good that cause may be. When all is said, the record of this time is a record of worthy achievement.

The various lines of activity may be grouped under the heads of economic and humanitarian reform, with political changes subserving both. In the economic sphere the innovations at first related to commerce, they took shape as an attack upon the existing mercantile system, and they were discussed some time before it was evident that great industrial changes were impending. As early as the reigns of William III. and Anne there had been Tory thinkers who advocated a policy of free trade. Their appeal had been vitiated by suspicion of party motive, for the Tories of that time had represented in the main the land-owning interest whilst the Whigs were identified with commerce, and it was easy to say that protective duties entailed high prices for all in order to profit a section of the community. The Tory free-traders saw their policy rejected by Parliament during the negotiation of the Treaty of Utrecht, and a year afterwards the Whigs entered upon half a century of supremacy with high protection as a leading tenet of their faith. That faith was common to all Europe, and it was not until the mid-eighteenth century that it was again challenged by the Physiocrats in France, the forerunners of the *Philosophes* who sowed the seeds of the Revolution. The Physiocrats were abstract reasoners rather than framers of a practical policy, but they may be remembered as the coiners of the phrase "*Laissez-faire!*" which became the watchword of the later English economists. Turgot was their most eminent product in political life, and he was prevented from realizing more than a fraction of the Physiocrat programme.

During the long disputes that were destined to ruin the old colonial Empire, Adam Smith, a Scottish professor, was moved to make an exhaustive study of commercial policy, and in 1776 he published his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. The book attracted widespread attention to the doctrines of free trade set forth

by its author, and it did so largely by reason of the method he adopted. Adam Smith did not limit himself to facile abstract reasoning. He examined things as they were, the colonial institutions of the world, the actual operations of traders and manufacturers, the working of navigation acts, the real effects of duties, drawbacks and bounties, the whole available statistics of the mercantile policy in action. With their roots planted in the soil of reality, his conclusions forced themselves not merely upon scholars, but upon men who dealt with affairs. He showed the theory of the balance of trade to be a fallacy based on the assumption that money alone was wealth, whilst goods and labour were not. He showed also that no nation benefits financially from protection or the artificial guiding of enterprise into unnatural channels, and further, that a peaceful foreign trade brings mutual gain to the countries concerned and not, as the mercantilists had taught, a gain to one at the necessary expense of loss to the other. His arguments distinguish the interests of the producer and of the consumer. Mercantilism had promoted exclusively the former. Smith gave the latter first importance, seeing that the consumers are the whole people. He admitted that mercantile practices might enrich individual interests, but he showed that the emolument was unjustly drawn, not from foreigners but from compatriots: "That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and propagated this doctrine, cannot be doubted, and they who first taught it were by no means such fools as they who believed it." His remedy was *laissez-faire*, the sweeping away of all restraints and the restoration to trade of that natural liberty under which it could best flourish.

In one respect Smith trod on firmer ground than did some of those who followed him. His temperament was that of the earlier eighteenth century, realist and experimental. That is what makes him in our own day more congenial reading than are the later free-traders of the school of Cobden and Bright. They were crusaders for an ideal, and it is easier for us to ridicule their quixotism than to warm to their enthusiasm; for the world has not followed the path they predicted. For Smith the principles of economy were a servant, not a master. He could admit that what was economically unsound might be politically sound and conducive to the health of the nation, a thing more important than its wealth. He examined the laws of navigation and found that under their operation goods were carried at a greater expense than if shipping had been free. But here is his judgment: "As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England." Smith did not look for, perhaps did not altogether hope for, a revolution of economic practice: "To expect indeed that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it."

The method of step-by-step reform appealed to the statesmen who drew their inspiration from Smith. The younger Pitt attempted

and failed in 1783-4 to introduce freedom of trade with Ireland. He could have carried the reform at Westminster, but the Irish Parliament, emphasizing its newly won independence, would have none of it, and the restrictions continued until after the Act of Union—a passage of history which seems now to be repeating itself. Pitt was more successful with France, with which country he signed in 1786 a treaty for the mutual reduction of duties. This step might have been the precursor of others of a similar nature had not the revolutionary wars diverted statesmanship into different channels. In the colonial field Pitt relaxed but did not entirely remove the restrictions upon American trade with the British West Indies. This traffic had been very active whilst the Americans had been British subjects, but their attainment of independence had made them foreigners and, as such, the Navigation Acts excluded them.

After the general peace of 1815 the question of free trade again grew prominent. Among statesmen the methods of Pitt found favour, but outside the official circles a school of doctrinaire free-traders arose which declared for *laissez-faire* undiluted by reciprocal bargaining with foreign countries. The London Chamber of Commerce in 1820 made a pronouncement of the latter tendency: "the maxim of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest . . . is strictly applicable as the best rule for the trade of the whole nation." Responsible opinion would not venture thus far. Free trade in corn was deemed inadvisable, both because it would injure the agricultural interest, and because it would cause danger in time of war by accustoming the country to rely upon foreign supplies. The Corn Law of 1815, afterwards modified, therefore imposed heavy protective restrictions. In 1822-3 the Tory ministry of Lord Liverpool was reconstructed, and a band of reformers found places in it. William Huskisson was the foremost in taking up the work which Pitt had relinquished. He secured the removal of all duties on Anglo-Irish trade, the reduction of the tariff in general, the full admission of the United States to the West Indian traffic, and the passing of the Reciprocity of Duties Act which empowered the ministry to negotiate treaties of mutual concession. These measures involved the repeal of important sections of the Navigation Acts, although a substantial portion remained intact. British shipping still retained the monopoly of trade between one port and another within the Empire—misleadingly called the coasting trade—and it retained also the carrying trade between foreign countries and the colonies; but foreign ships were now permitted access to the colonies with cargoes of their own countries' production.

With this advance statesmen in office remained content for some years to come, but in the 1830's the unofficial free-traders became very active. The Industrial Revolution had now gone far, and British manufacturers were so convinced of their superior efficiency that they asked for no protection and judged that complete *laissez-faire* would suit them best. The core of the movement lay in Lancashire, and the

Manchester School, the party of the advanced free-traders, became a political power. Although they advocated free trade in general, they concentrated upon an attack on the Corn Laws, and in 1838 founded the Anti-Corn Law League to that end. Sir Robert Peel, a statesman in the line of succession from Pitt, became Conservative Prime Minister in 1841. He was a free-trader in principle, but excepted corn on much the same grounds as Adam Smith had excepted the Navigation Acts. His budgets of 1842-5 went far to establish free trade in all but corn. On that matter his supporters of the landed interest were obdurate. But the Manchester School, led by Cobden and Bright, maintained a ceaseless propaganda, a crisis arose with the Irish famine and the failure of the English harvest in 1845, and in the following spring Peel, with Manchester and Whig support, repealed the Corn Laws in defiance of a large section of his own party. The decision split the Conservatives and overthrew the ministry. Lord John Russell and the Whigs, who then came into power, accepted the full Manchester doctrine. They repealed the Navigation Acts (1849) and swept away the last remnants of the general protective tariff.

The demise of the Navigation Acts, a code which had been elaborated during three centuries and had held full sway for nearly two, calls for remark. In spite of all theoretical objections, the Acts must be held to have been an indispensable agent in building up the sea-power of the old colonial Empire. They had compelled Englishmen to engage in shipbuilding, to obtain naval stores and train shipwrights, and to employ English seamen. The Nile and Trafalgar were, in one sense, the triumphs of the policy which Henry VII. had inaugurated. In 1849 British shipbuilding was yielding ground to that of the United States, but afterwards, by an unforeseen stroke of fortune, the supersession of wood by iron, it recovered and maintained its supremacy. But since the repeal British shipowners have been free to man their vessels with foreign sailors owing no allegiance to the country to which sea-power is a condition of survival, and they have extensively done so. *Laissez-faire* in this matter has encouraged shipping in one way by making it more profitable, but it brought the nation within an inch of disaster in the last great war. In 1917, when the submarine was inflicting wholesale destruction, the heroism of British seamen just turned the scale; but there were perilously few of them for the task.

The thorough-going free-traders of the Manchester School cared for none of these things. To their idealistic minds war was a thing of the past, a calamity which could never recur if they should have the ordering of the world. They had no patience with the cautious reciprocity of Pitt and Huskisson: England must adopt free trade at a stroke, and the world would follow. To keep the colonial Empire under the flag was to shoulder a useless burden; colonies were often an occasion of war, and one could trade with them, in a *laissez-faire* world, under any flag. Such sentiments are easily accounted for. British

industry was in the hands of self-reliant men who personally managed their businesses and had obtained a free hand by overthrowing effete regulations. Their self-confidence bred distrust of state interference, however well intentioned. State regulation of trade and work has appealed to the aristocrat with his inbred taste for governing. It has appealed also to the working masses by offering them a hope of better conditions than they could obtain by their individual efforts. It was abhorrent to the prospering middle class of the nineteenth century, to whom it implied an unjust or stupid handicap upon their natural abilities. It is no accident, therefore, that the heyday of *laissez-faire* was in the period of maximum middle-class influence, from the Reform Act of 1832, which ended aristocratic supremacy, to the Reform Act of 1867, which began the enfranchisement of the labourer. But, with all this, the writ of *laissez-faire* ran only in economic causes and in the politics which expressed them. On the spiritual side the dominant middle-class was far from *laissez-faire*. A man might be left to go his own way to the workhouse, but not to the devil; and the captain of industry who inveighed against the Factory Acts was often an ardent supporter of missions to the heathen.

Midway between the economic and humanitarian categories, and partaking of both, may be placed the social and political ideas which were spread by the French Revolution. Of these the idea of equality was the most powerful in England. The middle-class was prone to read it as equality of opportunity and to translate it narrowly in terms of *laissez-faire* and the maximum of liberty. The industrial masses thought more crudely of equality of possessions, and among them the practical outcome was the Chartist movement, which began in 1838. It was not until the arrival of the later, scientific phase of the national development that men began to realize that absolute equality does not exist, and that if it could be attained it would mean the end of liberty. In the overseas empire the equalitarian ideal had perhaps a greater effect than at home. Through the missionaries and their backers in England it influenced, not always for good, the administration of dependent native races, until the emphasis gradually faded out of it with the progress of anthropological and kindred studies. This matter will recur in later chapters. Here it is enough to point out that the missionary of the 1830's did go far to persuade his home-staying fellow countryman that it was not only just but wise to treat the African native as the equal of the European, and that serious friction between the white colonists and the mother country was the consequence.

The diverse humanitarian ideals of this period produced a movement whose effects upon the Empire have been enormous. Its origin lay probably in the religious revival of the middle eighteenth century, inaugurated by the preaching of Wesley and his followers. It manifested itself strongly before the Industrial Revolution had produced its upheaval, and before the French Revolution had supplied the

equalitarian doctrines that were powerfully to reinforce it. And it was for a full century deeply imbued with the Christian principles which have been noted as giving their tone to a phase of imperial development.

In Great Britain itself the humanitarian movement was curiously irregular in its sympathies. It produced attempts at prison reform, and was partly responsible for the philosophy that led to Australian transportation. It helped also in the extension of medical services by means of charitable institutions, which had so much to do with the increase of the population. But in the main the domestic efforts of the movement were spiritual. It placed more emphasis upon the salvation of souls than of bodies, and men like Wilberforce were almost inclined to congratulate the poor on their poverty, because it made easier their path to heaven. The Christian humanitarians of the first generation, therefore, approved of such measures as the Combination Acts (forbidding the formation of trades unions) and the Corn Laws, and it was left to a later phase of the movement to incorporate the French doctrine and include social inequalities as an abuse to be overthrown. There is, in fact, no clear dividing line between the Christian philanthropists and the political Radicals, although it is plain enough that the men at the extreme wings of each—Wilberforce and Lord Durham, for example—were mutually antagonistic.

In the overseas Empire the humanitarian movement was much more uniform in its aims and methods. It held that British imperialists were generally oppressing the weaker races, whose material and spiritual salvation must be pursued together. Its first crusade was directed against the slave trade and slavery. There had been ineffective precursors of the anti-slavery movement. Many of the Quakers had denounced the institution from the Stuart period onwards, and some Frenchmen had been opposed to it as early as the sixteenth century. Montesquieu and the later *philosophes* of the eighteenth century had expressed academic disapproval. Jefferson also would have placed in the Declaration of Independence a clause repudiating the slave trade as offensive to the American conscience, but Southern influence compelled the omission of the words. It was therefore left to the English humanitarians to bring the protest into the field of practical politics. In 1772 Granville Sharp took up the case of a negro held in bondage in England, and the Lord Chief Justice Mansfield decided that a slave became free by setting foot on English soil. The Mansfield judgment did not extend to the colonies, and the emancipators had therefore attained success merely on the fringe of the question. Four years later they made their first motion in Parliament with a declaration that the trade was "contrary to the laws of God and the rights of man." The Quakers, to use a popular term for the Society of Friends, supported the campaign on the one hand, and on the other, William Wilberforce, an evangelical Churchman and a personal friend of Pitt, joined the movement in 1787 and made himself its protagonist in

Parliament. These elements combined in the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, recognizing that practical politics demanded first an attack upon the trade and forbade for the present any tampering with existing slavery in the colonies.

Towards the end of 1788 the prospects of abolition were encouraging, and many thought that the end was in sight. Both Pitt and George III. were favourably disposed, and delay arose only from the consideration that common justice demanded an opportunity for the slave-traders to state their defence. Almost immediately the outlook clouded. The opposition hardened, and the events of the French Revolution cast the slur of Jacobinism upon all reforming projects. Pitt grew lukewarm and the king hostile, and public opinion felt that, apart from the merits of the case, it would be unwise to ruin an important branch of trade in the midst of an expensive war. It was therefore twenty years before the Abolition Society triumphed. In 1806 Fox, a whole-hearted abolitionist, succeeded Pitt as premier. He died later in the year, but the necessary legislation was already being prepared. In 1807 the Act abolishing the slave trade was passed. The French factor is noteworthy. Revolutionary excesses had set many Englishmen against the reformers, but Fox, who approved of the Revolution, had found the abolition of slaving congenial to his principles. By 1807, again, France had ceased to be a republic, and the fact that we were fighting a despotism instead of a democracy weakened the objections felt in the revolutionary period.

The slave trade was abolished only in theory. In practice the policing of the Atlantic was for years ineffective, and so long as slavery existed in the colonies there was always a market for illicit cargoes. The reformers therefore resumed their attack as soon as the wars and the most difficult years of the peace had come to an end. In 1823 Wilberforce and Fowell Buxton formed the Anti-Slavery Society to end not only the trade but the institution of slavery itself. The change of objective is significant of the progress of *laissez-faire* in economic matters. In 1787 the planters' interest in the colonies had forbidden any move to deprive them of their existing stock of slaves. Forty years afterwards public opinion, tinged by the new free-trading industrialism, held colonial prosperity of much less account, and it was feasible to launch a campaign whose success would admittedly injure the British West Indies in comparison with their slave-owning competitors. Success followed ten years of agitation, and in 1833 the first reformed Parliament abolished slavery throughout the Empire just when Wilberforce himself lay on his deathbed. The financial settlement was a compromise between sentiment and equity. A sum of £20,000,000 was voted as compensation to the planters, and it was less than half the value of the confiscated property. One modern critic calls it "a measure of quixotic liberalism," and speaks of "this noble donation for conscience's sake."¹ Another puts it that "amidst self-laudations and

¹ *Polit. Hist. of England*, vol. xi. (G. C. Brodrick), pp. 326-7.

congratulations, the nation paid up conscience money to the extent of something less than ten shillings in the pound.”¹

The early humanitarianism showed itself very plainly in the impeachment of Warren Hastings for misgovernment and maltreatment of the people of India. Hastings returned from Bengal when the new India Act came into force in 1785. For a time he was well received by statesmen and society, and looked for a suitable reward for the great services he had rendered. Then the malice of his enemies, and in particular of Sir Philip Francis, brought against him charges of the grossest tyranny. Burke and Sheridan, the chief parliamentary orators of the age, took up the charges in good faith. Burke, ignorant of Indian conditions, persuaded himself that Hastings was a monster whose rule had been a blot upon his country's fame; and he employed all the power of his eloquence to compass the governor-general's ruin. The opening proceedings in Parliament turned upon the question whether or not there was ground for an impeachment. The matter might have been decided in the negative at that stage, had not Pitt, who had at first been favourable to the accused, suddenly changed front and declared himself unable to countenance all that Hastings had done. The impeachment, therefore, went forward. The House of Lords, who acted as the judges, sat for only three or four weeks in each year to try the case, and after the expiration of seven years much of the evidence was yet unheard. Much, indeed, was inaccessible, for the witnesses were dead or dispersed. Burke lashed himself into transports of fury, so that fashionable auditors fainted at the imaginary horrors he depicted. The accusation ranged over the whole period of Hastings' administration, but finally centred round the deposition of the Rajah of Benares and the extortion of their unjustly held riches from the Begums of Oudh. On all the counts the Lords ultimately pronounced an acquittal, and the additional evidence which modern research has brought to light confirms their judgment. The significance of the case is that it marked a definite advance in British national ethics. Burke and his more reputable allies were wrongly but honestly convinced that an English governor had oppressed not merely the native princes but millions of their defenceless subjects, and they were resolved to make so notable an example that such conduct could never be repeated. It was a pity that they were misled into attacking a man who had been in the main fair and magnanimous: had they brought to justice some of his predecessors their triumph would have been complete. Even as it was, the great trial so forcibly stated the maxims which were to guide future British policy in the dependencies that any responsible official who has since been minded to play the tyrant has been deterred by the certainty that retribution would overtake him in the end.

A less emotional and perhaps less amiable manifestation of the new spirit runs in an undercurrent through James Mill's History of

¹ Egerton, *Brit. Colonial Policy*, pp. 277-8.

British India, first published in 1817. Mill is cold to the glamour of the mercenary eighteenth century imperialism. He examines the conduct of Englishmen in the East with apparent impartiality; but on occasion with an underlying bias against men who were obliged to subordinate abstract laws of conduct to practical exigencies. He is, in fact, an early example of that school which habitually distrusts and belittles the achievements of those who have served their country in the sphere of action rather than of words. One or two instances will illustrate his tendency. Of the Black Hole of Calcutta, he says, "the English had their own practice to thank for suggesting it to the officers of the Subahdar as a fit place of confinement," and in a footnote, "What had they to do with a *black hole*? Had no *black hole* existed . . . those who perished in the Black Hole of Calcutta would have experienced a different fate." Such an argument was sheer claptrap, neglecting, as it did, to mention that the atrocity consisted not in the nature of the prison but in the number of victims driven into it. Dealing with the treatment of Omichund, Mill says, "A piece of consummate treachery was practised upon an individual," and gives a detailed account of the forged treaty, in which he holds up Clive and his fellows to reprobation: "To men whose minds were in such a state the great demands of Omichund appeared (the reader will laugh—but they did literally appear) a crime." But he omits to say why they appeared and were a crime—in that they were accompanied by a threat of betrayal which would have entailed the murder of the Englishmen at the Nawab's court. Mill's treatment of Warren Hastings is parallel to that of Clive. Under a veneer of impartiality he interprets each incident of the governor-generalship through the medium of an *a priori* assumption—that Hastings was corrupt, crooked and unscrupulous, and must, therefore, have acted from evil motives. So he smoothly asserts that greed of money led to the conquest of the Rohillas, and smoothly implies that Hastings murdered Nuncomar. Yet Mill, like Burke, was honest. A morbidly developed sense of fair play and a hatred of the strong hand are perhaps the true explanation of much that disgusts in his *History*.

The most characteristic activity of Christian humanitarianism was that which founded and maintained the great missionary societies. Here again there had been a precursor in the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, which originated in the late Stuart period. But the really vigorous work commenced with the formation of the London Missionary Society and the Church Missionary Society in 1795 and 1799 respectively, and of the Edinburgh and Glasgow societies at the same period. The doings of these bodies overseas will be considered in later chapters; but in this place it must be noted that they made a strong and lasting appeal to public support at home and played an important part in the later stages of the campaign against slavery. Wilberforce and his allies were promoters of missionary work. From the fact that he and several of the others lived at Clapham they became known as the Clapham Sect, and that body, by stirring

public opinion, exercised a great influence upon the administration and policy of the Empire. Amongst its members and those who gained inspiration from it may be mentioned Zachary Macaulay, father of the historian, and James Stephen the elder, both of whom had conceived their aversion to slavery from personal observation in the West Indies. Sir James Stephen, the son of the last named, carried on the tradition and held office as permanent Under Secretary for the Colonies from 1836 to 1847. During that time he virtually controlled his chiefs and was nicknamed "Mr. Over-Secretary Stephen." To his humanitarianism he added the economic views then current about the value of colonies, and although a just and laborious administrator, his influence was somewhat destructive to the imperial idea. Charles Grant, afterwards Lord Glenelg and Colonial Secretary from 1835 to 1839, drew his inspiration from the same source with similar results.¹ The spiritual successors of the Clapham Sect were the large body of people who in the mid-nineteenth century were grouped under the generic title of the Exeter Hall party, from the use of that building for their public demonstrations. Exeter Hall was a dominant force until 1870, and powerful to a later date. The humanitarian element in our public life has never declined, but, as has been noted, it has shifted its emphasis from the religious to the scientific outlook.

None of the ideals treated in this section was ever universally accepted. All found an old guard in opposition, and some a new constructive school in rivalry. Some of the humanitarians were by no means democratic in their politics, as the careers of Burke and Wilberforce and Lord Shaftesbury of the Factory Acts bear witness. In contrast to them may be seen a radical school, also humanitarian, although not congenial to the Clapham Sect, of which Fox and afterwards the Earl of Durham and the Chartist leaders may stand as example. Something similar may be observed in the economic sphere and in its bearing upon imperial policy. The principles of the Manchester School gained a hold upon the liberal-minded among both Whigs and Tories, with whom the hope and desire for a constructive imperial future was generally dead by 1850. Yet the Radicals produced in the Earl of Durham and his associates a group of ardent imperialists who made an effective stand against the disintegration promised by *laissez-faire*. This matter of colonial policy will be elaborated in a subsequent chapter. It is mentioned here to complete the survey of ideas, and once again it may be said that the period of 1870 marks a permanent transition. Radical imperialism was short-lived if brilliant, and Manchester anti-imperialism resumed its sway until the date in question. Thenceforward it gave ground to the modern belief in the Empire, a belief which now permeates all parties and has a truly national character.

¹ For these men see in general R. Coupland's *Wilberforce*, Oxford, 1923, and the articles in the *Dict. of Nat. Biography*.

CHAPTER II

THE CHANGING WORLD : THE OCEANS

WHILST methods of industry, canons of economic thought, and standards of national conduct were undergoing the changes outlined in the previous chapter, the world itself, as known to European enterprise, was becoming a very different place from the world of the old colonial Empire. In the late eighteenth century vast tracts of sea and coastline became visible for the first time to European eyes, new regions offered themselves for settlement or exploitation; new ocean trades called for improvement in shipping and its management; and the growing humanitarianism and business enterprise of Great Britain found large fields for new expansion. Between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries there intervened the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Just as they hindered in some ways and accelerated in others the advance of theory and practice in home enterprise, so they had similar effects overseas. After 1815, when the peace of the nineteenth century set in, the parallel developments we are tracing continued without a break, and oceans were traversed and continents penetrated in many new directions. The present chapter will be concerned chiefly with the oceanic story in the hundred years ending about 1870.

In the last four decades of the eighteenth century the Pacific Ocean revealed its long hidden secrets to European eyes. In the earlier great age of oceanic discovery, that of the sixteenth century, navigators from Magellan onwards had crossed the Pacific from America to Asia, but they had done so on a narrow front. Their tracks had followed fairly closely the most practicable route for the purpose they had in view, and their resources in shipping, navigational science, and supplies had not enabled them to make a thorough survey of the world's greatest ocean. The island groups of the southern Pacific remained unknown to them, and so also did the coasts of north-eastern Asia and north-western America. The regularly traversed part of the ocean narrowed itself, in fact, to the route between the Philippine Islands and Central America. The north appeared on the more scientific maps as a blank, and upon the more imaginative was filled with guesswork about a navigable Strait of Anian leading eastwards to the Atlantic. In the south the guesswork was even more wild and more generally accepted as a fact. It covered the whole southern cap of the earth with a vast

circular continent, its northern shores almost meeting America at the Strait of Magellan, coming up fairly close to South Africa and bulging into the tropics so as to include Australia, whose existence was probably known to some voyagers of the sixteenth century. The Dutch navigators of the early seventeenth century, great as their achievements were, had merely nibbled away the fringes of this illusory continent. Le Maire and others rounded Cape Horn and so proved that the Tierra del Fuego was not continental. Tasman, from Batavia, circumnavigated Australia, and so pushed back the Antarctic Continent in that quarter. But Tasman had made a wide sweep through open water and had not actually seen the eastern coast of Australia, and he had thought that New Zealand, which he had merely sighted and not explored, might be a projection of the great southern land mass. Moreover, Tasman's results, clear as they are to us, were not widely published at the time, and fifty years afterwards the Englishman William Dampier, who visited Western Australia, was evidently not aware of them. Until well on in the eighteenth century opinion was divided, and some geographers were showing Australia as stretching away to the South Pole. So the question remained until a great new era of scientific exploration set in after the Treaty of Paris closed the Seven Years' War in 1763.

The truth was that the conquest of the ocean had awaited the improvement of the ship and its equipment, and by the date in question the ship was at length adequate to its task. It is often not realized that the discoveries of Magellan and his contemporaries had been made at a ghastly expense in life and suffering due to the poverty of equipment. By well-nigh incredible heroism these men had just scrambled across the Pacific on the shortest possible track; but in them human endurance had reached its limit, and nothing more could be expected until better material should be available. The eighteenth century had improved its material. Its ships were larger, more weatherly, more durable, and could be sailed by fewer hands. Its provisions were better preserved and included some experimental antidotes to the scurvy, which had slain infinitely more men than had the violence of the sea. Its methods of navigation were more exact, and by its invention of the chronometer it had solved the problem of determining longitude. Above all, the eighteenth century had at its disposal a body of oceanic history and geography, a knowledge of the factors in failure and achievement, a synthesis of learning about winds and weather, of which it made full use. Cook and Bougainville and Vancouver were seamen of the fine modern type, not only leaders of men but students of books, who knew what their predecessors had done, and wasted no time in proceeding to a further advance. So we find their exploration true to its age and falling into line with the other manifestations of the second great renaissance of the European mind.

In the South Pacific discovery began with the voyage of Commodore John Byron—one of Anson's circumnavigators—in 1764-6. He re-

vealed some small island groups, but kept rather close to the waters previously known. In the year of his return three navigators set forth, two from England and one from France. In 1766-8 Captain Samuel Wallis discovered part of the Low Archipelago and the beautiful and populous island of Tahiti. His colleague, Captain Philip Carteret, parted company and made a separate discovery of certain other small units. The Frenchman Antoine de Bougainville (1766-9) visited Tahiti, discovered the Tuamotu group and part of the Samoa group, and reached the New Hebrides. In 1771-2 two other French commanders helped to keep alive the belief in the southern continent by sighting Kerguelen and other islands in high southern latitudes, and mistaking them for a main coastline.

Meanwhile Captain James Cook, a self-made Yorkshireman who had risen from the forecabin, sailed in 1768 in command of an expedition equipped by the British government at the instance of the Royal Society. He was accompanied by Sir Joseph Banks and other men of science, whose first object was to observe a transit of Venus from the newly reported island of Tahiti. They approached the Pacific by way of Cape Horn, made their observations, and then sailed westward to New Zealand (August, 1769). New Zealand was at that date a name and nothing more upon the map, but Cook, whose knowledge of the scientific side of his profession was unequalled by that of any navigator of the past, circumnavigated both North and South Islands, and made the first detailed chart of the coastline. Thence they sailed still westwards to Australia, and by so doing became the first explorers to behold its eastern shores (1770). They were impressed by a fertility in contrast with the rather desolate western and northern shores of Australia, the only parts hitherto known to Europeans, and Banks determined that Englishmen must one day colonize the country. Cook named it New South Wales. He followed the coast northwards and charted the Barrier Reef with immense labour and hazard; on two occasions his ship was within an ace of destruction, and there would have been small chance of the survivors ever reaching home. But thoroughness was his watchword, and he stuck to his task to the end. Then he returned to England by Torres Straits and the Indian Ocean, having revealed an extent of new coastline unsurpassed in any voyage since the sixteenth century.

In 1772-5 Cook made a second voyage which finally exploded the notion of the southern continent. During three successive summers he swept the southern ocean in sufficiently high latitudes to prove that whatever land existed must be permanently covered by the polar ice-cap. In the intervening winters he revealed new islands in the South Pacific, including New Caledonia and some unknown units of the New Hebrides; and on his homeward passage he made a wide sweep round Cape Horn and discovered South Georgia. All these expeditions had been mainly scientific in their motives, but between them they had revealed a new world to European enterprise—fertile

and healthy shores, intelligent and often kindly natives, a variety of new products for which the industrial age could find a value. A generation which listened to Rousseau's exposition of the idyllic savage life found confirmation of the romance in the gentle lotus-eaters of Tahiti, traders lost no time in prospecting for profit, and whalers ranged the vast ocean, secure of victuals and fresh water in innumerable island havens. It was, alas, a paradise that sordid fingers were soon to smirch.

After Cook's second voyage there remained only details to be filled in, and the interest shifted to the North Pacific. Here the Russians had been the pioneers. They had pushed right through Siberia in the seventeenth century and had reached Kamschatka in 1697. In 1728 Bering, a Russian officer, explored the straits that perpetuate his name, and in the ensuing decades his compatriots were over in Alaska, although their discoveries, partly by lack of publication, did not result in any general and accurate knowledge of its coasts. Next, after 1770, the Spaniards tardily awoke to the importance of the Pacific. In 1774 an expedition from their western colonies sailed up the Californian coast to 56° and discovered Nootka Sound on the way. Sixteenth century navigators had visited these coasts, but the details of their discoveries were forgotten. California now revealed its commercial importance. The tea trade with China was increasing, and it had been difficult to find some product which the Chinese would take in exchange. California provided this in the furs of the sea otter, and furnished also ports of refreshment on the China passage by way of Cape Horn. In 1776 Cook sailed for the third time to explore the North Pacific. He went by the Cape of Good Hope, and passed through the scenes of his early discoveries, charting new islands on his course. Then he crossed the equator, and in January, 1778, found the Sandwich Islands in 21° N. They seem to have impressed him as a more notable discovery even than New South Wales, but his main objective still lay ahead. He pressed on to Vancouver Island, which, however, he did not recognize as separate from the continent, and then used the summer of 1778 in prospecting the Alaskan coast. He passed through Bering Strait and was stopped by the ice beyond. He judged that there was little hope of a passage through to the Atlantic, but determined to try again in the summer of 1779. He returned south to winter in the Sandwich Islands, and was there killed in a quarrel with the natives on February 14, 1779.

Shortly afterwards there began the commercial exploitation of California above referred to. From 1785 English ships, some of them sailing from China, were regularly upon the coast. Their proceedings caused the Nootka Sound dispute with Spain, which claimed a prior right in the region and arrested some of the English traders. At length, after a war scare in 1790, Spain gave way. To clear up the geography of the disputed area an expedition led by Lieutenant George Vancouver was despatched in 1791. Vancouver, like Cook, sailed by the Cape and the Western Pacific. He found the Sandwich Islands

regularly visited by traders and their inhabitants deteriorating. He spent three years, 1792-4, in making charts of the North West coasts of America and reported that there was no practicable channel to Hudson's Bay or the Atlantic. Vancouver's work rounded off that of Alexander Mackenzie, the Canadian land traveller. He had discovered the Mackenzie River in 1789 and had followed it to the Arctic coast. In 1792-3 he crossed the Rocky Mountains from the eastward and came down on the Pacific shore, the first white man to traverse North America from east to west. One other Pacific voyage of this period must be mentioned for its tragic interest. In 1785-8 the French captain La Pérouse ranged the whole ocean in the grand manner of Cook. He went first to California, thence to Kamschatka, and finally southward thousands of miles to eastern Australia, where he found the first English colony disembarking at Botany Bay. After exchanging compliments he passed on, never to be heard of again. A generation later it was established that his two ships had been wrecked on an outlier of the New Hebrides with the loss of all on board.¹

The British settlement of New South Wales in 1788, the imperial first-fruit of the Pacific discoveries, will be dealt with in a later chapter. Here it may be noted as marking in the South Pacific the transition from discovery to exploitation, just as the Nootka Sound dispute of 1790 may signalize the same process in the North. Midway between these areas the British flag was also more frequently seen than in the past upon the western fringe of the Pacific. The growth of the tea trade, especially after the general peace of 1783, took British ships in increasing numbers through the channels of the Dutch Indies to Southern China, and ere long American merchantmen began to follow their example.

It was in a world in which these prospects were opening that the great wars of 1792-1815 involved the centres of civilization. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts were waged chiefly for European objects in the narrower sense of the word—for and against the revolutionary political ideal, for and against the Napoleonic concept of a Europe united under a French autocracy. For these reasons Great Britain took part. Yet, with her oceanic and imperial tradition it was natural that she should devote some of her energy to extra-European objectives. Critics of Pitt have said that he did this to excess, and that he expended upon "filching sugar islands" the flower of the army which might have led the First Coalition in a conquering march on Paris. However Pitt may have handled the army, he cannot be charged with misusing the navy, for it was the sea-power engendered by the old colonial Empire that carried England's effort to a victorious conclusion and was then available to vitalize the new Empire of the nineteenth century. France also had her oceanic traditions, and Napoleon, notably in his Egyptian design, thought more than once of developing

¹ The best general authority for the Pacific voyages is E. Heawood's *Geographical Discovery in the 17th and 18th Centuries*; see also Kitson's *Life of Cook*, 1911.

them. But revolutionary politics had crippled the fine French navy at the outset by depriving it of its officers, and the British blockade thus established completed its ruin. The French armies had exercise in which to train new generals, but no man could evolve new captains and admirals from a navy that dared not put to sea. Thus the French sea tradition faded, and for a generation the ocean became almost a British monopoly.

Spain and Holland, great colonial powers, though of minor weight in Europe, fell generally under the domination of France in these wars. France sought to use their navies against us, and their colonies were therefore open to British attack. Portugal, on the other hand, when not neutral was the ally of Great Britain, and her colonial Empire remained untouched. The colonial results of the two stages of the struggle may therefore be given as follows. At the Peace of Amiens in 1802 Great Britain retained Ceylon, taken from the Dutch in 1795, and Trinidad, taken from Spain in 1797. She promised to restore Malta to the Knights of St. John (an organization that was largely French), but actually she did not do so. She did restore Martinique, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, the Cape of Good Hope, Malacca and other units of the Dutch East Indies, and some Dutch settlements in Guiana. Pondicherry and other French factories in India were to be restored, but had not, in fact, been handed over when the short-lived peace was broken. This peace reflected the French victories in Europe rather than the British ascendancy at sea. The Napoleonic War, which began in 1803, witnessed a more immediate assertion of British supremacy on the ocean and the prompt seizure of certain hostile colonies, St. Lucia and Tobago from the French, and Demerara and Surinam from the Dutch, all of which fell in 1803-4. Among later West Indian conquests were Martinique, Guadeloupe and Cayenne (French Guiana), and four Dutch islands of minor value. An expedition sailed for South Africa in 1805, passed through the maze of fleet movements that culminated at Trafalgar, and captured the Cape Colony in January, 1806. A further venture in the South Atlantic, the attempt to seize Montevideo and Buenos Ayres and begin the detachment of Latin America from Spain, ended in a disgraceful failure. In the East the British advance was slow but thorough. In 1808 the Moluccas, small but valuable spice islands, were taken from the Dutch. Bourbon (Réunion) and the Isle of France (Mauritius), French cruiser bases, fell in 1810. Next year Lord Minto, governor-general of India, listened to the urging of Sir Stamford Raffles, hitherto a subordinate official, and went in person with an expedition for the capture of Java. After a hard fight on land near Batavia the whole island was surrendered, and Raffles was installed as its British governor. These successes, from the Cape to the Moluccas, threw the entire Eastern trade into British control.

The general settlement of 1814 made colonial decisions that were not modified by Napoleon's adventure of the Hundred Days in the

following year. British statesmen, their minds intent on ensuring European stability, were tempted to sacrifice more distant considerations. The humiliation of France was mollified by the return of all her West Indian losses except Tobago and St. Lucia, and by the restitution of Réunion, although not of Mauritius. Pondicherry and the Indian factories were likewise given back. British policy required the maintenance of the enlarged Kingdom of the Netherlands. The British East India Company, also, had lost in 1813 the monopoly of all trades except that with China, and it had no desire to further the private interests which would profit by trade in the former Dutch Indies. Its influence was therefore on the side of restitution to Holland. Java and the Moluccas were accordingly handed back by Great Britain, and so also was Surinam (the present Dutch Guiana) in the West. But we did retain Demerara and the neighbouring settlements as British Guiana, and likewise the Cape of Good Hope, for its value, not as a colony, but as a naval base on the route to the East. For these units we paid a cash indemnity to Holland.

The treaty of 1814 was not the final word on the question of the Malay archipelago. Raffles in his three years' governorship had made a great improvement in the condition of Java, where the Dutch régime had been one of gross tyranny. He was loth to give it up, and humanitarian feeling supported him. But his former employers, the East India directors, had no love for him or his schemes, and Castlereagh's decision went against him. The question of British trading interests could not be so easily stifled. The merchants had established themselves in the islands, and would not withdraw without a struggle. The Dutch system had been to hold and govern only a few places, to control others by protectorates over native rulers, and to secure the trade of the remainder by mere predominance as the only European power in the vicinity. The Dutch also had never sought to develop the trade of the archipelago. Their policy had been rather to restrict it and so to obtain high prices in Europe for a small supply of commodities. This procedure had answered so long as there were no competitors, but now, with the British established and the French and Americans making their appearance, the Dutch had to display more energy, and a brisk rivalry ensued. The peace left England in occupation of Bencoolen, an ancient factory in Sumatra, and of Penang, purchased from a local sultan in 1786. Both were on the western fringe of the archipelago, and we had no possession within it. But the Dutch parsimony of older days, in neglecting to occupy what they could dominate without the expense, now left the British free to trade legitimately at many points in the archipelago where the natives were of independent status. The Dutch showed animus, strengthened their hold where treaty rights permitted, and indulged in covert hostility elsewhere.

Raffles returned after the peace as governor of Bencoolen, a miserable place which could not content him after his former dignity. He

had visions of extending the British hold over Sumatra, but the Dutch asserted their dormant rights to some of its ports and restricted him to his own station. He saw the necessity of a British post, held in full sovereignty, within the archipelago, and in 1819, after a hard struggle with doubters at home, secured the acquisition of Singapore from the Sultan of Johore. Singapore, on an island at the extremity of the Malay Peninsula, had in ancient times been a place of trade, but had long been deserted. Under British rule it flourished mightily, and became an entrepôt for the archipelago, stimulating the enterprise that had been blighted by the illiberal system of the Dutch. The whole affair of Malaya was regulated by a treaty of 1824, whereby Great Britain ceded Bencoolen and all claims on Sumatra, retained Singapore, and received Malacca from the Dutch. It was an excellent bargain, for which the credit was entirely due to the efforts of Sir Stamford Raffles.¹

The reformers who passed the Act of 1807 for the abolition of the slave trade were destined to find that legislation was a different thing from enforcement. The openly conducted trade by British agents in West Africa did, of course, cease at once. But it was succeeded by a clandestine traffic carried on under the Spanish or Portuguese flags, and largely promoted by British and American investors.² With the beginning of the Peninsular War there was an improvement. All ports of Spain and Portugal were either under French control, and therefore blockaded, or under British, and so subject to the supervision of a dominating ally; and by 1814 the trade had been much reduced. The peace of 1814 led to its revival. The Spanish, Portuguese and French governments connived at wholesale slaving by their subjects, and under peace conditions it was not always possible for British cruisers to interfere. All governments now in theory condemned slaving except that of Portugal, which allowed it south of the equator, or, in other words, for the benefit of the Brazilian planters. But, as has been said, the condemnation was not effective, and the illicit trade was more barbarously conducted than the legal trade had been. Prices were high, ships were overloaded, and penalties engendered brutality; it was said that a slaver pursued by a warship had been known to throw his negroes overboard before he could be captured. It required years of effort by the British government and navy before the trade was mastered. In 1824 England made slaving a capital offence. She gave money bribes to Spain and Portugal to induce them to perform their obligations, and last of all prevailed upon France to take effective steps. The United States, which had prohibited slaving in 1808, had also a long struggle to compel its citizens to conform. The result was that while the worst of the Atlantic slave trade was over by 1830,

¹ R. Coupland, *Raffles*, Oxford, 1926, *passim*.

² W. L. Mathieson's *British Slavery and its Abolition*, p. 21, gives an instance of an Englishman, George Woodbine, who carried slaves under Spanish colours as Don Jorge Madre Silva.

traces of it survived as long as any of the Atlantic countries permitted the existence of slavery itself. The last to abolish the institution was Brazil in 1888.

Meanwhile the missionaries were taking up the double task of converting native races and protecting them against white exploitation.¹ The London Missionary Society opened a station at Tahiti in 1797. The practice of missionary work had to be learnt by experience, and it is not surprising that there was little progress in the early years. But after the language difficulty had been overcome, and some insight into native mentality had been gained, the missions did achieve a considerable improvement in Polynesian conditions. At Tahiti and elsewhere in the islands their policy was to strengthen and Christianize native government and to stand as advisers next to the throne of the tribal king. After half a century, more or less in different localities, this policy had to give way before the annexations rendered inevitable by the growth of trade ; but it had achieved a great social success. We have to consider what would probably have happened in the Pacific in the absence of any missionary work. The answer is suggested by the extermination of the West Indian Caribs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The conditions in the two areas are closely parallel—tribal savages, indolent, warlike, cannibalistic, and intelligent, and fortune-hunting white adventurers with a fair sprinkling of outright criminals among them. To the missionary is due in large measure the survival of the native, alike in New Zealand and in the smaller islands. Missionary efforts in South and Central Africa will be considered in later chapters. On the West African coast there had been sporadic missions by the Catholic nations since the first discovery. The Church Missionary Society made the stretch from Sierra Leone to the Niger its especial province in the early nineteenth century, although the Wesleyans had begun work at Sierra Leone coincidentally with the founding of the colony in 1787. On the East African coast, largely under Mohammedan influence, the work was taken up later and was not so successful. Missionaries obtained formal admission to India in 1813, by an alteration procured by Wilberforce in the Company's charter. In the West Indian colonies they evangelized the slaves and incurred considerable hatred from the planters.

From the first century of the colonial era English merchants had hankered after the trade of Latin America, and it is strange that, although the fascination was almost always disastrous to those who yielded to it, the lessons of the past were never digested, and every fifty years or so the project came up in some new guise. Hawkins and others had sought to force a trade under Elizabeth, Cromwell's Western Design was directed to conquest and monopoly of South American trade, the South Sea Company with its Asiento concession tried next, illicit

¹ K. L. P. Martin, *Missionaries and Annexations in the Pacific*, Oxford, 1924 ; W. A. Young, *Christianity and Civilization in the South Pacific*, Oxford, 1922 ; Sir H. H. Johnston, *Colonization of Africa*, Cambridge, 1899, ch. viii.

traders provoked the War of Jenkins' Ear, and the expeditions of Vernon and Anson in 1741-4 had the object not only of conquering South American ports but ultimately also of stirring up the colonies to assert their independence. All these undertakings failed, and Englishmen at length began to realize that they were not suited for wars of conquest in a tropical continent. The later phase of the project therefore became that of instigating the secession of the colonies from the Spanish Empire, because, once independent, they would open their trade to all the world. The Spanish colonists had warmer feelings of loyalty to their mother-country than had the North Americans of our own old colonial Empire, but the long wars of 1792-1814 loosened the bond. For many years Spain was the ally or vassal of France and shared her naval disasters. Trafalgar completed the ruin of the Spanish navy and cut the link with the West. The colonists, uncontrolled from home, began to govern themselves, and opened their ports to British and American shipping. Joseph Bonaparte, as King of Spain, was loathed by Spaniards on either side of the ocean, and it was a patriotic duty to repudiate his authority. Consequently there was a habit of independence already formed by 1815.

With the restored monarchs of 1815 the watchword was reversion to the state of affairs overthrown by the revolutionary wars. Ferdinand VII. of Spain was no exception. He expected the acquiescence of his colonies in absolute authority and a regulated trade. It was asking too much, and the Spanish Americans who had resisted Bonaparte in his name revolted against him. In some parts of the vast empire the revolution was scarcely opposed; in others, such as Venezuela, Peru and Chile, it led to years of sporadic fighting. In 1823 Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, and Monroe, President of the United States, combined to recognize the independence of the new republics and to prohibit their reconquest. The Monroe doctrine formulated the policy, and the British navy made it effective. By 1825 the last shot had been fired and the Spanish flag had disappeared from all but the island colonies. The whole continent was independent, for Brazil had conformed and had separated from Portugal, which was incapable of attempting coercion. British veterans, from both the army and the fleet, had served the South American revolutionaries. Their names are still honoured in the lands for which they fought, and their descendants flourish there. As one republic after another established itself there was again a commercial enthusiasm for Latin America. In the early 1820's it amounted to a mania like the South Sea Bubble of a century before. The outcome was also similar, collapse of business projects and repudiation of debts by the new states. The British financial crisis of 1825 was largely due to South American failures. Since that time, however, conditions have slowly improved, and the natural wealth of Latin America has contributed powerfully to the building up of modern British trade and sea-power.¹

¹ A good account of the liberation of Latin America is in *Cam. Mod. Hist.* x. chs. ix, x.

At the other side of the world there were wealthy regions still closed to European enterprise. Japan, alarmed at the progress of Jesuit missionaries in converting her people, had denied her ports to European intercourse in the seventeenth century. The only permitted exception was a small Dutch factory, and with that exception Japan remained a sealed country until the period now under review. China was in principle almost as exclusive, although the laxity of officials at a distance from the capital did permit a precarious trade by European adventurers in various seaports. The only recognized trade was at Canton, whence the bulk of the tea export was conducted. The demand for tea increased towards the end of the eighteenth century. The British share of the trade was monopolized by the East India Company, which found the opium of India an acceptable article of exchange. Other European merchants also did business at Canton, and American traders became important after 1783. The attitude of the Chinese government was that all foreigners were inferiors and must acknowledge the fact in humiliating terms. This prevented the attainment of closer relations by the embassy of Lord Macartney, sent by the British Government in 1792 ; as the King's representative he could not abase himself as Chinese ceremonial required. The Company's servants, nevertheless, contrived to prosper at Canton by judicious handling of the local mandarins. In 1833 the revision of the charter abolished the Company's monopoly, and the private merchants who succeeded it were soon in difficulties. They complained of oppression, and their own conduct gave offence. The trouble arose from the Chinese habit of not squaring profession with performance. The import of opium was in theory prohibited and in fact admitted, to the enrichment of the mandarins by bribes ; but if a merchant was disliked his opium could be legally confiscated. A seizure of this sort in 1839 led to war between Great Britain and China. British forces carried out a punitive raid, and China was compelled to cede the island of Hong-Kong in 1841 and to sign the Treaty of Nankin in 1842. By this instrument five additional Chinese ports were thrown open and unfettered trade was promised. France and the United States secured similar concessions. Thus began the opening of China, a process that was not to be completed without further fighting and the disruption of that empire's ancient polity.

The turn of Japan came next. By the mid-nineteenth century the western coast of North America was being peopled, shipping was traversing the North Pacific, and steamship lines, for which coaling stations would be necessary, were being projected. To this vigorous enterprise a blank area upon the map was intolerable, and the days of Japanese isolation were numbered. In 1853 the United States sent Commodore Perry with an armed squadron to demand the opening of the Japanese ports. There was no choice but to comply, and by 1858 all the western powers had secured treaties of intercourse. At first it seemed as if Japan would disintegrate before the advance of an

alien civilization. But her people, more compact and public-spirited than the Chinese, rallied from the confusion, drew fresh energy from the peril, and trained themselves in the western methods of national power. The revolution of 1867-8 marks the triumph of the progressives and the beginning of the modern Japanese Empire.

Africa was the last of the continents to be penetrated by the new European enterprise, and the record of its opening belongs in the main to the period after 1870. But before that date its coasts assumed a new importance owing to the abolition of the slave trade and the demand of industry for raw materials. Mediterranean Africa need not be mentioned here. It is much more a part of Europe and of nearer Asia than of the Africa of the tropics. On the West Coast the movement against slaving produced great changes. The philanthropic Sierra Leone Company obtained a charter to colonize that peninsula in 1787. Wilberforce and his friends were the promoters, and Zachary Macaulay went out as governor. The object was to establish an African home for redeemed slaves, and it was carried out with some success. The "Willyfoss Niggers," as they called themselves, although of diverse origins, settled down as a peaceful community. The Crown took over the administration in 1807. In 1820 a similar American organization, the Washington Colonization Society, founded Liberia as a refuge for negroes freed in the United States. Some years afterwards Liberia was made an independent republic, in theory a more liberal arrangement than that of Sierra Leone, but one which has not yielded results so beneficial to the inhabitants. Farther down the coast the African Company of Merchants (of 1752) had to cease slaving in 1807, and was wound up in 1821. Its forts on the Gold Coast were then taken over by the British Government, although some were not maintained. From 1828 to 1843 they were again placed under a committee of merchants, and Crown control did not become definitive until the latter year. The detailed history of British West Africa will be taken up in a later chapter. For the present purpose it should be noted that the whole coast diminished somewhat in importance during the half century between the abolition of the slave trade and the really intensive exploitation of its products for modern industrial requirements. The philanthropic interest did much to bridge the gap by missionary effort and anti-slavery vigilance. The coast south of the equator remained largely neglected until the rise of competitive imperialism among the great powers after 1870. The East African coast was more backward. The Portuguese had in the days of their greatness occupied all its ports, but by the eighteenth century the Arabs from the Persian Gulf had taken the offensive and evicted them from all their holdings north of the present Mozambique colony. The coast and its hinterland under Arab rule were a hell of slave-raiding until long after the middle of the nineteenth century, and the waste of life was so enormous that even now, after fifty years of civilized control, the population is relatively scanty. The redemption of East Africa

had to await the last years of Livingstone and the stimulation of European enterprise by the opening of the Suez Canal.

So far we have surveyed the pioneering work over vast regions of the world which were closed to most Europeans until the last decades of the eighteenth century. The work was chiefly maritime in its emphasis, the discovery, the administration, or the commercial opening of islands and continental coasts. Extensive penetration had to await two things, the pressure of European emigration and the economy of effort provided by scientific transport and tropical hygiene. It remains here to give some account of the new oceanic trades which the early efforts made possible, of the growth of shipping, and of the improvement of trade routes. The motive power behind these activities was, it must be remembered, the continuing industrialization of Great Britain and other European countries.

British oceanic trade has changed its essential nature since the fall of the old colonial Empire. Before the Industrial Revolution and the growth of population, England was primarily an agricultural country, able to live of her own and even, on occasion, to export foodstuffs. The trade of the earlier time represented a surplus energy. Its imports were chiefly luxuries, which raised the standard of living but were not at first indispensable. Its exports likewise brought increased wealth, their curtailment would have meant distress, but it would not have caused the ruin of the whole people. England played the old game of empire with the confidence of a wealthy man who can devote himself to public activities and risk a margin of his substance with an easy mind. That circumstance had made for an audacity of statesmanship which reached its height with the Earl of Chatham. There are good reasons why the modern Empire has produced no Chatham nor is likely to. From the beginning of the nineteenth century Great Britain has supported a population which the soil has been unable to feed. The factories must find markets, or the consequence is death. The problem has been successfully met, but it has not been the glorious jingo sport of the Seven Years' War, with rattling sabre and "this country the terror of the world." It has been a more sober and vital struggle, with inglorious famine as the penalty of failure. Statesmanship and national character have changed. Peace had been bought by 1815 at the price of unexampled suffering among the population at large. Peace must be ensured as the prime condition of future success. Hence the pacifism of the Manchester School, its cosmopolitanism, its distrust of empire as a cause of war, its enthusiasm for philanthropy overseas as a means of softening the passions of mankind. Until 1870 these currents were predominant; they were not so much a reasoned policy as an instinctive reaction to the needs of the time. So trade also ceased to be a gamble in superfluities and became a means of national livelihood. The prime commodities were no longer the spices, the sugar, the luxury fabrics, the wines and the slaves of the old time. They became instead the mass-produced textiles for common wear,

the heavy machinery for factories and transport, the foodstuffs for the life of a whole people, raw materials by the million tons for their industry, fertilizers from the ends of the earth for increasing the produce of the soil. Drake most likely saw guano islands off the Peruvian coast; he would have laughed at the notion that hundreds of English ships would one day come to scrape the phosphates from them and make two ears of English corn grow in the place of one.

The tea trade has already been mentioned. At first a luxury, tea became a necessity from the time of the Industrial Revolution, a drink without which the poor diet of the factory-workers would not have kept them going. The campaign against drunkenness which formed part of the Evangelical movement increased its use, which entailed also a growth of the sugar import. Other imports from the East rose to importance. Rice had been little eaten in England in the eighteenth century, and that little had come from Georgia and Carolina. Soon after the War of Independence those states went over to cotton growing, and then rice began to be imported in considerable quantities from Burma and the coasts eastward to China, and to take its place as a staple foodstuff. Industrial needs called for a cheap packing material, and East Indian jute supplied the demand. Jute was first spun at Dundee in 1833 and thenceforward became an import of appreciable bulk. Tallow candles or fish-oil lamps had been the common illuminants of earlier times. In the opening years of the nineteenth century coal gas became available, but only to the well-to-do in large towns, and at the same time colza oil made from Indian rape seed was generally used for lamps until displaced by petroleum towards 1870. Trades of this sort quite superseded in importance the spices and muslins furnished by the East Indies of the old colonial Empire, for they dealt in articles of universal and not merely luxurious consumption.

The Pacific yielded a variety of hitherto unexploited business. The whale was the most valuable product of the oceans as distinguished from the coastal fishing grounds. Whaling had been practised in European waters until the demand exhausted the supply. Then the industry shifted to the Arctic, and after that to the South Atlantic. When Cook and his contemporaries opened the Pacific it was not long before the whalers followed in their tracks. Whalemen from Great Britain and the United States were ranging the Pacific in the 1790's, and in the next century they were joined by many from British North America, where the shipyards of Quebec and the Maritime Provinces turned out hundreds of fine wooden ships from a limitless supply of raw material. Whale-oil and bye-products enjoyed a rising market which was never glutted. But the profits went rather to the shipowners than to the hands they employed. The wages, even of officers, were surprisingly low, and few sailors would willingly ship before the mast. For the whaler stayed out until he had a full cargo, generally for three years, and sometimes for four or five, and the pay of the men was absorbed in purchases from the slop-chest at exorbitant prices. Apart from

the skilled ratings the crews were made up by landsmen and non-descripts entrapped by crimps, who, deserted when they could, and filled the Pacific islands with crime and vice. These deserters and the runaway convicts from New South Wales were the plague of the islands until annexations restored order.

The need for the wherewithal to purchase China tea had a powerful influence in developing Pacific trade. The sea-otter skins from California have already been mentioned. The southern islands produced two other luxuries that tempted the Chinaman, the sea slug or *bêche de mer*, from which he made soup, and the sweet-smelling sandalwood, which he burnt as incense in his temples. The sandalwood trade was very extensive, until the supplies were exhausted in the period about 1870 and Chinese commerce assumed other forms. As sandalwood declined, copra or coconut pulp took its place as the chief island commodity, and European industry has found various uses for it. Until 1813 the East India Company enjoyed a nominal monopoly of English trade from the Cape of Good Hope to the western Pacific; but it had no power to stop interlopers, who as early as 1804 were collecting sandalwood in the Fiji group and sending it to Sydney and thence to China. By 1822 the Fiji Islands contained established factors doing a regular business, whilst in New Zealand a few years later there was a European community two thousand strong, devoid of morality and uncontrolled by any government.

Australian wool was a great new trade of the nineteenth century. The experimental period in sheep-rearing was prolonged, but by 1830 the export was on a large scale and employed much shipping. Raw cotton, until 1861-5, came almost exclusively from the United States, but the Civil War of those years cut off the supply and led to attempts at cotton growing in various parts of the British Empire, notably in Natal and Queensland. The Queensland industry in its turn produced a new activity in the Pacific islands, the recruiting of Kanaka labour on short-term contract for work on the plantations. The labourers were generally well treated in Queensland and repatriated at the close of their term of service; in fact, it was claimed that the whole process might be made a civilizing agent comparable to the work of the missionaries. But there was another story to be told about the methods of recruitment in the islands. The natives seldom understood the nature of the contract they were entering into, villages were denuded of able-bodied men and the children and old people left destitute, and sometimes the recruitment was done by force and massacres resulted. The "blackbirding," as it was called, bore a strong resemblance to the old-time slave trade, and its evil features continued for more than twenty years before it was brought under regulation. An earlier form of it, the recruiting of Kanakas by the Peruvian Government for mineral work in South America, had resulted in the deaths of almost all the natives carried off, and was stopped by the protests of Great Britain.

The South American side of the Pacific produced two bulky trades in the nineteenth century, the shipping of nitrate from the mainland of Peru and northern Chile and of guano from the sea-cliffs and islands of the same rainless region. The nitrate deposits were useful for many purposes of agriculture and industry. The guano was the accumulation of centuries of sea-birds' droppings and lay to a depth of many feet on their breeding-places. It would be available from the haunts of sea-fowl all over the world but for the fact that rain destroys its value. It is obtained, therefore, only from the arid belt of the South American coast and from a few unimportant stations elsewhere. The scientific explorer, Von Humboldt, recognized its utility in 1804, but it was not until about 1840 that shipments began in quantity. From then onwards for fifty years the trade furnished thousands of cargoes for the enrichment of the soil of Europe. In the early days a guano island was as profitable as a gold mine to its discoverers, but the South American governments soon asserted their rights and levied royalties. At the present day the richest deposits are worked out, and those remaining are strictly controlled.

Amongst other great ocean trades of the modern era may be mentioned those in timber from British North America, palm oil and solid vegetable fats from West Africa, hides from the River Plate republics of South America, and above all, the carrying of emigrants to all the new settlement areas of the world. The timber came over in bulk and also in manufactured form as wooden ships, of which hundreds were constructed in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Quebec and sold in England at the conclusion of their first Atlantic passage. The emigrant traffic developed after 1815. It went in greatest volume to Canada and the United States and was considerable to Australia and New Zealand. The Atlantic passage, being shorter and cheaper, attracted passengers of the poorest class, destitute and dirty and packed without scruple into narrow quarters ill-suited for the purpose. The west-bound ships often encountered terrible weather, and the mortality was enormous. In 1847-8, the aftermath of the Irish famine, it was computed that 25,000 emigrants died of typhus on the voyage or after landing in Canada, and many were lost every year by wreck. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1855 began the mitigation of these horrors by enforcing strict regulations for the health of passengers. The longer Australian voyage attracted, apart from convicts, a better class of emigrant, victualling difficulties prevented gross overcrowding, and the hardships, although considerable, were undoubtedly less. An unpublished journal of a voyage to Western Australia in 1830, which the present writer has seen, shows that the steerage passengers were reasonably well cared for, and that there were no deaths, although the passage took seven months. The chief drawback was the abundance of liquor, which enabled some of the emigrants to be more or less drunk all the time. The Californian gold rush of 1848 produced a heavy though short-lived emigrant traffic round Cape Horn, for the

trans-American trails were not yet open. The Australian gold discoveries of 1851 doubled and trebled the flow in that direction.¹

The mercantile marines of the maritime nations consisted chiefly of wooden sailing ships until about 1870, although during the last twenty years of that period ocean-going steamers were beginning to dominate a few routes, and iron, followed later by steel, was coming into use for the construction of both types of vessel. At the close of the Napoleonic War Great Britain had by far the greatest mercantile marine in the world. Her tonnage, excluding coasting craft, probably exceeded that of all other European countries together, and her nearest competitor was the United States, which possessed about half as much as the British total. The merchantmen, although improvement had been steady, were still small and relatively slow. The best all-round type had been evolved in the West Indian sugar trade, whose cargoes needed a dry, well-built ship; and here a vessel of 400 or 500 tons was reckoned large. The East Indian Company had built much greater bottoms, but they were armed and manned almost as ships of war, and the monopoly permitted a lavish expenditure upon them which would have been impossible in competitive trades. The throwing open of the Indian Ocean trade in 1813, coupled with the growth of the Australian and Far Eastern traffic, gave a stimulus to the building of larger and faster vessels. The British shipbuilders used hard wood, and turned out craft of extraordinary durability; there are cases on record of hulls which have remained at work for more than a century.

The United States, where the weight of population still remained upon the Atlantic coastline, made great progress in the half century after the peace of 1815. Their builders used soft woods and aimed at cheapness rather than durability. In the 1830's also they went in for speed and evolved the clipper ships which revolutionized previous ideas of sea communication. It is true to say that the clippers shortened passages in their day quite as much as any steamers in ordinary use have shortened them since. But it is also true that the clippers were not economic carriers and could be made to pay only in a few special trades. By 1850 the merchant tonnage of the United States was drawing near to that of Great Britain, and by 1860 it was virtually its equal. An American politician declared in that year that his country was actually ahead and that "England can no longer be styled the Mistress of the Seas"²—a comforting statement to reflect upon in view of present-day anxieties. Meanwhile, as has already been noted, British North America was also building heavily with the soft timbers so freely available. These "Bluenose" craft did not equal the speed of the American clippers, but they carried ordinary trade the world

¹ The growth of oceanic trade awaits a comprehensive history; its details have to be gathered from a variety of sources among which the numerous recent books on shipping are useful.

² Quoted in Knowles, *Ind. and Comm. Revolutions*, p. 304.

over, many of them under the flags of London and Liverpool owners. Their construction by little family firms with small capital, and their launching in petty creeks and rivers more likely to produce fishing boats, are a fine record of enterprise and ingenuity.

At the mid-century the tide turned in favour of the British ship-builder. The repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849 was received with groans as the death-blow of a languishing industry; but it evoked its fighting qualities and proved a blessing in disguise. By the late fifties British hard-wood clippers were rivalling the Americans, and in the next decade iron-framed and then all-iron vessels proved definitely superior. Here the British yards held the advantage, for iron was much cheaper than in the United States. The British clippers gained and held the China tea trade until 1870, and the Australian wool trade until fifteen years later still. The Americans were probably doomed to be out-distanced in any event, for their ships lacked stamina; but their fall was hastened by the Civil War in which they destroyed a great part of their own tonnage. After its close the mass expansion into the Western territories diverted the nation's genius from the sea; the race of American sailors and shipowners dwindled, and recent attempts at its revival have been very moderately successful. The same factors operated against British North America, although the absence of war destruction postponed their effect. But in the decade 1880-90 the wooden ship went under, and Canadian shipbuilding became, almost abruptly, a thing of the past.

Many products of human skill have reached their zenith only when already doomed to extinction. The illuminated manuscript was never so perfect as in the dawn of printing. The cavalry of 1914 could have made rings round Napoleon's dragoons or Cromwell's Ironsides. So it was with the sailing ship. Whilst the clippers were doing the Eastern and Australian passages in ninety days as against the six to nine months of fifty years before, the steamer was conquering the ocean. Experiments with steamers began with the nineteenth century, but various factors combined to retard their use for ocean work. The paddle steamer (the first form) was unsuitable as a cargo vessel, since differences in weight of lading altered the submersion of the paddles. The use of the screw propeller had to await the development of iron construction, for its vibration soon loosened the strongest wooden hull. The earlier engines consumed a great quantity of coal, so that in default of coaling stations the supply for a long voyage left little tonnage for cargo; and fresh water had to be carried for the boilers, which were quickly ruined by salt. It was not, therefore, until the decade 1820-30 that steamers came into regular use for river and cross-channel work, and until the end of the following decade that they began to make the North Atlantic passage, the shortest of the ocean routes. Even there they were profitable only for mails and first-class passengers. The emigrant traffic and the bulk of the cargoes still went in sailing ships for another twenty years or so.

Large iron steamers, admitting of screw propulsion, began to be built towards 1850. Ten years later the invention of the compound engine effected a vital economy in coal. Ten years later still (about 1870) the perfecting of the surface condenser solved the problem of water supply by enabling the same water to pass through the boilers as many times as the length of the voyage required. During this period coaling stations were being established at numerous points in the oceans, and sailing ships which had formerly gone in ballast (as, for instance, to India) now carried coal instead. Finally, in the eighties, steel superseded iron as a new means of economy, and the steamer achieved the supremacy in the Indian Ocean which it had long held in the Atlantic. The sailing ships became fewer and also slower, for their crews were diminished and their sail areas cut down under stress of competition. They still held the long Cape Horn passage from the Atlantic to Western America until the opening of the Panama Canal in 1911 proved the finishing stroke. To-day there are less than a dozen large sailing vessels under the British flag, although foreign nations operate many more, mostly old British craft.

The crucial event of this series, both for the changes in shipping and for many imperial interests, was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The Canal represented the perfecting rather than the inauguration of the short route to the East. That route was discussed by a parliamentary committee as early as 1834.¹ In 1837 the Peninsula Company began running steamers to Spain and Portugal. Three years later it extended to Alexandria and became the Peninsula and Oriental. In 1842 it placed steamers on the Indian Ocean and connected Suez with Bombay and soon afterwards with Singapore and Hong-Kong. The result of this was that mails and passengers reached India in thirty days, or less than one-third of the sailing-ship passage then made by the Cape. The connecting link between the two steamer lines was still the overland journey from Alexandria to Suez by desert tracks, inconvenient and often risky. This was simplified by the opening of a railway from Cairo to Suez in 1857. Three years earlier Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French engineer, had secured the concession for cutting the Canal, but he did not complete his task until 1869. With that date a new era of imperial communications and annexations set in.

¹ The question is summarized in A. J. Sargent, *Seaways of the Empire*, London, 1918, pp. 45-51, and A. W. Kirkcaldy, *British Shipping*, London, 1919, pp. 74-7.

CHAPTER III

THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND ITS CRITICS

THE end of the War of Independence saw a change in the mechanism for administering the colonies. In 1782 the American Secretaryship, founded fourteen years before, was abolished together with the Board of Trade, and colonial business was entrusted to the Home Secretary, assisted after 1786 by a Committee of the Privy Council. In 1794 a new department, that of the Secretary for War, was created, which had some dealings with colonial affairs. In 1801 the two departments were permanently united, and their head became Secretary for War and the Colonies. In the course of the next half century there were twenty-two successive Secretaries with an average tenure of less than three years at a time, although three of them had two terms of office each. In these circumstances the conduct of business fell very much into the hands of the permanent officials, who were able to monopolize power and patronage and dictate to their ephemeral chiefs. In 1854, after the outbreak of the Crimean War, the departments of War and the Colonies were separated, and the Colonial Office received its modern organization.

Among the Colonial Secretaries of the first seventy years of the nineteenth century may be mentioned Lord Bathurst (1812-27), who was a sympathiser with, if not a member of, the Clapham Sect; Lord Glenelg (1835-9), who was very accessible to missionary influence; Lord John Russell (1839-41), who in those years gained knowledge of colonial affairs which he found useful during his premiership of 1846-52; W. E. Gladstone (1845-6); and Lord Carnarvon (1866-7). Three Permanent Under-Secretaries enjoyed long terms of office: Sir James Stephen (1836-47), Herman Merivale (1847-59), and Sir F. Rogers, afterwards Lord Blachford (1860-71). These three were broadly similar in their policy and ideals, and the tone of the Empire during the thirty-five years which they shared among them is largely to be ascribed to their influence.

To say that the loss of the American Colonies occasioned an immediate period of pessimism in imperial affairs is misleading. That loss did not appear so serious to contemporaries as it does to those who view it from the standpoint of the present day. In the eyes of contemporary statesmen the thirteen continental colonies had always represented a

divergence from the true type of a maritime empire. It had always been difficult to fit this mainland population into the imperial scheme, and the difficulty had increased as the population grew. Chatham, almost alone among the statesmen of the old Empire, had accepted the continental colonies and had striven to enlarge them. The Seven Years' War had witnessed his success, but twenty years later had come the downfall. After 1783, therefore, the Empire reverted more nearly to the maritime and commercial type, an awkward problem had found its own solution, and there was far less of hopelessness and heartbreak in the contemplation of the diminished Empire than has often been supposed. (Interest swung again to the tropics, in the East as well as in the West.) Outside the tropical belt Canada and the Maritime Provinces alone remained. They were not greatly valued, and Canada itself had narrowly missed being given away at the Treaty of Versailles. After that settlement the natural desire of statesmen to retain what they held was a more powerful influence in the administration of British North America than was any hope of the country's future usefulness. Elsewhere Pitt and his successors took a very healthy interest in imperial administration and even expansion. The founding of New South Wales in 1788 was undertaken partly to solve the problem of disposing of criminals, but there was also the motive that the northerly coasts of Australia might be made a spice-producing region. The West Indies were still esteemed as valuable colonies, and Parliament consented to the abolition of the slave trade only because convinced that the planters' interests would not suffer. Throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars there was a systematic acquisition of plantation-islands, trade centres, and naval bases, and if some of these were returned by the treaties of 1802 and 1814 it was only under pressure of European considerations vital to the national safety. It is true to say, therefore, that the Empire of 1783 was viewed by its rulers as a sound and promising concern, and that they resumed in good spirits the task of its administration.

It is, nevertheless, perfectly true also that the American failure left a permanent disillusionment. But it was a disillusionment with settlement colonies, and it did not become important until new settlement colonies had arisen and grown politically self-conscious. During the forty odd years that elapsed between the Peace of Versailles and the rise of the Radical imperialists and the Manchester School, imperial policy followed conservative lines and devoted itself to strengthening the network of British trading interests throughout the world. Free trade had not yet entered its cosmopolitan, idealistic phase. Its pursuit was still the cautious, step-by-step process of Adam Smith and the younger Pitt, dealing with separate cases on their merits and shunning change, except for demonstrated advantage. In this period the new settlement colonies of the nineteenth century grew of themselves; the State did not go out of its way to found them. British North America was thrown open to the United Empire Loyalists because

the Crown was under obligation to do its best for the men who had stood by it in the American War. The Cape Colony was taken over purely as a naval base, in the same class as Mauritius or Malta. New South Wales had convicts steadily sent to it, but free emigrants were not assisted and were for a time actively discouraged. The whole aim was to create an Empire of dependencies, every one with a definite value, managed by officials of home appointment, and containing as small an independent white population as possible—in a word, the old colonial Empire shorn of its greatest anomaly. In 1819 a speaker in Parliament could still restate, without general disapproval, the old formula that the mother-country exacted economic subjection from the colonies in return for defence.

The student of this post-Independence period of colonial policy finds no such ample material to his hand as exists for the old Empire, for the subject has not yet been fully investigated with the aid of the official documents preserved in the Record Office. All that can at present be done is to compare recorded transactions with the known opinions of influential men, and so to make deductions on policy which future research may modify. For this purpose the views of George Chalmers are illuminating. He was a man of colonial experience and of wide study in geography and economic science. In 1786 he was appointed Clerk to the Committee of the Privy Council which dealt with colonial business. Two years previously he had published a book entitled *Opinions on Public Law and Commercial Policy arising from American Independence*, a work which presumably found favour with the government of the day. Its contents may be surprising to those who have had the impression that the American disaster killed imperial aspirations and that the early readers of Adam Smith conceived the thorough-going views of Cobden and Bright.

Chalmers limits his remarks to the Atlantic sphere of empire, and what he there proposes is nothing less than a watertight all-British concern of the mercantile type, with the definite aim of strengthening the national sea-power and the prosperity of the mother-country. He is not at all downcast by the American separation, which he regards as a blessing, because the Americans, hitherto competitors with the British for tropical wealth, are now aliens and excluded from imperial advantages. For him the West Indies are the centre of the Atlantic system and the nursery of sea-power. By an order in council following the Peace of 1783 they are allowed to trade directly with one foreign power, the United States, but only in British ships legally manned in accordance with the Navigation Acts. Chalmers approves this, as making the best of the situation, and he evidently thinks that the Americans will discourage a trade that will not employ their own shipping. In their place, British producers will reap the benefit. The plantations may have cereals from Canada, salt fish from Newfoundland, salted meat, dairy produce, draught cattle and horses from Great Britain

and Ireland; and all these units will be regaining a market engrossed by the Americans prior to their secession. England is considered as a food-exporting country, a useful reminder that at this date the Industrial Revolution was in its infancy and the upward trend of population a thing unrealized by publicists. Canada, says Chalmers, has hitherto been sluggish as a corn-grower, but he sees no reason why it should not rise to the opportunity. The Newfoundland fishery, still important as a reservoir of seamen, will expand; and here he notes, quite in seventeenth century style, that the colonist-fishermen should be discouraged and the preference given to those resident in English ports. On the subject of the timber trade, Chalmers puts forward novel and at the same time severely mercantile views. The shipbuilding of the lost colonies was a weakness to the Empire, for it gave them the means of tapping trades that ought to have been reserved to the mother-country. Nova Scotia is already entering the breach by building numbers of ships within the liberties of the Navigation Acts, and it ought to be discouraged from doing so, and from sending lumber to the West Indies. It will be far better for Great Britain to supply the islands with cooper's timber and house-building stuff obtained from the Baltic and sent out in British-built ships; and the home shipyards ought to build for the whole Empire with material from the same source. The only mention of the East is a note that Philadelphia is already opening a trade with China, with the implication that British North America should be restrained from doing the like. Chalmers, like Adam Smith, is no abstract theorist. He gives numerous statistical tables in support of his views.

How far such a programme was seriously considered by the administration cannot yet be stated in detail. Some of its main ideas square very well with the actual performance of the ensuing forty years. Pitt, for example, although personally in favour of making the Americans entirely free of the colonial trade, was unable to do so, and the restrictions approved by Chalmers were not fully removed until Huskisson's time. On the other hand, the discouragement of British North American shipbuilding was politically inadvisable, however attractive economically; and the wars which began in 1793 disorganized any attempt that may have been made to canalize the Baltic lumber business for imperial purposes. But in general it may be said that there is no sign of any reversal of the economic principles of the old colonial administration for a full generation after the Treaties of Versailles. Henry Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, took charge of the War and Colonies department in 1794. He is chiefly known for his interest in the Eastern sphere of imperial affairs, but there is nothing in his recorded policy that is at all incompatible with the views set forth by Chalmers.¹

¹ The obscurity of the economic policy in this period may be seen on reference to Egerton's work on *British Colonial Policy*, the standard authority. It jumps in one page from 1783 to 1823—from the old Empire to Huskisson.

Whilst this attitude endured there was no disposition to encourage colonial autonomy in any form. Canada, with its representative government accorded in 1791, was an exception inevitable from the nature of the case, for the Loyalists were a trusted community which had been bred under representative institutions, and could not be disfranchised. In New South Wales and at the Cape the powers of the governors continued unmodified even by a nominated council of settlers until 1823 and 1825 respectively. In the West Indies the islands of St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, captured during the wars of 1793-1814, received no grants of elective assemblies, such as were possessed by the islands of earlier British development. The same is also true of Mauritius. In British Guiana there was an elective element in the legislature, but it was of Dutch origin and was merely continued, not created, after the conquest. Where, as in the older British West Indies, there were elective institutions already in operation, they were not curtailed. Nova Scotia and Bermuda were in this category. New Brunswick, founded by United Empire Loyalists, received representative government for the same reason as Canada. Newfoundland, on the other hand, which had never had an elective legislature, did not obtain one until 1832, when a new phase of policy was setting in. This survey reveals a reaction from the principle active in the seventeenth century, when most of the units of the old Empire had been founded, the principle, that is, that the English subject overseas was entitled to the same constitutional rights as he would have enjoyed at home.

A variety of causes were destined to overwhelm this policy of reshaping the colonial empire by the old methods purged of their weakening factors. The growth and the depressed condition of the British population after 1815 gave rise to a new emigration and to new colonies of the incompatible settlement type. The rise of the Radicals and the interest of some of them in empire-building produced effective criticism of the old type of administration. Agitation, both at home and overseas, stirred the new settlers to a political self-consciousness that would not rest content without autonomy. The progress of the free-trade principles weakened the fundamental motive underlying strict supervision. The humanitarians, especially those of the missionary interest, became strong enough to influence the administration for their special purposes. And finally the Manchester School, with their cosmopolitan pacifism, believed that colonial possessions were a common cause of war besides being economically useless, and that they were, therefore, best dispensed with altogether. These new influences were visible in 1823 and were markedly effective by 1830. They worked together in discrediting the old policy, but they were by no means unanimous about that which should take its place.

Administration, as apart from policy, has been rather better illuminated, chiefly by the criticisms of the reformers in the ensuing period and by the complaints of the colonists in various matters of dispute. In general it was alleged that ministers relegated business to the

control of the permanent officials, who distrusted colonial aspirations, worked in a hole-and-corner fashion, and tightened the leading-strings in order to arrogate the maximum of power and patronage to themselves. The Colonial Office frequently appointed as governors persons who possessed influence but no other qualification for the position. <Patronage scandals were still more obvious in the minor appointments. Officials went to the new colonies without any intention of identifying themselves with local interests, banded themselves into cliques, and displayed contempt for the working colonist. Others, in the old eighteenth century fashion, never stirred out of the British Isles, and performed their duties through the medium of ill-paid deputies. With incompetent or ill-disposed persons in control large mistakes of local policy were inevitable. <The disposal of the public land was a glaring example. In Canada large areas were granted to mere speculators who had no capital with which to improve them and simply waited for the lapse of time to increase their selling value. Under the Act of 1791 an attempt was also made to endow the clergy of the Anglican Church by reserving to them one-seventh of the unoccupied lands. The clergy reserves were usually the least improved of all, and intersected the more settled areas. The result was that small men found holdings difficult to obtain, the best land remained artificially dear, and many emigrants were deflected to the United States, where a sounder land policy prevailed. Australia suffered from a different mistake. There the free settler could obtain land with too little difficulty or expense. Consequently all sought to be proprietors and few would work for wages, and the dearth of labour hampered development as much as the dearth of cheap land in Canada.

The government attitude towards emigration was also unsatisfactory. There was no real desire to promote settlement colonies, although after the peace of 1815 it was obvious that the mother-country was producing a surplus of population. As a rule, the better sort of artisans and labourers could obtain no state assistance to emigrate. The government transported criminals against their will, and was also accused of shovelling out paupers to remote places where they could die without disturbing the consciences of their fellow-citizens at home; but for the promising type of pioneer it would do little. The shocking hardships endured in emigrant ships were an additional discouragement to the better class of workers.

Such was the general position of colonization fifty years after George III. had acknowledged the independence of the United States; and it was obvious that a need existed for new ideas and new methods. The self-styled "Theorists of 1830," a self-appointed band of colonial reformers, stepped into the breach. Their leader was Edward Gibbon Wakefield, a man who might have found a great career in politics had not a matrimonial scandal and a term of imprisonment blighted his prospects. With Wakefield were associated the Earl of Durham, Sir William Molesworth and Charles Buller. Together they founded

the Colonization Society for the promotion of their views. They were radicals in politics, with a love of liberty and a keen sense of the social evils of their age.

Their policy was two-sided. In its destructive aspect it sought to abolish the corrupt and short-sighted management said to be prevailing in the Colonial Office. To this end the reformers attacked the existing régime, exposed its jobbery, and goaded the public to take an interest in the hidden activities of the permanent officials. The latter, under the soubriquet of "Mr. Mothercountry," were pilloried by Charles Buller in a well-known paper from which the following is a quotation : "Parliament . . . exercises, in fact, hardly the slightest control over the administration or the making of the laws for the colonies. In nine cases out of ten it merely registers the edicts of the Colonial Office in Downing Street. It is there, then, that nearly the whole public opinion which influences the conduct of affairs in the colonies, really exists. It is there that the supremacy of the mother-country really resides : and when we speak of that supremacy, and of the responsibility of the colony to the mother-country, you may to all practical intents consider as the mother-country—the possessor of this supremacy—the centre of this responsibility—the occupants of the large house that forms the end of the *cul de sac* so well known by the name of Downing Street. In some back room—whether in the attic, or in what story we know not—you will find all the mother-country which really exercises supremacy, and really maintains connexion with the vast and widely scattered colonies of Britain. We know not the name, the history or the functions of the individual, into the narrow limits of whose person we find the mother-country shrunk. Indeed, we may call him by the name, of which we have thus shown him to be the rightful bearer ; and when we speak of Mr. Mothercountry the colonist will form a much more accurate notion than heretofore of the authority by which he is in reality ruled."

The writer goes on to describe the obscurity of Mr. Mothercountry, his indispensability to the Secretary of State, his absorption in routine, his subservience to "interests," his jobbery—"jobs which even parliamentary rapacity would blush to ask from the treasury, are perpetrated with impunity in the silent realm of Mr. Mothercountry"—his arbitrary behaviour, and his lack of information about colonial affairs. All these render him unfit to wield the large powers he has acquired.

"Mr. Mothercountry," as Buller admitted, was really a hit at Sir James Stephen who, although he did not become permanent head until 1836, had been the ruling influence at the Colonial Office since the days of Lord Bathurst. Buller's caricature was not altogether just. Stephen was a man who loved power and exercised it with little sympathy ; but he was absolutely honest, and the ascription of jobbery and rapacity to him was very wide of the mark. It arose undoubtedly from the dislike felt by the Wakefield party for the missionaries and

evangelicals whom Stephen favoured. There had been a great deal of jobbery before Stephen's time, and there is some evidence that it continued, but none that he personally countenanced it. In 1837, the year in which he was assuming full control, a well-informed man wrote,—“The scum of England is poured into the colonies: briefless barristers, broken-down merchants, ruined debauchees, the offal of every calling and profession are crammed into colonial places.”¹ Buller's charges are therefore corroborated, but he applied them to the wrong person.

On the constructive side the reformers advocated responsible government as the palliative for the evils they exposed. This, of course, applied to colonies already settled. With regard to the large undeveloped territories, they put forward a plan of systematic colonization. They saw that the Empire possessed the three elements of expansion—land, capital and labour. Land lay in great unoccupied stretches in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa; capital, with the middle classes at home, growing rich by industrial enterprise; while labour rotted and starved in the slums of the cities, in a permanent floating surplus to the amount which could be regularly employed. Wakefield in particular worked upon the problem and embodied his solution in his *View of the Art of Colonization*. Briefly, it amounted to this: colonial lands must be sold, not given away; they must be sold for a “sufficient price” to persons with capital to expend upon them; and the money so obtained must be used to assist the emigration of the poorer classes of both sexes. By this plan Wakefield claimed that labour in the colonies would be kept sufficiently plentiful to attract the necessary capital. His “sufficient price” would vary with the locality, and he refused to state any figure of general application. Some of his adherents were less cautious, and to the colonization of South Australia they sought to apply a formula which gave the price of a stated area of land as the exact cost of the transport of the labourers necessary to cultivate it.² By so doing they hoped to secure the necessary equilibrium between capital, labour and the amount of land exploited.

The impossibility of exactly gauging in advance the qualities of varying kinds of soil naturally upset the element of uniformity thus introduced into Wakefield's system. Colonists already settled also disagreed with it, for they had come to regard the unoccupied lands as their own prospective property. His theory, nevertheless, had a considerable influence in the opening up of New Zealand and parts of Australia, particularly the southern province. It was nowhere put into complete practice, but it certainly provided some approach

¹ Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, quoted in P. Knaplund's *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy*, London, 1927, p. 20. Cf. also Sir Charles Lucas, Introduction to *Lord Durham's Report*, Oxford, 1912, i. pp. 273-4, for a word on behalf of the Colonial Office.

² R. C. Mills, *The Colonization of Australia, 1829-42*, London, 1915, pp. 236-7. An excellent exposition of the Wakefield system, differing in important respects from that of previous commentators, occurs in this work, particularly in chaps. v.-viii.

to a system where before there had been none. Its best result lay in the stimulation of the government to assist the emigration of the right kind of people; and the rapid development of Australia during the twenty years following 1831 was largely due to it. In South Africa (military and racial problems) rendered much of the theory inapplicable. In Canada a great part of the Crown land had already been recklessly thrown away; there also there was less need for an emigration fund, since the passage was shorter and colonists came forward more readily than for the south.

Systematic colonization may be said to date from 1831 when the Colonization Society first obtained a hearing from the authorities. But the improvement of the colonists' political status lagged behind their growth in numbers and wealth. Towards the end of the thirties there was unrest throughout the Empire. In Lower Canada the old French stock was in conflict with the British element, and ripe to sever the imperial connection; in Upper Canada an oligarchy monopolized political power to the exclusion of newcomers; Nova Scotia voiced the same grievance; Australia was vainly demanding the stoppage of the flow of convicts and resenting home interference in the disposal of land; South Africa was rent by a feud between the missionaries and the Boers on the subject of the natives and their treatment. The old system of control was rapidly losing credit. When rebellion broke out in Canada in 1837 Lord Durham, one of the reformers, was sent out to investigate. His Report began the movement towards responsible government as we know it to-day.

From the above it will be seen how entirely the point of view of imperial affairs had altered since Chalmers wrote in 1784. The criticism of 1830, to which the Colonial Office had eventually to listen, was concerned exclusively with the settlement colonies, whose growth was forcing them into the first importance. History had repeated itself at a more rapid pace. The men of 1784 had been able to congratulate themselves on getting rid of the American settlement colonies, and to set about creating an improved version of the mercantile empire. Forty years later a new series of settlements had appeared and were upsetting the balance. It was now, and not earlier, that the pessimism begotten of American independence began to show its effect. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries statesmen in office grew progressively gloomier about the Empire's future. The Radical imperialists were, on the contrary, full of hope, but their hope was not for an empire of the old description. The Greek idea of expansion, of free daughter communities thrown off from the parent stock, an expansion of race rather than an empire of domination, was taking hold of constructive minds. New England in the Stuart period had been of this type, and Wakefield often expressed admiration for the Puritan emigration. Grote's exhaustive work on Greek history, with its praise of democratic politics, was at the height of its fame, and Grote was a participator in the new plans for British colonization in Australia. So for a time the contest between

the pessimists and the optimists continued, complicated by other factors which will be treated in their place.

Meanwhile the mercantile ideal was breaking down in the sphere to which it properly applied. Its essential was the monopoly of trade with the tropical colonies, and particularly with the West Indies. In 1784 it had seemed possible to make these plantations depend upon Great Britain and British North America for the supplies formerly obtained from the seceding American states. The ensuing thirty years saw the plan fail. The British Isles ceased to export foodstuffs, and Canada did not develop fast enough to fill the gap. Pitt made an ineffective concession to the Americans in 1797, but steady and recognized intercourse between the United States and the West Indies did not begin until the Treaty of Ghent in 1814. <Huskisson threw the trade entirely open in 1822.> His reforms also permitted direct trade in British shipping between the West Indies and European countries. In 1825 he went further. He threw open the trade of all British colonies to all foreign countries on two conditions, namely, that goods were to be laden in British ships or those of the country of origin, and that foreign powers must accord similar liberty to British trade with their colonies.> Within six years the leading maritime countries acceded to these terms and the mercantilist organization of the Empire was at an end. If Huskisson finished the work of change, it is evident that Castlereagh and the ministers of 1813-15 had begun it. The new East India charter of 1813 abolished the Company's trading monopoly except with China. Thenceforward the private merchant was free of the Indian Ocean. The Treaty of Paris in 1814 restored Java to Holland, without absolute necessity to do so; and it was a thing which the true mercantilist would have resisted to the uttermost. The Treaty of Ghent, as has been said, began the opening of the West Indies. These things were done almost simultaneously and all by the same government. They may at least be said to show that mercantilism was weakening its hold ten years before its final overthrow.

With the completion of Huskisson's work imperial monopoly had given way to imperial preference, the discrimination of customs duties in favour of colonial products. In the Atlantic sphere this favoured British North America by admitting its timber and its scanty corn exports into Great Britain at rates which were nominal compared with those levied on foreign produce. Similarly, the sugar of the British West Indies paid little more than one-third of the duties paid by non-British sugar.¹ This preference was attacked by the free traders of the Manchester School, who became active and organized in the thirties, soon after the Wakefield party began to agitate for responsible government and systematic colonization. During the same decade yet a third movement attained great influence, that of the missionaries and the root-and-branch abolitionists of slavery. We have therefore a com-

¹ C. H. Currey, *British Colonial Policy, 1783-1915*, Oxford, 1916, pp. 37-8

petition of three distinct schools of thought for the control of imperial destinies. During two decades they wrestled for the succession over the dying form of the old policy.

The evangelicals who formed the missionary interest are hard to classify. They were, for the most part, conservatives at home, but on the spiritual plane they were decidedly radical abroad. Wilberforce, who supported the Combination Acts and the Corn Law of 1815, may serve as their type; there was no common ground between him and Gibbon Wakefield or the Earl of Durham. From 1823 to 1833 the evangelicals concentrated upon the abolition of slavery. That accomplished, they developed a missionary policy with a definite political plan. It was that white settlers and traders must be prevented from intruding upon native races, since the impact would disturb the missionary's work of raising the savage to civilization. In South Africa they desired to form a ring of protected tribes, whose chiefs should rule under missionary guidance, and whose land must be closed to the colonists. In New Zealand they resisted all proposals of settlement or annexation with the same object of creating a civilized Maori nation. And where, in other Pacific islands, they advocated annexation, it was only that they might pursue the same ends untroubled by French intrusion. From the passing of the Reform Act, if not before, the evangelicals dominated the Colonial Office. Sir James Stephen and Lord Glenelg, Colonial Secretary from 1835, were with them heart and soul, and Dandeson Coates, the secretary of the Church Missionary Society, was received almost as a minister of state at Downing Street, where he incurred the hatred of Wakefield and the colonizers.¹ The battle raged chiefly over South Africa and New Zealand, and its details will be treated in the chapters dealing with those colonies. Its outcome was a victory for the colonizers in New Zealand, and a disappointment for both sides in South Africa, where a vacillating policy ensued. But it had reactions elsewhere, for the Colonial Office was confirmed in its antipathy, of much earlier origin, to schemes of settlement, even where, as in Victoria and South Australia, they involved no prejudice to native interests.

In Canada there was no conflict with the missionaries, and it was here that the Radical imperialists achieved their greatest work. For, with Lord Durham at their head, and with Wakefield and Buller assisting him, they laid the foundation of responsible government and moulded the destiny of the white dominions. In this matter again they received no countenance from statesmen in office. Lord John Russell, to whom it fell as Colonial Secretary to take action on the Durham Report, rejected responsible government in his Canada Act of 1840, and the institution came gradually into being from force of circumstance in the following years.

With the Durham Report and the foundation of New Zealand the Radical imperialists had shot their bolt. They had never formed an organized political party. In Parliament they were leaders without a

¹ J. S. Marais, *Colonisation of New Zealand*, Oxford, 1927, pp. 31-4.

following, drawing fortuitous support from divers quarters; for the bulk of the Radicals were simply not interested in their work. Personal handicaps lay heavy upon them. Durham gave offence by his arrogance, and cut short his administrative career by an ill-judged decision in Canada. He died soon afterwards, in 1840. Buller was a man of charming nature and comprehensive mind, but ill-health precluded him from steady work and sapped his driving power. He died prematurely in 1848. Gibbon Wakefield lacked principle. The offence that sent him to Newgate in early manhood was a fruit of his character. He was an unreliable associate, and in controversy he could not confine himself to the truth; and these defects went far to outweigh his ability and his real enthusiasm for the cause. He settled in New Zealand in 1853, and England knew him no more. Sir William Molesworth, the least brilliant of the band, survived until 1855, but achieved little after the loss of his colleagues. Thus the pioneers of Radical imperialism died out and left no successors. They had, nevertheless, made a lasting contribution to British expansion.

In the decade 1840-50 the way was clear for the triumph of the Manchester School in home politics, and that triumph would probably have disrupted the Empire but for the good work done by imperial officials overseas. Lord Elgin in Canada, and Sir George Grey in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, were governors of a very different type from that denounced in "Mr. Mothercountry," and they may fairly be regarded as the offspring of the Durham teaching. In them the spirit of Lord Durham combated the materialism of Manchester. The Manchester men, it is true, had an ideal, the pursuit of international peace, but it was closely harnessed to the desire for commercial gain. In that respect the Manchester School were as hard and narrow as the mercantilists. The parallel is close. In the eighteenth century, monopoly gilded by a jingo patriotism; in the nineteenth, unrestricted profit-hunting allied to a pacifism that scoffed at the love of country and pride of race natural to decent citizens, both wolves in sheep's clothing. Either movement produced its bad men and its good, and if Chatham stands as the purest patriot of the earlier times, so Richard Cobden should take rank as the most disinterested philanthropist of his rather sordid fraternity. The influence of the Manchester School was greater than its parliamentary voting power. It never became a governing party, but its ideas suffused the policy of both Liberals and Conservatives, of the latter until 1870, of the former until a later date. So, for five-and-twenty years at least, the doctrine was implicit in the policy of the Colonial Office that settlement colonies were not a sound investment. Their tutelage whilst immature was incompatible with the claims of industrial enterprise; and when fully developed they would go their own way as America had done. They were an encumbrance to be dropped as convenience dictated.

To turn now to the transactions of this period, the first which claims attention is the establishment of free trade as Great Britain's fiscal

example, remarked in 1852, "These wretched colonies will all be independent in a few years, and they are a millstone round our necks." In 1854 Sir F. Rogers, afterwards permanent head of the Colonial Office, alluded to "what we are, I suppose, all looking to, the eventual parting company on good terms." In 1869 Lord Granville, Gladstone's Colonial Secretary, wrote to the Governor-General of Canada: "You will also be good enough to bring to my notice any line of policy or any measures which, without implying on the part of Her Majesty's Government any wish to change abruptly our relations, would gradually prepare both countries for a friendly relaxation of them."¹

Overseas the omens were more favourable, although towards 1870 the home attitude was putting a strain upon natural loyalty. The Crimean War evoked loyal addresses from Canada, Nova Scotia, New South Wales and Tasmania, contributions to distress funds, and the raising of volunteer corps to release imperial troops.² The Australasian colonies entered upon responsible government, not in a spirit of scoring off the central authority, but with its cordial goodwill. In 1858-9 Sir George Grey reported from South Africa that there was a possibility of bringing the Boer Republics into a federation within the Empire; but he was severely reprimanded for the initiative he had taken in the matter, and nothing came of it. The impulse to the confederation of British North America in the Dominion of 1867 was entirely colonial, and here the home government was wise enough to acquiesce. In Australia and New Zealand there were special causes of irritation, and the goodwill of the Crimean War period was succeeded fifteen years later by a wave of freely worded censure. In 1870 New Zealand, incredible as it now may seem, was talking of a Declaration of Independence or of voluntary annexation to the United States.³ In retrospect, however, more of good than of evil is discernible. It was indispensable to the later development of the Empire to make a complete break with the habits and traditions of a world that had passed away. The Manchester School and the Laodiceans of the sixties made that break, and in so doing they were building better than they knew. Already the constructive forces that succeeded them were drawing together from various directions, and the Empire was preparing to cross the intangible line that marks the distinction between its records before and after 1870.

¹ Quoted Knaplund, p. 99.

² Lucas, pp. 66-8.

³ Egerton, *British Colonial Policy*, p. 395.

CHAPTER IV

CANADA FROM CONQUEST TO DOMINION

Of the constituent members of the present family of British nations* Canada is the greatest, after the mother-country, in the size of its white population. It is also the senior in date of establishment, and in it were first worked out those problems of internal government and imperial relationship whose solutions were afterwards applied to the white dominions of the southern hemisphere. For these reasons it is useful to study the history of Canada before turning to that of South Africa and Australasia.

(i) *The French and British Canadas, 1760-1815*

At the time of the British conquest in 1760 Canada proper exclusive of the maritime provinces contained about 70,000 white inhabitants, all of French nationality. They were thinly settled along the banks of the St. Lawrence, the majority between Quebec and Montreal. Two main occupations, agriculture and fur-trading in the western wilderness, gave rise to two very different types in the population. In the settled regions social organization was feudal, the *seigneurs* held the land on a system of tenure which originated in mediaeval France, and the peasants as sub-tenants yielded them the ancient feudal dues and taxes. The hunting and trading element was wandering and undisciplined, approximating more to the Indian than the European mode of life, and largely outside the social scheme. Religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, were well endowed. The French government had been corrupt and oppressive, and was little regretted by any class. The people were generally lacking in political instinct and ideas of the citizen's rights and duties. They were quite content to live under absolute rule so long as that rule was reasonably just. The priests had great influence with them, and the priests, being promised toleration, very sensibly refrained from agitation against the new government.

For the first four years General Murray, who had received the surrender of the French army at Montreal, carried on the administration upon military lines. He made his wishes known by means of proclamations, and quickly gained the goodwill of the Canadians. By the terms of the capitulation and the peace treaty of 1763 Catholicism was to be

tolerated, the property of the clergy, with certain exceptions, to be confirmed to them, and all who wished it to have permission to withdraw freely to France. The French officials thus took their departure, but few of the Canadians followed their example. Of the religious orders, the Jesuits alone were expelled. Murray's chief trouble arose from the influx of a few hundreds of British Protestants, mainly from the American colonies. These persons, numbering about 300 in 1764, apparently took for granted that they were to exploit the whole population for their own benefit. They were loud in protest against religious toleration, and quick to demand a "representative" assembly in which they alone should occupy the seats. Murray described them as "the most immoral collection of men I ever knew." They on their side accused him and his officers of unduly favouring the French *seigneurs* by reason of social affinities. In 1764 there came into force a royal proclamation which introduced a civil element into the government. The governor, with the advice of a nominated council, was empowered to issue ordinances having the force of law. He might also—although actually he did not—summon an elected assembly. At the same time judges and other officials arrived from England to inaugurate the English criminal and civil codes. The former was inevitable, but the latter proved a snare to the Canadians, who were totally ignorant of its intricacies and accustomed to their equally complicated feudal tenures. Much sharp practice and legal tyranny arose from this attempt to enforce the English civil law. Murray also declared that the civilian officials sent out to him were of poor character, and it is obvious that he was more at his ease with the French colonists, who were used to military obedience. He quitted the province in 1766.

His successor was Sir Guy Carleton, also a soldier who had seen Canadian service in the Seven Years' War. Carleton, in the course of a long career, proved himself one of the soundest colonial administrators England has produced. His principles and methods were similar to those of Murray. He desired to conciliate the French, to restrain the intolerance and oppression of incoming adventurers who were fortune-hunters rather than true colonists, and to rule with a minimum of constitutional machinery in a country which had no political ambitions. He had, in fact, justly appreciated the needs of Canada, for which at that juncture a paternal despotism was the only workable form of government. By an ordinance he partially restored the French civil law, but confusion still continued. The Catholic clergy also, although holding their property and undisturbed in their functions, were uncertain of their position in the matter of tithes. For these reasons it became necessary to regulate the administration by a new Act of the British Parliament.

The Quebec Act of 1774 declared that it was inexpedient to call a representative assembly, and decreed that the governor should rule by the aid of a nominated council of not more than twenty-three persons.

These were to be residents of the province and chosen without restriction of nationality or religion. Criminal cases were to be tried by jury under English law, and civil cases without jury under French law. Roman Catholics were to pay tithes for the support of their priests. The Earl of Chatham, apparently moved by Protestant bias, stigmatized the Act as cruel, oppressive and odious. The consensus of modern judgment is expressed by Sir C. P. Lucas, who describes it as "a just and generous measure . . . to the credit of English good sense, in dealing with the actual facts of a difficult position, and the prejudices and feelings of an alien people."¹ Less wise, perhaps, were the clauses defining the limits of the province, since they contributed largely to the outbreak of the War of American Independence in the following year. Canada under the proclamation of 1763-4 had consisted of a strip some fifty miles in average width on the southern bank of the St. Lawrence and of another about a hundred miles wide on the northern bank. The western boundary had run just beyond Montreal and the Ottawa river, far short of the Great Lakes. The Quebec Act now enlarged these borders so as to bring within the Canadian government the whole of the Great Lakes and of the wide lands to the southward in the angle of the Mississippi and the Ohio. By this decision Canada received territories shutting off New York, Pennsylvania and to some extent Virginia from future expansion. Those colonies might plausibly argue, in fact, that from their point of view the Seven Years' War had been won in vain. The Ohio lands were at this time very sparsely occupied. Another transfer of less importance was that of Labrador from the government of Newfoundland to that of Quebec.

On the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1775 the American Congress undertook the conquest of Canada; and after the surprisal of the British garrisons holding the forts on Lake Champlain it looked as though the task would be an easy one. Two columns invaded Canada, one by way of Lake Champlain and Montreal under Robert Montgomery, the other under Benedict Arnold marching through wild country from Maine to the southern bank of the St. Lawrence opposite Quebec. Carleton had sent away most of his regular troops to the assistance of Gage at Boston. With what forces he could gather he attempted to make head against Montgomery. The latter, however, captured Montreal with little difficulty, and Carleton, with the loss of all the garrison, barely made his personal escape down the river to organize the defence of Quebec. The French Canadians, had they chosen, could have inclined the balance of victory decisively to one side or the other. Instead they remained neutral. The Americans had entered the country with stirring proclamations about deliverance from tyranny, but the Canadians disliked the intruders and very few joined them. On the other hand, Carleton was disappointed at receiving no support from his subjects, for he had supposed that the Quebec Act would have rendered them fanatically loyal. The *seigneurs* and

¹ *History of Canada, 1763-1812*, Oxford, 1909, p. 89.

the clergy worked for him, but their influence was insufficient to stir the people at large. Canada as a whole stood sullenly aloof whilst two alien governments competed for the mastery of her soil. Montgomery had taken Montreal in November. By the middle of December he joined hands with Arnold on the Plains of Abraham before Quebec. The besiegers numbered from two to three thousand, whilst Carleton commanded a very mixed force of some 1700 within the walls. On the last night of 1775 the Americans attempted a surprise attack. They found the garrison vigilant and were beaten off with the loss of Montgomery killed and Arnold wounded. The latter continued the siege in somewhat languid fashion until naval relief arrived for Carleton in May, 1776. The Americans then retreated, and by midsummer were entirely cleared from Canada. In October the British destroyed the American flotilla on Lake Champlain and opened the way for the expedition which Burgoyne led to the Hudson with such disastrous results in the following year. With the remaining operations of the War of Independence Canada proper was only indirectly concerned. The Franco-American alliance of 1778 promoted this immunity, since either partner was somewhat suspicious of the other's designs in the north, and neither was willing to risk giving offence to the other.¹ In 1778-9 the great tract between the Ohio and the Mississippi, transferred to Canada by the Quebec Act, fell into American hands, largely through the energy of George Rogers Clark, a partisan leader in this thinly populated region.

British statesmen opened the peace negotiations in a mood of disgust with all settlement colonies; and at first they were inclined to hand over Canada to the United States as not worth keeping amid the general ruin of the American empire. As time went on, however, they changed their plan, and insisted upon retaining the province. The boundary between Nova Scotia, Canada and Maine was left uncertain; farther west the line cut the northern end of Lake Champlain, then followed the centres of Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron and Superior and the course of the La Pluie River from Superior to the Lake of the Woods. This gave the entire Ohio region to the United States and nullified the territorial decisions of the Quebec Act. No further westward definition was attempted, since the country was as yet unoccupied. The Maine boundary gave rise to much subsequent negotiation and was not finally settled until 1842.

By a special article in the treaty the American Congress undertook to do its best to secure fair treatment for those of the colonists who had fought for George III. This promise remained a dead letter. Congress had as yet little authority over its constituent states, and in every one of them the victorious republicans persecuted the unhappy loyalists with the utmost rancour. The result was a general exodus of one of the best elements in the population. The loyalists, by their sacrifice of property and life in a losing cause, had demonstrated a patriotism

¹ Lucas, *op. cit.* p. 184.

and devotion to duty at least as great as that of the fathers of the Republic who had taken up arms in 1775. With more generous behaviour on the part of the victors, the majority would probably have acquiesced in the result of the war and their children would have grown up good citizens of the United States. Such is the teaching of history in parallel cases. As it was, the loss of America was the gain of Canada and the British Empire. The loyalists emigrated northwards in large numbers, peopled the almost empty maritime provinces at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and created the new British colony of Upper Canada to the west of Montreal and Quebec.

The first immigration of British settlers into Nova Scotia had taken place in 1749. After the Seven Years' War many New Englanders also entered the province, and the total population amounted to some 13,000 in 1767, of whom perhaps half were Americans.¹ In 1758 Nova Scotia received a grant of representative government. Ten years later Prince Edward Island was separated from it and began an independent existence under somewhat unsatisfactory conditions, the whole of its land having been allotted to a small number of ex-officers of the British Army. This system of large estates owned by persons with resources insufficient for their development retarded the progress of the island. In view of the origins of its population, it is not surprising that Nova Scotia showed some sympathy with the American Revolution. After the peace, however, a great influx of loyalists altered its tone. Numbering 28,000 in all, about 12,000 of them settled in the western districts bordering upon Maine, and in 1784 this region became the separate province of New Brunswick, with a representative assembly of its own.

At the same time the flow of loyalists poured by the land and sea routes into Upper Canada, and colonized the northern shores of the Great Lakes. Amongst these must be reckoned not only the white men but also a large proportion of the Six Nations, who had fought for George III. and now preferred to emigrate in order to remain under British rule. The Mohawk tribe crossed the border *en masse* under their educated chieftain Joseph Brant. They received a grant of land upon a river flowing into Lake Erie, and their descendants are to be found there at the present day.² About 10,000 white loyalists settled in Upper Canada immediately after the peace, and by 1791 the number had risen to 25,000. The total number entering all parts of British North America has been variously estimated at from 40,000 to 60,000, the latter figure being based on the most recent investigation.³ In 1789 they were officially granted the title of United Empire Loyalists for themselves and their descendants. They made Canada a British nation in a sense which seemed improbable before their advent.

¹ Sir J. G. Bourinot, *Canada under British Rule*, Cambridge, 1900, p. 51.

² George Bryce, *The Canadian People*, 2nd edn., London, 1914, pp. 218-21. This work gives many interesting details of the loyalist emigration.

³ Authority cited in Lucas, *op. cit.* p. 226.

Sir Guy Carleton had resigned his governorship in 1778 on account of a quarrel with Lord George Germaine, the Secretary for America. His successor was Sir Frederick Haldimand, a Swiss officer of long service in the British Army. Haldimand carried on the government in the tradition already established. He had some trouble with certain of the Canadian clergy, who, after the entry of France into the American war, were inclined to modify their previous loyalty to British rule. In other respects his tenure of power passed uneventfully. He quitted Canada in 1784. Carleton, now created Lord Dorchester, who had been commander-in-chief at New York in 1782-3, was reappointed governor of Canada, and arrived in 1786. The influx of British settlers gave rise to a demand for representative government. For several years a series of petitions to this effect crossed the Atlantic, together with one or two counter-petitions from the French Canadians deprecating the proposal. The imperial authorities were confronted with a problem new in our colonial history—how to establish representative institutions in a country containing a minority of British Protestants of advanced political training and undoubted loyalty, and a majority of French Catholics politically inexperienced and not too enthusiastic for the imperial connection. To grant the franchise to the one section whilst withholding it from the other would have been disastrous. To admit both to equal participation in one representative body would have entailed the placing of the British minority permanently under the heel of the French majority. Pitt therefore took the course suggested in a Loyalist petition, and divided Canada into two provinces, each with an assembly of its own. Lord Dorchester disapproved of this division, although it is difficult to imagine any workable alternative suitable to the circumstances.

The Canadian Constitutional Act of 1791 established for Upper Canada a legislative council of seven or more members to be nominated by the Crown, and an assembly of sixteen or more to be elected by the inhabitants on a franchise which included virtually all landowners. For Lower Canada (*i.e.* the original French colony) the corresponding bodies were to number not less than fifteen and fifty respectively. A lieutenant-governor with a nominated executive council was to preside over each province, and a governor-in-chief over the whole country, although in practice the governor-in-chief tended to limit his attentions to Lower Canada. Lands were to be set aside for the endowment of the Protestant clergy, and the Catholics were to continue to pay tithes to their own priests. The system of land tenure was to be English in the upper province and French or English at the option of the grantee in the lower; the criminal code was to be that of England in both. The assemblies obtained the principal control of taxation, but they had no direct power of influencing or dismissing the executive.¹

¹ The executive power was ultimately in the hands of the governor. The executive councils which advised him comprised some persons who had seats in the legislative councils, but none who were members of the popular assemblies (Lucas, *op. cit.* pp. 252-3).

The constitution was therefore of the representative but not responsible type which had worked so badly in America in the previous period. These arrangements, of course, did not apply to the maritime provinces, three of which already enjoyed representative government. The fourth, Cape Breton Island, had been separated from Nova Scotia in 1784 and was re-annexed to it in 1820. Newfoundland also, then and throughout her history, had no political connection with the provinces on the mainland.

Under the Act of 1791 Canada continued to be governed for nearly fifty years. At the outset it worked well, although, in addition to withholding responsible government, it embodied some fruitful causes of disagreement. The geographical position of Upper Canada forced the bulk of her external trade to pass through the lower province. It thus became possible for the custom house at Quebec to squeeze and almost to strangle its neighbour's commerce. Disputes early arose on this score, and in 1795 it was agreed that duties for the two provinces should be jointly collected at Quebec at a uniform rate, Upper Canada receiving one-eighth of the proceeds. As her trade increased this proportion grew until in 1838 it was two-fifths. In spite of this arrangement the imperial parliament had to intervene with the Canada Trade Act in 1822 to prevent unjust treatment of one province by the other. Another source of trouble lay in the presence of an appreciable and growing British element in Lower Canada. British merchants were established in large numbers at Quebec and Montreal, and British settlers were taking up land in the district known as the Eastern Townships. These people considered themselves betrayed by the Act, and Adam Lymburner, their spokesman, had protested at the bar of the House of Commons against its passage. At first the French took little interest in their new political privileges. Then a change in their attitude gradually became manifest. The influence of the *seigneurs* declined with the abolition of feudal authority, and few of them were elected to the assembly. The peasants, on the other hand, realized their political power, and formed an exaggerated notion of the uses to which it could be put. Their votes tended to return demagogues and sensationalists to power, and the growth of British immigration supplied a grievance which was easily exploited. The aggressive tendency of the French is illustrated by the appearance in 1806 of their first newspaper, *Le Canadien*, with the motto, "Nos institutions, notre langue, et nos lois." This paper freely abused the authorities, and in 1810 Sir James Craig, then governor-in-chief, suppressed it. Upper Canada remained tranquil for a generation after the separation, but there also the seeds of trouble lay in the faulty land policy, by which jobbers were enabled to engross larger areas than they could develop, and in the irresponsibility of the executive, whereby an oligarchy was tempted to seize an undue amount of influence and patronage.

The war of 1812-15 with the United States checked these disruptive

tendencies and temporarily united all Canada in a common effort of patriotism. The conflict sprang out of the Continental System of Napoleon and the Orders in Council of the British government, which inflicted hardships upon neutral trade; the searching of American ships for British deserters; the grievance of American frontiersmen at Canadian support of the unsubdued Indians; and the strife of political parties in the United States. The southern and recently founded western states were anti-British and convinced that the conquest of Canada would be an easy undertaking.¹ New England, on the other hand, with a great maritime trade at stake, was unwilling to go to war. Nevertheless war was declared in the summer of 1812, and the invasion of Upper Canada began. General Sir Isaac Brock rallied the British forces and lost his own life in his victory over the invaders at Queenston Heights. The Loyalists, serving in the militia, proved their worth to the Empire, and by the end of the year Canadian soil was free. The story repeated itself on a larger scale in 1813. The Americans took Toronto, then called York, and destroyed the government buildings and private property; in Upper Canada either side suffered defeats; in Lower Canada an invasion of the Montreal region by way of Lake Champlain was utterly routed at Chateauguay and Chrysler's Farm, victories won by the French and British respectively. When the year closed the Americans held nothing but the frontier post of Amherstburg. Again in 1814 the flood of invasion poured in, to be turned back at the final decisive battle of Lundy's Lane near Niagara Falls. Meanwhile in Europe Napoleon had fallen, and reinforcements of Peninsular veterans were crossing the Atlantic. The Americans had committed wanton destruction in Canadian towns and villages. In retaliation a British force landed on the American coast and took and burned the public buildings at Washington, the federal capital. Another expedition which attempted to capture New Orleans in the south was disastrously repulsed early in 1815. The combatants here were in ignorance of the fact that peace had already been signed at Ghent at the close of the previous year. The causes of the conflict had been bound up in the great Napoleonic war. With its cessation all such questions as the rights of neutrals had lost their immediate interest, and the United States had found that conquest of their northern neighbour was no easy matter. The peace therefore restored the general *status quo ante bellum*. Neither party had anything to gain by continuing. Great Britain was exhausted by twenty-two years of strife since 1793; the American Union was threatened with the secession of the New England states,² which had become increasingly restive as the war went on and the tale of maritime losses mounted.

¹ There were only 1500 regular troops in Upper Canada at the outbreak of war.

² *Cambridge Modern History*, vii. p. 348.

(ii) *The failure of representative government, 1815-1840*

The American war led in both the Canadas to a strengthening of patriotism and national character which at first promised beneficent results for the future. That the promise was sadly belied was due in the main to two facts: the growth of racial antipathy between the French Canadians and the British immigrants, and the continuance of a faulty system of colonial governance. The tenets of the old colonial system had still sufficient vitality to demand that the executive government should represent the wishes of statesmen at home, and not those of public opinion in the colony. The latter was required to content itself with the passage through its assembly of laws not objectionable to the supervising authority in London; in case of disagreement it must give way. So far as French Canada was concerned the imperial government merits little blame for its attitude, for there is no doubt that, owing to political inexperience, complete self-government in the early years of the nineteenth century would have produced greater evils than did the system actually in force. The difficulty was one which time alone could cure. In Upper Canada again, a condition existed which almost amounted to a racial schism. On the one hand was the dominant party of United Empire Loyalists, conscious of their sufferings and merits, proud of their services; on the other the newer immigrants, some direct from the British Isles, the jetsam of the Industrial Revolution, others of American origin, who had crossed the border not for love of British institutions but for desire of the lands which their countrymen had failed to conquer in war. It was hard for the Loyalists to yield equality to these newcomers, and hard for the imperial government to compel them to do so. In this case also time was the only solvent of the problem. From this point of view the long struggles which distracted Canada and culminated in the rebellions of 1837 are pathetic because they were needlessly premature; nevertheless they constituted the final trial and condemnation of the controlled representative system, and when they came to a head the time was ripe for the remedy—colonial self-government complete and unalloyed.

Lower Canada had been entirely loyal to the British connection during the American invasions. Its prejudices would have received little respect in the event of a conquest, and its victory at Chateauguay had been one of the most complete of the war. Sir George Prevost the governor had been personally popular, and his departure was regretted. His successor Sir John Sherbrooke (1816-18) was also well liked, and took a politic step in procuring the admission of the Catholic bishop of Quebec to a seat on the executive council. Nevertheless with this exception the executive was entirely in English hands, and the racial struggle proved to have been delayed rather than averted, when the Duke of Richmond (1819-20) took office. The issue upon which all antipathies concentrated was the collection of revenue and control of

expenditure. The assembly entered upon a feud with the judges and refused to vote adequate and permanent salaries for them and other public officials. It also prejudiced the interests of Upper Canada by manipulation of the customs payable at Quebec. On the question of salaries the Duke of Richmond and his successor the Earl of Dalhousie (1820-28) demanded the provision of a permanent civil list as indispensable to the public service. Failing to obtain this, Dalhousie recommended the reunion of the two provinces, and the British Parliament considered a bill for the purpose in 1822. The Canada Trade Act of that year regulated the customs matter, but the reunion bill was dropped. The proposal gave further offence to the French, although it was welcomed by the British of Lower Canada. During this period Louis Papineau, the speaker of the assembly, stood forward as the most irreconcilable leader of discontent. He was an honest and enthusiastic democrat, but violent in speech and carried away by impracticable ideals of a Canadian nation in which the British element should have no place. He indulged in personalities against Lord Dalhousie and gradually became a revolutionist when opposition hardened against his schemes. It is interesting to compare these nationalist and democratic tendencies in Canada with the similar movements which permeated the whole of Europe during the generation following the Napoleonic war.

The deadlock between the executive and the assembly, overcome only by makeshift expedients such as the payment from imperial funds of monies which the assembly refused, outlasted Dalhousie's rule. An attempt at conciliation in 1831 took the shape of an Act giving control of certain Crown revenues to the Canadian legislatures in the hope that they would then provide a civil list. Upper Canada acceded, but the French province did not. In 1834, under Papineau's direction, the assembly at Quebec passed ninety-two resolutions embodying its grievances and their suggested remedies. The principal demands at this time were: (1) control of finance by the assembly alone; (2) an elective legislative council; (3) the assembly to have a share in nominating the executive council; (4) the abatement of patronage abuses; (5) the remedying of anomalies in land tenure; (6) the discontinuance of the activities of the chartered British American Land Company which brought in British immigrants.¹ Foolish speeches in the British Parliament, such as those of the radical Joseph Hume, fomented the trouble, and the imperial ministers took up the position of refusing to countenance the political demands in the above list. Nevertheless they decided to send out a new governor-in-chief, the Earl of Gosford, at the head of a commission of investigation. Gosford, the first governor who had not been a soldier, failed to render the government's decisions palatable. The Lower Canadian Assembly met for the last time in August, 1837, and passed resolutions of protest. Papineau bitterly declared that all British officials were alike; and he and

¹ Sir C. P. Lucas, *Lord Durham's Report*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1912, 1. pp. 65-6.

his supporters, scarcely considering the gravity of the step, prepared for revolution.

In Upper Canada, a parallel contest had been in progress since the peace of 1814. Here, as we have said, the issue was between old and new colonists—in fact, between oligarchy and democracy. It was now thirty years since the United Empire Loyalists had made the province. As a caste they were beginning to lose their outline and to merge with the general population. Nevertheless their conception of ascendancy lived on in the shape of the Family Compact, the name given to a closely allied body of politicians who monopolized the seats upon the executive and legislative councils, the majority of public appointments, and in general the distribution of patronage. Not all of the Family Compact were U.E. Loyalists; and some of the Loyalists were to be found in the liberal party which opposed the Compact. Yet it is broadly true to say that the latter was the outcome of the Loyalist clan-spirit. Political and economic motives clashed in the matter of American immigration. Loyalist feeling made for the exclusion of American settlers, but their entry increased the demand for, and therefore the value of, land. In practice they were therefore admitted, but subjected to political disabilities such as incapacity to sit in the assembly; and the oligarchical party were naturally tempted to apply these distinctions to other newcomers from the British Isles. One fact emerges from the political record of the time: if the Family Compact was a minority in the state, so also were its liberal opponents; for the latter were by no means consistently successful at the polls, and the Compact had sometimes a majority in the assembly. The bulk of the Upper Canadians, working hard for their living, took little interest in politics, and discontent was neither widespread nor deep-seated. The only question which really caused general indignation was that of the clergy reserves and the distribution of certain other lands. The Act of 1791 had set aside one-seventh of all unoccupied lands for the endowment of a Protestant clergy. This was interpreted to apply only to the two established churches of Great Britain, the Anglican and the Presbyterian. Other denominations, of whom the Methodists claimed to equal the Anglicans in numbers, found themselves excluded. Other lands which caused heartburning were those allotted to discharged soldiers and officers after the signing of peace in 1783 and 1814. These persons frequently had no means of working their grants, and sold them on easy terms to speculators. Hence the genuine pioneer found his holding cut off from those of his neighbours by large tracts of waste, co-operation was hindered, and public works, roads, bridges and the like, were in a backward condition.

Turning to the steps by which the old system of government broke down, we find the first embodied in the case of Robert Gourlay, who emigrated from Scotland in 1817. Gourlay somewhat inadvisedly drew attention to the methods of the oligarchy by directing a series of leading questions on social and political matters to each township in

the province. The fact of his being a newcomer rendered his conduct the more presumptuous in the eyes of the ruling body, and they determined to make him a signal example. They proceeded against him under a statute originally directed against the intrusion of seditious aliens, and sentenced him to banishment. On his refusal to go they imprisoned him for several months, and when he again came before the court his mind had given way. He finally left Canada in 1820. This case proved a Pyrrhic victory for the Family Compact, for it opened the eyes of many to the actual state of the liberties of the citizen in the province. In 1824 William Lyon Mackenzie, another Scottish immigrant, started a Radical and anti-government newspaper, *The Colonial Advocate*. Unlike Gourlay he thrived on persecution, for the sacking of his premises by the young men of the Compact yielded him increased popularity and monetary compensation to continue the struggle. Mackenzie and his friends put their finger on the real sore by demanding the responsibility of the executive ministers to the assembly, a principle which the French Canadians seem never to have appreciated at its true value.¹ Mackenzie became the leader of the reformers in the assembly, from which body his opponents voted his expulsion on trifling grounds on more than one occasion. In 1834 he was elected Mayor of Toronto when that city received its first municipal organization. Sir John Colborne, a Peninsular veteran, was at this time lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada. Whilst deploring the tactlessness of the dominant party he was convinced that the government could only be safely entrusted to their hands, and he therefore gave no countenance to the Liberals. In 1836 he gave place to Sir Francis Bond Head, one of his last acts having been the endowment of forty-four new rectories, to the chagrin of the dissenters. Head at first made a parade of liberal principles and nominated two or three reformers to seats on the council. Soon, however, the Family Compact gained him over, and he so far forgot his dignity as to become their whole-hearted partisan. In 1836 he dissolved the assembly, which then showed a Liberal majority. Mackenzie's people had been talking unwisely about separation from the Empire, and Head seized the opportunity to make loyalty to the throne, which with the bulk of the people was never in doubt, the election issue. By so doing he obtained a majority for his party, but he drove the extremists into the very course of action which he denounced and professed to dread. In the closing months of 1837, in Upper as in Lower Canada, armed rebellion was brewing.²

¹ Prof H. E. Egerton's volume on Canadian history in Lucas' *Historical Geog. of the British Colonies* (vol. v. pt. ii.) should be compared with the works of Bourinot and Lucas, already cited, for this period. Bryce's *History of the Canadian People* gives excellent sketches of the characters and careers not only of Mackenzie but of Bidwell, Rolph and other leaders whom there has been no space to mention in the above account.

² Miss Aileen Dunham, in *Political Unrest in Upper Canada, 1815-1836*, London, 1927, pp. 162-6, makes it clear that the existence of responsible government in the Mother Country was a thing unrealized by many people at this time. It was customary to speak of the Canadian constitution of 1791 as similar to that of Great Britain. The conception of responsibility emerges in Canada in 1828-9.

The rebellions of 1837, regarded as a military effort to separate Canada from the Empire, were of trifling significance. As a political demonstration they were a weighty and successful performance, for they made colonial policy a first-class question with statesmen in England, and led to decisions whose effects were felt thousands of miles from the banks of the St. Lawrence. The actual events need only a brief narration. In November there was a virtual break-down of the civil authority in the Montreal region, the centre of sedition in Lower Canada. Sir John Colborne, who had taken command of the troops there on his supersession by Head in the upper province, took measures to cope with an outbreak. It began with the attempted arrest of some revolutionary leaders. Dr. Wolfred Nelson held an improvised fort at St. Denis and repulsed a first attack by the troops. He was afterwards defeated and captured. Another band of insurgents at St. Charles was likewise dispersed. These places were on the Richelieu River. At St. Eustache, north-west of Montreal, more prolonged fighting took place, and a number of French Canadians with their leader Dr. Chénier were killed when the village was stormed on December 14. All was over in a month from the commencement. Papineau had fled to the United States when the first shots were fired. In Upper Canada the rebellion lasted little more than a week. Mackenzie gathered a half-armed mob and attempted to surprise Toronto. After some parleying, in which Head took a somewhat shifty course, the troops attacked and dispersed the rebels. Mackenzie escaped across the border, and two of his followers were executed. In Lower Canada there were no executions in 1837, but on an attempted recrudescence in the following year Colborne hanged twelve of the ringleaders. In either province an inconsiderable minority had rebelled, against the sense of the people at large whether French or British.

The very feebleness of the revolt might have tempted the British government to misread its significance. Had George III. put down the Bostonians with equal ease sixty years before, we may be fairly sure that he would have made no great modification in the colonial policy of his empire. It is to the credit of Lord John Russell, the most energetic member of the Melbourne ministry of the day, that he realized the need of a thorough investigation of the Canadian question. British statesmen had learnt much since 1774—amongst other things, that a minority can make a successful revolution if its grievances are allowed to fester too long without redress. The ministers therefore turned to the group of men who had for the past ten years been studying colonial questions, and in 1838 Lord Durham sailed as governor-general of all British North America, with Charles Buller and Gibbon Wakefield in his train. Durham was instructed to inquire into and adjust the important questions which had arisen in Upper and Lower Canada, and which might equally arise in the maritime provinces. His orders were vague in detail and evidently designed to leave him a large discretion. The latter was further amplified by an Act suspending the Canadian

constitution. The ground was thus cleared for a new constructive policy.

Although Lord Durham was a Radical in politics he was a believer in civil discipline and in maintaining the cohesion of the Empire. He stayed only a few months in Canada, but in that time he and his assistants accumulated the material upon which he based his *Report on the Affairs of British North America*. His enthusiasm for liberty failed to render him a mere conciliator, glossing over difficulties by a flow of honeyed phrases. On the contrary, he faced hard questions unflinchingly, and gave his considered judgment in courageous terms which made him feared as well as respected in the disturbed provinces. It is this which makes the *Report* a political document of permanent value. Its main conclusions were twofold: that the Canadas must be reunited and that responsible government must be introduced. He declared the former step to be necessary as the only means of overcoming the "idle and narrow notion of a petty and visionary nationality" which had bemused such men as Papineau for twenty barren years. Canada, in his view, must be a united nation, and the French ideals must merge in a common citizenship with those of their neighbours. Responsible government, wherein the people have the choice of the executive ministers to do their bidding, formed the complement of reunion: only by political responsibility could a colony be transformed into a nation. But Durham's conception of responsible government did not carry him so far as the institution extends in practice in our own day.¹ He would have reserved to imperial control the direction of external trade, foreign affairs, and the unoccupied lands, and the power of amending the colonial constitution. Great Britain in his day, it must be remembered, was still a protectionist country, and the Navigation Acts were unrepealed. With regard to the unsettled lands Durham was a disciple of Wakefield, and held most strongly that they were the patrimony not so much of existing colonists as of the crowded masses in the mother-country, "the ample appanage which God and nature have set aside in the New World for those whose lot has assigned them but insufficient portions in the Old." Here, of course, he did not see eye to eye with Canadians whom in all other matters he was ready to entrust with the complete control of their internal affairs.

A party intrigue set on foot by Lord Brougham, his personal enemy, led to Durham's resignation before the close of 1838; and it fell to others to inaugurate the new régime which ensued from his *Report*. The imperial government adopted his proposals in the matter of reunion, but they were not yet ready to concede fully responsible government. That, however, followed within a few years, largely because the *Report* had prepared the soil for it. Many Canadians, it is clear, had not previously realized that it would be the cure for much of their discontent. Lord John Russell's Canada Act of 1840 (in force from

¹ On this point see E. M. Wrong, *Charles Buller and Responsible Government*, Oxford, 1926.

February, 1841) provided for a united Canadian legislature consisting of a legislative council of twenty nominated by the Crown for life, and an assembly of eighty-four (42 from each province) elected on a fairly wide franchise. The executive ministers were to be chosen by the governor-general, which left it open to him to appoint those belonging to the ruling party in the assembly, and thus to inaugurate responsible government, should he see fit, without formal alteration of the constitution.

The political developments of this period have left little space for the record of Canada's material growth. It is best indicated by the statistics of population. In 1815 the latter, including the maritime provinces, amounted to about 500,000; in 1838 to 1,400,000. Lower Canada or, as it was henceforward called, Quebec, was still the most populous region. But the continuous flow of emigration from Great Britain was rapidly bringing Upper Canada (after 1841 Ontario) to an equality. Less than twenty years later, as we shall find, the new province outstripped the old. In 1833 a Canadian-built steamer made the first transatlantic passage accomplished solely by mechanical power. Five years later a regular steamer service began. The wonderful growth of British North American shipping has been noted in a previous chapter. In 1840 there was inaugurated another unifying influence in the shape of cheap postage between the mother-country and the colonies. Prior to that date the average cost of a letter from England to Canada had been between three and four shillings. Afterwards it was scarcely as many pence.

(iii) *The Establishment of Responsible Government, 1841-54*

Lord John Russell's objection to responsible government in 1840 was perfectly logical: if the colonial executive were really responsible to the assembly, it could not at the same time be responsible to the imperial authority, and the latter would be devoid of all control of the colony. Responsible government thus entailed the severance of political supervision. This, in effect, is what has taken place. The common sovereignty of the Crown exists on the tacit understanding that it shall not be actively exercised, and a natural alliance between the British peoples, based upon community of blood, language, institutions and ideals, has supplanted the formal bond of the days of merely representative government. The statesmen of the mid-nineteenth century saw clearly the element of disunion in the new proposals, but scarcely one of them foresaw the natural impulse to alliance.¹ Some were content for the colonies to separate entirely and at once; others, like Lord John Russell, wished to delay the parting and accomplish it by instalments. Durham, the advocate of responsible government, met the objection by proposing to limit its scope and to retain the imperial

¹ For these views see J. L. Morison, *British Supremacy and Canadian Self-Government*, 1839-54, Glasgow, 1919, chap. vii.

control of the colony's external relations. He seems not to have foreseen the certainty that a self-governing nation must sooner or later demand the direction of its own public lands, of its own foreign trade and fiscal policy, and finally, of its foreign relations in general.

The Canada Act of 1840 thus contained no formal grant of responsible government, and the earlier governors-general under that Act received no instructions to inaugurate it. Nevertheless a demand for it at once arose in Canada, and in a few years it was an accomplished fact. The first governor-general of the new series was Mr. Poulett Thomson, better known as Lord Sydenham. He was a sympathizer with Durham's ideas, and sought to avoid the question of principle by identifying himself with the party returned to power at the first election. In 1841 the new Canadian Parliament passed resolutions asserting: (1) That the governor-general is responsible to the imperial authority alone; (2) but that his chief advisers must be in harmony with the popular will; and (3) that it is assumed that the imperial authority shall be exercised in conformance with the wishes and interests of the province.¹ This was to render the working of the Canadian constitution dependent, like that of Great Britain, upon the personal goodwill of the individuals concerned. Viewed absolutely, it did not appear a hopeful arrangement, but the mother-country provided a good precedent, and the ensuing years gradually furnished that training in forbearance, tact, and political good manners which is really indispensable to the working of any constitution however logically it may be drawn. Lord Sydenham died at the close of 1841 leaving to his successor, Sir Charles Bagot, the task of reconciling liberty with supremacy. Bagot, during his short reign (1842-3), simply acquiesced in the demand for responsible government, and wrote to the Colonial Secretary that "virtually it exists."² This progress was too rapid for the Peel ministry now in power at home, and Lord Metcalfe was sent out in 1843 to apply the brake and tighten imperial control. He found the task impossible to fulfil, and succeeded only in becoming thoroughly unpopular and exciting a new period of unrest. He dismissed the Liberal executive based on a majority in the assembly, which he found in power on his arrival, and carried on with a nominated ministry of his own. The experiment would probably have led to serious trouble had not ill-health caused his resignation in 1845. After a year during which the governor-generalship was given, for military reasons, to Lord Cathcart, the office was filled by Lord Elgin, who believed in responsible government and was determined to show that it did not entail the break-up of the Empire.

In 1847, when Lord Elgin took up his duties, England had just adopted Free Trade, the Manchester School was in the ascendant, and *laissez-faire* was the order of the day. Elgin was therefore enabled to carry out his policy without interference from home. His plan was for the governor-general to retire from the foreground of politics

¹ Bourinot, *op. cit.* pp. 168-9.

² Morison, *op. cit.* pp. 126-7.

and to occupy, like the British sovereign, a position as referee and interpreter of the public will. The political colour of the assembly was the sole factor dictating his choice of ministers, and they enjoyed his countenance only so long as they enjoyed that of the elected body. With his rule Canada became a truly democratic state. The latest writer on this period describes him as "the first great constitutional governor-general of Canada," who "remained a consistent guide and friend to his new ministers."¹ He educated both them and their opponents in the niceties of political procedure.

Elgin found the guidance of a newly enfranchised and turbulent democracy by no means an easy task. The ministry of 1848 contained representatives of the French and British races. To do justice to the former a Rebellion Losses Bill proposed to pay compensations in Quebec similar to those already granted in Ontario. The Bill was the signal for an outburst of racial hatred, and a loud demand that the governor-general should exercise his veto. When he refused to depart from his constitutional duty rioters attacked him in the streets of Montreal, an egg struck him in the face, and a shower of stones narrowly missed inflicting more serious injury. In 1849 discontent was rife at the abandonment by Great Britain of her preferential treatment of Canadian corn and at her maintenance of the Navigation Acts, some clauses of which restricted Canadian trade. The mercantile interests raised a cry for voluntary union with the United States and issued an annexation manifesto to that effect. The repeal of the Navigation Acts, followed by Elgin's negotiation of a favourable commercial treaty with the States, stilled this clamour, and gradually imperial loyalty revived in Canada. Two other vexing questions received their solution in the last year of this governor-generalship—those of the clergy reserves and the seigniorial tenures: the former were secularized and the latter abolished. Lord Elgin laid down his office in 1854, having established a tradition which his successors have followed. The contrast between even his early years and those of the rebellion is sufficiently emphasized by the words of Mackenzie, who returned on pardon after ten years' exile: "Had I seen things in 1837 as I do in 1848, I would have shuddered at the very idea of revolt, no matter what our wrongs might have been."

(iv) *Confederation*, 1854-67

The Union Act, which promised to assuage political troubles in 1840, began to reveal its inadequacy to that end fifteen years later. The cause lay in the rapid development of the country. In 1840 Quebec was still the more populous province, but the tide of emigration set strongly towards its western neighbour: no less than 100,000 Irish arrived in a single year after the great famine of 1845. As soon as Ontario began to exceed Quebec in population a demand arose for a

¹ Morison, *op. cit.* pp. 203, 205.

readjustment of the representation in the assembly, which the Union Act had provided with an equal number of members from each province. The French, however, clung tenaciously to the letter of the law, pointing out that in the earlier days it had been unfair to them since their province had then been superior in numbers. A renewal of racial jealousy was the result of raising this question. In the assembly the two nationalities kept a watchful eye upon one another, and no ministry could hope to live unless it could conciliate a majority of both. Any necessary expenditure upon public works in one province had to be balanced by an equal outlay, necessary or not, in the other. Extravagance, jobbery, and an increase in the public debt were the consequences; and the western province grew more and more restive at the checks imposed upon its activities by its smaller and less progressive neighbour. From the nature of the case the grievance was one which must grow instead of subsiding. Ontario never ceased to claim the preponderance which it considered its due. Quebec, on the other hand, was likely to rebel if the claim were granted. These were the circumstances which gave birth to the idea of confederation—of union for national purposes and provincial separation for the conduct of local affairs.

In the meantime the maritime provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island had been developing without much contact with Canada proper. The battle for responsible government had been fought and won in them somewhat later, the last to attain it having been Prince Edward Island in 1851. Here there was no racial complication, and a similarity in geographical and industrial circumstances led the three provinces to discuss the question of a federal union amongst themselves in the summer of 1864. Canada at the time seemed naturally out of this scheme since there was no railway communication with her, and transit was almost impossible during several months in each year.

With necessity as the spur the confederation movement in Canada went steadily forward. In 1858 it was submitted to the imperial government, which showed itself scarcely alive to its importance. The subsequent realization of the scheme was thus purely the result of Canadian initiative in every stage. The Conservative and Liberal parties had as their respective leaders (Sir) John A. Macdonald and George Brown, who have been aptly compared as the Disraeli and Gladstone of Canada. In spite of party antipathies each realized the need for confederation, and Brown, who championed the interests of Ontario, let it be known that he would act with his opponent for that purpose only. It is in fact recorded that after successfully achieving their joint object they never again spoke to one another. Fortunately, on the greatest occasion in their careers public spirit rose superior to that of faction. Brown and Macdonald formed a coalition ministry and convened a conference to work on the confederation question in the autumn of 1864. Having gone thus far Canada turned to the maritime provinces and invited their co-operation. They suspended their own conference,

and their delegates, prominent amongst whom was Sir Charles Tupper, the premier of Nova Scotia, merged their deliberations with those of the Canadians at Quebec at an inaugural meeting on the 10th of October, 1864.

The Quebec conference in fourteen working days passed seventy-two resolutions embodying the whole plan. In its final form the Confederation comprised the following chief elements. The executive government of the union was vested in the British Crown and the Governor-General acting on its behalf. The Governor-General was to appoint and remove from time to time the members of the privy council, *i.e.* the cabinet ministers composing the acting executive. The legislature was to consist of one parliament of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Commons. Senators were to be nominated by the Governor-General and removable for non-attendance, bankruptcy, felony or change of residence from one province to another. Members of the Commons were to be elected in the several provinces in numbers proportionate to their populations. The Canadian Parliament so constituted was to possess legislative power in all matters not expressly reserved to the provincial legislatures. The latter, varying in their composition, and presided over each by the lieutenant-governor, retained in general the control of purely local questions, and of revenue raised for provincial purposes. Two other decisions were of practical importance: the seat of government was fixed at Ottawa; and the construction of an intercolonial railway from Halifax to the St. Lawrence was to begin not more than six months after the Act should take effect.

The outlines having been drawn, it remained to secure the assent of the British government and of the several provinces. The former was a foregone conclusion; to the latter the distribution of financial liabilities was the chief obstacle. Finally the Canadas, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia agreed to enter the Confederation. Prince Edward Island temporarily stood out, and Newfoundland has done so permanently. These negotiations were a work of time, and it was not until the close of 1866 that Canadian statesmen were able to place the matter before the British government. Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, raised no objection, and on July 1st, 1867, by the British North America Act, the Confederation of Canada began its career. The name suggested by Canadians for the united country was that of the Kingdom of Canada. The home government, out of deference to American sensibilities, altered "Kingdom" to "Dominion." The matter, from the British point of view, seems unimportant; nevertheless it is one upon which Canadian opinion is still inclined to be sensitive owing to a fancy that "Dominion" connotes some lingering shadow of a claim to domination.¹

¹ See lecture on confederation by Prof. George M. Wrong, delivered in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary in 1917; printed (with others) in *The Federation of Canada*, Toronto, 1917.

It is natural to compare the union of Canada with that of the United States. The principal point of difference is that whereas the former accords to the national government all functions not expressly reserved to those of the constituent provinces, the latter gives the state legislatures all powers not expressly reserved to the national government. The difference produced in actual working is considerable; and it was the breakdown in the United States in the years 1861-5 that had a great effect in determining Canada upon the course she adopted. In the choice of the executive the Canadian constitution follows the British model in leaving it to the sovereign to appoint his ministers from the party enjoying a majority in the House of Commons. Here again the divergence from the American practice, with its separation of the executive from the legislature, is complete.¹

We have now traced the evolution of Canadian government to its final form, or to the form at least which it has retained for over sixty years. Complete provincial separation was tried and found wanting. Legislative union of the two chief provinces also failed. The compromise, of union in separation, has succeeded, and it is difficult to imagine any other system, under which the great subsequent expansion of the country could have taken place. For the federal constitution is elastic; it admits new provinces without disturbance, and it adjusts itself easily to changes of relative weight in the old. Under it the French of Quebec have remained French, and still have gone forward as Canadians. Taking a wider view also, we can see that the corporate strength of the Empire has gained greatly by the consolidation, imitated later in Australia and South Africa, of many small units into a few large ones.

(v) *The Growth of Canada*

The record of political development in the south-eastern portion of the present Dominion of Canada has carried us forward to the year 1867. It is now necessary to hark back for the greater part of a century in order to trace the successive steps by which British occupation extended from the banks of the St. Lawrence northwards to the Arctic and westwards across the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. The pioneer work in these vast regions was done not by agricultural settlers but by fur-traders, explorers and gold-seekers.

For more than fifty years after the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 the Hudson's Bay Company pursued the even tenor of its way undisturbed by war or the competition of rivals. Jealous persons indeed brought charges against it in 1744, accusing it of the mismanagement of its great trust; but a parliamentary enquiry left its position unimpaired. The British conquest of Canada heralded the end of this peaceful state of affairs. At Montreal several vigorous trading firms conducted by

¹ For a full comparison see lecture by Z. A. Lash, "The Working of Federal Institutions in Canada," in the collection above cited.

Scotsmen supplanted the former French fur-collecting monopoly in the lands west of the Great Lakes. From 1766 onwards these Montreal adventurers pushed ever more vigorously into the north-west, and in 1787 they combined amongst themselves to form the North West Fur Company. The Hudson's Bay adventurers had hitherto confined their trading posts to the shores of the Bay and the rivers flowing into it—the Rupert's Land secured to them by their early charters. The North West Company, by entering the regions to the south and west of Rupert's Land, threatened to divert much of the trade at its source, and the older body began to find the volume of produce brought in to its posts diminishing. Sir Alexander Mackenzie, a member of the Montreal company, performed great work in exploration. In 1789 he journeyed northwards to the Great Slave Lake, and thence by canoe down the river which bears his name until he stood, first of white men, upon the northern shore of Canada, and looked out upon the Arctic sea. In 1793 he pushed westwards over the Rocky Mountains and reached the Pacific, being the first man also to accomplish that feat by a land journey. Simon Fraser and many others followed in his steps and completed the exploration of the region afterwards known as British Columbia. By sea Captain Cook had discovered Nootka Sound, and a settlement began there in 1788. Five years later Vancouver charted the island named after him, and the surrounding coasts. Americans were also busy in maritime exploration of the western coast-line, a fact which gave rise in later years to a serious territorial dispute.

Mackenzie and his friends about 1796 seceded from the North West Company and set up the New North West or X.Y. Company; but in 1804 the two bodies reunited and carried on with increased vigour their competition with the Hudson's Bay monopoly. The latter now seriously bestirred itself to push southwards the effective sphere of its operations. The Earl of Selkirk had at this time a controlling interest in the Hudson's Bay Company, and in 1811 he obtained from it a concession to plant an agricultural colony upon the Red River, in the present Manitoba. Selkirk's management of the undertaking endured until 1818. The North West Company showed great hostility to his settlers, and in 1816 their employees killed his governor and about thirty other persons. The colony languished but never entirely disappeared. The population ultimately developed into one of French and English half-breeds and semi-civilised Indians. The Hudson's Bay Company repurchased Selkirk's claim from his heirs in 1834, and Manitoba remained under its management in a backward and disorderly condition. In 1821 the long strife between the Hudson's Bay and North West Companies was ended by an amalgamation. Henceforward for a generation the whole territory from Ontario to the Pacific lay under the control of one vast organization. It had, however, not a permanent sovereignty but only a licence to trade in the Indian lands which lay beyond the scope of the original Hudson's Bay charter.

At two points of prime importance the boundary of Canada with the United States remained undefined, and the progress of population in either country rendered a settlement necessary. The Treaty of 1783 had described the limits of Maine, New Brunswick and Quebec in ambiguous terms, for which faulty surveying and the haste of the negotiators were chiefly to blame. Maine became a full-fledged state of the Union in 1820 and began immediately to insist on a very liberal interpretation of its claims. Arbitration failed to solve the difficulty, and the matter remained a standing menace to peace until Lord Ashburton and Daniel Webster, the American secretary of state, settled it by treaty in 1842. The Ashburton Treaty, whilst not yielding to the extreme American claim, went far in that direction, and Canada had to resign about 6000 square miles of territory to which she was convinced she had a right. Americans, however, were equally chagrined, and a recent authority concludes that substantial justice was done.¹ From the Lake of the Woods, west of Lake Superior, it had already been agreed that the boundary should follow the parallel 49° N. as far as the Rocky Mountains. West of the Rockies another urgent problem had arisen. Russian pioneers crossing Behring Strait had occupied Alaska, and by a treaty with Great Britain in 1825 Alaska stretched down the Pacific Coast to latitude 54° 40' N. South of this the North West Company's explorers and traders had formed posts down to the Columbia River in 46° N. But Americans had also entered the same region, and an American claim was now put forward to the whole Pacific Coast up to the Russian frontier, involving the exclusion of Canada from the ocean. For some time a joint control of Oregon, as the whole land west of the Rockies was called, afforded a temporary alleviation of the difficulty. Lord Ashburton's treaty did not settle it, but four years later a decision became imperative, since the rival claims were leading to dangerous war-talk between Britain and America. In 1846, therefore, the Oregon Treaty was signed at Washington by which the line of 49° N. was continued westward of the Rocky Mountains to the shore of the mainland, and the whole of Vancouver Island (reaching somewhat south of that limit) was assigned to Great Britain. The purchase of Alaska from Russia by the United States in 1867 led to yet another boundary question, which, however, did not become pressing until the early years of the twentieth century.

The settlement of the western boundary affected immediately the interests of the Hudson's Bay Company, which still enjoyed the trading monopoly of the west. In 1848 Vancouver Island was placed under the Company's control, and although colonists began to settle, progress was very slow. By inclination and nature the great Company was not a fit power to preside over colonization. To the very last it sought to discredit the agricultural value of its territories, for it saw that

¹ Egerton, *op. cit.* pp. 32-4. For a remarkable, but not fully substantiated, story concerning the manipulation of the evidence in this negotiation, see Bryce, *op. cit.* pp. 28-9.

settlement was inimical to the fur trade. And where it had settled subjects, as in Vancouver and Manitoba, its methods of government were inclined to be reactionary. In the mainland region secured by the Oregon Treaty an accidental circumstance complicated the position. In 1856 the discovery of gold on the Fraser River caused a stream of immigrants to flow in. The Company's officials could not hope to control such a population, and the solution was found in creating the territory a Crown colony in 1858 under the name of British Columbia. In a few years the usual demand for popular government arose, together with a desire for union with Vancouver Island. The latter had already an elected assembly, and the union was carried out in 1866. At the same time the confederation of eastern Canada was taking place. Under the Dominion constitution it was possible for new provinces to be admitted, and British Columbia saw the advantage of joining the Confederation whilst retaining her own local legislature. She applied for and obtained membership of the Dominion in 1871.


The question of the lands between Ontario and the Rocky Mountains demanded a solution in the same decade, 1860-70. Manitoba was thinly and poorly settled, but beyond that the prairies were tenantless save for Indians and traders. In spite of denials it was becoming evident that this region was fit for cultivation, and there was a danger that Americans would enter and set up a kind of moral claim to annexation. Far-seeing men, particularly in Ontario, realized the land-hunger of the United States, evidenced by its successive purchases and threats of conquest; and they concluded that the future safety of Canada demanded the extinction of the Hudson's Bay Company as a territorial power. The matter came up in the first Dominion Parliament in 1867. The Company, reconstructed four years earlier, recognized that its days of sovereignty were numbered, and submitted with a good grace. In 1869 it surrendered to the Crown the whole of its territories, with certain small reservations, on payment of £300,000. This of course did not prejudice its position as a trading body, in which character it flourishes to the present day. The transfer, and some tactless proceedings which accompanied it, gave alarm to the wild inhabitants of Manitoba. Thinking their interests imperilled, some of them rebelled under the leadership of Louis Riel. During the winter of 1869 confusion prevailed, but the revolt was put down in August, 1870, by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Riel escaped, to return and head another rising of the half-breeds in the western territory in 1885. On this occasion he was captured and hanged. Manitoba was raised to the status of a province of the Dominion in 1870, Rupert's Land and the remaining parts of the north-west being administered as territories (*i.e.* without local self-government) until such time as they should be more closely peopled.

Provinces admitted later to the Dominion have been Prince Edward Island (1873), and Alberta and Saskatchewan (1905). The two latter cover the region between Manitoba and British Columbia, and extend

English Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500.

Principal Railways . ++++++

1 = New Brunswick
2 = Prince Edward Island



as far north as 60°. In 1912 Manitoba sought and obtained a similar northward extension: her northern frontier is now also lat. 60°, and her north-east corner touches the shores of Hudson's Bay so as to include Port Nelson. At the same time Ontario was extended northward to the shore of the Bay, and Quebec to that of Hudson's Strait on the Arctic sea. The remainder of Canada consists of the two territories of Yukon and Mackenzie in the extreme north-west, and of the coast-strip of Labrador, administered by Newfoundland. The inland boundary of Labrador was long undefined and has only recently been settled by a decision of the Privy Council, whose Judicial Committee is the supreme legal court of the Empire.

Railway construction has played a great part in linking up Canada into a united Dominion. In the forties a proposal was on foot for a line from Nova Scotia to the St. Lawrence, but at the time nothing came of it. The first important line actually completed was that between Quebec and Montreal. About 1860 the Grand Trunk railway from Montreal to the western lakes was partially constructed, but the work proved to be long and expensive. One of the conditions of the original confederation had been the speedy making of the intercolonial line between the Maritime Provinces and Ontario. Nine years saw the completion of the task, and the railway was opened in 1876. When British Columbia entered the Dominion she did so under a similar condition, that a great transcontinental line should be made from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts. This undertaking proved more difficult than had been anticipated, owing to the backwardness of investors of capital; and parts of the line were constructed as government works. After long delay a new syndicate took up the matter in 1881, and in 1885 the Canadian Pacific Railway was an accomplished fact. Its effect on the peopling of the west has been boundless. Politically also it has tended to bind the western provinces to Ontario and Quebec instead of their being allowed to fall, as at one time seemed probable, under the influence of their southern neighbour. Two other transcontinental lines, the Canadian Northern and the Grand Trunk Pacific, have since been undertaken, and numerous connecting links are circulating population and commodities through hitherto stagnant parts of the Dominion.

CHAPTER V

THE FOUNDATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COLONIES

(i) *Circumstances leading to Colonization*

THE early discovery of Western Australia by the Dutch, if not by the Portuguese, led to no scheme of colonization. The explorers found the coast devoid of any promise of a lucrative trade and unsuitable for settlements of the plantation type, and their reports convinced the Dutch East India Company that "New Holland" was a worthless discovery upon which it need bestow no further attention. For a long period after Tasman's voyage enterprise languished. William Dampier's two visits in 1689 and 1699 were only to the western coasts and led to no result. Stray navigators continued to sight the southern lands, and occasional writers in England and France advocated their colonization. One of them, de Brosses, in the middle of the eighteenth century, even suggested a penal settlement, arguing in the optimistic fashion of the time that "criminals tend to cure one another of crime, and disorder destroys itself." His work was reprinted in English and may have had an effect on subsequent undertakings, but nothing immediately came of it.¹

The explorations of Captain Cook in 1770 were the real prelude to colonization, for Cook was the first navigator to examine the eastern coasts, and to report upon their advantages. Sir Joseph Banks, who had accompanied him, was permanently impressed with the fertility of the soil, and it was he who bestowed the name of Botany Bay upon an inlet which revealed some specially luxurious vegetation. Cook, it should be noted, did not discover that Tasmania was a separate island. It continued to be thought part of Australia for ten years after the British occupation had begun, for it was not until 1798 that Dr. Bass, adventuring in an open boat, discovered the straits that bear his name.

The determining impulse to the colonization of Cook's New South Wales was undoubtedly the loss of the American colonies in 1783, although it is often forgotten that there was another motive that might sooner or later have operated by itself. The American secession contributed in two ways. At the close of the War of Independence

¹ Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, vol. vi. Australasia, by J. D. Rogers, pp. 18-19.

the Loyalists remained to be provided for. Most of them, as we have seen, went directly into British North America, but a good many came to England, where the government was puzzled to know what to do for them. It was then proposed that they should be settled in New South Wales, and although nothing came of the suggestion it did draw attention to the vacant coast. Another and a more pressing problem arose from the same cause. Ever since the foundation of Virginia and Barbados it had been customary to send English felons to the plantations as an alternative to putting them to death. In 1717 the system had been fully legalised, and sentences of transportation continued, even after 1783, to be regularly passed. But the American plantations were now closed to transportation, and the West Indies had long given up employing white bondservants, for those of criminal character would obviously be a dangerous element to mix with negro slaves. After 1783 there were experiments in transportation to West Africa, which usually resulted in the death of all concerned; and humanitarian opinion, voiced by Burke, condemned the process as barbarous. For some years the authorities adopted the makeshift of confining felons in hulks in the Thames estuary; but revolts and escapes occurred, the prisons grew more congested, and it seemed obvious that some new outlet must be found. Hence arose in practical shape the plan of a penal settlement in Australia, a plan which made a plausible appeal to philanthropists by the hope of reformation which it held out. To the sceptical the idea also seemed good, for transportation had hitherto been a cheap means of getting rid of undesirables. For a penal colony pure and simple without free capitalists to act as exploiters of labour there was no English precedent. The nearest approach to it had been Oglethorpe's experiment in Georgia for the benefit of debtors. Nevertheless, the movement gained ground, and Pitt, although not personally enthusiastic, was persuaded to sanction it.

Such is the best known side of the story, but there was another, closely connected with the mercantile imperialism whose continuance after 1783 has been unwarrantably neglected. James Maria Matra, a Corsican who had sailed with Cook, assisted Sir Joseph Banks in drawing proposals to place before the government. In his plan the convicts were an afterthought, brought in because the authorities were interested in their disposal. But his original idea was to form a settlement with a minimum number of white men, and to recruit labour from the Pacific Islands and China.¹ The fact that few whites would be needed was put forward as a virtue of the scheme, for the doctrine still held favour that emigration of any but undesirables was a loss to the mother-country. Since the loftiest philanthropists were not as yet concerned with finding Christian homes for Kanakas and Chinamen, the New South Wales project was evidently one for founding a plantation colony of the type dear to the mercantilist, managed by white men and worked by semi-servile natives. The possibilities of the coast were quite unknown.

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, ix. 736.

It might grow spices in competition with the Dutch Indies; it might provide a commodity to exchange for China tea. It would be a beginning in the new ocean Cook had opened up, a Virginia of the Pacific.

Pitt was not greatly interested in the mercantile view of colonies, but he was anxious to find a place of transportation, and so, with the convicts added, he took up the scheme. There is a possibility that even he saw something more in it than a mere penal settlement. His was a mind that did not run in narrow grooves, and it is unsafe to argue from his respect for Adam Smith that any particular mercantile project could make no appeal to him; he judged cases on their merits. In 1787 an expedition equipped by the French government was known to have sailed for the South Seas, and after much discussion the ministry acted. Botany Bay was declared a penal colony in pursuance of a permissive Act passed three years before, and the direction of the enterprise was entrusted to Captain Arthur Phillip, an officer of distinguished service in the navy. Phillip's instructions were to annex, not merely a site on Botany Bay, but the entire eastern half of Australia from longitude 135° to the coast and from Torres Straits to Van Diemen's Land. Nor was this all, for he was to claim in addition all islands adjacent to the east coast and within the parallels covered by it. Whatever may have been Pitt's real intentions—and most probably he had not decisively formed them—there was no doubt in the minds of Phillip and his officers about the ultimate nature of their mission. They were going to retrieve in the Pacific what their country had just lost in the Atlantic: "all sailed with empire in their heads."¹

(ii) *The Foundation of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, 1788-1823*

Captain Phillip, with an expedition numbering some 1100 persons in all and including 750 convicts of both sexes, sailed by way of the Cape of Good Hope. After halting at that point he pushed on with an advanced party and reached Botany Bay on January 18, 1788. He was dissatisfied with the conditions at that locality and immediately went on in person to Port Jackson, the next inlet to the northward. There he found a deep-water harbour which he named Sydney, and to it he transferred the whole enterprise ere a week had elapsed from the first landfall. Thanks to its euphonious title Botany Bay has attained a celebrity which it has not deserved, for it never was after that first week the headquarters of the penal settlement. The French expedition under La Pérouse hove in sight at the moment the transfer was being made. Its commander may have intended annexation in his country's name, and if so he found himself forestalled by six days. After exchanging civilities with Phillip he sailed away and was never heard of more. Forty years afterwards wreckage found on a lonely island was identified as that of his ships.

¹ Rogers, *op. cit.* p. 48.

At Sydney Phillip came to grips with his task. It was one which had confronted no other Englishman of his time, for he had to establish a colony in a virgin continent uninhabited by civilized man. At first sight Virginia suggests itself as a parallel, but in reality no close comparison is possible. The climate at Sydney was reasonably healthy, and the natives, although they might become troublesome, were not dangerous. They were few in number, poorly armed, and incapable of sustained and intelligent effort to resist the newcomers. The eighteenth century was trespassing upon the stone age, and there was never any doubt of the issue. The governor's chief anxiety lay in the character of his colonists. There were probably among them a few unfortunate men who should never have been sent to gaol, but the majority were dissolute scoundrels without the habit of work and amenable only to the lash. The women were mostly of a character which rendered them unfit to be—as in historical fact they were not¹—the mothers of the young and vigorous nation which has since occupied the southern land. Whilst touching upon this point it may be as well to indicate in a few words the social condition not only of Sydney but of all the penal settlements in their early days. In general, it was one of brutal crimes, brutal punishments, and universal depravity, with men and women in the proportion of three to one. There were few opportunities for the work of reformation, and little use was made of those that presented themselves. From the moment when the convicts were herded into the transports they lost whatever chances they might have had in England of retrieving their past. Even those few who completed their sentences and rose as freed settlers to material prosperity commonly lived in the colonies after a fashion which would have brought them into trouble again at home. As a philanthropic experiment transportation was an utter failure. To control these unpromising pioneers the governor had his officers and a handful of marines. In 1790 the home authorities raised the New South Wales Corps to take over this duty, and its officers and time-expired soldiers, receiving grants of land, became the first free settlers of Australia.

Governor Phillip stayed until 1792. He saw the colony through the anxious period of establishment, and by his firmness and good discipline averted an early disaster from famine. The cultivators were unskilful, and the first crops failed. Starvation more than once threatened annihilation, but on each occasion the timely arrival of food-ships saved the situation. Not until 1794 did New South Wales provide sufficient corn for its own needs, and it was some years later still before stock-breeding was successful: at first it seemed probable that cattle could not be acclimatized. The lack of manufactured goods was also acute. In 1798 the whole colony was said to be "actually naked," none having clothes to wear by day or blankets in which to wrap themselves

¹ On this point see A. Wyatt Tilby, *Australasia*, London, 1912, preface and pp. 88-9. After an examination of the evidence the author comes to the conclusion that the convict stock died out, having little part in the ancestry of present-day Australians.

at night. Soon after the foundation of Sydney it became necessary to find some remote spot in which to segregate the worst characters, and Phillip chose Norfolk Island, 1000 miles out in the Pacific, for the purpose. Lieut. Gidley King accordingly colonized the place in 1788, and reported that it was fertile and promising. On Phillip's departure the military officers carried on the government until 1795, when another naval governor, Captain Hunter, made his appearance. During his rule the colony gradually struggled to security as regarded the barest necessities of life. But at its close (1800) the home government was contemplating abandonment on account of the great expense. The pleading of Sir Joseph Banks is said to have averted the decision. Free settlers, consisting principally of officials and ex-soldiers, began to take up land and farm on a sufficient scale. Private enterprise thus gradually supplanted state rationing in the provision of foodstuffs, and to a slight extent the social organization lost the entirely military character which it had assumed at first.

Captain King, the pioneer of Norfolk Island, succeeded Hunter in 1800. During his governorship several important developments took place. Whalers and sealers began to frequent the coasts, and merchantmen from New England and the west coast of South America to arrive with trading cargoes. English trade with the colony was hampered until 1813 by the fact that the East India Company claimed the monopoly of commerce in the Pacific, and did little to turn its privilege to account. Coal had already been discovered on the Hunter River, to the north of Sydney, and the new settlement of Newcastle provided sufficient fuel for the colony's needs, and even exported small quantities to Bengal. Social difficulties were now accentuated by the excessive importation of rum. There was a scarcity of coin in New South Wales, and rum became the effective currency by which labour claimed payment and necessities were exchanged. The military officers, as the only free capitalists, monopolized the liquor import with unfortunate results among a population in which the moral tone was already low. To the credit side of this period we may place the establishment of sheep-breeding as the staple industry. John Macarthur, a captain of the New South Wales Corps, obtained sheep from South Africa and India, and by careful experiments produced a strain which yielded excellent wool. Returning to England in 1801, he aroused the interest of the authorities, and obtained a grant of 5000 acres of pasturage. Other men of substance went out with him to Sydney, and Australian wool soon became an element of world-commerce. By this time many convicts had served their sentences and remained in the colony as freed settlers, or emancipists, as the local jargon termed them. Few showed any aptitude for work and self-improvement, and they formed an intermediate class between the bond and the free which caused infinite trouble to successive governors.

In 1803 the fear of French designs led to the colonization of Van Diemen's Land. During the peace of Amiens Napoleon had sent out

an exploring mission which paid close attention to the southern coasts of Australia. The governor of New South Wales therefore sent a detachment of convicts and guards to form a subordinate station at Hobart. In after years Van Diemen's Land received more convicts than did the parent colony, and in general they seem to have been of a more ruffianly type. They found in the island a breed of aborigines who were genuine paleolithic savages, and by a sustained and brutal war of extermination they killed out the whole race. Escaped felons kept the island in constant alarm, and the word "bushranger" was first coined in 1817 to describe them. This atmosphere of crime and cruelty could have had few temptations for free settlers. Nevertheless some did go to Van Diemen's Land, and in later years they took the first steps in the colonization of Victoria across the straits.

On King's resignation in 1806 the authorities made an unfortunate appointment to the governorship. Their choice fell upon Captain Bligh, a man whose courage had been publicly recognized by Nelson, but whose harshness whilst commander of the *Bounty* had caused his crew to rise in mutiny and turn him out in mid-ocean to take his chance in an open boat. Bligh, apparently from perversity more than from principle, took the course of favouring the despised emancipists and humiliating the military officers by every means in his power. He evinced a violent hatred for Macarthur in particular, swore to strip him of his land, and finally had him arrested on inadequate grounds. Bligh's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to force the officers to a decision which imperilled their own fortunes. They overpowered the governor, expelled him from the colony, and wrote their justification to the authorities (1808). The home government sent out a soldier, Colonel Lachlan Macquarie, to reinstate Bligh for twenty-four hours and then to take over his office.

Macquarie's reign (1809-20) was the longest among those of the early governors. He had a definite policy which he forwarded in spite of opposition. It was that New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, as penal settlements, existed primarily for the benefit of convicts, serving and freed, and that the interests of free settlers had no title to consideration. He therefore discouraged free immigration and encouraged emancipists, by grants of land and appointments to public offices, to make some effort to recover their self-respect. Macquarie was in this matter short-sighted, for, as subsequent history has shown, the future of Australia belonged not to the convict but to the free man; but he is entitled to the credit of having been the only highly-placed official who tried to turn the miserable transportation system to a good end as regards its individual victims. Macquarie found growing difficulty in carrying out his policy after 1815, when the cessation of the Napoleonic wars led to an increased emigration from Great Britain. The bulk of these emigrants, it is true, went to Canada and the United States, but a fairly steady trickle, mostly of a superior class, found its way to New South Wales from this time onwards. Another event

had an immeasurable influence upon the future of the colony. Inland expansion had hitherto been blocked by the range of the Blue Mountains, which ran roughly parallel to the coast at a distance of about sixty miles from it. In 1813 pioneers found a pass through the mountains and discovered Bathurst Plains, a rich grazing country beyond. The governor acted with energy and in two years had a road completed over the pass. At once stock-breeders moved westwards beyond the boundaries of settlement, and huge herds of sheep tended by a few nomadic white men became the advanced guards of a new wave of colonization. This was the first period of Australian land-exploration, when a succession of daring pioneers began to trace the courses of the rivers of New South Wales and to survey the ground for future exploitation.

Macquarie left Sydney in 1820, and his successor, Sir Thomas Brisbane, arrived in the following year. Free settlers were now becoming influential and were acting as employers of the better-behaved convicts. For the more desperate characters the system of exile to remote settlements was extended. Some of the worst went to Van Diemen's Land, others to Norfolk Island, abandoned at the beginning of the century but now re-occupied, and others to Brisbane on Moreton Bay, the germ of the later colony of Queensland. Sir Thomas Brisbane took a less active part in politics than Macquarie had done, and his tenure of office resembles an interregnum between the absolute monarchy of the early governors and the slightly more liberal régime which followed. In 1823 the imperial Parliament passed an Act for the government of the New South Wales which came into force in the following year. It provided for the limitation of the governor's authority by a nominated council with certain legislative and financial powers. There was no elective element, but some of the councillors were drawn from the ranks of the settlers. A chief justice was placed in charge of a supreme court, and trial by jury was established in civil cases, although the military officers were still to decide in criminal causes. Van Diemen's Land was erected into a lieutenant-governorship with similar constitutional machinery, and soon became virtually independent of Sydney. The legislative councils obtained increased numbers and scope by a further law of 1828.¹

The two colonies were now in transition from the purely military organization under which they had been founded to the civil government natural to Englishmen. They were also on the eve of a period of dispersion of population which led to the planting of new settlements. In New South Wales Phillip had established less than 1000 persons in 1788. By 1800 these had increased to close on 6000, and by 1821 to 30,000, of whom one-twentieth were free settlers, one-fourth ex-convicts, one-fourth children, and the remainder serving convicts, soldiers and officials. At the latter date the colony was reputed to possess 250,000 head of sheep and cattle. Van Diemen's Land was peopled by about 10,000 white men in 1824.

¹ Edward Jenks; *The Australasian Colonies*, 3rd edn., Cambridge, 1912, pp. 156-60.

(iii) *New South Wales and its offshoots, 1824-59.*

The outstanding features of this period are the exploration of the entire continent; the rapid growth of free emigration, leading after a bitter struggle to the abolition of transportation; the introduction first of representative and then of responsible government; the differentiation of enterprise into stock-raising by the squatters, agriculture, and urban industries; the discovery of gold with its great consequences; and finally the marking-off of the districts north and south of New South Wales into the separate provinces of Queensland and Victoria. These developments, coupled with the planting of Western and South Australia, to be treated in a separate section, constitute the true foundation of the Commonwealth as it now exists; and, viewed in this perspective, the penal era becomes, not an essential stage in the building of the nation, but rather a mistaken experiment which failed to ripen to any permanent result. Transportation may have saved the southern land from becoming a French possession. Apart from that it seems probable that Australia would not wear a radically different aspect to-day had it never been thought of. As an attempt to colonize by government action exclusively, early New South Wales forms the one great exception to the general rule of British expansion. It might have succeeded after some fashion had it been left alone; but private enterprise crowded in upon it, swamped the government experiment, and brought the colony into line with the other extensions of the British race in Australia and elsewhere.

Australian inland exploration somewhat conveniently falls into the same grouping as the spread of colonization—or perhaps it would be truer to say that colonization has followed the lines of discovery. Thus we have one group of explorers working from the Sydney area and opening up the interior of New South Wales, tracing its river system, and reaching that part of the southern coast which faces Tasmania. Another group, also based on Sydney, struck northwards in search of grazing lands, and so penetrated Queensland to the York Peninsula and the Gulf of Carpentaria. Meanwhile settlements were springing up on the shores of South Australia at Adelaide, and of Western Australia at Perth. From them explorers went from Adelaide northward and from Perth eastward to see what Central Australia had to offer; and from these efforts arose the first crossings of the continent from east to west and from south to north. The whole period of the great inland journeys occupies some sixty years from the first passage of the Blue Mountains in 1813 to the desert voyage of Sir John Forrest in 1874.

The New South Wales discoveries come first in chronological order. The early pioneers, after pushing westwards through the mountains, discovered the Lachlan, Macquarie and Murrumbidgee Rivers without, however, fully tracing the courses of any of them. Squatters soon

occupied the new grazing country thus made available. The next move was a semi-circular sweep to the west and south by Capt. W. H. Hovell and Hamilton Hume in 1824-5. The explorers crossed the rivers already mentioned and a new one since named the Murray; then they passed over a mountain range and down through the centre of what is now Victoria to the sea at Port Phillip. Three years later Allan Cunningham made a corresponding semi-circle to the west and north. He found the Liverpool plains and Darling Downs, crossed various rivers, and discovered a new pass through the coastal mountain range which brought him out to the sea at Brisbane. These journeys led to a great extension of the grazing area, an increase in the business and population of Sydney, and a consequent inland removal of the frontier of agricultural settlement. A geographical mystery now presented itself. Numerous rivers, great and small, were known to be flowing in a general westwardly direction from the inland slope of the great coastal watershed of which the Blue Mountains formed a part. Yet the shores of Australia had been by this time fairly accurately surveyed from the sea, and no great estuaries had been found which would provide an outlet for these streams. Whither did they lead? One theory was that they all mingled to form some great river whose mouth had been somehow overlooked, but whether it lay on the northern, western or southern coast, no man could say. Another suggestion, firmly believed by many, was that these waters must all be lost in some large inland sea in the unknown interior. If this inland sea existed it was obviously worth seeking, for it might be expected to be the centre of a fertile region. Captain Charles Sturt did much to solve the problem. In 1828-9 he and Hume went westwards from Sydney and struck the Darling River and some of its affluents. The Darling, so far as they could follow it, was flowing south-west. A year later Sturt descended the Murrumbidgee to its confluence with the Murray, the Murray to its confluence with the Darling, and the combined stream, the lower Murray, to its outfall into the southern sea at Encounter Bay. This outfall was so masked by lagoons and bars that the seamen who had charted the coast had never guessed the existence of a great river behind these obstacles. Sturt's discovery partially solved the river mystery, for almost all the waters of New South Wales drained into the Murray. There were, however, many streams in the interior of Queensland which did not do so, and the theory of an inland sea still held its ground. Meanwhile the revelation of South-Eastern Australia was completed. In 1836 (Sir) Thomas Mitchell struck southwards from the middle course of the Murray to the sea at Portland Bay. In doing so he traversed the rich lands of Western Victoria, which he named Australia Felix. Four years later Angus McMillan discovered another fine grazing region in Eastern Victoria, then named Gippsland. The northward journeys of Leichhardt (1844) and Mitchell (1845) accomplished similar work in Queensland. Leichhardt went north-westerly right through Queensland and past the Gulf of Carpentaria to Port

Essington in the Northern Territory. In 1848 he set out to cross the entire continent from east to west through its central line, but with his seven companions he disappeared into the unknown, and no trace of the party was ever found.

Sturt's discovery of the Murray's outfall led to the founding of South Australia and its capital of Adelaide. From that city other expeditions sought to solve the problem of Central Australia. In 1840-1, E. J. Eyre, afterwards governor of Jamaica, rode northwards and found the "inland sea" in the shape of Lakes Torrens, Gregory and Eyre. They were a great disappointment, little more than mud and salt patches in the midst of a burning desert; and into them drained, when they did not dry up by the way, the promising streams from the Queensland mountains. Eyre, unable to push farther north, turned westwards, and made his way, accompanied at last by a single native, right along the arid shore of the Great Australian Bight until he reached the settlement of Albany in Western Australia. In 1844-5 Sturt also went north from Adelaide, finding dried-up watercourses, terrific heat, and sandy deserts in the country beyond Lake Eyre. He discovered the Diamantina River, and to the northward "another region of forbidding desert, gigantic ridges of blood-red sand . . . and all around them and beyond them were the salt snow-white beds of waterless lagoons and dry salt creeks like huge shining serpents writhing through the gloomy landscape."¹ The season indeed was one of exceptional drought, but such a country could never be inviting. The first south to north passage of the continent did not take place until 1861 when R. Burke and W. J. Wills crossed from Melbourne to the Gulf of Carpentaria, and perished in attempting the return journey. In 1862 McDowall Stuart crossed by the harder and more central route from Adelaide to the north. Ten years later an overland telegraph on this line linked Adelaide with Port Darwin and thence by cable with the outer world.

The explorers of Western Australia on pushing inland from the coast found in general the same waterless, desert conditions in the interior of their province. Perhaps the most notable journey in this region was that of (Sir) John Forrest in 1874 from the coast eastwards to the telegraph line and thence to Adelaide. It was now evident that, failing some scheme of irrigation which only the future might bring forth, the principal value of these desiccated areas would be mineral rather than agricultural.

In Eastern Australia, the magnified New South Wales as annexed by Phillip in 1788, huge pastoral regions had been revealed, and in the track of every successful explorer there followed the squatters with their flocks of innumerable sheep. The resultant growth in the output of wool is understated by the fact that in New South Wales the export increased twenty-four fold in money value between 1826 and 1854.² The actual increase was at a still greater rate, for in the latter year

¹ Tilby, *op. cit.* p. 163.

² Rogers, *op. cit.* p. 89.

Victoria was no longer part of the parent colony, and South Australia was contributing its share. Wool production dictated in large measure the course of social development in the pastoral colonies. The export trade made Sydney, and later Melbourne and Adelaide, great seaports. An urban population thronged these cities, employed in commercial and industrial pursuits. And between the squatter and the ports there was needed an ever-expanding belt of agricultural land to supply foodstuffs to the multiplying people. The squatter, who claimed that he was the real maker of all this prosperity, was always in trouble with the authorities about the terms on which he occupied his land. The extreme view was that the waste belonged to the existing colonists, and that he who first pushed into the unknown and seized it had a moral right to ownership. The effect of this would have been to lock up vast areas, capable of subsequent improvement and needed for subsequent agriculture, in the hands of a few lucky pioneers. A class of plutocrats would have held the whole country in its grip, and a revolution would have been needed to burst the bonds. The imperial government took a sounder but at the time a less popular view. It enforced the ancient feudal doctrine that all land within the dominions of the crown belongs to the crown unless some individual can prove his legal title to it. And the method of disposing of the crown land on terms which should be just and favourable to the whole community became the subject of much theorizing and much experimental legislation.

Until 1831 the distribution of land remained virtually within the discretion of the successive governors of New South Wales. They allotted fair-sized holdings for cultivation to officials, ex-soldiers and free immigrants of respectable standing, and also smaller grants to ex-convicts. Under some regulations sent out from home in 1824 it was laid down that the whole territory was to be surveyed and valued, and the land distributed by sale. But the survey was impracticable, and as the free grants were to be continued to the classes above indicated, only the specially valuable town plots could command a price of any sort upon the market. This cheapness of land led to a scarcity of labour, since no man would be a servant when he might easily become a proprietor. It led also to a dispersion of the population over a larger area than was necessary and consequently to a loss of communal efficiency. The labour difficulty was merely palliated by the assignment of convicts to the farmers, for the convicts were incompetent and unruly, and generally gave more trouble than they were worth. Another attempted solution, that of employers paying the passage of labourers from England on promise of so many years' service, also broke down, for such covenants were easily evaded. These considerations led in 1831 to a new regulation by which all land was to be sold by auction, with a minimum price of five shillings per acre. This was cheap for agricultural land, but far too dear for the unsurveyed wilderness in which the squatters pastured their sheep. The squatters

to New South Wales led to Brisbane being thrown open. It became the nucleus of a business and farming population, and the first land sale for the neighbourhood took place in 1842. The Act of that year foreshadowed an ultimate separation from the parent colony, for it divided New South Wales into three districts, northern, middle and southern, with a separate land and emigration fund for each. The squatters, short of hands, favoured the continuance of the convict system, and even went so far as to import Chinese labour in 1849 in opposition to the public opinion of Brisbane.

Victoria, in many ways the most favoured region of Australia, waited long for its advantages to be appreciated. In 1803, it is true, New South Wales, in fear of French designs, advocated its colonization. Colonel Collins took a party of criminals by sea to Port Phillip, but the local conditions discouraged him and he proceeded to the settlement of Van Diemen's Land instead. Another short-lived settlement existed from 1825 to 1828 a few miles from the scene of Collins' landing, but this was also abandoned owing to scarcity of water. The permanent occupation of the country arose from Van Diemen's Land. In 1834 a Kentish family, the Hentys, moved from that island and established a whaling centre, supported by agriculture, on Portland Bay. Next year John Batman, also of Van Diemen's Land, formed a private syndicate known as the Port Phillip Association, and in the manner of William Penn made a so-called treaty with the aborigines, by which he secured the cession of 600,000 acres of land for an annual payment of trade goods. Since he had no authority for this transaction the governor at Sydney, who claimed jurisdiction, informed him that he was a trespasser upon crown property. The Colonial Office, at this time under the apathetic rule of Lord Glenelg, also totally disapproved of the formation of new colonies entailing more responsibilities for the imperial government. The settlers nevertheless persevered, and their superiors had to bow to the accomplished fact. There was a steady influx of pioneers from New South Wales, and in 1836 the governor sent his representatives to set up a civil government. In the following year he appeared in person and marked out the site of Melbourne. Land sales took place according to the established rules, and Batman's somewhat preposterous treaty was set aside. He himself died in misfortune, but some of his associates did well. Melbourne grew into a thriving centre, always retaining a grudge against subjection to distant Sydney. Here, as in Queensland, separation was obviously certain to follow when a certain stage of development had been reached.

Van Diemen's Land, during this period, slowly followed the example of New South Wales in becoming a country for free colonists. Its convicts were more numerous and of a more villainous character. Its aborigines, cut off by the sea from escape, proved intractable, and were exterminated after a prolonged war. The survivors in 1835, less than two hundred in number, were deported to Flinders Island. The last individual died in 1876. The bushrangers—escaped convicts—

were more dangerous than the unfortunate natives, but they also were hunted down as free immigration increased. Their crimes were atrocious, but they had the excuse that no more awful prisons existed in the world than the penal settlements of Macquarie Harbour and Port Arthur. Among the notable governors of this period were Colonel Arthur (1824-36), who did much to assist free colonization and commercial prosperity, and Sir John Franklin, the Arctic explorer, whose mildness and humanity produced little effect upon the savage manners of the colony.

Transportation to New South Wales continued in full force for fifty years after its inauguration. Until 1830 convicts formed the great majority of the immigrants. After that date assisted emigration began to alter the proportion, and towards the end of the thirties free men landing at Sydney outnumbered the felons. At the same time a generation of colonial-born free men was springing up, and with it arose a demand for the abolition of the whole convict system. It became evident indeed that New South Wales could never become a normal country as long as transportation continued. The system of assigning three-fourths of the prisoners to private employers relieved the extreme severities of the earlier treatment. But crime was still rampant, together with drunkenness and immorality. In 1833, when the population was about 60,000, there were 69 death sentences; in 1834, 83; and in 1835, 71. If the same proportion held good in the British Isles at the present day it would mean a thousand sentences of death every week. These figures approach the record of the French Reign of Terror. The chief justice remarked in 1833: "it would appear as if the main business were the commission of crime and the punishment of it; as if the whole colony were continually in motion towards the several courts of justice."¹ It is not surprising that decent men raised a passionate outcry against this state of affairs. In 1837 a Parliamentary Commission in England reported in favour of discontinuance. The following year saw the abolition of assignment, and in 1840 the last convict ship discharged its cargo of felons at Sydney. Ticket-of-leave men and pardoned offenders were still sent for a few years more; but when in 1849 the home government attempted once again to land a cargo of serving convicts Sydney flatly refused to receive them, and the system ended for ever in New South Wales. Van Diemen's Land had been the first to protest; it received more and worse criminals; and it was not freed from the stigma until 1853. Then, in order to wipe out painful memories, it changed its name to Tasmania, which it has borne as a free colony ever since. Norfolk Island, where the conditions rivalled those of Van Diemen's Land, was not finally cleared until 1856. Meanwhile Western Australia, where the labour shortage was acute, actually petitioned for convicts and continued to receive them until 1868. Then only was transportation at an end

¹ Cited in Tilby, *op. cit.* pp. 57-8. The number of convictions for capital offences greatly exceeded the number of death sentences.

in the British Empire. The total number transported from 1788 to 1868 was 137,161.¹

The government of New South Wales, under the laws of 1823 and 1828, had been vested in the governor and a nominated council. This arrangement continued until 1842, when a new constitution of the representative type came into force. The Act of 1842 extended the number of the councillors to thirty-six, of whom twelve were to be nominated for five years each, and twenty-four elected by the colonists on a middle-class franchise roughly equivalent to that existing in England at the time. Of the twelve nominated councillors only six were to be officials. This legislative body was to control the colonial revenue and expenditure with the important exceptions of the land fund and a fixed civil list for the payment of officials. It had the usual power of legislation subject to the veto of the governor, and it also had authority to extend the franchise whenever it should see fit. In the reservation of the land fund and of the civil list we see the reflection of Lord Durham's Report and of the bitter Canadian struggle of Papineau's time; and in the absence of any provision for rendering the executive officials answerable to the council we are reminded that in 1842 British statesmen were by no means reconciled to responsible government in the colonies. That system in fact was only in process of realizing itself by the spontaneous action of the Canadians. Yet, considering the social condition of New South Wales and the extent of the convict element still surviving, it is plain that the constitution was a liberal one, calculated to train the community for a fuller exercise of political independence. An accompanying scheme for municipal bodies to take over local administration was premature, and broke down in practice. An imperial Act of 1850 extended the representative type of government to Tasmania, South Australia, and the newly separated colony of Victoria.

The separation of Victoria was really inevitable from the time when Melbourne became a city and the surrounding district a favoured area of settlement. The chief reason lay in the geographical obstacles which made it harder to travel from Sydney to Melbourne by land than by water, and really converted the southern coast into an overseas dependency of New South Wales. The land regulations of 1842 set up a separate fund for Victoria, and the constitutional Act of that year empowered it to elect six members to the New South Wales legislature. Suitable candidates with leisure to undertake the distant duty were not to be found; and in 1848 the Victorians emphasized the fact by ironically electing Lord Grey, the Colonial Secretary in England, as their sole representative. In 1850, as we have seen, the imperial parliament was passing measures for the extension of representative government in Australia, and it included in them one by which Victoria became a separate colony with the Murray River as its northern boundary. This came formally into effect on July 1st, 1851.

¹ Tilby, p. 84.

In that very year gold in large quantities was discovered near Bathurst in New South Wales. It had long been predicted by geologists that this would be the case, and the great discovery arose from the fact that a prospector returning from California noticed a similarity in formation between the Bathurst region and the gold area of western America. The government at once issued proclamations permitting gold-digging upon crown lands on payment of thirty shillings a month for a licence. In theory the government could have claimed the whole monopoly of the output; in practice it was wise enough to foresee that no force at its disposal would avail to stem the rush of excited adventurers eager to be rich. Hardly had the Bathurst sensation begun to abate than a still richer find was reported from Ballarat in Victoria, not six weeks after the latter became a separate province. Here the fortunate few picked up nuggets like mushrooms in an English pasture, and a rush of immigration set in such as no British colony had ever seen before. In 1850 Victoria had about 70,000 inhabitants; in 1855 there were 333,000. Port Phillip was crowded with derelict ships from which all hands had deserted the instant after anchors had been dropped. Nor was the new industry a transitory affair, for as the alluvial deposits of Ballarat were exhausted a new quartz-mining centre at Bendigo came into prominence. As knowledge of gold-mining increased, other portions of the continent revealed their treasures, and the mines of Queensland and Western Australia as well as those of Victoria remain fruitful to the present day. The huge disturbance in the social system of Victoria inevitably produced disorders. The licence fee became a chief grievance, for the majority of the diggers earned no more in real value than an ordinary mechanic's living. The police became demoralized by bribery and desertion, and even magistrates yielded to the prevailing temptation. Towards the end of 1854 a party of the miners at Ballarat revolted against the licence duty and against non-representation in the legislature. They occupied an entrenchment called the Eureka Stockade, from which regular troops were employed to expel them. The engagement caused about forty deaths, but it led to a clearing of the air. Authority had shown its strength, and proceeded next to introduce reforms. Victoria, in common with the other colonies, received a new constitution in the following year, whereby the franchise was adjusted to include the miners. The licence fee was also reduced to a nominal amount. Disorder in the goldfields was really slight in comparison with the extent of the emergency. Had the like arisen amongst men of other than British nationality it is fairly safe to assert that hundreds rather than dozens of lives would have been sacrificed ere a settlement could have been reached.

The introduction of responsible government, the struggle for which played so prominent a part in the history of Canada, took place in Australia with very little friction, if we except a short agitation in New South Wales. This was largely because the whole principle had

been fought for and settled in Canada ten years before Australia was ripe for it. The Acts of 1842 and 1850, which conferred representative government, contained clauses providing that the colonies might themselves devise alterations in their constitutions, to be submitted for the approval of the crown. After the gold rush had somewhat subsided New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia proceeded to act upon this power, and each drew up a constitution having the effect of introducing responsible government. The necessary Acts received the royal assent in 1855. The detailed arrangements varied in each case, but in general the constitutions sought to imitate the British model. In each the governor represented the Crown at home, an upper chamber corresponded to the House of Lords, and a lower chamber to the House of Commons. New South Wales decided for a nominated upper chamber; the other three colonies for one elected on a restricted franchise. The lower chambers were all to be elected on a wide democratic franchise. The pith of responsible government lies in the harmony of the executive ministers with the majority-opinion of the popular chamber. This, in the British constitution, is entirely unwritten and a matter of custom. In the Australian constitutions it remained very nearly so.¹ In both countries the popular control of finance renders government impossible if the custom be disregarded. It was the transference of fiscal control from imperial to colonial hands which really entailed responsible government. This had been mainly effected in 1851-2, soon after England became definitely a free-trade country. The old nominated executive ministers, who were permanent officials, gave place after 1855 to colonial cabinets supported by popular majorities. At first, owing to lack of political training, government under the new régime was an uncertain matter, and the lives of cabinets were reckoned in months rather than years;² but in time things settled down and Australia secured political tranquillity coupled with liberty under the only system the Empire has so far devised to that end.

The development of the northern territory of New South Wales, centring round Brisbane, caused similar heartburnings to those which had separated Victoria from its parent state. The growth of population was slower than in Victoria, or separation would have been accomplished much earlier. As it was, the demand was granted in 1859, when the region had some 30,000 inhabitants. The new colony received the name of Queensland and entered at once into the enjoyment of responsible government. In area it is twice the size of New South Wales, and its capital, Brisbane, lies in the extreme south-east corner. This has given rise in modern times to a demand for yet further subdivision into two or even three self-governing states, but for the present Queensland retains its boundaries of 1859.

¹ For analysis of the constitutions of 1855 see Jenks, *op. cit.* pp. 233-51.

² Constitutional deadlocks were particularly prevalent in Victoria. For the moderating influence of the Colonial Office on these disputes see Egerton, *Colonial Policy*, pp. 378-85.

(iv) Western and South Australia

The colonization of Western Australia is linked with the later undertaking in South Australia by the fact that the Wakefield school made the misfortunes of the former their text upon which to preach the model scheme of settlement they wished to see adopted in the latter. In their eyes there was a complete antithesis between the two colonies. In practice the contrast was considerable, although not so extreme as they painted it, for they exaggerated the ill-success of the western settlement and they did not secure a complete acceptance of their views in the southern.

The movement to plant upon the Swan River in Western Australia arose from a glowing report upon the amenities of the region made by Captain James Stirling in 1827. After examining the coast he declared it to be of "the greatest natural attraction—not inferior . . . to the plain of Lombardy." The imperial government countenanced the scheme owing to fears of French and even of American intrusion. It was, however, totally unwilling to expend public money, or to grant a proprietary charter to private capitalists in the manner of the seventeenth century. In the end it came to an agreement with the capitalists whereby they were to receive huge grants of land in return for taking out labourers and their families—in the general ratio of forty acres for every £3 so invested. The civil government was to remain under imperial control through the medium of a governor and a nominated council. There was to be no convict element in the population from the outset. Prominent among the undertakers was Mr. Thomas Peel, a relative of Sir Robert, who received 250,000 acres and sank altogether £50,000 in the enterprise. The first governor was Captain Stirling, who also received a large grant of 100,000 acres.

Stirling reached the Swan River with an advance party in June 1829, and proceeded at once to mark out the port of Fremantle and the capital of Perth nine miles inland. These towns remained mere skeletons for many years. Peel appeared in December with 300 persons, of whom about sixty were adult males. By the end of 1830 other arrivals brought the population up to 4000. Serious disadvantages at once showed themselves. The land was not so fertile as the first prospectors had alleged. Although there were good patches they were intersected by bad ones, and the omission of a preliminary survey caused many to select unfavourable spots. The vast areas allotted to individuals led to undue dispersion over an unmapped wilderness. The anchorage was unsafe during part of the year, and many ships were wrecked. And above all, the superior attraction of the established colonies in the east tempted labour to desert the new settlement. Land-owners could not enforce the covenants of their servants, and some of them, finding themselves unable to work their estates, cut their losses and went to New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land to retrieve

their fortunes. It seems evident that the promoters had bestowed insufficient forethought on the organization requisite for planting 4000 persons on a virgin soil. They invested ample capital in the enterprise, but most of it was lamentably wasted by the necessity of feeding a crowd of people who could not at once be set to profitable labour. Had they begun on a more modest scale they would have prospered better. New South Wales, even under military discipline and state rationing, had eaten up the public money at the rate of £180 per settler during its early years. The private persons who planted on the Swan River, with no such power of strict control over their helpless and hopeless dependants, were unable to withstand the strain ; and government declined to spend a penny in their aid.

A period of depression set in almost at once. For three years the colony failed to feed itself, and had to purchase its supplies in Van Diemen's Land, and even from the Dutch Indies. By 1832 the population had dropped to 1500, mainly by re-emigration, for there is no evidence of actual deaths from famine. Immigration entirely ceased for a decade, since moneyed men were frightened by the bad accounts sent home, and there was no fund to assist the poorer class of emigrants. The government, it is true, introduced the same regulations for land sales as in the other colonies, but the lavish grants of the first years, coupled with the scarcity of labour, rendered land a drug on the market, and none could be found to buy from the state at the minimum price fixed. Thus the remedy of an emigration fund drawn from the sale of crown land was inoperative. Nevertheless the year 1832 proved to be a turning-point. Those who had held on during the bad time began gradually to attain a moderate prosperity, which alone was warranted by the nature of the soil, and population grew by natural increase to 2300 in 1840, and to 4600 in 1849.

By the latter date the landowners had entirely lost the prejudice against convict labour which had been one of the original motives of the settlement. New South Wales had refused to take in more felons, and Van Diemen's Land was seeking to be rid of them. Western Australia petitioned the authorities to send them. The Colonial Office granted the request, and a great stride forward in material prosperity was the result. Convicts entailed not only cheap labour but also government expenditure in the colony, and by 1859 the population had grown to 15,000. Farming and stock-raising and a certain amount of mining were the chief industries ; the great days of the West Australian goldfields were yet to come. Transportation had the disadvantage that whilst it endured representative government was virtually impossible. Nevertheless the majority of the colonists were content, and the motion for abolition came from without. The other colonies complained that transportation to Western Australia contaminated their own society, and demanded its discontinuance. A movement was even set on foot to boycott the offending province. Somewhat reluctantly the British government yielded, and the last

shipload of felons disembarked in 1868. Two years later Western Australia obtained a representative constitution similar to that of New South Wales in 1842.¹

Shortly after the plantation and early failure of Western Australia Gibbon Wakefield formed his Colonization Society and the period of systematic colonization set in. To Wakefield's mind Western Australia, with its land virtually sold at 1s. 6d. an acre, was a shining example of the way not to found a colony. He and his followers were never weary of improving upon the occasion, and they allowed themselves a certain extravagance in their remarks upon it: "The first grantee took his principality at the landing place; and the second, of course, could only choose his outside of this vast property. Then the property of the second grantee compelled the third to go further off for land, and the fourth again was driven still further into the wilderness. At length, though by a very brief process, an immense territory was appropriated by a few settlers, who were so effectually dispersed that, as there were no roads or maps, scarcely one of them knew where he was."² This was to some extent true, although over-coloured, but it diverted attention from another truth, that neglect of detail and personal failings were quite as much to blame as faults of principle. On this point the systematic colonizers had still much to learn by bitter experience.

As soon as news came to hand of Sturt's discovery of the lower Murray the new school marked down that region as the destined scene of their own model colony. They formed a South Australian Land Company, and promised to plant a settlement on joint-stock principles without expense to the public. The Colonial Office demurred, holding the scheme to be chimerical and disapproving also of the implied alienation of political control from the imperial authority. Wakefield persevered, and in 1834 drew together an influential body named the South Australian Association. This consisted mainly of intending settlers, who resigned the joint-stock idea and combined on regulated principles. It held public meetings, converted the Colonial Office, and secured the passage of the Act of 1834 which authorized the undertaking. By this measure three Commissioners in England and one in the colony were to control the distribution of land, the emigration of suitable persons, and finance in general. At the same time a governor of crown appointment was to exercise the usual political power of his office. Land was to be sold at a uniform price finally fixed at twelve shillings an acre; and the commissioners might raise a loan, secured upon future revenue, for the initial expense of public works and

¹ For the foundation of Western Australia the earlier accounts should be checked by a reading of Mills' *Colonization of Australia* (1915), chap. iii., which puts a fresh complexion on the matter, and of J. S. Battye's *History of Western Australia*, Oxford, 1924, an exhaustive work, which likewise shows that the Wakefield story of the failure was exaggerated. The complaining settlers were generally of the type which would fail anywhere.

² Wakefield, quoted in Egerton, p. 269.

surveying. No convicts were at any time to be sent to the colony. The weak points of the scheme were division of authority between the commissioners and the governor, and the mortgaging of the colony's future income to pay interest on the initial loan. Wakefield also declared that twelve shillings per acre was not a "sufficient" price in his sense of the word. He laid down £2 as the minimum necessary to yield an emigration fund adequate to maintain a proper supply of labour; at the lower figure he prophesied "a second Swan River." He further criticised the commissioners as unsuitable persons, untrained to the magnitude of their responsibilities. On paper, however, the plan seemed perfect, and there was much talk of "self-supporting colonization" as if it were some newly-discovered scientific principle.¹

The first party arrived in St. Vincent Gulf in the summer of 1836, and Colonel Light, the surveyor-general, decided upon the positions of Adelaide, the capital city, and its port. As at Swan River, embarrassment arose from the large number of emigrants treading too closely upon the heels of the pioneers. Many were able and anxious to buy land and set to work, but the surveying was in arrears. Consequently a great proportion of the colonists remained in Adelaide, consuming their capital and engaging in the purchase and sale of invisible lots of land to retrieve their fortunes. Emigration from home, continuing at a rapid rate, helped to make the confusion worse. Things were in this state when Colonel Light died after working heroically on the survey, and Captain Hindmarsh, the first governor, was recalled (1838). Colonel Gawler, his successor, found the colony on the verge of an ugly crisis. To relieve distress he embarked upon lavish public works. These provided employment, but were paid for by large drafts upon the commissioners in England, so that in 1840 there was a debt of £300,000 and the majority of the 15,000 colonists were in Adelaide instead of working upon the land. At length the commissioners were at the end of their tether, and Gawler found his bills dishonoured. He left for home in 1841, to be made the scapegoat for a financial failure to which, at most, he had been only a contributing party.²

The next governor, (Sir) George Grey, straightened the complicated situation with unbending firmness and without respect of persons. A large area of land had by now been allotted, and only awaited labourers. Grey forced these out of Adelaide by cutting down the payments for government work to a bare subsistence level. There was considerable grumbling, but prosperity resulted. In little more than a year the area under actual cultivation rose from 2,500 to nearly 20,000 acres, and in 1842 no more than a third of the 17,000 inhabitants remained in the capital. From this time South Australia never looked back. The settlers were in general of an excellent type, and responded to wise leadership. When in 1845 Grey was transferred to New Zealand there was no break in the progress he had inaugurated. An act of 1842

¹ Mills, *op. cit.* pp. 236-40.

² See Jenks, *op. cit.* p. 133, and Mills, pp. 246-52.

abolished the authority of the commissioners and made the province an ordinary Crown colony. The commissioners had been blamable for a good deal of mischief in financial matters, but they had done creditable work in the selection of emigrants. By 1849 the population totalled 52,000, and in fulfilment of a promise embodied in the original statute the imperial authority granted representative government similar to that already established in New South Wales. This constitution was enacted in 1850, and came into force in the following year. Responsible government followed in 1855.

The South Australian undertaking has often been described as initially a failure. Financially this was so, owing to faults both in system and personnel. But the fact remains that a large population was successfully established in a short time without any of the sufferings so often associated with new ventures in colonization. The expenditure was much greater than had been anticipated, but all experience proves that this was inevitable. Bacon's words of wisdom written in the seventeenth century still held good two hundred years later. As a trial of the Wakefield theory the colony was an inconclusive example, for Wakefield failed to get his recommendations adopted in many important details. But broadly it did justify the principle of selling land rather than granting it free of charge, as had virtually been done in Western Australia.

The Australian colonies were now founded, peopled, and endued with self-government in all essential matters. In the course of the next half-century their task was to develop their resources, to assimilate new immigrants, to evolve a social order suited to their possibilities, and a political constitution which should reveal them to the outside world for what they really were—a single British nation. The record of that development, whilst remaining in one aspect their local concern, is in another a part of the story of the British Commonwealth as a whole; and from that standpoint it will be treated in subsequent chapters of this book.

CHAPTER VI

THE COLONIZATION OF NEW ZEALAND

THE colonization of New Zealand, the modern dominion which most nearly resembles the mother-country in many of the conditions of its life, began in a very different manner from that of Australia. For something approaching a precedent we must look back to the first part of the seventeenth century, when buccaneers, exiles, and similar adventurers were forming by individual enterprise the first English and French settlements in the West Indies. Two hundred years later we see the same conditions repeating themselves in the Pacific—fertile islands, warlike man-eating savages, traders, seamen, runaway convicts, white men with a taste for barbarism, ambitious adventurers with visions of personal sovereignty, and the distant English government in a sluggish mood, waiting for its hand to be forced by the pioneer upon the spot; in the later picture there is but one new figure, that of the missionary with his enormous power, generally—in the Pacific at least—exercised for good. Of such elements is the history of New Zealand composed during the half-century after its first effective contact with the men of western Europe.

Soon after the foundation of Sydney in 1788 the colonists began to take an interest in New Zealand, so named by Tasman, and noted for its fertility by Captain Cook. As early as 1792 whalers and traders were making their rendezvous at the Bay of Islands on the eastern side of the northernmost peninsula. Some were migratory, others settled permanently in a society without law or government; a few went over to the Maoris, tattooed their bodies, and lived the savage life. Escaped felons from New South Wales and broken nondescripts from everywhere resorted to the same region. Others of like character settled on the shores of Cook Strait between the North and South Islands, and yet others at Foveaux Strait cutting off Stewart Island in the far south. They were for the most part English, although a few were Americans, and after 1815 Frenchmen began to make their appearance. By 1839, when Great Britain at length decided to assume sovereignty, there were computed to be in all some 2000 white settlers. They found the Maoris in the main hospitable, for the white man's firearms were coveted for the uses of tribal warfare. The Maoris themselves, as their traditions showed, had come centuries before from some other land. They were

organized in many tribes, attached to their lands, possessed of a traditional literature of legends and songs, always at war, and in the habit of eating their prisoners. They were more intelligent and quicker to learn than most savages. At the opening of the nineteenth century some of their chiefs visited Sydney and even England; they early realized that the white man was a force to be reckoned with, and that mere unreasoning resistance would not dispose of him. There were at this period from 70,000 to 100,000 Maoris in the North Island and 5000 in the South Island.

It was not long before tales of crime and outrage began to reach New South Wales. In the circumstances they were inevitable, and the trouble was of such a nature that it must increase with the passage of time. Conditions of spontaneous origin rendered it essential that some governing authority should sooner or later take charge of New Zealand. Great Britain was the nearest established power, but the British government long sought to evade full responsibility by various half-measures which gave no effective results. A private philanthropist, the Rev. Samuel Marsden of New South Wales, made the first move. In 1814 he went to the Bay of Islands, founded a mission station, and made a good impression upon the Maoris. He continued his work at intervals until his death in 1838. He and his fellow missionaries found that European adventurers were purchasing tracts of land for trifling payments of guns and trade goods. They followed the example and bought up lands themselves, partly to hold in trust for the natives, partly to provide for their own families. In this early period the Church Missionary Society worked on the eastern side of North Island and the Wesleyan Missionary Society on the western.

New Zealand had been formally annexed by Captain Cook in 1769, and in 1787 it had been included in Phillip's commission for New South Wales. In 1814 it was claimed again as a dependency of New South Wales. All this had been purely nominal, but now, just as the British government began tentative steps to enforce order in New Zealand, it coupled with them a disclaimer of possession. An Act of Parliament in 1817 placed British subjects in savage countries within the criminal jurisdiction of the nearest British colony, and this measure, being made applicable to New Zealand, implied that the country was "savage," *i.e.* not under British control. This denial of possession continued until 1839, and had no effect in preventing British subjects from resorting to the country. In 1826 a New Zealand Company was formed and sent out a few settlers, but dissolved owing to lack of money and of government support. Seven years later the British government tried another half-hearted experiment in controlling without ruling. It sent James Busby as resident magistrate to the Bay of Islands to promote order among the adventurers living there. But Busby without armed force could do little: he was known as "the ship-of-war without guns." Meanwhile the French were beginning to show interest. In 1822 Charles de Thierry, a person of fertile but unbalanced mind,

purchased land, and later styled himself sovereign of New Zealand. The French government did nothing until 1839. In that year its ministry of marine recommended the annexation of South Island, but circumstances in Europe prevented the plan from being taken up. The latest historian of these matters holds that, whatever the ambitions of private Frenchmen, there was no real competition between the British and French governments: "if there was any 'race,' it was a race in procrastination."¹ Nevertheless there were two French companies floating schemes of settlement in 1839.

So far we have been considering sporadic efforts of little individual weight. But in the late thirties a more determined movement began in England, which forced the hand of the government and led rapidly to effective annexation. The Wakefield party of systematic colonizers were occupied with the South Australian preliminaries until 1836, but just as South Australia entered the stage of action Gibbon Wakefield broke off his connection with it because he was not allowed to have his own way in the management. He now advocated the colonization of New Zealand and in 1837 procured the formation of the New Zealand Association. This body consisted of intending colonists and of men like Lord Durham and Sir William Molesworth, who joined for public reasons without claiming any financial interest. Wakefield's model was the Puritan colonization of New England, and the Association applied for a charter which should confer powers of government as extensive as those obtained by the Massachusetts Bay Company from Charles I. The New Zealand Association met with a rebuff from Lord Melbourne and his Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg. These ministers refused to back the Association's Bill in Parliament, where the proposal was accordingly rejected.

The inspiration to this decision came undoubtedly from the missionary interest, which at this date was hostile to colonization. The well-known Report of the Aborigines Committee of 1837 had laid it down that contact with European intruders (other than missionaries) was inevitably harmful to native races, and this principle was accepted by Sir James Stephen, Glenelg, and the bulk of religious opinion in England. But the weak point of the argument lay in the fact that New Zealand was actually being colonized by miscellaneous adventurers, mostly scoundrels, and that nothing could prevent the process from continuing if the government held its hand. Wakefield was therefore able to point out that the missionary aims would be best served by placing settlement under the control of a recognized corporation which could be held to account for its native policy. The reasoning was sound, but it is evident that personal ill-feeling between Wakefield and Stephen counted for more than logic. Objection was raised on a technical point in the constitution of the Association. That body was therefore dissolved and its members reunited as the New Zealand Company in 1839.

¹ J. S. Marais, *The Colonization of New Zealand*, Oxford, 1927, p. 97; but A. J. Harrop, in *England and New Zealand*, London, 1926, accords considerable importance to the French movement.

The logic of the existing situation in New Zealand now compelled Stephen and Glenelg to admit that colonization must be officially permitted. Before anything more had been done Glenelg gave place to Lord Normanby as Colonial Secretary, although Stephen remained as before the power behind the throne. Their policy became that of annexation by the Crown and of economic but not political control of settlement by the Company. Stephen and Normanby were willing to promote a charter to this end on condition that the Company would purge its Board of Directors of some individuals obnoxious to the missionaries.¹ The Company refused, and the charter again seemed unattainable. This was the situation in the summer of 1839, and the New Zealand Company then despatched a colonizing expedition without waiting for further recognition. The government was thus obliged to annex New Zealand without more delay to prevent the business from slipping out of its hands. Captain William Hobson, as lieutenant-governor under the governor of New South Wales, received his commission and instructions in August, 1839, and reached the colony in February, 1840. Finally, Lord John Russell, Normanby's successor, decided to recognize the Company. In 1840 it received a grant of 160,000 acres from the Crown, and in 1841 the long-sought charter of incorporation.²

The new governor's first acts were to proclaim all land titles invalid pending investigation and to summon a meeting of the Maori chiefs to discuss the subject. Misunderstandings on the land question were the cause of all the trouble in New Zealand for the next thirty years. The Maoris had a land law of their own by which the tribe as a unit was the owner of all the soil occupied by its members. No individual, not even the chief, had the right to alienate land without the common consent. Nevertheless many individuals had been pretending to do this, tempted by Europeans who misunderstood or ignored the native law; and in consequence sales took place which were afterwards repudiated. Further complication arose from the numerous inter-tribal wars and conquests, whereby a block of land might be occupied and sold by *de facto* owners, whilst *de jure* owners might be hovering in the background to step forward at a favourable opportunity and assert their rights. On more general considerations, also, tension was certain to arise, for the native was wasteful in his use of the land; he required a larger area for his support than did the white man, and pretensions that seemed quite just to the Maori tribe were regarded as excessive by the incoming colonists. When the pioneers of the New Zealand Company came upon the scene in 1839-40 the situation entered a difficult stage. Their agents made large but doubtfully legal purchases on the shores of Cook Strait, and certainly did not pay the fair value of the land.³ The whole Wakefield theory precluded any substantial

¹ Harrop, p. 65. It is evident that Stephen was not opposed to responsible government, or even to a chartered company. It was the particular management in view to which he objected, on personal grounds.

² Marais, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³ Harrop, pp. 193-4.

payment to native owners, for it was based on the payment of purchase money to a white authority which should use the proceeds as a fund for assisting emigration.

At the moment when Hobson arrived, in February, 1840, the significance of the Company's policy was scarcely apparent. Hobson at once convened the chiefs of the North Island, and with the aid of the missionaries secured their consent to the Treaty of Waitangi. This document laid it down in clear language that the native tribes submitted to the Queen's authority on guarantee of their possessions; and that if at any future time they should be willing to part with land the Crown should have the first right of purchase at fair prices. The Maoris always claimed that this treaty rendered sales by individuals invalid. In September Hobson fixed the site for a capital at Auckland on an isthmus between the eastern and western seas in the north part of the island. At the same time New Zealand was created a separate colony from New South Wales. Hobson was made first governor with nominated executive and legislative councils.

The New Zealand Company disliked the choice of Auckland for a capital, and determined to push the colonization of Cook Strait, where it planted the settlement of Wellington in 1840. The Wellington lands, and others on the south shore of the Strait, were to form part of the grant sanctioned by the Colonial Office, and the Company, whilst actively shipping emigrants, pressed on the acquisition of land for their accommodation. Its principal agents in New Zealand were Captain E. J. Wakefield and Colonel W. Wakefield, brothers of Gibbon Wakefield. The Wakefields showed little respect for the Treaty of Waitangi, and some of their purchases were made from persons whose rights to sell were vague. One transaction, on Wairau River, at the northern end of South Island, led to a tragedy. The local chiefs denied that any sale had taken place. Discussion ended in an affray in which Captain Wakefield and eighteen of his party were killed. The British had undoubtedly fired the first shot, whilst the Maori chiefs had been cool and dignified. The governor (Shortland, Hobson's successor) was obliged to admit that the natives had acted in self-defence and to call Colonel Wakefield to task for his high-handed proceedings. This judgment was naturally unacceptable to the enraged settlers of the Company, and a strained situation ensued. It continued through the short reign of the next governor, Captain Fitzroy (1843-5), who weakly threw over the treaty and allowed extensive private purchases of the usual doubtful legality. At the same time the Company in England was urging the entire repudiation of the treaty as merely "a praiseworthy device for amusing and pacifying savages for the moment"; an unscrupulous doctrine which elicited a stiff rebuke from the Colonial Secretary.¹ The responsible Maori chiefs were exasperated, and a serious war was breaking out when Sir George Grey arrived from South Australia to cope with the situation.

¹ Harrop, pp. 196-7.

Grey acted with the firmness expected of him. He announced that the treaty would hold good, stopped the traffic in firearms, conciliated the wavering tribes by showing that he trusted them, and fell with great energy upon those already in revolt. By the middle of 1846 peace was restored. He then redeemed his promises by stopping irregular purchases of land. In the meantime a change of government at home favoured the Company. In 1847 the Crown bought out the few Maoris of South Island, and turned it over to the Company on very easy terms.

During these years the New Zealand Company had been acting with great vigour and good sense in its management of emigration. It carried on a steady press propaganda in Great Britain and allotted some of its rights and responsibilities to subordinate companies which could make local appeals for group settlement. One of these, patronized by the magnates of Devon, formed the settlement of New Plymouth in North Island in 1841. The parent company, having founded Wellington in 1840, began a new venture at Nelson in 1841. Here, as at certain other spots, the old mistake was made of landing settlers before the ground had been surveyed, but in general the arrangements were good. The emigrants were carefully chosen, with a due proportion of classes and sexes in order to set up a real English society in the new land. Having formed a party, the Company chartered the shipping for its transport and appointed leaders to enforce moral and sanitary discipline on board. On arrival in New Zealand, the settlers were lodged and rationed in camps until they could get to work. There was hardship, of course, and there were casualties and bad bargains among the emigrants, but there was nothing remotely approaching the waste of human life that was then taking place in the unregulated emigration to Canada and the United States. By the end of 1841 some 6000 settlers had been sent out, and by May, 1844, the number had increased to 15,000.¹

The opening of South Island, apart from the Cook Strait shore, followed upon the Crown purchase of 1847. In 1848 a semi-religious group settlement of Scottish Presbyterians founded Dunedin, the capital of the Otago Province. They were less than five hundred strong and had a hard struggle to maintain life until the soil began to support them, for they went out with very scanty equipment. They used spades in default of ploughs, threshed their grain with flails, and ground it with hand-mills. It was the story of the Pilgrim Fathers repeated in a milder climate and consequently without the same loss of life, and, as in the seventeenth century, sterling character was the factor that brought ultimate success. The discovery of gold in 1859 caused an influx of population which resembled on a smaller scale that in Victoria eight years earlier. In a few months the numbers were quadrupled, and the increase of capital and man-power permanently raised the standard of living. By the close of 1860 Otago had nearly 30,000 inhabitants.

A more ambitious scheme of group-settlement took its rise in the

¹ Emigration details are given in Marais, *op. cit.* pp. 47-73.

formation of the Canterbury Association in 1848. This body consisted of High Churchmen and Tories—novel recruits to the doctrines of such a man as Gibbon Wakefield—and counted among its members nine bishops and a number of noblemen, including Lord Ashley (afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury). In accordance with the Wakefield plan, the settlers purchased their land from the New Zealand Company at the high rate of £3 per acre, five-sixths of which was to be expended on assisted emigration and public services. At the close of 1850 eight ships sailed with 1500 colonists, of whom one-fourth were men of substance. They arrived without a hitch to find good land already surveyed and capable of immediate allotment, and there they founded the province of Canterbury with its port of Lyttelton and its capital of Christchurch. They established themselves with far fewer hardships than those experienced by the Otago settlers, mainly because they had more money at their disposal. Wakefield himself, feeling that his work in England was accomplished, emigrated to Canterbury in 1853. He sought to take a prominent place in New Zealand politics, but he soon grew unpopular and his health broke down. He died after years of illness in 1862. He, more than any man, had created New Zealand. Others might have done it better, but he had made it as it stood, and, remembering that, his fellow-colonists might well have been more tolerant to his undoubted faults of character.

Invercargill, an offshoot from the Otago settlers and the last of the pioneer nuclei of South Island, was founded in 1857. North Island received another establishment at Napier in 1849. Auckland, the pre-Wakefield site, remained the capital of New Zealand until 1865, when it gave place to Wellington. By that date the white population of the whole colony was 172,000, a fine achievement for twenty-five years of effort based almost entirely upon agriculture and hampered by the presence of a powerful native population. As in Australia, squatters occupied the more remote districts beyond the agricultural nuclei. Incoming colonists, as soon as they had settled down, were generally content with their prospects, and the lot of the working-man was far less hard than at home.

The first governorship of Sir George Grey saw the working out of the political constitution. In 1846 the Colonial Office devised a complicated federal government cutting up New Zealand into provinces each with a governor and a two-chamber legislature, and providing in addition a central legislature for the whole colony, the entire edifice being based upon a system of municipal corporations in which alone direct election had a place. In the existing state of the country this was theorism run mad, and Grey disregarded instructions to put it into force. His chief objection seems to have been that he foresaw the complete subordination of the natives' interests to those of the settlers. The home government itself repealed the Act two years after its passage. The New Zealand Company was dissolved in 1851, having done much mischief, but also, it is fair to say, having laid the foundation of a

promising dominion. Comparatively viewed, its good work outweighed its bad, and its lack of sympathy with the Maoris was to some extent inevitable. Its dissolution cleared the political ground and Sir George Grey now advocated representative government. In 1853 this came into being. Six provinces were to elect councils for local purposes, and a general assembly of two chambers was to legislate for the whole country. The members of the upper chamber were to be nominated by the governor and those of the lower returned by direct election. The executive was to remain in the hands of the governor and his permanent staff of officials, who also were to retain full jurisdiction over the native districts. Grey left New Zealand at the end of 1853 after seeing these arrangements partially established, but the first general assembly did not meet until the following year.

In the constitution of 1852-3 there was no hint of responsible government; it was stated, on the contrary, that the governor and the permanent officials were to form the executive. But directly the new assembly met it demanded a responsible executive removable at its pleasure. At this period there was little fear that the home authorities would permanently refuse such a reform, and in 1856 responsible government was granted. One department, that of native affairs, was for the time reserved from popular control. Imperial troops were still necessary for the security of the colony, and the imperial government naturally desired to keep the occasion of their employment in its own hands.¹ New Zealand was a smaller country than Australia, and its white population was more homogeneous; and as settlement extended the provincial organization became artificial and gave rise to useless expense. An Act of 1875 accordingly abolished the provincial councils and with them the federal element in the constitution. Local affairs were left to be dealt with by municipal bodies, as in England, and the general legislature took over all the remaining functions of government.

When Sir George Grey's first governorship came to an end the native trouble in the South Island no longer existed. In the North Island, on the other hand, it merely slept, ready to break out again in an acute form. The white settlements were but isolated patches around the coast, and the major areas of the country still belonged to the tribes. These tribes were by no means united. North of Auckland they were on friendly terms with the British, and on the shore of Cook Strait also there was little trouble. But in the centre of North Island the conservative, aristocratic elements were in the ascendant, determined to resist Europeanizing influences and to sell no more land to settlers. To the older type of Maori warfare was not a thing to be dreaded; it was rather a normal and pleasurable function of existence. The discontented tribes made some attempt to federate in the manner of their enemies, and for a time a superior king claimed and was allowed some general jurisdiction over the chiefs of some of the clans. A block of land near New Plymouth occasioned an outbreak. The British claimed to have

¹ Jenks, *Australasian Colonies*, p. 272.

purchased it, but there was the usual denial of the validity of the sale ; it appeared that those who sold were themselves trespassers who had forcibly evicted the rightful owners. In 1860 the disputants came to blows, and desultory fighting continued into the next year. Sir George Grey, who had been employed in Cape Colony, returned as governor and attempted to repeat his former brilliant handling of the situation. He could not, however, stamp out a conflict arising from a fundamental incompatibility between the claims of the two races. In 1862 the colonial legislature obtained the control of native affairs, and it determined to punish rather than conciliate the rebels by a steady confiscation of their lands. A guerilla war therefore alternately smouldered and blazed until 1866, when the resistance of the tribes was crushed. Grey, leaving in the following year, thought that the miserable business was finished. But a fresh revolt of Maori diehards broke out again in 1868, and peace was not finally restored until the first days of 1870. At that date the Maoris still held more than half the area of North Island, and they have since maintained their position. They now enjoy political rights and their numbers are on the increase.

CHAPTER VII

DUTCH AND BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA

(i) *Early History to 1836*

BARTHOLOMEW DIAZ was the first European recorded to have reached and rounded the southern point of Africa. On his homeward passage in 1487 he sighted the Cape of Good Hope at the south-western extremity of the continent. A few years later Vasco da Gama completed the route to India by the Cape, and throughout the sixteenth century, with very few exceptions, the crews of Portuguese carracks were the only seamen to fight their way through the stormy region between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans or to drop their anchors in Table Bay. Among the exceptions were the Spanish circumnavigators who sailed with Magellan in 1519, Drake and Cavendish completing a like exploit respectively in 1580 and 1588, Lancaster voyaging to the Spice Islands in 1591, and Cornelis Houtman leading the first Dutch Indies expedition in 1595. For more than a hundred years the Cape was open to Portuguese colonization had they cared to undertake it. But Portugal, in common with her rivals of that epoch, was intent upon commerce rather than settlements, and she never gave a thought to the possibilities of South Africa as a new home for Europeans. The native Bushmen and Hottentots were savages of a low type, having no produce worth the attention of traders who were pressing on to Java and the Moluccas, affording at the best a few lean cattle for the refreshment of scurvy-stricken crews, and at the worst setting upon landing parties and murdering them as they filled their water-casks. Table Bay was first visited by the navigator Antonio de Saldanha in 1503, and long bore his name. A returning viceroy of the Portuguese Indies, Francisco de Almeida, was murdered there in 1510, and thenceforward the carracks avoided the place, for the most part preferring to water elsewhere. A few names, St. Helena Bay, Algoa Bay, Cape Agulhas, Natal, still surviving on the modern map, are the only traces left in British South Africa of a nationality which regarded the coast as ill-omened and hurried by it as quickly as possible.

In the seventeenth century the English and the Dutch began rapidly to oust the Portuguese from the Indies trade. They made more use of the Cape as a refreshing place, and used to leave letters buried under

stones for succeeding visitors to pick up. The English and Dutch Companies were jealous rivals, and each kept a keen watch upon the intentions of the other. This led in 1620 to the first attempt at annexation. Two English captains, hearing a rumour that the Dutch intended to plant and fortify a settlement, proclaimed the sovereignty of James I. over Table Bay and the whole continent adjoining. But trading bodies reckoned the expense prohibitive, and neither side took any action upon the announcement. The English Company generally preferred its ships to use the island of St. Helena, and left the Cape more and more to the Dutch. The latter, thirty years after the abortive English annexation, thus became the founders of the first European settlement on South African soil.

The settlement was due solely to the necessities of the East Indian trade, and it was intended solely to subserve those necessities. European enterprise was extending upon the oceans. The Portuguese still had an eastern commerce, and Frenchmen and Danes were rounding the Cape in addition to the English and the Dutch. But the latter had the preponderant interest at stake, and it became apparent to them that if a hostile power should seize Table Bay and establish a naval station there, it might easily work havoc with their trade. In 1652, therefore, a small body of about a hundred servants of the Dutch Company landed in the Bay and planted the nucleus of Cape Town. Their leader was Jan van Riebeeck, and his orders were to build a fort and to establish a small plantation to supply foodstuffs to the Dutch Indiamen. A few years later the Company authorized the taking up of land by free farmers, more with the object of saving expense than for any other reason. The farmers had no political privileges and were strictly bound by the Company's regulations on the sale of their produce. In the eyes of its founders the Cape was not a colony but simply an accessory station to the eastern trading system. To shipping of other nationalities it permitted watering and little more, and a governor was reprimanded and dismissed in 1667 for provisioning a French squadron at a time when French and Dutch were waging war in alliance against England. After twenty years' existence the settlement had 600 European inhabitants, nearly all of the adults being paid servants of the Company. Expansion began with the governorship of Simon van der Stel (1679-99), who encouraged agriculture, planted farmers in the districts of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, and began the export of a little grain and wine to the Dutch Indies.¹ In the last years of the seventeenth century French Huguenots in flight from Louis XIV.'s persecution began to appear at the Cape. Although few in number they took root and prospered, and became a permanent strain in the population. By this time the settlement had become a colony with a definite life and character of its own which sometimes refused to harmonize with the aims of the East India Company. The latter body

¹ Sir C. P. Lucas, *Hist. Geography of the British Colonies, South Africa*, part i. 1913, pp. 65-7.

fell into decay as the eighteenth century progressed, and its deterioration involved considerable misgovernment and discontent at the Cape. One effect was that the farmers were constantly tempted to push more deeply into the interior in order to be free from the annoyances inflicted upon them by the officials at Cape Town. By the close of the eighteenth century a population of 15,000 Europeans owning a somewhat greater number of slaves was thinly spread over an area the size of the British Isles, inhabited in addition by semi-independent tribes of Hottentots and Bushmen. The slavery was different in type from the plantation system of the West Indies. Some of the slaves were African natives, many were Malays from the east, and it would appear that the conditions of servitude were much milder than in the competitive sugar colonies.¹ The wars of the French Revolution entailed two changes, either of which would have opened up a new future for the Cape. The Dutch East India Company was abolished after floundering in bankruptcy for many years, and at the same moment a British expedition effected the seizure of Cape Town.

From the date of its foundation until 1781 the Cape Colony had never been assailed by a European enemy. In that year, when the Netherlands had been added to the coalition which pulled down the old mercantile empire of Great Britain by securing the independence of the United States, a British squadron was sent to capture Table Bay in order to use it as a naval station. Its commander was dilatory and his intentions were frustrated by the French admiral Suffren on his outward passage to Ceylon and India. In 1795 another British attempt was successful. The Netherlands, renamed the Batavian Republic, were in alliance with France, and a British fleet with a landing force compelled the surrender of Capetown on September 16. For nearly eight years the British administered the colony, until the Peace of Amiens in 1802-3 entailed its restoration to the Netherlands. War with Napoleon and his subject-states soon broke out again, and in 1806 a second British occupation followed. This time it was permanent. A convention of 1814, part of the general settlement following the fall of Napoleon, confirmed the Cape Colony and certain other Dutch possessions to Great Britain on payment of an indemnity of £6,000,000. At this period there was no idea of British colonization in South Africa. It was not the wide spaces of the interior which the British government desired, but simply the possession of a good naval station on the road to the East. The statesmen who purchased the Cape had little inkling of the vast and vexatious responsibilities they were acquiring for their successors to deal with.

In 1814 the white population numbered 26,000, and there were reckoned to be nearly two millions of free natives. During the first years the administration was entirely autocratic; it was not until 1825 that an executive council was established to share responsibility with the governor. The problem of government was to a certain extent

¹ E. A. Walker, *History of South Africa*, London, 1928, p. 177.

similar to that experienced in Canada after 1763, the control of alien colonists by British military officials. But in South Africa the existence of slavery and of a large native population were factors which complicated the situation, and invited the interference of the new missionary movement which exercised so powerful an influence in English life during the early nineteenth century. The London Missionary Society was formed in 1795, and it made the Cape the scene of its earliest efforts. In the Pacific islands the missionaries have generally been an influence for good. In South Africa they did much noble work, but also, and often with the best intentions, they wrought irreparable harm by stirring up racial animosity between British and Dutch and preventing that co-operation which statesmanship has achieved in Canada. The Boer, in spite of legends to the contrary, was not consistently brutal to the black man; his record was far cleaner than that of the West Indian planter. But he saw the blacks as they were, people of a lower race far outnumbering his own, and not safely to be treated as equals and brothers after the manner advocated by the missionary. The latter was often intemperate in his language, and he alone had the ear of public opinion in England. The Dutchman felt himself maligned and had no effective means of reply. Bitterness was already apparent before the final settlement of 1814. In the following year it resulted in an explosion which, small as was its scope, has unhappily become a household legend throughout South Africa, and is quoted in perverted forms to the present day. A Dutchman at a frontier station resisted arrest on a charge of ill-treating a native. He fired on his pursuers and was shot dead. His brother and others rose in revolt. They were surrounded and captured at Schlachter's Nek, and five were tried and hanged for rebellion, Lord Charles Somerset, the governor, refusing to mitigate the sentence. Schlachter's Nek became a byword of British tyranny, but it is often overlooked that the persons who killed the original delinquent, and who arrested and tried the others, were nearly all Dutchmen acting in the common cause of law and order.¹

The natives of South Africa fell into three categories. The first who came into contact with Europeans were the Hottentots of the south-western region nearest to the Cape. They were a pastoral people, with no fixed habitations, a weak tribal organization, and little capacity for warfare on the large scale. Intermixed with them were the Bushmen, of a still lower type, and persecuted to extermination by all other races, white and black. These Bushmen were unjustly regarded as mere animals and vermin, but more sympathetic observers have shown that they were capable of responding to kindly treatment. They were survivals of palaeolithic mankind and practised a pictorial art having some resemblance to that found in palaeolithic caves in Spain. In the south-east and in the northern interior dwelt the Bantu peoples,

¹ For a full account see Dr. G. McC. Theal, *Hist. of South Africa since 1795*, London, 1908, vol. i. pp. 229-41. Walker, *op. cit.* p. 160, emphasizes the support of authority even by the frontier Boers.

the Kaffirs properly so-called, a mixed race resulting from centuries of migration and conquest. They were virile and capable of large common efforts. In the early nineteenth century one section of them, the Zulus, had been moulded by its king Chaka into a conquering army carrying devastation and slaughter through all the region now occupied by Natal and the Transvaal. The Zulu raids depopulated vast areas and produced a displacement of the other Bantu tribes which impinged upon Cape Colony. The Bantus were not indigenous to South Africa. They invaded it from the north during the centuries when Europeans were slowly becoming acquainted with the southern coastline. The inevitable clash was that between two conquering races, and its result was not the subjection of peoples with an ancient title to the soil.

The point of contact between Europeans and Bantus lay in the region of Algoa Bay, more than four hundred miles to the east of Cape Town. It was essential to form a strongly occupied barrier district for the protection of the older parts of the colony, and here accordingly was planted the first distinctly British settlement. After the peace of 1815 a number of discharged soldiers and seamen had settled in the neighbourhood of Cape Town itself. In 1819 the home government decided to organize a new colony, to be called Albany, on the eastern frontier. The scheme to a certain extent anticipated the systematic colonization of the Wakefield school. Parliament voted £50,000 to pay the passages of 5000 emigrants. The latter were selected so as to include professional men, tradesmen, and mechanics, but very few farmers, for it was in the towns that over-pressure of population was greatest, and the experiment was conducted as much with an eye to relieving distress at home as for the improvement of the Cape Colony. The majority of the emigrants landed at Algoa Bay and moved about a hundred miles inland towards the north-east. Each family received a free grant of 100 acres, which proved to be too small for successful working. After a period of hardship and discontent the scheme as originally conceived broke down, but most of the settlers remained in the district in one capacity or another and became the ancestors of the distinctively British element which occupies the eastern region of Cape Colony to the present day. Grahamstown thrived as the result of this immigration, and developed into the centre of the new Albany province.

From this date the anti-slavery agitation throughout the Empire entered upon its last victorious phase. In South Africa the missionaries were its protagonists, with Dr. John Philip of the London Missionary Society as their most active leader. He was one of those men whom their fellows regard either with intense admiration or with lively hatred. In his case the former feeling was entertained by the philanthropists in England, and the latter by the majority of the colonists and officials at the Cape. Compromise and conciliation were foreign to his nature, and in the opinion of a cool historian he often overshot the mark :

"he said, and wrote, and did much that all who are regardful of truth must pronounce decidedly wrong."¹ His book, *Researches in South Africa*, published in 1828, was received with indignation in the colony, and an official who claimed to be libelled in it recovered damages and costs of over £1000. The philanthropic interest was at that time becoming paramount in the Colonial Office. Its effects were exasperating to the colonists of both races, but more particularly to the Dutch. An ordinance of 1828 gave the Hottentots equality in law with white men, and when the Act of 1833 abolished slavery it did so in a manner which bore harshly upon interests of South Africa. The Albany settlement had no slaves, and the Dutch population possessed among them about 39,000 valued at £2,000,000 to £3,000,000. The farmers had no passionate desire to perpetuate slavery, but they naturally expected due compensation for the loss of their property, especially as the reform took the guise of an act of generosity on the part of persons with whom they had not even the bond of blood in common. The share of compensation allotted to South Africa was one-and-a-quarter millions, and, furthermore, payment was to be made only in London, where each claim had to be proved separately and each set of documents covered by a thirty-shilling stamp. The Boer had not, like the West Indian planter, any business connections in London to take charge of his interests. He was constrained to sell his claims to speculators for much less than their value, and his chagrin was not lessened by the indecent exultation of the abolitionists at the Cape.² Impoverishment followed, and a deepening of disgust with British rule.

In the year 1834, whilst the emancipation business was proceeding, a new governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, arrived at the Cape. He was disposed actively to promote the welfare of the colony, and a native crisis soon put his abilities to the test. The colonization of the eastern region had involved complicated disputes with the Kaffir tribes. In December they suddenly invaded in force, killing the settlers and laying waste the country as far west as Algoa Bay. D'Urban and Sir Harry Smith gathered what forces they could and cleared the Albany region early in 1835. Then they crossed into Kaffir land and annexed a new belt of territory bounded on the east and north by the Kei and Kraai Rivers. They called the new province Queen Adelaide, and made an agreement with the native chiefs whereby the latter were to remain with their people under British protection. The colonists approved of D'Urban's proceedings, but the home government did not. Lord Glenelg became Colonial Secretary in 1835. He took the view that the Kaffirs had been systematically oppressed and driven into insurrection. He ordered the abandonment of the Queen Adelaide province and the moving back of the frontier to the line of 1819. D'Urban protested in vain and finally gave up the argument in despair: "your lordship in England, and I upon the spot have seen all these African matters under different views, and it would be now useless to pursue the subject

¹ Theal, *op. cit.* i. pp. 442-9.

² *Ibid.* ii. pp. 75-6.

further." Tardiness of communication contributed to this difference of opinion. D'Urban was dilatory in correspondence, and Glenelg, anxious in a purblind fashion to do his best, listened too readily to Dr. Philip, who was then in England, and to the Aborigines Committee of the House of Commons, which was then commencing its labours. There was some misunderstanding about the abandonment of territory. Glenelg undoubtedly ordered it, but thought it was prematurely carried out. The zeal of the humanitarians caused some misgiving, even among their supporters, of whom the more judicious suspected that the colonial case had not been fairly stated: "The Committee adjourned to draft its massive report, while Philip and his samples of South African humanity became the lions of the philanthropic season amid such enthusiasm that the *Times* uttered a warning that all their assertions must not be taken at face value."¹ D'Urban warned the Secretary of State that the patience of the colonists was exhausted, and was recalled, the first but not the last English leader in South Africa who had failed because his judgment was too clear and strong. Shortly afterwards began the exodus of the Boers from Cape Colony, known to history as the Great Trek.

(ii) *The two colonies and the two republics, 1836-72*

The course of the Great Trek was moulded by the discontent of the Boers with the administration of the previous years. But the movement was not altogether occasioned by these grievances. It was an intensification of a process of ancient origin. In the days before the British annexation the Dutch East India Company had sought to keep its colonists under strict control, and trekking had begun even then as a means of escape. The original extension of the colony had been due to it. By 1836 land hunger as well as political feeling was an operative factor. The Boers were not numerous, but they were pastoral rather than agricultural in their pursuits, and their scanty herds occupied enormous areas, so that as a whole they were already straitened for room. Racial and political troubles then caused the movement to take shape not as an expansion of the colony but as a determination to break away from it. Religious enthusiasm also bore its part, and there was a conscious imitation of the pastoral trekkers of the Old Testament.²

The causes of Boer discontent were manifold in detail but all leading to one conclusion, hatred not so much of their British fellow-colonists as of British methods of government. In addition to racial feeling and religion, such factors as the favoured treatment accorded to the Hottentots, emancipation, missionary activities and the policy of limiting expansion in a boundless country, all helped to shape the movement, which was essentially an attempt to throw off British citizenship at the cost of much hardship and personal sacrifice. The first small parties set out from the Cape Colony in 1836, and in the next few years

¹ Walker, *op. cit.* pp. 196-8.

² Walker, *op. cit.* pp. 203-8.

some 10,000 Boers followed their example. The pioneers crossed the Orange River into the land now known as the Orange Free State. There they took different courses, some settling down around Winburg, others pushing northwards over the Vaal into the unknown country beyond, and still more crossing the Drakensberg range eastwards into Natal. In general they moved in small bodies, sometimes less than a hundred strong, driving their waggons over the trackless wilderness until they reached some spot favourable to settlement. Beyond the Orange they found the Griquas, a half-breed race of Hottentot origin with an admixture of Dutch blood. Natal was the preserve of the bloodthirsty Zulus, who had exterminated or absorbed all the other tribes. Across the Vaal lived the Matabele, kinsmen of the Zulus and equally ferocious. But to lay down geographical limits is deceptive, for all beyond the borders of the Cape Colony was in a state of flux. The fighting tribes raided far and wide, and the more peaceful fled from one region to another to escape massacre.

The Griquas were already half civilized by missionary enterprise. In the west they owed allegiance to a chief named Waterboer, and in the east to another named Adam Kok. East of Adam Kok's country again were the Basutos, a Kaffir tribe under Moshesh, a chief of pacific disposition. These settlements were all recent and mainly due to the missionaries who sought to establish a ring of civilized but independent tribes around the Cape Colony. Passing through the Griquas the Boers established the nucleus of a republic at Winburg, but some bolder spirits passed on, routed the Matabele, and chased them over the Limpopo River in the far north of the Transvaal. Across the Vaal their first permanent settlement was founded at Potchefstroom.

Meanwhile, the main stream of Boers entered Natal under Pieter Retief in 1837-8. At Port Natal (afterwards Durban) a small body of English traders and adventurers had dwelt for more than ten years by favour of Dingaan the Zulu king. The first pioneers had bought land from Chaka as early as 1824, and had been joined by ivory-hunters and vendors of firearms to the Zulus. Port Natal was also a base of the ubiquitous American whalers. The position of these white men was precarious, for they had no recognition from the Cape government. At first therefore they welcomed the advent of the Boers. Dingaan also pretended to countenance the newcomers, but took an early opportunity to massacre Retief and sixty of his companions at a conference (February, 1838), and afterwards to fall upon the main body at Weenen and kill 300 more. But the Boers persisted, and under Andres Pretorius they defeated Dingaan at the Blood River and slew 3000 of his Zulus. Dingaan was then assassinated by his own people, and his successor withdrew across the Tugela into Zululand proper, leaving Natal to the victors. Pretorius set up a republic with its centre at Pietermaritzburg, and for a time it seemed likely that the other republics at Winburg and Potchefstroom might coalesce with it to form a single Dutch state.

Among the British colonists at the Cape there now arose a demand for the government to take charge of Natal. Otherwise, it was contended, the Boers would displace the natives in the protected belt between Natal and the Cape Colony, and fresh incursions into the latter would result. A small military garrison was sent to Durban in 1838 and was withdrawn in the following year, leaving the original British pioneers still in possession of the port. Gradually, however, the home government was converted to the colonial view, and in 1842 the troops returned to Durban, where they were besieged by the Boers. They made a successful defence, and the Natal republic showed signs of breaking up. Some of the Boers submitted to British sovereignty, whilst the irreconcilables trekked back once more into the interior. Towards the end of 1843 Natal was declared a British colony, and was administered for the time being from the Cape. Years of uncertainty followed. In Natal the Boers were discontented, since they claimed that the conditions under which they had submitted were unfulfilled. Across the Orange and the Vaal the Cape government refused to annex any territory, but at the same time it claimed the Boers there as British subjects with no title to the land. Its main anxiety appeared to be the prevention of encroachment upon the protected tribes. In 1847 Pretorius went from Natal to Cape Town to secure redress of grievances, but was turned away unheard. He and his compatriots then determined to emigrate from Natal in a body.

At this juncture Sir Harry Smith reappeared at the Cape as governor. He was a man of quick decision and boundless energy. Early in 1848 he journeyed to the Natal border and found the Boer population moving out of that colony. He tried to turn them back, but could persuade very few to abandon their intention; Pretorius and his followers continued their trek into the lands between the Orange and the Vaal. Smith then determined upon a forward policy. He annexed the territory in question under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty. Pretorius and his friends took up arms, and were defeated at Boomplatz in August, 1848, after which the leaders escaped into the wild country beyond the Vaal. The Orange River Sovereignty settled down into an uneasy peace under a British resident stationed at Bloemfontein. By this authority it was mismanaged and the settlers alienated, especially by an obligation to turn out and fight on behalf of the native tribes who enjoyed British protection. Smith's settlement had in fact been hasty, and its terms ill-considered. In particular he had neglected to define the boundaries of the jurisdiction.

Lord Grey, the head of the Colonial Office, was anxious to make the new sovereignty self-supporting, and he realized that the goodwill of the inhabitants was a necessary condition to that end. Failing to obtain it he began to think that abandonment offered the only solution of the difficulty. The Transvaal, however, which had never been annexed, was the first Boer community to be formally recognized as independent. Pretorius was living in that territory, and on

January 16, 1852, he and others met British representatives and concluded the Sand River Convention by which the emigrants beyond the Vaal obtained the right to govern themselves as an independent state on condition that there was to be no slavery within their jurisdiction. Of that jurisdiction the Vaal formed the southern frontier, but in other directions the borders were left vague, to provide a fruitful crop of disputes in the future. Meanwhile the settlement of Europeans in the Orange River Sovereignty had broken the missionary system of a belt of protected native tribes. The essence of that arrangement had been that the blacks were to have undisturbed possession of the soil, and that was now impossible. Constant wars with Basutos and other Kafir tribes wearied the home government of expense and insecurity and brought the Colonial Office, under the Duke of Newcastle, to a decision to repudiate all responsibilities beyond the Orange River. Accordingly in February, 1854, by the Convention of Bloemfontein, it granted independence to the Orange Province, henceforward the Orange Free State, on the same terms as the Transvaal had obtained. The "grant" was actually a shirking of responsibility, effected against the wishes of the inhabitants of the province. The political future of South Africa was at length definitely outlined—two British colonies occupying the coastline, and two Boer republics the interior, the latter surrounded in addition by a ring of Basutos, Zulus, Matabele, Bechuanas and Griquas.

After the complicated movements which resulted in this state of affairs a period of comparative stability set in, of which the internal progress of the several states form the chief feature of interest; but the stable period had lasted little more than twenty years when the discovery of mineral wealth and a renaissance of the fighting tribes gave the signal for a new age of South African turmoil.


The Cape Colony, in spite of the loss of the emigrating Boers, maintained its population by a large inflow of British settlers. It should be remembered also that the majority of the original Dutch inhabitants did not emigrate, but remained in occupation of their ancient lands. Political development, on account of bad communications and the native peril, lagged behind that of Canada and Australasia. The powers of the governor were supplanted by the establishment of an executive council in 1825 and of a legislative council in 1833, but both these bodies were nominated by the authorities. The representative principle first came in with the election of municipal councils and road boards in 1836 and 1843. By the middle of the century British statesmen were committed to the view that all the large colonies must ultimately become self-governing, and also self-supporting in the matter of military defence. It was this corollary which delayed the political progress of the Cape, for the colonists were by no means prepared to dispense with the services of imperial troops. However, the colony had long been ripe for more liberal institutions than it actually enjoyed, and in 1853 a representative government was established.

It consisted of the governor and his executive ministers, an elected legislative council, and an elected house of assembly. The franchise was fixed on a moderate property qualification and was open to all men, black and white, of the necessary standing. A civil list provided for the payment of the executive, who were not responsible to the assembly.

In the following year Sir George Grey arrived from New Zealand as governor. His previous experience had convinced him that federation was the true policy for European colonies to pursue in a land where economic conditions were uniform and the native races strong. The home government was favourable to a joint control of the Cape, Natal, and British Kaffraria, the protected native area between the two former. But Grey went further. He hoped for the inclusion of the Boer states. The project was by no means impossible, for the republics were in chronic trouble with the natives and a prey to internal dissensions. The Free State of its own motion made an offer to discuss the matter. Grey accepted it eagerly and laid it before the Cape government. In so doing he was transgressing discipline by making public a line of policy which was in opposition to that pursued by his superiors at home. They naturally took the view that he was seeking to compromise them and force their hand, came officially to the conclusion that he was "a dangerous man," and recalled him. A change of government at that juncture (1859) secured him a reprieve, but he was strictly ordered to meddle no more with federation; and a year later he was re-transferred to New Zealand. Grey's policy was undoubtedly right, though his method was wrong, and Lord Carnarvon, the author of the censure above quoted, was destined twenty years later to attempt the federation of South Africa when it was no longer possible to achieve it without bloodshed.

In other matters Grey acted with vision and statesmanship. He established British magistrates among the tribes of Kaffraria, promoted missions, medical aid and instruction in agriculture, and won the respect of the Bantu tribes. When news arrived of the Indian Mutiny he was able to place the chiefs upon their honour and almost to denude the country of troops to send aid to Bengal. He also took the responsibility of diverting a Highland regiment which touched at the Cape on its way to China, and these Highlanders turned the scale in the relief of Lucknow. Grey risked much in so doing, for if the Indian situation had proved to be less desperate than it was, he would have been convicted of a heinous act in meddling with high affairs outside his jurisdiction. It is no wonder that officials found him "dangerous."

Thrown back upon itself, the Cape progressed slowly towards responsible government. Kaffir wars and military expenditure were the hindrance, and to the last there was a strong party in the colony which objected to the change. The imperial authorities took the initiative, and in 1867 they gave notice that the regular troops were to



be progressively withdrawn, or retained at the colony's expense. The colonists retorted that this was unfair, since it was the imperial policy, of which they had never approved, that made the presence of the troops necessary. The home thrust was, on a long view, justifiable. A tedious haggling followed, drawn out over several years. New annexation questions arose, and the imperial authorities declared positively that they would consent to no extension of territory unless the Cape Colony would assume responsibility. At length in 1872 the bill establishing responsible government was passed by narrow majorities through both chambers of the Cape legislature, and duly received the royal assent.¹

The uncertain boundaries of the Boer republics led to continual trouble with the tribes. In 1866 Moshesh, the Basuto chief, appealed for British protection against the Free State. By a treaty signed in 1869 the latter country secured a part of his territories and the Cape agreed to protect the remainder. Two years later Basutoland was formally provided for as a protected state under native chiefs and British residents, all subject to the High Commissioner for South Africa, an official appointed to supervise native questions and usually identical with the governor of the Cape. In 1871 again, the discovery of rich diamond fields at Kimberley brought up another territorial question. The ground was claimed by the Griquas and the Orange Free State, and in part by the Transvaal. The latter's claim was submitted to the arbitration of the lieutenant-governor of Natal, who disallowed it; whilst the High Commissioner proclaimed his recognition of the Griqua claim and barred out the Free State. The Griqua chief then surrendered his sovereignty to the British Crown. The effect of these decisions was to limit the western expansion of the Boers and to throw open a path for British penetration to the northward.

Natal remained subject to a measure of Cape control until 1856, although prior to that date it obtained a nominated legislative council of its own. In 1856 its lieutenant-governor was made independent of his former superior at Capetown and a representative constitution was set up which endured for nearly forty years.² The colony extended south-westwards at the expense of the tribes in British Kaffraria. At the moment when Pretorius and his followers quitted the country in 1848 a new immigration of British settlers from Europe was beginning. Thousands arrived in the next few years, rendering Natal the province with the largest proportion of British inhabitants in South Africa. When white men first landed on its shores the Zulus had exterminated well-nigh all the other tribes. After Dingaan's overthrow remnants of broken clans began to filter back, and ere long there was a large Kaffir population. But the Kaffirs, although numerous, were un-

¹ For a summary of these negotiations see A. B. Keith's *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, Oxford, 1912, vol. i. pp. 41-8.

² Responsible government was introduced in 1893.

satisfactory as labourers. The Natal colonists began to develop sugar-planting and resorted to the importation of coolies from India. Many of the Indians remained after the expiry of their indentures, and their descendants at the present day outnumber the whites. The period under review was on the whole one of growth and prosperity, but beyond the northern frontier an ominous cloud was gathering. The Zulus, long quiescent, were recovering their old self-confidence and lust of slaughter under Cetewayo, an ambitious prince who only awaited the death of his aged father, Panda, to assume complete control. Cetewayo was recognized as heir and associated in the government in 1861; Panda died in 1872.

After the grant of its independence the Orange Free State underwent an unsettled period of some ten years before its polity became firmly established. During the time of British control a considerable number of British colonists had taken up land within its borders, but this element gradually decreased after it became a republic. Wars against the Basutos and Griquas also hindered progress, but from 1864 the country settled down and enjoyed an uneventful history for many years. The dispute over the Kimberley territory caused a soreness against Great Britain, but the decision, by defining the western border, helped to consolidate the state.

The Transvaal was less happy. Its settlers were among the most independent of the Boers, spreading themselves out thinly over a vast area in search of solitude, and intolerant of any effective control even by a government of their own choosing. The South African Dutch had never displayed a marked capacity for political work, and years of trekking had weakened their sense of citizenship until no-government was more to their taste than democratic government. At one time four chaotic republics struggled for existence within the Transvaal territory. The prospect of adventure and the mineral wealth of the country, already giving indications of its presence, attracted independent characters who added to the difficulty of dealing with the serious native problems which surrounded the state. Soon after the signing of the Sand River Convention the undefined western border became a cause of dispute with the British. Imperial authority had determined to stop short at the Orange, but missionaries and traders pushed northwards into Bechuanaland. The Boers accused them of fomenting native aggression and distributing arms to the blacks. The Boer attempt to close the northern route was unsuccessful, but Bechuanaland long afterwards remained a territory with an uncertain future, wherein either party resented the intrusion of the other. In 1857-60 the Transvaal made an attempt to compose its internal differences and evolved some approach to a united constitution. The president was to hold office for five years, and to rule with the assistance of an executive council of four and a Raad or assembly of twelve. Civil troubles, however, continued, followed by border disputes with Cetewayo and other native chiefs. These transactions produced in England a very

bad impression of the Transvaal, where the opinion gained ground that the Boer native policy was indefensible and a danger to all South Africa. The election as president in 1871 of Thomas Francois Burgers, a liberal-minded man, seemed to give promise of a better era, a promise however, which the future was to belie.

CHAPTER VIII

INDIA AND THE FAR EAST

(i) *The extension of British control over the Indian Peninsula, 1785-1858*

WHEN Warren Hastings left India in 1785 British rule was effective in the great province of Bengal, and elsewhere in but an insignificant proportion of the total area of the Indian Peninsula—the coast regions of the Circars, stretching from Masulipatam to the delta of the Mahanadi, Madras and its immediate environs, and Bombay with a still more exiguous hinterland than that of Madras. The directors of the East India Company, alarmed by the problems arising from their acquisition of Bengal and by the increasing diversion of their servants' energies from trade to administration, were in no mood for further territorial expansion, and sought vainly in the succeeding period to set a drastic limit to it. But the force of circumstances was destined to set at nought their wishes. The British Company for good or ill was now a political power in India, and came inevitably into collision with other powers, restless and bellicose, which considered themselves its equals and had no mind to allow the country to settle down to peaceful progress. The history of the period from 1785 to the great Mutiny is therefore one of the continuous expansion of British sovereignty by conflict with the native rulers, of the transformation of the Company from a trading to a governing institution, and of the transference of its effective control from the directors to the imperial government acting through the Secretary of State at home and the Governor-General in India, both of parliamentary appointment by the terms of the India Act of 1784.

The native powers in 1785 divide themselves into three groups, in southern, central, and north-western India. In the south the Carnatic ran in a long strip parallel with the Coromandel coast. Its Nawabs, set in power as a result of the British victories over Dupleix and Lally, and relying upon British aid to extricate them from difficulties of their own creation, consistently misgoverned the province until dishonesty and tyranny at length reached such a pitch that annexation became inevitable at the opening of the following century. West of the Carnatic lay Mysore, seized by the Mohammedan adventurer Hyder Ali, and now ruled by his son Tipu Sultan, a fierce tyrant with

unsatisfied ambitions, who saw in the British power at Madras the only obstacle to the conquest of southern India. Mysore at this date extended to the western or Malabar coast. Small, semi-independent states such as Tanjore, Coorg and Travancore completed the southern group. In the centre, on the northern border of Mysore, lay the dominions of the Nizam, the political Deccan which Dupleix and Bussy had dreamed of acquiring for France, but now shrunk to half its former extent by reason of the aggressions of its neighbours. The Nizam was a Mohammedan prince, in theory a vassal of the Mogul. He was weak in comparison with the other native powers, and driven to maintain himself by a shifty diplomacy which made him the nominal but unreliable ally of the British. To the north, the east, and the west of the Nizam rolled the vast dominions of the Maratha confederacy. Its titular head was the Peshwa, or prime minister, of Poona. But already the Peshwa was becoming a puppet in the hands of the military families founded by Hindu adventurers, who led armies and allotted to themselves, not states with definite frontiers, but rather spheres of influence in central India. These military dynasties were those of the Bhonsla, occupying the eastern Deccan and stretching to the Bay of Bengal; Holkar and Sindhia in the western Deccan, reaching northward nearly to Delhi and southward to Poona; and of the Gaekwar of Baroda, dominating Gujerat and the coasts north of Bombay. The Marathas had originated as Hindu rebels against the conquests of the Mogul empire. Their chiefs had long lived as overlords rather than governors of central India, preferring to exact tribute from vassals rather than to administer the country themselves. But there were now signs that they were about to harden into definite sovereigns of territorial states, intensely militarist, and ever ready to pick quarrels with their neighbours and with each other. One other area, that of the north-west, remains to be described. This had been the cradle and source of strength of the Mogul empire. But that empire was now utterly gone, and its titular head resided at Delhi wielding less power than the rajah of a petty state of the south. Into the vacuum caused by its disappearance swept waves of Maratha invasion from the south and of Afghans from the north, and ephemeral chiefs with overlapping jurisdictions maintained themselves sometimes in independence and sometimes in vassalage to their greater neighbours. In the Punjab in the extreme north-west the Sikhs were beginning to form a united nation, but they did not accomplish that end until the opening decades of the nineteenth century. In Sind, in the delta of the Indus, a congeries of chiefs owed allegiance to the Afghan monarchs beyond the mountains. Oudh, a semi-protected, misgoverned state like the Carnatic, lay as a buffer between Bengal and the north-western whirlpool. Such was the India which conservative statesmen in England hoped to petrify by some policy of non-intervention into a condition of stability and pursuance of the arts of peace.

Lord Cornwallis arrived at Calcutta in 1786 as the first Governor-

General under the India Act passed two years before. His position was stronger than that of Warren Hastings had been, for his council needed to be unanimous in order to thwart him, and a supplementary law of 1786 enabled him in case of emergency to override the opinion even of the united councillors. He was himself the governor of Bengal, and his authority extended over the presidencies of Bombay and Madras in all matters of diplomacy, war and revenue. His first care was to raise the tone of the Company's service by suppressing corruption and substituting an increase of pay for the private venturing to which officials had hitherto looked for their main source of income. He made reforms also in the judicial system of Bengal. The principal achievement of his rule was the Permanent Settlement of the Bengal land dues. Taxes on land had formed the chief revenue of the province since the establishment of the Mogul power. The *zemindars*, originally farmers of the revenue, had now become virtually the landlords of their several districts, collecting rent from the peasants and paying a lump sum to the government. The authors of the Permanent Settlement, after an exhaustive inquiry, fixed the amounts due from the landowners and sought to systematize the terms of tenure of the peasants in order to prevent rack-renting. In the latter part of the scheme they were not entirely successful, and the cultivators suffered many grievances for half a century to come. Cornwallis, although not the author of the settlement, presided over its accomplishment, in which much of the spadework was performed by (Sir) John Shore.¹

Although Cornwallis had come out prepared to operate a policy of peace, the behaviour of Tipu Sultan rendered war inevitable in southern India. In 1790-2 the Governor-General himself directed campaigns on a large scale against Mysore. The Marathas and the Nizam rendered nominal assistance, and the country was overrun until Tipu sued for peace to avert the storm of his capital. He paid an indemnity and surrendered nearly half his territory, most of it being allotted to the Nizam. This policy of balancing the native powers and shirking complete annexation proved in a few years to be a false one. Tipu despised the Nizam and determined to be revenged upon the English. The scandal in the Carnatic government caused the Governor-General in 1792 to force a treaty upon the Nawab to provide for a measure of British control. This arrangement, not being sufficiently far-reaching, proved ineffective in ending the abuses.

Cornwallis left India in 1793, and his successor was Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth. The period of Shore's government (1793-8) was one of uneasy peace in India, during which the Revolutionary War with France extended its scope towards the east and the unsettled questions of Indian supremacy ripened towards an explosion. The independent native rulers took French officers into their service and began to organize armies on the European model. This was particularly

¹ A clear exposition of the settlement is to be found in Sir W. W. Hunter's *Indian Empire*, 3rd edn., London, 1893, pp. 521-3.

and oppression of its rulers bade fair to reduce it to a desert. In 1801 Wellesley took over the entire administration, compensating the Nawab with a pension. The Rajah of Tanjore voluntarily surrendered his jurisdiction on the same terms, and the Madras Presidency thus became a territorial area second only to Bengal in extent. Surat and its district fell in like manner to the Bombay Presidency in the same year, when also the Governor-General grappled with the problem of Oudh. Although Oudh was a long-standing ally of the British, and it was of vital importance to them to maintain its strength, it had nevertheless fallen into a condition similar to that of the Carnatic. British protection seemed to deprive the Nawab of all sense of responsibility for internal administration. The country was a prey to a demoralized native army and a horde of international adventurers who steadily sucked its life-blood. To Wellesley the remedy appeared to be the subsidiary alliance in a stringent form. In 1801 he dictated the Treaty of Lucknow, whereby Oudh ceded the frontier provinces towards Delhi, on the south bank of the Ganges, and towards Bengal, leaving to the Nawab the central nucleus around the capital. The Nawab further undertook to exclude Europeans not approved by the Company and to mould his policy on British advice. In return he received a guarantee of protection. These proceedings appear, superficially, arbitrary and high-handed in the extreme. For their justification they must plead that in every case they operated to the advantage of the populations concerned. Eighteenth-century India, as Lord Morley has remarked, resembled fifth-century Europe. Wellesley knew that British rule was the only alternative to bloodshed, tyranny and anarchy, and he had no false delicacy in translating his conviction into fact. Europe after the fall of Rome took many weary centuries to settle down into a land where the common man might live his life in security ; in India British authority accomplished a settlement in the space of fifty years.

After the events of 1801 the Marathas remained the one native power which could hope to dispute the supremacy of India. Of their ruling families that of Sindhia had made the greatest advance during the eighteenth century. In 1785 Madhoji Rao Sindhia had occupied Delhi and taken possession of the imperial puppet who lived there. In the latter's name he had even ventured to demand tribute from Bengal. The death of this Sindhia in 1794 and the accession of a minor in his place left Tipu Sultan for the moment the strongest native prince, and postponed the trial of strength with the British. That trial arose out of dissensions among the Marathas themselves. In 1802 the Peshwa, his authority invaded by Holkar, fled from Poona to Bombay, and signed the subsidiary treaty of Bassein whereby he accepted British protection. In pursuance of their undertaking the British restored him to his capital in 1803, and immediately the fighting families, with the exception of Holkar, declared war. The campaign was short and severe. In the autumn of the year Sir Arthur Wellesley defeated Sindhia's troops

at Assaye and the Bhonsla's at Argaum, thus crushing resistance in the Deccan. At the same time General Lake scattered Sindhia's northern forces near Delhi at the Battle of Laswari. Sindhia had to surrender the Delhi region and a large tract bordering upon the Nizam; the Bhonsla gave up his coast province of Orissa on the Bay of Bengal; and both princes, together with the Gaekwar of Baroda, entered into subsidiary alliance with the Company. Holkar in the meantime had remained neutral, but in 1804 he also declared war. Owing to his maintenance of the old style of Maratha army his conquest proved no easy matter. A force under Colonel Monson suffered a disaster, which made such an impression upon the authorities at home that in spite of subsequent successes they decided to compromise with the Maratha chief. But Holkar had already been defeated by General Lake and driven from his territories when orders arrived to break off the war.

The Company, in fact, was thoroughly alarmed at the independent policy of its Governor-General. Like earlier fighting statesmen of India he seemed to care little for trade and to be reckless of expense. An acrimonious correspondence led to his resignation and departure for England in the middle of 1805. In seven years he had transformed the map of India and launched his countrymen upon a career of expansion which stopped only at the Afghan mountains half a century later.

In a vain attempt to react against this policy the authorities appointed Lord Cornwallis to a second term of office, with instructions to incur no new responsibilities. Cornwallis died two months after reaching India, and Lord Minto took up the Governor-Generalship in 1807. This was the year of Napoleon's Treaty of Tilsit with the Tsar Alexander, and whilst the pact between the two emperors endured there were frequent plans mooted for a Franco-Russian advance towards India.¹ Nothing came of them in practice, but the matter is interesting as being the first recorded stage of the Russian menace which became so serious at a later date. Lord Minto seized the French Isles of France and Bourbon in 1810, and the Dutch colony of Java in 1811. Ceylon had already been taken during the Revolutionary War of 1795. Of these conquests Bourbon and Java were restored at the peace of 1815. In India itself Lord Minto suspended the forward policy and devoted himself to consolidation, with the result that the Maratha powers recovered much of their old confidence. He was succeeded by the Marquis of Hastings in 1814. In the previous year the Company had been compelled by the expiration of its charter to ask Parliament for a renewal. It was granted for twenty years only on condition that the trade of India was to be thrown open to private merchants, although that with China still remained a monopoly. When the period expired in 1833 the last vestige of the commercial monopoly was abolished and the Company became exclusively a governing body.

Hastings during his nine years' rule (1814-23) found himself obliged to extend British authority in northern and central India. In 1814

¹ Sir A. C. Lyall, *British Dominion in India*, pp. 276-7.

he opened a campaign against the Gurkhas of Nepal, who had been plundering the Gangetic Plain. At first unsuccessful, the British operations finally resulted in an enduring peace. The Gurkhas ceded some outlying districts, including that of Simla, and have since retained their independence in the Himalayas on terms of friendship with British India.

The system of subsidiary alliances inaugurated by Wellesley had had the effect of disbanding numbers of troops formerly maintained by the native rulers. These formed the nucleus of robber bands known as the Pindaris, which gradually grew to the size of armies and lived by the plunder of central India. The Maratha chiefs, humbled but not finally crushed, secretly patronized the Pindari leaders. In 1817 the Governor-General assembled a large army to restore order. He broke up and destroyed the Pindari bands, and reduced their leaders to flight or submission. At once the Marathas, conscious that they must strike now or never against the spread of the British peace, rose in revolt. A few months' fighting in 1817-8 brought them to ruin. The Peshwa was deposed and his principality of Poona added to the Bombay presidency. The other princes retained their thrones under British guardianship and were effectually deprived of their old military power. At the same time the Rajput chiefs to the north-west of the Maratha sphere placed themselves under British protection. The Company's overlordship now comprised the whole of India proper with the exception of the Punjab and Sind, the two states in the basin of the Indus.

The next trouble came from the ancient kingdom of Burma on the eastern frontier. The Burmese kings had been expanding their own territories during the British conquest of India, and their acquisition of Assam in 1800 led to a long series of aggressions against Bengal and against British traders using the Burmese ports. In 1823 Lord Amherst, the new Governor-General, declared war. The struggle continued with much confusion and waste of life from disease until 1826, when the king signed a treaty ceding Assam, Arakan and the coastal region of Tenasserim.

A period of peace lasting more than twelve years followed the Burma war. During this time Lord William Bentinck (1828-35) strove, by general reforms and special measures, to improve the conditions of life in India. Among the former were his suppressions of *sati*, the burning of widows at their husbands' funeral ceremonies, and of *thagi*, a monstrous brotherhood of religious fanatics whose cult was murder for its own sake, their victims being usually casual acquaintances who had given them no offence.

With Lord Auckland (1836-42) the centre of interest shifts to the north-west frontier, where British India had as yet no satisfactory boundary-line capable of defence against aggression from without. North-west of Delhi lay the Punjab, the region of the five rivers, the Indus and its affluents. Here during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century Ranjit Singh had consolidated the Sikhs into a nation

and had built up a kingdom defended by the most powerful native army India had yet seen. On the lower Indus was Sind under a confederation of chiefs, and beyond the Suliman Mountains ruled the Amirs of Afghanistan, once the overlords of all north-western India, but now withdrawn into their native hills. To British statesmen it seemed vitally important, first to prevent any prospective enemy from gaining a footing in Afghanistan, and secondly for the British themselves to acquire the remainder of the Indian plain up to the eastern gates of the mountain passes. It would probably have been sounder policy to carry out the second part of this programme first, but Lord Auckland judged that the situation in Afghanistan admitted of no delay.

In 1837 a mixed body of Russians and Persians besieged the Afghans in Herat. Having gained touch with Afghanistan the Russians converted their hostility into alliance with Dost Mohammed, the Amir. How real the menace was to India we cannot tell; probably it was never so formidable, for geographical reasons alone, as contemporaries imagined. They were too apt to assume, on the analogy of former Afghan invasions of a defenceless India, that regular Russian armies, dependent upon a long line of communications, could penetrate the mountains in sufficient strength to overcome the forces of the Company standing on their defence in their own territory. Perhaps the strongest evidence to show that the Russians had their doubts of the enterprise lies in the fact that they never tried it. However that may have been, the peril in 1839 seemed real enough, and Lord Auckland decided to meet it by deposing Dost Mohammed and setting up in his place Shah Shuja, a convenient Afghan claimant who was taking refuge in India at the time. A British army passed through Sind and the southern passes and occupied successively Kandahar and Kabul. It sent Dost Mohammed a prisoner to India and installed Shah Shuja as Amir. According to the pre-arranged programme it should now have left Afghanistan with its task completed. But it was evident to all that the new Amir's throne would not stand for a month without foreign support. For two years therefore (1839-41) the British troops remained, amid the increasing discontent of the Afghan populace, accustomed for centuries to impose rulers upon others but never to suffer the same indignity themselves. At length the British political officer, Sir Alexander Burnes, was assassinated, Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Mohammed, took up arms, and it became suddenly apparent that the British troops were isolated and in peril. Hesitating leadership increased the danger. Sir William Macnaghten, Burnes's successor, was murdered at a conference with the rebellious chiefs, and it was then decided to evacuate the country under a promise of safe-conduct from Akbar Khan. In December, 1841, the column started from Kabul 16,000 strong, three-fourths being non-combatants. On January 13, 1842, a sole survivor reached Jalalabad, the first outpost of British India. All the others, with the exception of a few hostages, had been massacred as they struggled through the snow-clad passes. At the moment of the disaster

Lord Ellenborough arrived to succeed Auckland as Governor-General. His first impulse was to order General Nott, who still held Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, to follow the example of the Kabul force. Afterwards he made some show of retrieving the blow to British prestige, and in 1842 Generals Nott and Pollock marched through the country to Kabul, won victories in the field, and released the hostages. Then they withdrew to India, leaving Dost Mohammed to resume possession of his throne, the unhappy Shah Shuja having in the meantime been murdered. So ended a disastrous, and as the event showed unnecessary, adventure.

Sind lay on the southern road into Afghanistan, as the Punjab did on the northern. During the war the chiefs of Sind were told that their allegiance must be transferred from the Amir to the East India Company. On their raising objections in 1843 Sir Charles Napier was sent to effect a military conquest, which he achieved by the victory of Miani. The single word "Peccavi," his well-known message announcing his success, was something more than a pun upon the name Sind, for he seems to have doubted the justice of the whole undertaking.

Under Ranjit Singh the Sikhs of the Punjab had become a strong and militant nation, with an army well disciplined and well equipped, and inspired by a religious fervour comparable to that of Cromwell's Ironsides. The river Sutlej formed the boundary between the Punjab and the Company's dominions, and Ranjit Singh had always maintained friendly relations with the British whilst extending his sway by conquests to the west and north. He died in 1839 leaving his state a prey to factions in default of a capable successor. The Sikh army became turbulent and its generals aggressive, and palace plots disorganized the central authority. The British disaster in Afghanistan moved the Sikhs to contempt, whilst the conquest of Sind aroused their alarm. In 1845 they crossed the Sutlej in force, confident that they could sweep through British India like the conquering hosts of old. Sir Hugh Gough (afterwards Lord Gough), the British commander, hastened to meet them. At Mudki and Firozshah he checked their advance, although suffering terrible casualties to his own army. At Aliwal and Sobraon (1846) his forces decisively routed them, chased them across the Sutlej, and entered Lahore, the capital. Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, refrained from annexation and contented himself with the establishment of an infant ruler under British protection, and the occupation of strategic points in the country by British troops.

The Sikh army, although beaten in the field, remained in being, and soon became anxious to try the fortune of war once again. In 1848 the British protectorate was overthrown and a new campaign became necessary. The British losses in the previous war had not been made good and there was some delay in dealing with the situation. Early in 1849 Gough was once more in the field, to find that the Sikhs were as formidable as ever. At Chillianwala a terrific combat resulted in something like a British defeat, in which three regiments lost their colours.

Gough's reputation fell under a cloud and his supersession was decided upon when he ended the war at a stroke by the victory of Gujerat. The Sikh army was destroyed, and the country was once more at the discretion of the British authorities. Lord Dalhousie, who had come out as Governor-General in the previous year, was the apostle of a new forward policy. On March 29, 1849, he proclaimed the annexation of the Punjab. Within a few years the British administrators, headed by the brothers Henry and John Lawrence, disarmed the inhabitants, settled the land revenue, enforced justice, and transformed the Punjab into a loyal province.

A second Burma war (1851-2) became necessary on account of the king's arbitrary treatment of British merchants in his territories. A short campaign resulted in the annexation of the province of Pegu, including the great port of Rangoon. Independent Burma was now reduced to an inland kingdom looking eastwards towards China and Siam.

Dalhousie was firmly convinced that British administration conferred supreme benefits upon the inhabitants of India, and accordingly he lost no opportunity of annexing native states. In particular he asserted the right of the Company to inherit when a native ruler died without leaving a successor of his own blood. This, the doctrine of "lapse," conflicted with the Indian custom of recognizing the right of a childless ruler to adopt an heir. Under this procedure Dalhousie annexed five states of secondary rank during his tenure of office. Nor was this all. The last Maratha of the Bhonsla line died in 1853 without an heir of any sort, and his lands became British under the name of the Central Provinces. The last Peshwa and the last Nawab of the Carnatic, both long deprived of authority, also died, and their titles were extinguished, although the latter left distant relatives and the former an adopted son, known to history as the Nana Sahib. The Kingdom of Oudh, which Wellesley had sought to reform in 1801, had slipped back into its old conditions of misrule. Successive Governors-General had protested and threatened penalties if the oppression continued. Dalhousie determined to act. Declaring that "the British government would be guilty in the sight of God and man if it were any longer to aid in sustaining by its countenance an administration fraught with suffering to millions," he annexed the country in 1856. He intended to carry out disarmament and reform as he had done in the Punjab, but he left India in the same year, with his policy uncompleted. Lord Canning, his successor, had not taken up the threads when the Mutiny of 1857 threw all into the melting pot.

In other ways Dalhousie's rule marked the end and the beginning of an epoch. In addition to making the British supremacy coterminous with the geographical boundaries of India, he simplified the administration and introduced the material achievement which applied science had made part of European life. Education, railways, posts and telegraphs threatened to break into the social stagnation of centuries, and

produced active resentment among a conservative people. His annexations had cooled the loyalty of a part at least of the ruling classes. The unrest might have passed harmlessly had not military precautions been neglected. But the native army, a great part of which was recruited in Bengal and Oudh, had grown in numbers whilst the European troops had diminished in the fierce Afghan and Sikh campaigns.¹ British armies in the field, although ultimately victorious, had suffered more than one reverse in those wars, and the sepoy soldier conceived that the credit of success was due as much to him as to his white brothers-in-arms. Thus, at the very moment when various causes were promoting discontent the military prestige of the British was open to depreciation. These are the chief reasons assigned for the Mutiny. Contemporaries attributed it in part to Russian intrigues, but for this there appears to be little foundation. The present nationalist writers of India seek to represent it as a kind of war of independence on the part of Hindu against western civilization. This is to overestimate a single phase of the matter, but colour is given to it by the grievance which formed the ultimate occasion of the outbreak—the introduction of the Enfield rifle with its cartridges greased with a mixture of cow's and pig's fat. The soldier had to bite off the end of the cartridge in order to load his weapon, and the action entailed sacrilege and defilement to Hindu and Mohammedan respectively.

The first revolt occurred at Meerut on May 10, 1857. The sepoy regiments murdered their officers and marched off to Delhi. There they found and drew forth from obscurity the lineal heir of the Mogul emperors. Their possession of the Mogul and of his ancient capital gave them a rallying-point and an excuse for proclaiming a military mutiny as a national war. The rising spread south-eastwards into Oudh and Bengal and southwards into the central Indian states, whose contingents joined the mutineers. In Oudh the populace also joined in large numbers. The Madras and Bombay armies, then separate organizations from that of Bengal, remained loyal, as did the people of the Punjab under the firm rule of Sir John Lawrence. The Bengal regiments in the Punjab were disarmed before they could make up their minds to revolt. At Cawnpore on the border of Oudh the British residents and troops held out in an entrenchment against a horde of mutineers led by Nana Sahib, the dispossessed heir of the Peshwa, who had been living in the neighbourhood. When resistance was no longer possible, they capitulated on guarantee of safe-conduct down the Ganges. Whilst embarking in the boats the men were set upon and murdered, and the women and children taken back to Cawnpore. Later, when a relief force was approaching, Nana Sahib had them all massacred in cold blood and their bodies cast into a well. At Lucknow, the capital of Oudh, Sir Henry Lawrence was forced to shut himself up with a small band of defenders in the residency. In the siege which followed he was killed

¹ In 1857 native troops numbered 311,000 (Bengal and Oudh, 137,000); and European, 39,000 (*Camb. Mod. Hist.* vol. xi. p. 745).

and, but for a superhuman defence, the tragedy of Cawnpore would have been repeated. Sir Henry Havelock and Sir James Outram carried out a relief, but were themselves shut in with those they had rescued. Sir Colin Campbell finally raised the siege after stubborn fighting in November, 1857. Meanwhile the British leaders saw that Delhi was the focus of the rising. Ere a month had passed from the first outbreak a small British force laid siege to the place, if such a word can be applied to an undertaking in which some five thousand assailants sought to force an entry into a great city defended by 30,000 to 40,000 armed men. The British camp on the Ridge before Delhi was the scene of grim sufferings from battle and disease. At length General Nicholson arrived with reinforcements from the Punjab, and Delhi was stormed and taken street by street in a week's fighting in September. The helpless Mogul puppet was sent a prisoner to Burma. His two sons were also taken, and shot by their captor on an attempt at rescue. The events at Delhi and Lucknow broke the Mutiny as an organized movement, but fighting continued for another eighteen months. Sir Hugh Rose fought many actions in central India, and defeated one by one the heads of the rising there. The Bengal and Oudh rebels dispersed northwards, Nana Sahib among them. He disappeared into the northern wilderness, and was never heard of again. For such men, when taken, there could be no mercy, but Lord Canning became somewhat unpopular for insisting upon clemency towards the rank and file. When passion had subsided his statesmanship was recognized.

It was now time to end the career of the Company which, since its trading operations had been wound up in 1833, had been an anachronism. From that date it had existed only as the governing agency of India, its dividends being guaranteed by Parliament out of Indian revenues. In 1858 the Government of India Act transferred all its property to the Crown, and on November 1st, at Allahabad, before the sound of the guns had yet died away, Lord Canning proclaimed that the Queen had assumed the sovereignty of India. The old Board of Control was abolished, and the department at Whitehall dealing with Indian affairs became a council of fifteen headed by the Secretary of State for India. The promotion of the Governor-General to the rank of Viceroy emphasized the Crown's new position. The Allahabad proclamation included an amnesty to all but actual murderers, and a declaration that justice and religious toleration should prevail. Laws and treaties remained as established by the Company, and the doctrine of lapse was disavowed. Since that date it has been necessary on occasion to depose an unjust ruler, but the independence of his state has been maintained. No further annexations have taken place, and the tendency has been all in the direction of supporting and strengthening the Indian princes.

(ii) The Indian Ocean and the Far East

The treaties of 1802 and 1814, as has been noted in an earlier chapter, left Great Britain in possession of Ceylon and Mauritius, whilst the subsequent Anglo-Dutch agreement of 1824 confirmed Singapore as a British trading station, and added to it Malacca, in addition to Penang, which had been acquired from its native ruler as early as 1786. Some particulars have now to be given about the development of these colonies and the acquisition of others still farther to the eastward.

The seaports of Ceylon had fallen under Portuguese control in the early years of the sixteenth century. Between 1638 and 1658 the Dutch ousted the Portuguese, and then entered upon a similar period of about one hundred and fifty years' possession, until they gave place in their turn to the British in 1795. Until that time European rule had never been effective in the mountainous interior, and it was not until 1803 that an armed force compelled the King of Kandy to receive a mission of British officials. The submission was but temporary, for the King soon repudiated control and remained independent until 1815, when he was deposed and his dominions were formally annexed. This transition from occupation of the coastline to complete administration of the whole island is characteristic of the change made by Wellesley in the position of the British in India, where the Company, predominantly a trading corporation in the eighteenth century, became a governing body in the nineteenth—the essential contrast between the old and the new imperialism amid eastern surroundings. The problem of establishing jurisdiction in Ceylon is illustrated by the facts that the country is nearly as large as Ireland and that its interior plateau rises in Adam's Peak, the sacred mountain, to a height of 7000 feet, and to over 8000 feet elsewhere. The Sinhalese population, of mixed origin and nearly all of the Buddhist religion, was about three-quarters of a million strong at the time of the British occupation, having greatly declined since the mediæval period prior to the advent of the Europeans.

The conquest of 1795 was made by the forces of the East India Company, but in 1802 Ceylon was removed from its control and became a Crown colony. Until 1920 the executive and legislative councils consisted entirely of nominated members; in that year the legislative council was enlarged to thirty-seven members, of whom sixteen are elected, some by special interests and communities and the rest by territorial constituencies. The population has risen rapidly in the past century, and in 1921 numbered $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions, the majority Buddhists, and the remainder Hindus, Mohammedans and Christians. About a quarter of the whole area is now under cultivation for coconuts, rice, tea and rubber. Until 1878 coffee was the chief crop, but at that period a disease of the plants ruined the industry. The great fluctuations in the population of Ceylon have been closely connected with the

maintenance or decay of irrigation works, which in their turn have depended upon peace and sound administration. Here, as elsewhere in the East, the mercantile period of European enterprise, which considered only the seaport trade without caring about the conditions of the interior, caused a retrogression of prosperity that has been made good only in the modern administrative era.¹

Mauritius, captured from the French in 1810, was retained at the peace of 1814, when its companion island, Réunion, was restored to France. The first European colonists were Dutch, but they had abandoned the island before the French established themselves early in the eighteenth century. The French made Mauritius a plantation colony for the growth of sugar, with a planter aristocracy and a large slave population, a character which, apart from the slavery, it still retains. The south-east trade winds, the latitude (20° S.), and the prevalence of hurricanes in the hotter months, have also contributed to give the colony a West Indian aspect, the resemblance being completed by intensive cultivation and a very dense population of nearly 600 to the square mile. The chief point of difference is that the bulk of the non-European inhabitants are now British Indians instead of negroes. The British conquest was undertaken for naval reasons, since Mauritius was a base for French privateers in the Napoleonic War. There was no movement to dispossess the French planters, and the Code Napoléon remains to this day the basis of the legal system. Crown colony administration was established, with the governor as the chief executive authority, assisted by nominated councils; but in 1884-5 an elective element was introduced into the legislative body. The only revolutionary change in the life of the island after the British occupation was the abolition of slavery. The Act of 1807, prohibiting the slave trade, was markedly ineffective in Mauritius, and recruitment from Africa continued under barbarous conditions. The emancipation of 1833 was carried out in the following years without disturbance, and the labour supply was thereafter drawn from East Indian coolies, who came on indentures and for the most part remained in the island after the expiration of their terms. The population (nearly 400,000) is now therefore 70 per cent. Indian by origin, although there is a greater European element, chiefly French, than in similar colonies in the West Indies.²

The Seychelles Islands, 900 miles north of Mauritius, were taken from the French at the same time. They were notable in the early days as the only habitat of a species of coco-palm which yielded enormously large nuts that commanded fancy prices as curiosities among the wealthy in India. An African slave population was liberated in 1833,

¹ The above account is based upon Lucas, *Hist. Geography of the British Colonies*, vol. i. (2nd edn., 1906), section iii., brought up to date by particulars from the *Colonial Office List*.

² Lucas, *op. cit.* and *Colonial Office List*. For the slave trade after 1807, see W. L. Mathieson, *British Slavery and its Abolition*, pp. 24-5.

and was recruited by negroes rescued from captured Arab slavers plying between the Zanzibar coast and the countries of the Near East. These blacks were settled in the Seychelles, which on a smaller scale have fulfilled the function of Sierra Leone and Liberia on the other side of Africa. The white residents are chiefly of French extraction, and the products in the past century have been copra, guano and palm oils.

An account has already been given of the foundation of Singapore, and of British interests in the Malay Straits down to the treaty with Holland in 1824.¹ Penang, Malacca and Singapore were all placed under the rule of the East India Company, and were constituted a joint presidency in 1826. After the abolition of the Company these Straits Settlements remained under the control of the Indian Government until 1867, when they became colonies under the Colonial Office. Singapore was from the outset a free port, not subject to the restrictions imposed elsewhere by the East India Company's charters or by the mercantile regulations still surviving in the Empire at large. To this fact and to its geographical position its rapid rise to importance was chiefly due. Within a few years of its foundation it began to serve as an entrepôt for the local trade of the Malay peninsula and islands, and it drew business also from the through traffic passing between the Indian Ocean and the China seas. The most striking development of the Straits Settlements, however, and the establishment of British protectorates over the series of Malay states in their neighbourhood, belong to the post-1870 period, and will be dealt with in the latter part of this volume.

The great island of Borneo, larger in area than France, attracted the notice of Europeans from 1521, when some members of Magellan's expedition, after their commander's death, paid a visit to the port of Brunei on the north-west coast. Brunei was the capital of a powerful sultan, and the name was corrupted by the Spaniards to Borneo and applied to the whole country. Portuguese and Spaniards in the sixteenth century, and English and Dutch in the seventeenth and eighteenth, all made efforts to establish themselves in the seaports with the object not only of dealing in the local products but also of tapping the considerable native trade with China. All failed except the Dutch, chiefly owing to the intractability of the island chiefs, who had a strong sense of independence. The Dutch achieved a precarious hold at Bangermasin and a few other places, lost it to the British in the Napoleonic War, and regained it after the peace of 1814. During these centuries the prosperity and civilization of the native people declined, possibly owing to the impact of European mercantilism. The subject is obscure, but it is at least certain that the intercourse with China withered away amid the altered conditions of trade; and China had always been the example of culture and administration to the adjacent countries of the Far East. By the nineteenth century the great sultanate of Brunei


¹ See above, chap. ii. pp. 33-4.

had decayed into impotence, and the only external activity of its inhabitants had become that of piracy.

The Dutch, on recovering their foothold, began slowly to react to the spirit of the nineteenth century and to establish administrative control over the southern part of Borneo. The north and west were left to themselves until in 1839-41 they were visited by James Brooke, an ex-officer of the Indian Army. He was impressed by the fertility of the country and the degradation and misrule prevailing among the inhabitants. He assisted in putting down an insurrection in Sarawak, a province of Brunei, and was made its governor by the Sultan in 1841. Rajah Brooke, as he was called henceforward, established order in his own territory and helped a small squadron of the British navy to root out piracy along the whole coastline. The Sarawak jurisdiction, which became hereditary in the Brooke family and is still held by it, increased in area by further cessions from Brunei until it now comprises nearly the whole of that sultanate. Sir James Brooke was at first willing to bring Sarawak within the British Empire, but the times were not propitious. The Colonial Office was not eager for fresh responsibility, and some ill-informed attacks made by the humanitarian interest upon Brooke himself in 1853 convinced him that his state would be better governed without interference, however well intentioned. He therefore remained an independent and absolute monarch until his death in 1868. His successors, Sir Charles Brooke (1868-1917) and Charles Vyner Brooke (from 1917) have maintained the same status except that in 1888 the external relations of the country were placed under the control of the Foreign Office.

In the course of the operations against the Borneo pirates the uninhabited island of Labuan, lying not far from the port of Brunei, was ceded to Great Britain by the Sultan in 1846. It was at first used merely as a naval base, but afterwards there was an effort to develop it as a place of trade and to work the coal mines existing in it. These operations, although still continuing, have never flourished, and a good deal of capital has been lost. The population in 1921 was six thousand, having declined by nearly thirty per cent. since 1901. The remnant of Brunei became a British protectorate in 1888. The story of British North Borneo, which fills the northern extremity of the island, belongs to the later period of the Empire's development.

The permanent trade of the East India Company with China dated from 1684, when its factors secured a foothold at Canton, and certain Chinese—the 'Hong' merchants—were privileged to do business with them. Before and after that date there had been attempts to establish English factories in other Chinese ports, but all had failed to prosper. The trade, even at Canton, was conducted under great difficulties. The Chinese imperial government might be induced to make regulations and to fix tolls and duties, but it would seldom condescend to enforce compliance upon its local officials. They united to the imperial contempt for foreigners a lively appreciation of the amount of



squeezing the trade would bear, and the Company's factors were kept continually at that point of extortion which made it almost, but not quite, necessary to abandon the position. During the eighteenth century French and Dutch ships also frequented Canton, and after 1783 Americans began to make their appearance there, whilst Russian traders tried without much success to penetrate China from the Siberian frontier. The controlling factor in the situation was that, while Europeans desired the products of China, they had nothing indispensable to the Chinese to offer in exchange. China was perfectly aware of this, and entertained, moreover, a profound intellectual contempt for the foreigners as uncultured barbarians, mere hucksters without morals or learning, and deficient also, as it appeared, in physical force. This attitude was pardonable from a view of the facts as they appeared to Chinese eyes, and especially from a consideration of the miserable results of European impact in the islands and outlying coasts of the Far East. Granted these facts, China was right in seeking to exclude the Europeans; she was wrong in the arrogance that moved her to underestimate their strength and to make no preparation for resistance while there was yet time to do so. Her own moral weakness appeared also in not making the exclusion absolute, a thing she was unable to do, since her local mandarins were always corruptible enough to betray a national policy for their private gain.

In the last decade of the eighteenth century the East India Company, relying upon the prestige it had gained by its victories over the French in India, thought that the time was ripe to demand improved treatment. It therefore moved the British government to send an ambassador to the Chinese Emperor. Lord Macartney sailed on this errand in 1792, with full credentials as the representative of George III. The mandarins received him with more courtesy than might have been expected, but tried hard to make him abase himself, and by implication his sovereign, by performing the *kotow*. On his refusal he was allowed a brief interview with the Emperor on his own terms, but achieved nothing in the shape of a treaty. The Chinese people were misinformed of the nature of the mission, whose members were accompanied by flags bearing the inscription, "Tribute bearers from the country of England."¹ Macartney's most definite demand had been the opening of additional ports to trade, and this was refused in a letter wherein the Emperor addressed King George as if he were a small boy under correction for impertinence.

During the following twenty years English trade and prestige increased at Canton owing to the diminution of other European shipping in the great wars. The Americans alone improved their position whilst the French trade was almost extinguished. Still, however, the difficulties and humiliations of the merchants continued, and in 1816 a second embassy was attempted. This time the ambassador, Lord Amherst,

¹ Sir R. K. Douglas, *Europe and the Far East*, 2nd edn., Cambridge, 1913, p. 47. This authority is generally followed in the ensuing pages.

reached Peking, but was denied an audience unless he would *kotow* to the Emperor. On his refusal he was turned away unheard, and an order was issued that no more envoys should be admitted to the capital.

In the decade following 1830 two innovations produced a crisis in the overstrained situation. The East India charter of 1833 put an end to the Company's trading operations and threw open the Canton traffic to private British merchants. Their representatives lacked the long experience of the Company's factors, and the personal acquaintance with the officials which had alone been able to break through some of the worst restrictions. Extortion and ill-feeling grew more rampant than ever, and the merchants appealed to their home government for redress. Tea was now a necessity to industrial England, and the volume of the trade had so increased that its difficulties could no longer be borne. The other crucial development was the Chinese discovery of a moral objection to the old-established import of opium from India. The objection was perfectly defensible in itself, but it was not genuinely advanced, for it was made simply an occasion for the mandarins to extort bribes for conniving at the forbidden traffic. As a more modern example of the same nature bears witness, a moral scruple against an established trade can command respect only if it is sincerely held and enforced without respect of persons. Of this there was no evidence at Canton, where the patrol boats for the interception of the opium became themselves the vehicles which monopolized its conveyance. The foreign merchants, the British among them, therefore continued to deal in opium, which commanded a higher price in consequence of the restrictions. The British authorities disavowed the trade and tried to stop it, but Chinese arrogance on the one hand, and corruption on the other, made co-operation impossible. The Canton river and the adjacent waters became a scene of anarchy in which Europeans, whether opium traders or not, were indiscriminately attacked, and the unscrupulous became ever more reckless in seeking quick profits whilst the situation endured. In 1839, on the demand of the Viceroy of Canton, the British representative ordered his merchants to surrender all their opium. They complied, and the stuff was burnt; but the Viceroy, who might have met forbearance with moderation, was merely emboldened to make the impossible demand that future smugglers should be submitted to Chinese courts and penalties. That meant, in the existing state of justice, that Europeans would be executed without a fair trial; and the whole British community therefore quitted Canton. The Viceroy ordered them to return at once or leave Chinese waters for good. He followed this with an attack upon the shipping by a fleet of war-junks. Two British frigates beat off the assailants, and war was declared.

In 1840 a considerable British fleet with a military force was sent to China. It blockaded the ports, bombarded and occupied certain places, and in 1841 took possession of the island of Hong-Kong as a base. The object was to compel the concession of trade on fair terms. The

Emperor discovered with dismay that he had no power to resist. His military force was trivial, and of national spirit among his millions of subjects there was no sign. Still his arrogant attitude made it hard for him to yield, and it was not until the British took Shanghai and then moved up the Yang-tse-Kiang and captured Nankin that he could bring himself to discuss terms. The Treaty of Nankin was signed in August, 1842. By it China paid an indemnity, ceded Hong-Kong, and opened Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai as "treaty ports" in addition to Canton, and it was stipulated also that British officers should communicate as equals with Chinese mandarins. The signature was accompanied by a good deal of face-saving talk which implied that the Emperor was condescending rather than submitting. The British commanders did not take it seriously, but the Chinese did, and after the departure of the forces the mandarins plucked up courage to encroach upon many details of the treaty. An uneasy period therefore followed in which it became apparent that the China problem was not solved. The lesson had not been severe enough for Chinese pride to admit the equality of foreigners, and a second and fiercer war was necessary to establish that principle.

The whole thing was a tragedy of perverseness. For there was no more favourable opportunity than the middle decades of the nineteenth century for China to be peacefully opened to intercourse with the world. The callous mercantilism of the previous century had passed. Great Britain was the predominant power concerned, and others were willing to follow her lead. She was in no imperialistic mood. Her statesmen desired no conquests, but only an extension of trade on equal terms; and her strong philanthropic element would have insisted upon fair play to China if the economic interests had shown any sign of truculence. As it was, the course of events from 1830 had produced insuperable suspicion and bitterness, and the only solution was that of a shattering blow to the prestige of the imperial throne, followed by a gradual descent of the empire into decay. Upon that unhappy condition there impinged the world-competition of the new imperialistic powers of the late nineteenth century, less altruistic and less scrupulous than the Britain of 1840, and the opening of China took place amid the preliminaries to the catastrophe of 1914.

The events that led to the second China war were the weakening of imperial authority by the outbreak of the Taiping rebellion in South China, and a series of hostile acts against the British by the officials at Canton. The seizure of a British ship which, however, carried only a Chinese crew, was a signal for a new attempt at coercion to begin in 1856. The British forces at Canton were insufficient, and the troops sent out to their aid were diverted by the Indian Mutiny. Thus it was not until 1858 that a serious move could be made. By that date the French were also sufferers by Chinese actions, and a joint Anglo-French expedition was set in motion. The British captured Canton, whilst farther north they and their allies stormed the Taku Forts and advanced

up the Peiho River to Tientsin. Here Lord Elgin and the other European representatives concluded a treaty which provided for the opening of five more treaty ports, freedom of movement for Europeans in the interior, and the residence of ambassadors at Peking. The Treaty of Tientsin was no sooner signed, and the troops withdrawn, than the Chinese decided to repudiate it. In 1859 they held the Taku Forts once more to resist the passage of the ambassador up the river. An Anglo-French attack was this time repulsed with heavy loss, and once again a large-scale campaign was necessary. In 1860 the French and British captured the forts and sailed up to Tientsin. Thence they marched to Peking, fighting by the way. Outside the city they captured the Emperor's summer palace, and the troops set a bad example of morality by plundering it of everything valuable it contained. The Emperor fled, leaving his advisers to deal with the situation, and they had no option but to receive Lord Elgin and his French colleague, to ratify the Treaty of Tientsin, and to cede to the British the promontory of Kowloon on the mainland opposite Hong-Kong. Some Englishmen had been treacherously seized before the advance and treated with great brutality whilst prisoners. In punishment for this, Elgin ordered the burning of the summer palace. The events of 1860 were decisive of the issue of fair trade and diplomatic equality, but they dealt the imperial throne a blow which ultimately proved mortal. The great Taiping rebellion was still desolating southern China. It was finally put down in 1864 by the efforts of General Gordon, but the central government had been so weakened that it was powerless to prevent disorders from occurring in an almost unbroken series thenceforward, or to adopt any such plan of modernizing the administration as that which saved Japan in similar circumstances.

CHAPTER IX

THE WEST INDIES

THE student of Empire history in search of information on the British West Indies is confronted with a remarkable fact : there is no comprehensive general history of the islands, of modern compilation, in existence. The records of the great dominions and of the Indian Empire have been written and re-written, dependencies such as Uganda and Malaya have been adequately dealt with, detailed accounts are available of many minor imperial units ; but for a full-dress history of the West Indian colonies that were once the pride of the Empire we have nothing of later date than the work of Bryan Edwards, first published in 1793.¹ The fact is of more than bibliographical significance ; it illustrates a profound change in relative values, the contrast between the position of plantation colonies in the old Empire and in the new. In the eighteenth century, even in the seventeenth, the West Indies excited public interest in England, for they were the prime care of statesmanship, and histories of them were in those times published freely to supply the demand. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries interest has shifted elsewhere, and it has seemed to be worth no one's while to perform the arduous research necessary for an exhaustive history. That leads to another point, that the story of the last hundred years is by no means blank. It has teemed with hotly debated questions which have called into being a mass of historical material. Much of it remains unexploited, but one or two topics have been illuminated in monographs, and from these it is possible to draw some interesting conclusions upon a unit of the modern Empire that has been otherwise neglected.

After the fall of the old colonial Empire the British West Indies experienced more than eighty years of economic and political crisis, during which their character as communities was completely transformed. The first of these difficulties arose with the acknowledgment of American independence, which, by the operation of the Navigation Acts, interrupted the long-established trade between America and the islands. That trade, or a substitute for it, was a necessity, since the plantations had been drawing lumber and foodstuffs from the continental colonies. The enumeration clauses of the Navigation Acts

¹ The excellent West Indian volume in Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies* is necessarily planned on too small a scale to rank as an exhaustive treatise.

prohibited the export of sugar and most of the other planters' products direct to foreign countries, and in 1783 the British Government issued an order in council excepting the United States from this rule, provided that the goods were carried in British ships. This, however, satisfied neither the West Indies nor the Americans, both of whom desired to use American shipping; and there was a good deal of contravention of the rule with the connivance of island officials.¹ An Act of 1787 allowed a limited foreign trade in certain free ports in the West Indies, but here again the liberty was not sufficient to remove hardship. Next, an Anglo-American treaty of 1794, usually called Jay's Treaty, threw open the British West Indies to American ships not exceeding 70 tons in burden.² These small vessels carried the fish and other foodstuffs needed for the slave population, which had suffered considerably by the previous stoppage. Another breach in the enumeration policy followed in 1808, when direct shipments were permitted from the West Indies to European countries south of Cape Finisterre. This was introduced as a temporary measure on account of war losses, but remained permanently in force. Thus the compulsion of circumstance rather than any radical change in the views of statesmen was whittling away the restrictive regulations of the old mercantile system. The Treaty of Ghent which closed the three years' war with the United States in 1814 made alterations of detail, but the entire liberation of transport between the States and the Islands did not take place until 1822. Restrictions affecting other foreign intercourse with the West Indies were in the main removed by Huskisson's Reciprocity Act of 1825, although some survived until the final repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849.

The above-mentioned restrictions were all designed for the benefit of British shipping or of the merchants of the mother-country, and they were contrary to the immediate interests of the West Indian planters. Compensation accrued from the discriminating customs duties which gave the British West Indies the monopoly of the home market; and whilst the shipping regulations disappeared bit by bit, the fiscal protection remained in operation until Great Britain became a free-trade country in the decade 1840-50. Consequently, although "the groans of the plantations"—to quote the title of a seventeenth century tract—had been bitter and continuous against the full mercantile policy from the moment of its inception until the days of Huskisson, the sweeping away of its purely fiscal remnants by his successors was felt as an added grievance which filled the cup of West Indian despair in the middle years of the nineteenth century. In fact it may be said that the inauguration, the modification, and the removal of the West Indian shipping regulations and preferences evoked a prolonged and dismal catalogue of recrimination from the successive interests affected. The

¹ See Southey's *Life of Nelson*, for a quarrel in which Nelson as a naval captain involved himself, in his zeal to enforce the law in face of the corruption of superior authorities.

² *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, 1922, i. pp. 156-7.

loyalty and sense of imperial citizenship conspicuous in the West Indies to-day are of modern growth ; they were absolutely lacking in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Great as was the cumulative wealth of the plantations, there was hardly ever a time when the planters were not to be found crying out that they were ruined. The truth was that sugar was a highly speculative business in which even in the best times it was possible to go wrong, and that the complaints of the losers tended to monopolize the record whilst the more fortunate pocketed their gains in silence. Apart from this, there were in the late eighteenth century certain general handicaps suffered by the British sugar islands. The French in Haiti, the western half of the original Spanish colony of Hispaniola, made enormous progress in sugar-planting upon soil which was comparatively unexhausted ; they used artificial methods of irrigation, and by the period of the Revolution were turning out more sugar than all the British units together. Haiti was considerably larger than Jamaica, and its yield per acre was said to be more than three times as heavy.¹ Jamaica had at this date some unexhausted land, but it was not readily accessible to transport. The smaller islands, such as Barbados, had long exploited every inch of their soil, and their crops, besides being lighter, required more labour to produce them. Then again the British planter expected his estate to keep him in affluence without much effort on his own part. The majority of the owners were absentees living in England and leaving supervision to deputies. The natural result was bad finance which treated all income as profits and starved expenditure upon improvements, for the manager's ability was judged by the amount of money he sent home. Even the resident planters were victims to this temptation. Surrounded by slaves, they disdained work, spent freely in good times, and raised mortgages in bad. The result was frequent transference of properties and a further neglect of the sort of expenditure which would take years to bear fruit. This improvidence was noted among the English planters from the first establishment in Stuart times, and much of it was undoubtedly due to the effects of the climate and of rum-drinking, which made life too short for long views to find favour. The French planters, on the other hand, are generally described as more frugal and industrious and less given to absenteeism. They treated their slaves more humanely and so probably got more work out of them. Yet another disability affected Barbados and the Leeward Islands, although not Jamaica and the Windward units conquered in the French wars. This was the 4½ per cent. duty on all exports, agreed to by the planters at the Restoration in return for the annulment of the proprietary claims of the Earl of Carlisle. Ceaseless agitation for the best part of two centuries succeeded only in 1838, when the duty was at length abolished.

For these reasons the islands were never really contented, even in the golden eighteenth century, although their slaves and their sugar

¹ W. L. Mathieson, *British Slavery and its Abolition*, p. 8.

output steadily increased. Then, in the 1790's, the French Revolution brought them a short-lived blaze of prosperity. The slaves in Haiti rose against their French masters, destroyed the plantations, and defied all efforts at reconquest. Political unrest and loss of sea-power checked also the output of Martinique and Guadeloupe. The European price of sugar was nearly trebled in consequence, and the British plantations revelled in the monopoly which thrust itself into their hands. It was a position which was soon lost. The Spaniards of Cuba, hitherto almost derelict as a planting colony, seized the opportunity and produced heavily, again with the advantage of a virgin soil. In 1799 the price of sugar fell rapidly, and by 1805 Cuba was growing as much as Haiti had done at its best. The smaller French islands also recovered, and the maritime war itself turned to their advantage. For when French and Spanish merchantmen were being swept off the seas, their governments admitted Americans to trade with their islands. The Americans, safe as neutrals, took the sugar to their home ports and thence re-exported it to Europe as their own property. In spite of British fleet supremacy there were hosts of enemy privateers at large throughout these wars, and British merchantmen had to pay heavy insurances from which neutrals were free. Hence the transport of the British planters' sugar cost more than did that of their vanquished enemies.¹ There are many sides to the question of "the freedom of the seas" as applied to neutrals in war. It is a phrase which deceptively simplifies one of the most complicated problems of statesmanship.

Amid these purely economic distresses the movement against the slave trade and slavery hung over the British West Indies like a menacing cloud. The sugar boom of 1791-9 caused an enormous increase in the importation of negroes from Africa and strengthened the determination of the abolitionists. They argued that the stoppage of the trade would not injure the plantations, and there were some grounds for the belief. For the system of working slaves rapidly to death and then buying new ones was wasteful, and in the boom years the price of slaves went far above their real value. There were humane owners who would have liked to reform the conditions of labour, but found it hard to differ in a marked manner from the general practice. After the Act of 1807 there was undoubtedly an improvement in the treatment of the slaves. The total number owned twenty-five years later was 670,000, and it was probably slightly less than in 1807, although exact statistics for that period are wanting. But the difference cannot have been great enough to prove a mortality as severe as during the days of unrestricted recruiting. There had, it is true, been some illicit slave trading after 1807, but an investigator holds that the British share in it was a mere "picking up the crumbs" from the vast numbers poured into Cuba and the French islands.² The conclusion is therefore that the conditions were ameliorated, otherwise there would have been hardly any negroes left to emancipate in 1833.

¹ Mathieson, pp. 9-10.

² Mathieson, p. 25.

But, indeed, the whole subject of the treatment of slaves is one upon which it is impossible to arrive at the truth. On the one hand were men like Zachary Macaulay and the elder James Stephen, who were moved to passionate indignation by what they had personally seen in the West Indies. On the other we have the testimony of many persons, owners, travellers, naval and military officers, to the happy, care-free existence of the negro, who simply could not be made to overwork, who addressed his master with affectionate familiarity, and on Sundays and holidays decked himself in finery which would have aroused the envy of the English villager. The normal sugar estate was to the outside observer a placid, genial community, and yet, like the tropical landscape, it had poisonous terrors beneath its surface, and was on occasion the scene of convulsions of elemental violence. Statistics of mortality, records of revolts and murders and floggings, are surer evidence than tourists' impressions, and they support the graver interpretation of the problem. Comparative estimates of Spaniards, Frenchmen, British and Dutch as slave-owners unite in placing them in that order of merit. Spanish slavery was the mildest, Dutch the harshest, with the British running it close.

Discussion of measures to ameliorate the condition of the slaves began before the abolition of the trade. Burke proposed in 1792 that a Protector of the Negroes should be appointed in each colony with power to supervise a scheme of education and religious instruction, of facilities for negro marriage, of statutory holidays increasing in number with the age of the slave, and of opportunities for him to save money and purchase his own freedom at fair rates. Henry Dundas (Lord Melville), Colonial Secretary from 1794, held similar views, and in 1797 the Commons passed a motion in this sense on the initiative of Charles Ellis, a planter and member of the House. These were expressions of opinion, which it was left to the colonial legislatures to carry into effect. They were reluctant, scenting a step to abolition, which indeed was intended, and the legislative result was almost nothing. In 1815 again the Commons recommended that the colonial assemblies should ameliorate the conditions of servitude, and Wilberforce introduced a bill for establishing a register of legally owned slaves in order to check illicit importation. The bill was dropped in England, but the colonies themselves established registers in the succeeding years.

With the founding of the Anti-Slavery Society in 1823 amelioration proceeded more vigorously. Lord Bathurst, then Colonial Secretary, sent a circular to the various governors enjoining the virtual cessation of flogging, a breach with the past that was too sudden to be carried into effect; but flogging was thenceforward controlled by local regulations which lessened its severity.¹ The missionary societies now became a force in the plantations, greatly to the disgust of the whites,

¹ The mentality of the humanitarians is illustrated by the fact that they made no protest against the flogging of white men, which continued for another half-century in the British army and navy.

and some unhappy passages ensued. The most flagrant case was that of the Rev. John Smith in Demerara, arrested for sedition and tried by court-martial in 1823. He was probably not guilty in intention, but a slave revolt had followed his preaching, and the alarm of the authorities resulted in harsh treatment of the missionary, who died from confinement in a pestilent gaol. Other revolts, caused by rumours of impending emancipation and suspicions that the planters were blocking its progress, occurred in Barbados in 1816 and in Jamaica in 1831, the last being attended with considerable bloodshed.

The Emancipation Act of 1833 provided for a period of semi-servitude in the guise of apprenticeship to continue until 1840, but in fact it was nowhere prolonged beyond 1838.¹ The social effects in the islands were immediate and permanent. In the smaller units like Barbados, where there was no vacant land, the negroes did in the main continue to work as free labourers, but in Jamaica and British Guiana, where there was room for expansion, they deserted the estates and lived in their own villages, supporting themselves by primitive subsistence agriculture. Their resulting condition was said in many places to be deplorable. Nevertheless the negro population has multiplied in the past century, and of the present two million inhabitants of the British West Indies approximately 80 per cent. are the descendants of the slaves. An exact statement is, of course, unattainable owing to the facts that many negroes were already free in 1833 and that a subsequent influx of East Indians has led to mixed marriages; many persons also are of mixed white and African blood. The social ruin that overtook the white planters has sometimes been exaggerated, for it is evident that their position had long been precarious for reasons unconnected with the abolition of slavery. That operation was only one among many of the manifestations of world-change between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which no government had power to prevent. The present position is that the islands belong in the main to the negroes, and one unlooked-for effect is that "there is no negro problem in the West Indies in the sense in which the phrase is used in the southern United States."² The law is respected, society is harmonious, and race-outrages, colour-hatred, lynchings and mob violence are almost unknown. And this state of affairs has been attained under administrations that are entirely in white hands, and under comparatively feeble legislatures unsupported by any democratic enfranchisement of the mass of the people. That, at least, is a British achievement which may be set against the crimes of slavery.

The labour problem, as has been said, was more acute in the colonies of larger area than in the small islands. To supply the place of the negroes a system of indentured labour was therefore inaugurated in 1835, although it did not become extensive until ten years later. A few thousand Chinese and free Africans were at first imported, but the

¹ For compensation paid, see above, chap. i. p. 23.

² Hume Wrong, *The Government of the West Indies*, Oxford, 1923, p. 172.

great majority of the new hands came from India. From 1835 to 1903 some 360,000 Indian coolies entered the West Indies on short terms of service, and only a minority elected to leave on their expiration. British Guiana and Trinidad absorbed the greater part of this influx, and their percentages of Indian inhabitants are now 41 and 36 respectively. Elsewhere the proportion does not reach 5 per cent.¹

Before the new labour supply was in full operation the last blow was dealt at the old economic system by the adoption of complete free trade in Great Britain. The Budget of 1846 provided for the diminution and subsequent extinction of the preference to British West Indian sugar over foreign sugar. New sugar-producing areas were developing in various parts of the world, and the British planters justly claimed that since many of their competitors used slave labour the question ought not to be judged solely by economic principles; the moral appeal had carried the day against them in 1833, and it should in fairness have been used in their favour in 1846. But it was not. The Manchester School was in the ascendant, and even Disraeli, on becoming Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1852, refused to reimpose the preference. Jamaica was very hard hit, with unhappy consequences in her political behaviour.

The social change caused by emancipation has produced in the West Indies a constitutional development quite contrary to that observed elsewhere in the Empire. In the colonies of early foundation there were until after the middle of the nineteenth century constitutions of the representative type in which the planters elected an assembly and the Crown appointed a governor and nominated the executive and legislative councils. In some cases the two latter functions were performed by one council. This was the colonial constitution characteristic of the old Empire, and modelled upon the English constitution of the Stuart period. The administration was wholly in the hands of the governor and his nominated executive, but the power of the purse was wholly in the hands of the assembly, whilst either element could veto legislation proposed by the other. The Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Dominica, Tobago, Grenada and St. Vincent had constitutions of this sort. British Guiana had a single chamber legislature with a majority of elected members for financial business only, an arrangement of Dutch origin which is at the time of writing (1928) under revision. British Honduras, a colony of what may be called spontaneous foundation, legislated by public meeting, originally of all the freemen, but latterly of a more restricted number virtually co-opted and sitting for life. Trinidad and St. Lucia, captured in 1797 and 1803 respectively, have never had any elective element in their government.²

¹ Wrong, *op. cit.* pp. 10-11; and Lucas, *West Indies*, p. 71.

² The constitutional history of the West Indian colonies is treated in Wrong's work already cited.

The representative constitution, as the history of the old American colonies has shown, was prolific in deadlocks between executive and assembly, and Jamaica was no exception to the rule. The Jamaica assembly, and to a less extent those of other islands, were continually passing measures which were disallowed by the governor or referred to the Crown for veto, and they no less frequently refused to pass measures enjoined by the authorities at home. Various proposals for ameliorating slavery were examples of the latter sort, and the abolition was carried only by the overriding authority of the imperial Parliament setting at nought the views of the colonial electorates. The removal of the preferential sugar duties led to a strike of the Jamaica assembly in 1849 and again in 1853. In the former year Jamaica rejected an offer of responsible government as operated in Canada, because it feared that the financial powers of the assembly would be curtailed. The incident shows how little responsible government was understood, and its outcome was fortunate, for the autonomy of a white oligarchy in its then existing temper would have been disastrous. The transformation of the negroes from chattels into free men accentuated the need for constitutional reform, for it was impossible to grant them the franchise; and the assemblies were elected by a ridiculously small number of voters, generally less than ten per member.¹ Another effect of the decay and absenteeism of the old planter families was that the assemblies themselves were often composed of men with few qualifications for political work.

British officials realized that the recovery and progress of the islands was impossible so long as a narrow-minded and sometimes illiterate minority exercised political power over a vast illiterate majority of the people. In 1854 the Jamaica assembly was induced to pass a modification in the constitution whereby an executive committee was appointed to represent the governor in the assembly. The object was to secure greater harmony between that body and the executive, and the principle was imitated in five other islands. Much was at first hoped from it, but it made little real improvement. The true remedy was to entrust all power to the trained and public-spirited officials who were by this time available for the imperial service, a very different set from the placemen of the old days before the reform of the British Parliament of 1832. That remedy had to await a catastrophe for its application.

The catastrophe occurred in 1865 in the shape of a localized rebellion in Jamaica. Its cause was chiefly economic distress, and it was sufficiently serious to throw the white inhabitants into a state of consternation. The governor, E. J. Eyre, famed as an Australian explorer, acted with severity and executed about 450 of the rebels, who had themselves murdered some thirty peaceful subjects. One of Eyre's victims was a coloured preacher who was hanged by a court-martial for offences committed outside the area for which martial law had been proclaimed. Exeter Hall took up the case with vigour, and Eyre was

¹ Wrong, p. 70.

recalled in disgrace. His opponents held that his severity was disproportionate to the occasion, as might be argued from the figures quoted above ; whilst his supporters replied that it had prevented a wholesale massacre. As in the more recent case of Amritsar, the success of severity destroyed the proof of its necessity, and opinions will always be divided upon the merits of the officers concerned.

Whilst English observers were chiefly concerned with the repression, the white men of Jamaica were more strongly impressed by the outbreak itself. They had looked, or thought they had looked, into the inferno, and they were frightened into acquiescence in a stronger imperial control of the colony. The assembly had become, in its own words, "deeply impressed with the full conviction that nothing but the existence of a strong government can prevent this island from lapsing into the condition of a second Haiti."¹ It was at first reluctant to surrender all its powers and sought a compromise, but finally yielded the decision to the Crown. In 1866, therefore, an order in council abolished the old constitution and set up a new one, whereby the governor and his privy council formed the executive, and the legislative council was composed of the governor, six officials and some nominated unofficial members. The government of Jamaica was thus placed ultimately in the hands of the Colonial Office, which made these appointments.

Once again the lead of Jamaica was extensively followed, and in the succeeding years the majority of the islands abandoned the old representative system and submitted to legislatures of the wholly nominated type. Some passed through an intermediate stage in which the legislative chamber contained a few elected but a majority of nominated members, but the last two examples of this sort came to an end in 1898. At the present day thirteen of the governments possess no elective element whatsoever. In Jamaica alone, the prototype of the change, there has been a partial reversion. In 1884 that colony was granted a legislative chamber in which half the members were to be elected and the remainder continued to be nominated ; and in the event of an equal division of opinion the governor has the casting vote.

Amidst all these changes three units, Barbados, the Bahamas, and Bermuda, have retained the representative constitutions founded under the old colonial Empire. Of these, Barbados alone is a typical plantation colony, and its constitutional record is therefore unique. It was the earliest but one of the English settlements in the Caribbean, having been antedated only by St. Kitts. It was the first to evolve a constitution, and that by its own spontaneous action, in defiance of the Carlisle proprietorship in 1639. Until the Restoration its governor, council, and elected assembly sat as one body. After the Restoration settlement the assembly became a separate chamber, and the council acted for both executive and legislative purposes. The only subsequent change has been the establishment of separate executive and legislative councils

¹ Wrong, p. 76.

in 1876. From very early days the assembly has been annually re-elected and has held frequent sittings throughout the year. The franchise provides a restricted electorate based on a property qualification without distinction of colour, and the assembly normally contains a number of coloured members.

Throughout the nineteenth century it has been the desire of the imperial government to federate the various colonies of the Lesser Antilles, but local sentiment and local variations of economic interest have prevented more than a partial realization of the plan. After several experiments the present position is that the original Leeward Islands together with Dominica are under a single governor, with a joint council and judicial, police, educational and agricultural services, although retaining their particular constitutional control in all other matters; the Windward group of Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Lucia are similarly connected with one another; Barbados remains entirely separate; and Tobago is united to Trinidad. In the western Caribbean, Jamaica has under its authority the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos group. A real federation of the dominion type seems for various reasons to be impracticable.¹

Socially and politically the Jamaica transactions of 1865-6 mark the turning-point in the modern history of the British West Indies. The disturbances consequent upon the abolition of slavery have since subsided, and racial harmony has taken their place. Obsolete political arrangements have been superseded or have been adapted to changed conditions by common sense and goodwill. Economically the position has gradually improved, although it has never regained its former superficial brilliance. On that head there will be more to say in a later chapter, when the economic policy of the Empire in the late nineteenth century will come under consideration.

¹ Wrong, pp. 82-89.

PART VI

THE GROWTH OF COMMONWEALTH AND
EMPIRE

CHAPTER I

WORLD COMPETITION AND THE PENETRATION OF THE CONTINENTS

THE defeat of France by Germany in 1870 was the most spectacular of a series of events which together mark the dividing line of the nineteenth century. In itself that defeat did much to usher in a new period, but there were many contributing factors. In the political sphere the re-shaping of Europe from the dynastic organization imposed in 1815 to the national organization of recent times was almost accomplished. The war of 1870 created the German Empire. It completed also the Italian kingdom, which had rapidly crystallized from the campaign of Solferino in 1859 to the occupation of Rome by Victor Emanuel in September, 1870. Austria, shorn of her incompatible Italian provinces, and barred out from control of North Germany by her defeat of 1866, became a military empire the stronger and more compact for its losses. France, her dreams of European predominance shattered, looked southward into Africa for a field of achievement wherein to recover her self-respect. The Southern Slavs of the Balkans still awaited national independence, but their turn was to come ere another decade had passed. Across the Atlantic the United States had reconquered the seceding Confederacy in 1865 and had achieved a closer union than before the rebellion; the Americans were now ready to sweep across the continent to the Rocky Mountains and plant in a vast territory the most populous of the white nations. Another transatlantic consolidation was likewise a portent of the new age—the Dominion of Canada, founded in 1867 and endowed with a huge area for expansion by the surrender of the Hudson's Bay Company's territories two years later. In the Far East a new world-power had laid its unnoticed foundation when Japan broke finally with the stagnant past in her revolution of 1868. From Poland to the Pacific the Russian Empire was province by province extending its grasp and at the same time consolidating what it held.

These were the great powers which, in complement to and in competition with the British Empire, were to dominate the story of the world until 1914. Until this 1870 turning-point Great Britain had been almost the only European nation in process of active expansion; after it she became one among many.

< Growing population, the search for trade, and the power of moral sentiment had shaped the second British Empire after 1783? These forces were to direct that penetration of the continents and the occupation of maritime points of vantage which now commenced. The industrialization of France, Germany, Italy, the United States, and even to some extent of Russia, proceeded rapidly in the new period, having made only tentative beginnings before. It was accompanied by improved sanitary conditions and a higher standard of living, and consequently, except in France, by a growth of population. The revolution in commercial methods amassed capital and rendered it mobile, a process furthered by successive discoveries of goldfields from 1848 to the end of the century. The newly consolidated nations realized that industrial activity was the way to power. The warlike circumstances attending their foundation bred in them an assertive, confident temper which preferred ruthless competition to co-operation with their neighbours. They saw that the non-European continents were the source of the raw materials for industrial advance. A scramble thus set in for monopoly rights in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. It was a scramble little to the taste of British opinion, with its predilection for free trade, the open door, and abstention from sovereign control of new areas. But Great Britain had to participate, or else to suffer exclusion from the vast developments in prospect, with the certain consequence of defeat by industrial competitors, loss of trade, loss of wealth, and arrest of the social progress in which she was proud of her pre-eminence. The spirit of the age produced a new imperialism, comparable to that of the seventeenth century, and in many respects as devoid of conscience and reckless of the peril of war. If Great Britain yielded to it, she did so on compulsion, with a memory of past lessons, with a constant readiness to forgo advantages and co-operate with rivals,¹ and without relinquishing for an instant that obligation of trusteeship to weaker races which had been the glory of the humanitarians. France also had a moral inspiration, if a more selfish one. She had been tried and found wanting in 1870, and she had to rehabilitate her self-respect until she could once more hold up her head and look her neighbours in the face. These feelings found satisfaction in the administration of an African empire and of dependencies in the East. As for Germany, her spiritual element was the more vulgar patriotism of dominance rather than defence; whilst Russia was—what? A conscious but inarticulate nation, or a little ring of chess-players with millions of pieces? Perhaps she was both, and the pieces were one day to find voice.

The chief instrument of the new expansion was steam transport, which after a generation of experiment had just reached the stage in which it could yield large-scale results. On the sea the compound engine and the surface condenser were now ready to carry cargoes

¹ Sir F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 2nd edition, Edinburgh, 1923, p. 10, mentions four separate instances in which Great Britain willingly recognized the claims of Germany and gave up her own.

anywhere at economic rates, whereas the steamer of the previous thirty years had been typically a mail and passenger carrier, too costly for less valuable freight. And here the work of the civil engineer converged upon that of the mechanical inventor; for in 1869 the Suez Canal opened a new world for the new vessels to conquer.

Important as was this development it was eclipsed by that of the trunk railway, which alone was capable of opening the locked continents. By 1870 the national railway systems of England and of central and western Europe were laid down. So also were those of the eastern United States and of the limited Canada of the St. Lawrence and the maritime provinces. But these were small-scale systems in comparison with those that were to follow, and in non-westernized lands railways hardly existed. The new age was that of inter-state, transcontinental railways. In Europe the national systems were effectively linked until the same rolling-stock could run anywhere from the Baltic to the Levant and from the Pyrenees to the Russian frontier.¹ This advance greatly facilitated the industrialization of Germany, whose land frontiers were much longer than her coastline. The piercing of the Alps by the St. Gothard Tunnel in 1882 gave German trade an outlet to the Mediterranean by way of Genoa and broke the sea-borne monopoly, hitherto mainly in British hands, of transport between North and South Europe.² The completion of another great trunk line from Berlin through Austria to Constantinople was of political as well as economic advantage to the German Empire, and formed a stepping-stone to the twentieth-century undertaking of the long line through Asia Minor to Bagdad—almost completed at the outbreak of war in 1914. Internally the German railways developed a great steel industry by bringing iron and coal together—the iron ores of Lorraine, for example, to the coalfields east of the Rhine. Russia also was enabled by railways to knit her administration, to feed her people, and to find markets for agricultural and even factory produce.

In the outer continents the effects were even more striking. Everywhere it was the same story of the rail pushing over ground hitherto trodden only by hunters, explorers and nomadic savages, and carrying labour and capital to the exploitation of corn lands and pasture lands, wealth-yielding forests, and mining areas previously unworkable. In the United States half-a-dozen transcontinental lines raced across the country after the peace of 1865. They peopled great virgin tracts west of the Mississippi—the Great Plains, the High Plains, the Rocky Mountains—and linked the East with the regions already settled on the Pacific coast, and hitherto accessible for heavy transport only round Cape Horn. Internally the result was the industrialization of the Middle West, and even of parts of the rustic South. Externally it was an outflow of manufactures, and still more of wheat and beef from the inland prairies to the urban consumers of Europe. To balance this

¹ All European lines, except those of Spain and Russia, were of uniform gauge.

² Knowles, *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions*, p. 187.

flow came a rush of human raw material, immigrants from the British Isles, Germany, Scandinavia, Italy and the Slavonic countries. The cattle fattened on the Great Plains, and the newly-invented refrigerator-car (1868) took the chilled carcases eastward, whilst Chicago became a great city by its industry of preserving all kinds of animal foodstuffs. From 1880 the wheat belt extended rapidly from Illinois across the Mississippi to Iowa and Minnesota and along the Canadian border through the Dakotas and Montana to Oregon.¹ North of parallel 49 there was a similar advance. British Columbia entered the Dominion in 1871 on the promise of a transcontinental line. The Canadian Pacific Railway was begun forthwith, pushed into the prairies by 1880, and opened throughout in 1886. Population followed, and 1882 saw the organization of the four territories of Athabasca, Alberta, Assiniboia and Saskatchewan, with free land for settlers and cheap rail and steamer fares to help them on their way. These territories were consolidated into two provinces of full rank, Alberta and Saskatchewan, in 1905. The political effect of the railway construction was also vital, for without it the prairie provinces would have been developed by northward extensions from the American lines, and a strong claim would have arisen for their inclusion in the United States. Externally the result of Canadian penetration has been complementary to that of her southern neighbour. As American food exports have declined through the rise of home consumption, those of Canada have grown ever greater. English agriculture, which was not seriously hit by the repeal of the Corn Laws, fell into decline in face of the new western competition; in the half-century before 1916 the English wheat acreage fell by one-half, although the home demand was rapidly rising with the population.

In Asia the railway builders on the great scale have been Great Britain and Russia, the latter in the centre and north, the former in the sub-continent of India. Russia after 1870 built lines through the Caucasus to Tiflis, Batoum and Baku. In the seventies and eighties, as she rapidly acquired province after province in the great stretch between the Caspian and the Chinese border of Turkestan, she consolidated her hold with railways that reached Tashkend, Bokhara and finally Merv, very close to the Afghan frontier. Farther north the greatest Russian undertaking, the Trans-Siberian Railway, was pushed right through to the Pacific coast by the close of the nineteenth century. Its easternmost section, ending at Vladivostok (acquired in 1860), took a short cut through the Chinese province of Manchuria and sent a branch southwards to Port Arthur in the heart of the Yellow Sea. The concomitant Russian seizure of Manchuria and preparation to seize Korea are a good example of the new railway-imperialism in its most high-handed mood. They provoked the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.

The British-built railways of India were imperialistic in another sense, economic rather than strategic in their inspiration. They belong

¹ S. E. Morison, *Oxford History of the United States*, Oxford, 1927, ii. pp. 347-57.

almost entirely to the modern period, which in India may be ante-dated to 1858; prior to that year there were only 300 miles of line in operation. Nevertheless a comprehensive plan was laid down by Lord Dalhousie in 1853, four years before the outbreak of the Mutiny, for railways to be built to connect the interior with the various seaports, and to connect the great provinces with one another.¹ This plan was worked upon, slowly at first, after the Company had given place to the Crown, and a system similar to that of Europe has evolved. Each natural region has its local network, whilst trunk lines interconnect the whole. The difficulties were great, and the expense of construction so heavy that the Indian railways have not been a dividend-paying enterprise; for every requisite had to be imported by sea from England, and a totally unmechanical people had to be trained to supply the necessary labour. But the benefits have been immeasurable. Famine has lost its worst terrors; these catastrophes formerly slew millions in provinces surrounded by plentiful supplies which it was impossible to transport in relief. Government has become more effective. Internal trade and foreign trade have swollen as they could have done by no other means. Population has increased; and (if it may be counted among the blessings) the industrial revolution has commenced with large-scale factory work in textiles and even with steelworks and other enterprises formerly regarded as necessarily the monopoly of European workers.

The period of African railway development was delayed, first, until the explorers had discovered the nature of the interior, a process not complete until after 1870, and second, until the Great Powers had mutually agreed upon their spheres of exploitation, which they did for West and Central Africa in 1885, and for East Africa not until 1890-1. The only important railway systems developed in the early years after 1870 were therefore those of Egypt and the Cape Colony. With the 90's, however, large advances began. Cecil Rhodes pushed the main line northwards from Kimberley to Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia. Thence a line was made to the coast at Beira in Portuguese East Africa. From Bulawayo, south-west of Salisbury, the Rhodesian railway extended northwards across the Zambesi to Northern Rhodesia and ultimately into the Belgian Congo. Another important line ran from Cape Colony through the Orange Free State into the Transvaal, where it served the new goldfield of the Witwatersrand, exploited from 1886. The Boers, anxious for a non-British outlet to the sea, linked this system with a line running east from Pretoria to the Portuguese harbour of Delagoa Bay. Natal also ran a line up from Durban into the Transvaal nucleus. Thus South Africa, by the end of the century, had a system of international trunk railways extending into the tropical zone, and furnishing a powerful impetus to the subsequent unification of the country. Meanwhile the Egyptian system extended southwards to Khartum and beyond with Kitchener's conquest of the Sudan in

¹ Knowles, *Economic Development of the Empire*, p. 338.

1898. In East Africa the British government from 1895 constructed the so-called Uganda Railway from Mombasa up country to Lake Victoria, and a decade later the Germans began a similar line through their territory from the neighbourhood of Zanzibar to Lake Tanganyika. West African railways began with the twentieth century. They are still in the local rather than the inter-state condition, designed to connect interior producing areas with the nearest seaport under the same jurisdiction.

The effects of these African railways, rudimentary as they still are in relation to the vastness of the continent, have been revolutionary. They have been the enabling factor in the planting of capitalistic enterprise at a distance from the coast, and that statement implies enormous economic, political and social consequences. Without them the employment of white men in the healthy uplands of the Transvaal, Rhodesia and Kenya would be limited to subsistence-farming, a mode of life that has small attraction for the civilized man of to-day. The Sudan and Uganda would be still a chaos of warring savages, or would be governed from altruistic or military motives by a power which could not recoup itself for the cost. In the moist tropical regions trade on the modern scale could not exist, for the tsetse fly kills all draught animals, and transport by human portage—which virtually implied slavery—was the only available method before the railway era. Slavery being abolished, the cost was prohibitive, and stagnation was unavoidable. In 1901, for example, the Gold Coast exported 960 tons of cocoa; in 1911, with the help of a new railway, 35,000 tons;¹ and similar figures could be quoted for other trades and areas. Nor are these the only economic effects; for pastoral or mainly idle natives have been introduced to the idea of labour for wages and have developed a purchasing power for European manufactures. Here the social aspect also appears; and tribal government, tribal warfare, slavery, cannibalism and witchcraft have yielded at the touch of the railway to the less picturesque but more healthy methods of European community life. Undoubtedly good things are dying with evil, and the transition stage has ugly features, but on balance there can be no doubt of the improvement.

Elsewhere, with varied conditions, there has been the same expansion of civilization over the wilderness. Railways have permitted fruit-farming and vine culture in Australian tracts that without them could not have marketed their produce. Railways killed slavery in southern Brazil, the last plantation country which officially countenanced that institution. In the pampas of the Argentine a complicated network of lines, of cheap construction because laid upon a billiard-table landscape, have made a vast wheat and pasture area available for the feeding of urban Europe. In China alone of the great countries the railway map is still comparatively empty. That is partly due to political uncertainty, but still more to the navigable rivers and the plentiful

¹ Knowles, *Economic Development of Empire*, p. 344.

labour supply, which provide alternative transport. And China, it should be noted, is still subject in its isolated provinces to the scourge of famine from which India has been delivered.

Other technical aspects of the continental penetration remain to be mentioned. An important one is that of warlike equipment. Every new invention in firearms has increased the disparity between the savage, armed with mere bravery, and the European using long-range weapons of precision. The outstanding example in the nineteenth century was the slaughter at Omdurman in 1898, when magazine rifle fire destroyed thousands of the fierce warriors of the Sudan in a pitched battle wherein neither side enjoyed any advantage of surprise or of ground. Yet the mechanical advantage, great as it is, should not be exaggerated, for Wellesley had won Assaye against heavier odds a century before, although at terrible cost to his own army. More effective in the long run has been the European's warfare against the enemies of nature, the tropical fevers which levied a toll upon life and efficiency more severe than those of human weapons or prohibitive tariffs. In 1897 Sir Ronald Ross made the experiments which revealed the cause of malaria and yellow fever—infection by the bites of mosquitoes. The danger known, it was possible to cope with it, and in some places to destroy it altogether. A decade afterwards the Americans applied this knowledge in the construction of the Panama Canal through the most fever-ridden tract in the tropics. By so doing they were able to succeed in an undertaking which had been ruined by disease when first attempted before the medical discovery. The general outcome has been thus described: "The new sanitation having made it possible for men to live in the tropics, these regions have gained an added value, trade has been stimulated and the wealth of the world and its interdependence still further increased, the tropical areas have come into their own, and are regarded as valuable assets to the Empire as a whole."¹ The study of disease has extended to the diseases of plants, and valuable progress has been made against the insect and fungoid pests that have in the past ruined one plantation industry after another, just as capital and experience had been accumulated in the enterprise.

So far the methods of European penetration have been dealt with; its general record must now be sketched as a setting for the history of British colonization which will follow in subsequent chapters. The continents chiefly concerned are Africa and Asia, for European action upon the Americas in the modern period has taken the form of emigration into the jurisdiction of established governments. It has had a great effect upon the balance of the world, but it has not occasioned the transference of territory or the planting of new colonies, and so has given rise to few passages of political importance.

North Africa is in most respects a non-African region. Even geographically it is more closely affiliated to Europe than to the remainder of the continent, for the Mediterranean is a connecting medium, whilst

¹ Knowles, *op. cit.* p. 347.

and in the following years traced almost the whole course of the Zambezi. From 1858 to 1864 he worked from the east coast and discovered the Shire River and Lake Nyasa. In the same years Burton, Speke and Sir Samuel Baker discovered Lakes Victoria, Albert, and Tanganyika, and revealed most of the sources of the Nile. Livingstone began his last explorations in 1866, completed the revelation of the lakes by finding Mweru and Bangweolo, and discovered one of the chief headwaters of the Congo system. He persisted in these central African journeys until his death in 1873. During much of this time he was lost to view, and expeditions were sent to find and relieve him. One was commanded by H. M. Stanley and another by Lovett Cameron. The latter confirmed the belief that Livingstone's river was the Congo, and in 1875 struck south-westwards across the great basin to the west coast, having crossed the whole continent. In the same year Stanley began a journey which rounded off the geography of the lakes and traced the course of the Congo down to the sea. The Frenchman de Brazza next discovered much new country north and west of the Lower Congo, and hoisted the French flag wherever he went. Finally the Germans struck inland from the Bight of Biafra and revealed the basin of the Cameroons and the mountainous country behind it.¹

Three chief motives may be discerned in the above undertakings: the purely scientific, the humanitarian (spread of Christianity and stoppage of the internal slave trade), and the economic. The first was present in all the explorations, the second was potent with Livingstone, and the third came uppermost in the late seventies as the Congo basin was surveyed and found to be wealthy. It was then that tropical Africa was seen to be an area of raw materials of vast significance to the industrialization of the great European military states. A general rush to stake claims and exploit concessions led to the meeting of the interested nations at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5. The formal Act of the Conference related to the Congo, but it was based upon an allotment of "spheres of influence"—a new diplomatic phrase—which had been arrived at during the previous years. The general outcome was that Germany obtained the Cameroons and also Togoland adjoining the Gold Coast, France secured the belt lying north and west of the great Congo bend and stretching up towards the Sudan, whilst to Great Britain was allotted the lower basin of the Niger. The Congo basin was made a nominally international Free State under the sovereignty of the King of the Belgians. Earlier in 1884 Germany had also declared her possession of South West Africa, on the coast between the Cape Colony and Portuguese Angola. France and Great Britain had long possessed relatively small areas on the Upper Guinea coast. The French now pushed inland with great vigour, connected their various holdings by encircling the British provinces, and ultimately occupied a vast empire in which Algeria, the Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey

¹ For a general survey of exploration see Sir H. H. Johnston, *Colonization of Africa*, chap. x.

and the French Congo all joined frontiers in the western Sudan. This result was achieved by the end of the century. The more daring French imperialists projected something further, a French belt right across the continent with its axis about ten degrees north of the equator. In 1898 an expedition pushed eastwards and reached the upper Nile at Fashoda just as Kitchener had routed the Dervish power at Omdurman. An ugly crisis ended with a French withdrawal and the confirmation of the eastern Sudan to Great Britain.

The rapidity of all these acquisitions and settlements is surprising. It was as if the occupiers of half-acre plots had suddenly and with one accord begun to gamble in ducal estates, and it illustrates the relentless competition which quickened to the explosion of 1914.

East Africa was not "ripe for development" at the time of the Berlin Conference, but it shortly entered that stage. North of the equator, in the region of the Hamitic races, the precipitating cause was indeed already operating—the collapse of the Egyptian hold on the eastern Sudan owing to the Mahdi's rebellion of 1881. From 1882 Italy expanded a small holding at Assab Bay on the Red Sea into the colony of Eritrea, which was regarded as a stepping-stone to the conquest of Abyssinia. That hope failed, however, in 1896 when a large Italian force was destroyed by the Abyssinians at Adowa, a disaster which assumes greater importance as the historical perspective lengthens; for there, for the first time in modern history, a European was fairly beaten by a non-European army, and the event has resounded through the East. In 1889 Italy made another beginning in Italian Somaliland, south of Cape Gardafui. The coast near the entrance of the Red Sea was strategically important, and England had taken possession of Aden on the Arabian side as early as 1839. In 1883-6 France staked a claim at Obock, opposite Aden, whilst Great Britain took the adjoining stretch as British Somaliland.

South of the equator there was, at the beginning of the scramble, no European possession north of the ancient Portuguese colony of Mozambique. The greater part of the coast was nominally subject to the Sultans of Zanzibar, and its hinterland was the principal scene of the Arab slave trade. Livingstone spent his last years in exposing the horrors that went on in this region, and after his death missionaries and traders began to penetrate it. British and German East Africa Companies were formed in the eighties, and the two powers divided the country by the treaty of 1890. German East Africa (now mandated to Great Britain as the Tanganyika Territory) was bounded by Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia and the Congo Free State. British East Africa (now Kenya Colony) lay between it and Abyssinia, and the British jurisdiction stretched inland in 1890 to include Uganda. This region connects the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with Kenya Colony; it was an instance of beneficent occupation, which almost immediately ended a régime of massacre and tyranny and substituted industry and peace. The rapid northward extension of Rhodesia from its inception

in 1889 caused a dispute with Portugal. That power, as the map shows, possessed in Angola and Mozambique areas of the west and east coasts in approximately the same latitude. Occupation of the interior was scanty and in large part nominal. But the Portuguese resented Rhodes's empire-building and aspired to establish a trans-African belt, and there was a period of tension ended by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1891, which settled the frontiers as they now stand. France, which obtained no East African mainland south of Obock, took the island of Madagascar as her sphere, and gradually established possession from 1885.

Such, omitting several minor units, is the outline of the penetration and parcelling out of Africa by the Great Powers. The greater part of it was accomplished in the decade 1880-90.¹ The railway developments, already referred to, inaugurated a second stage, that of exploitation, after the political delimitations had been laid down. In their methods and motives of exploitation the several powers differed according to their respective traditions. British proceedings will be dealt with at length, and need not be further mentioned at this point. The Germans believed in administration by the strong hand, with little sympathy for native susceptibilities or the rights of chiefs. The army was idealized after its victories of 1870, and the rigours of the military code, with corporal punishment and summary execution, were held to be the best discipline for coloured subjects. The system engendered hatred and respect in varying proportions, and as an offset to the atrocities of German rule in South West Africa may be placed the firm hold obtained on the natives of German East Africa, who certainly displayed loyalty and devotion to their masters in the Great War. On the economic side the German colonizers of the eighties favoured the mechanism of the chartered company with monopoly rights. They were not markedly successful with it either in Africa or in the Pacific islands, and it may be doubted whether the method is sufficiently flexible for modern conditions. The German East Africa Company, the largest of these organizations, survived for less than ten years, and by the time the German colonial empire came to an end the general tendency was towards an open national trade under protective tariffs.

In the modern African empire of France the military ideal has been paramount. Disparity of population precluded the French from placing in the field an army equal to that of the German Empire after 1870, and the accessibility of North Africa, only two days' steaming from the French coast, made it feasible to redress the balance by organizing a great African army. This was done not only in Algeria, but southward in the Senegal and its vast extensions through the Guinea hinterland. But the militarism of France has proved more congenial to its subjects than that of Germany. There has been less brutality and more sympathy. The Frenchman feels no colour repugnance, and his easy manners, the contrast to the German stiffness, have secured acceptance

¹ For an extended survey of the subject see Johnston, *op. cit.*, and Sir Charles Lucas, *The Partition and Colonization of Africa*, Oxford, 1922.

for his leadership. In commercial administration France has carried protectionist principles to their extreme, and the trade of her possessions has been proportionately hampered. As late as 1899 it could be said that, "with the exception of Tunis, there is not a single French possession in Africa which is self-supporting, or other than a drain on the French exchequer. The reasons of this lack of local revenue are the strong protectionist policy pursued (which fetters trade and drives away commercial enterprise) and the unnecessary multiplication of officials."¹ Both France and Germany have promoted missionary enterprise and have frequently made it an instrument not only of civilization but of political competition.

Portugal, the most ancient European power in Africa, made in the post-1870 period an effort to develop her two great holdings of Angola and Mozambique. She abolished slavery, spent money on railways and other public works, and, alone of the non-British nations, threw open her possessions to the trade of all comers. The object was to make, while yet there was time, a great Portuguese Africa stretching from coast to coast. But the Rhodesian enterprise grew too rapidly and thrust its wedge northwards over the Zambesi, and Portugal possessed insufficient capital for her task. She lacked, moreover, the basic incentives to modern African enterprise, an industrialized home population or a need for great military strength. In the nineteenth century, as in the sixteenth, Portugal was too weak a country to support a great tropical empire, and the leaders of men she has always produced have been wasted through lack of followers.

The Congo Free State has been in many ways the most striking product of the penetration of Africa. A great circular basin with an outlet to the sea through a single bottle-neck, the lower Congo, it was clearly indivisible, and yet too rich a prize to be allotted to any of the Great Powers in face of their competitors. It was therefore internationalized, and the King of the Belgians placed in control. There was no intention to make it a Belgian colony; King Leopold accepted the duty as a man of rank who was sufficiently detached to fulfil a disinterested trust. The idea was that of Stanley, the chief explorer of the Congo, who saw that commercial penetration was inevitable and thought that it could be regulated by a confederation of the native chiefs under a European guide and protector; but he expected that his own country would assume the office. King Leopold at first employed officers of all nations and maintained the open door. But after a few years he governed solely through Belgians and made much of the interior trade his own monopoly or that of privileged companies. The Belgian officers were few in numbers, they had no colonial tradition and no organized department of the home civil service to supervise them, they had to use savages to coerce savages, and above all, they had to make the dominion pay from the outset. Their moral undoubtedly broke under the strain, and they were guilty of atrocities on a scale comparable to those of the

¹ Johnston, *op. cit.* (1st edn.), p. 145.

Spanish *conquistadores* in Peru. Leopold's complicity is hardly disputable,¹ and there can be no doubt that he played the part rather of a trader than of a trustee, of an absentee managing director and not of a sovereign. The new commercial imperialism was young in 1884, and it was the ineptitude rather than the crime of European statesmanship that produced the Congo horrors by creating power divorced from responsibility. In 1898 a railway circumvented the falls of the lower Congo, which were impassable to steamers, and this was the first step to letting in the light of civilization. In 1908 the Congo was made definitely, as it had become informally, a possession of the Belgian state, whose sense of honour, it was hoped, would be the best guarantee of a breach with the past.

The penetration of Asia offered different problems from that of Africa, for its population, where dense, was already organized in states of ancient civilization, and where scanty was located in regions that offered small temptation to commercialism of the Congo type.

The British advance in India has already been dealt with. To the eastward lies another peninsula almost as large as India itself, the mountain-covered mass of Indo-China. The north-western part of this region formed the ancient kingdom of Burma, inhabited by a people different in race and religion from those of India. Burma repeatedly behaved in a manner obnoxious to the British in India and was annexed in three distinct stages, of which the last occurred in 1885-6. At the same time the French made the larger south-eastern part of the peninsula their especial sphere. Here existed the kingdoms of Siam, Annam, with its vassal-state of Tongking, and Cambodia, of established though arrested civilization, looking eastward to China as the source of culture. In the early part of the nineteenth century French missionaries were at work in Annam, where they suffered ill-treatment from the inhabitants. Napoleon III., always disposed to activity in the Far East, took up their cause and made war upon the King of Annam in 1858.

In the course of the next ten years the French possessed themselves of the whole of Cochin-China, the southern part of Annam, with the important harbour of Saigon. At the same time they established a protectorate over the adjoining kingdom of Cambodia. After 1870 the process continued, and by 1884 France had absorbed Tongking in the north and the remainder of Annam, although some years of sporadic warfare were yet to elapse before the people accepted their new masters. Tongking adjoined Burma, and the fear of French expansion towards eastern India was one reason for the final British

¹ Johnston, *op. cit.* 2nd edn. (1913) sums up the case. His condemnation is the more impressive since in 1899 he was disposed to regard it lightly. Cf. Lucas, *Partition of Africa*, pp. 85-6 :—"The evils must primarily be laid at the door of King Léopold himself. He seems to have run a kind of Rake's Progress which would have made him, had he been a private individual, a criminal of the not unfamiliar and not uninteresting type, moved at first probably by good or mixed intentions, urged on by ambition into more and more unscrupulous courses, and finally altogether losing count of justice and humanity."

annexation of Burma in 1886. The remaining Indo-Chinese kingdom, Siam, seemed likely to share the same fate, but neither England nor France was willing to see it in the hands of the other, and therefore Siam was able ultimately to preserve its independence as a neutralized buffer-state. In south-western Asia two other kingdoms, Persia and Afghanistan, have likewise remained unabsorbed, the former by reason of Anglo-Russian jealousies, and the latter chiefly on account of the fighting qualities of its people. From Persia westwards to the Mediterranean everything was within the bounds of the Turkish Empire until the war of 1914.

In northern Asia the Russians had penetrated and subdued the thinly peopled plains of Siberia by the opening of the eighteenth century. This advance brought them to the northern frontiers of the Chinese Empire, which long remained strong enough to resist intrusion. It was not until 1858-60 that an extreme corner of what was vaguely known as Chinese Tartary could be nibbled off, an acquisition which brought the Russians southwards on the Pacific coast to the port of Vladivostok. Meanwhile Russia was beginning to extend her hold over the most populous part of central Asia, Turkestan, the great bight of territory between the Caspian Sea and the Chinese border in Tibet. The great advance here took place in the sixties, seventies and eighties, swamped the independence of all the buffer khanates, and brought the Russians into immediate contact with Afghanistan and Tibet.¹ It was regarded as a threat of invasion to British India, and caused more than one Anglo-Russian crisis in the late nineteenth century. Whatever the purpose of the Russian rulers may have been, there were undoubtedly many among their subordinates who looked forward to a march into India in the manner of the conquering hosts of the past. With the close of the century Russian activity swung to the Far East, completed the Siberian railway, seized Manchuria, and came face to face with the rising power of Japan.

The forcible opening of China and Japan to European intercourse, a process complete by 1860, has been described in a previous chapter. Its effects upon the two countries were in strong contrast. The intense patriotism of the Japanese felt itself humiliated. A reactionary party was for resistance and a fighting finish in what all knew would be a hopeless battle. A more constructive opinion was for acceptance of the inevitable, followed by hard study of the western means to power and a reconstruction of Japan as a modern world-state. This party triumphed in the revolution of 1867-8, reformed the government as a slightly diluted autocracy of the German type, introduced modern commercial methods and the industrial revolution, trained a great conscript army on European lines, and began the creation of an iron-clad navy with ships of the newest pattern constructed in British yards. The effects of these measures came as a surprise to the world

¹The several acquisitions are well delineated in Robertson and Bartholomew's *Atlas of the British Empire*, London, 1905 (reprinted 1924), p. 29.

in the easy victory of Japan over Chinese forces, which on paper were superior, in the war of 1894-5. After that date Japan was a power, the only Asiatic power to be reckoned with.

China, potentially stronger, did not rise to her destiny. The intellectual arrogance which would not admit the necessity of reform was her ruin. The humiliation of the foreign armies marching to Peking in 1860 dealt a fatal blow to the prestige of the imperial family, which had long ceased to produce able rulers. During the next generation authority declined and the state slowly disintegrated. Foreigners were now free to penetrate the empire in all directions. Traders and missionaries everywhere established themselves, and the government could not protect them from outbreaks of local violence. In the seaports the European communities, although on Chinese soil, enjoyed an extra-territorial political status, for it was impossible for them to submit to the corruption of Chinese administration and justice. The war with Japan revealed the rottenness of the public services. Thereafter it seemed as if the Great Powers, fresh from the partition of Africa, were gathering for a similar partition of China. But no partition took place. There were more powers concerned—Russia, Japan and the United States in addition to those which had carved up Africa—and mutual jealousies were too great. Moreover, the swarming population of China was an obstacle. It might claim a voice in its own disposal as no negro tribe had been able to do; and mutual suspicion in Europe was now so intense that any nation needed to think twice before committing itself to some endless entanglement on the other side of the globe. The temper of China was illustrated by the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1900, a spontaneous rising against the foreigners, which needed a strong international force for the relief of the besieged legations in the capital. The Powers, therefore, with the exception of Russia, showed no eagerness to take shares of China. Russia did unwisely press forward, occupying Port Arthur and building a railway to it through the length of Manchuria. She intended also to take possession of Korea. But in 1904 Japan suddenly declared war, routed the Russians on land and sea, and evicted them from the disputed provinces. The year 1904 marked the turn of the tide of European domination in Asia. Meanwhile China remains to this day an unsettled problem. The practical Japanese has looked to the West for ships and guns, the more philosophic Chinaman has studied democratic politics. In 1908 a few doctrinaire reformers abolished the effete empire and substituted a yet more fatuous republic under which anarchy has become permanent; but the only discernible outcome is that no European power has now any prospect of reorganizing the country.

In the movements described in this chapter there is one respect in which the activities of governments have been divorced from those of their peoples. Whilst cabinets were concerned with the division of tropical Africa, Asia and the Pacific islands, emigration to those regions was scarcely appreciable. Throughout the nineteenth century the surplus

population of Europe poured westwards to the American continents. So also for the most part did that of the British Isles, although a smaller proportion of them sought the dominions of the southern hemisphere. Multitudes of Germans went to the United States, and some to Brazil. In the later decades of the century German emigration declined, since industrialization was enabling the fatherland to support a larger population. At the same time the Italian, Russian and Southern Slav outflow increased. Italians sought the United States and also, in large numbers, Brazil and the Argentine Republic. The Slavs went to the United States and Canada. Russians might have been expected to find Siberia a congenial climate for colonization, but in fact the vast majority of them pressed westward. Until 1900 most of the British emigrants settled in the United States, but with the new century the stream flowed chiefly to Canada and the other dominions. The Great War interrupted it, and it has recommenced in much diminished volume since the peace.

Tropical Africa, with the exception of favoured spots in Kenya and Rhodesia, is now realized to be unfit for white colonization. But it was not always thought so, and it is a fact that an important incentive to German imperialism in the seventies and eighties was the hope of founding true colonies in the tropics. Enthusiasts pointed to the loss of German subjects by American emigration and persuaded themselves that the Cameroons and South West Africa might become regions where they could settle under the flag. The French entertained the same idea, although with them, owing to their stationary population, the problem was less urgent. Italy likewise had visions of African settlement, and in Tunis there are numbers of Italians under French jurisdiction. In 1911, when preparing to seize Tripoli, the Italian government prohibited the usual emigration to the Argentine in order to have men in hand for the new undertaking. In England, with a longer experience of the West African coastline, there seem to have been no illusions on the possibility of settlement. The thing had indeed been tried on a small scale at Sierra Leone in the eighteenth century, and had turned out disastrously.

CHAPTER II

THE EMPIRE UNDER DISRAELI, GLADSTONE, AND SALISBURY

THE MOTHER COUNTRY, ASIA AND TROPICAL AFRICA

(i) *Imperial Ideas*, 1870-95

UNTIL the turning-point which we have already described as the period about 1870 the British Empire had been, with respect to its colonies, the concern chiefly of statesmen and officials, whilst in the affairs of its dependencies the humanitarian interest had also been active. This interest had been supported by a powerful section of the middle class, and was the nearest approach to an expression of national opinion on external affairs. But it was not truly national in the modern sense. The masses, politically unenfranchised and economically unhappy, thought more of reform at home, and a national outlook upon imperial problems was non-existent; the Radical imperialism of 1830 was a short-lived growth with its roots in stony ground. The ruling class at home, who monopolized the direction of the Empire, were not very proud of their achievement and had no reason to be. Their thoughts, as has been shown, ran wholly to pessimism about the future, and their policy was not of construction but of negation.

In the late forties, as the Durham school died out, the soil was prepared for the growth of a new sentiment. A period of wonderful prosperity set in, destined to last for a generation, and in strong contrast to the bad times that had succeeded the Napoleonic wars. Economic and social reforms were showing their effects, and the mass of the people had time to think of something more than the bare struggle for bread. There was no immediate outburst of an interest in the Empire, but there was at length a possibility for it to arise. Then came the Second Reform Act of 1867, which enfranchised the working men in the towns. Half of England was made democratic, the middle-class ascendancy was broken, and it was certain that new instincts would find expression in politics. Disraeli, with his wonderful acumen for discerning such instincts, foresaw that the Empire would come into favour, and made amusing haste to repudiate his former views about "these wretched colonies" and to attune his utterances to the time. The Gladstone ministry of 1868 was believed, with good reason, to be

working for the dissolution of imperial connections: there was considerable press discussion of the question; and for the first time for many years a section of public opinion made active protest.¹

Disraeli took occasion in 1872 to castigate his opponents for the coldness of previous years. "There has been no effort," he asserted, "so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much energy, and carried on by so much ability and acumen, as the attempt of Liberalism to effect the disintegration of the British Empire . . . Self-government in distant colonies, when it was conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by an imperial tariff, by securities for the people of England for the enjoyment of the unappropriated lands which belonged to the sovereign, as their trustee, and by a military code which should have precisely defined the means and responsibilities by which the colonies should have been defended, and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves. It ought further to have been accompanied by the institution of some representative council in the metropolis which would have brought the colonies into constant and continuous relations with the home government." On behalf of Gladstone it has been urged that his administration "witnessed steady progress in the evolution of the British Commonwealth of Nations."² This claim can be conceded only in its negative aspect; the home government, by withdrawing from its responsibilities, left sentiments of separate nationality free to develop in the colonies. But this was done with no constructive purpose, and Gladstone's advocate quoted above shows no reason for concluding that he was anything but destructive. It would seem, however, that the prime mover was not Gladstone himself, but his Colonial Secretary, Lord Granville, abetted by the permanent under-secretary, Sir F. Rogers. In opposition a few years later Gladstone certainly held that the Empire was too great a burden to be borne.³

It is perhaps misleading to say that the imperialism of 1870 was a new phenomenon; it was rather the expression of it that was new. It seldom happens that a nation is unanimous in its view of a public question. There is nearly always a second opinion, unexpressed perhaps, but ready to find voice as soon as the circumstances are favourable. The precipitating factor in the present matter was probably the second Reform Act. For half a century there had been a steady emigration to the colonies, chiefly of the unenfranchised classes. Almost every family in England had some friend or member overseas, and cheap postage was a link that had been lacking in the old colonial Empire. There was thus a strong sense of imperial kinship which had failed hitherto to find expression in politics. Parliament had during that half-century been concerned with the middle-class crusade for *laissez-faire*,

¹ C. A. Bodelsen, *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism*, London, 1924, p. 94.

² Knaplund, *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy*, p. 94.

³ Published writings, 1878, quoted *ibid.* pp. 142-3.

with its cosmopolitan view of the world as the trader's oyster, and with no special estimation for colonies in its utilitarian scheme. By 1870 *laissez-faire* had no fields left to conquer. The new voters were inclined to think that in some directions it had even gone too far. They listened kindly to talk both of social regulations at home and of imperial consolidation overseas, and it was Disraeli's service to the Conservative party that he led it in both these directions and so made it one of the two great organs of democratic English thought.

There was thus a ground in rational sentiment for the revived popularity of the white empire. More surprising is the democratic impetus to the extension of the dependent empire, to the British share in the scramble for Africa, and to the pursuance of a positive policy elsewhere. In the seventies and eighties the ultimate value of tropical dependencies as indispensable to industrialized European peoples had scarcely been reduced to a formulated doctrine. British business men were beginning to realize it, and statesmen also, although much more dimly; but it had certainly not been presented to the public at large. Neither were our competitors fully aware of the ultimate justification of the movement. Germany was dreaming of settlement colonies for her surplus population, and France of political prestige and military strength to salve the wounds of 1870. Nevertheless, in spite of this haziness, the British public became firmly imbued with the importance of the dependent empire. The phenomenon is best described as the working of an instinct, and left at that. Events abundantly prove that the uninstructed mass did express strong opinions on matters of which they had the vaguest knowledge, and that it was these opinions that pushed governments into action. An authority may be quoted: "British Africa was acquired not by groups of financiers, nor yet by the efforts of her statesmen, but in spite of them. It was the instinct of the British democracy which compelled us to take our share. When Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet in 1893 had decided to evacuate Uganda, he was told by his Scottish agent that if he did so he would have to evacuate Downing Street too."¹ The nature of the instinct may, of course, be variously described: some would call it jingoism. But its results accorded with those that would have flowed from the most profound policy.

Amid this general atmosphere the events with which this chapter will deal moved in well-defined alternations of ebb and flow, the "swing of the pendulum" of late nineteenth-century politics. From 1868 to 1874 government coldness towards the Empire provoked a contrary expression of opinion in the country, and the new imperialism took its rise. The general election of 1874 returned the imperialists to power, and in the following six years they pursued a policy whose successes were balanced by its failures, and whose rashness caused alarm. The general election of 1880 reflected the feeling by placing the anti-imperialists in control with a programme of concentration upon home

¹ Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, p. 616.

affairs. But almost at once the course of events forced the Empire again into prominence. A variety of first-class questions required settlement, and the Gladstone ministry was as bitterly reviled for pusillanimity as that of Disraeli had been for jingoism. From the end of this ministry in 1885 the question of Irish Home Rule dominated the parliamentary scene, and the Empire fell rather into the background for a decade to come. This period was nevertheless one of striking achievement overseas and of careful administration in the Colonial Office, and so the way was made clear for a new period of active construction to begin in 1895.

Public interest in imperial questions never slackened after the revival of 1870. Disraeli's speeches had shown his leaning towards the idea of imperial federation; after his death it began to be prominently discussed, and a League for its promotion was formed in 1884. This movement worked upon an assumption which was gradually seen to be unsound, the idea that there was complete national identity between all the English-speaking subjects of the Crown—that Canada, for example, was as much part of England as Kent. This view was strongly put in Sir J. R. Seeley's *Expansion of England* (1883), a book which had an enormous effect in propagating the imperial idea. Two others of the same period may be coupled with it, J. A. Froude's *Oceana* (1886) and Sir Charles Dilke's *Problems of Greater Britain* (1890). Together they did much to educate opinion and to usher in a flood of popular literature whose main thesis was that the British Isles were now a part of Greater Britain and that politics must be no longer insular but imperial.

Meanwhile imperial federation proved not to be a line of advance. Colonial national consciousness was a rising force which threatened to be of centrifugal tendency; the younger generation in the dominions regarded themselves primarily as Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders, and much more vaguely, although with a few exceptions not less loyally, as British. They suspected the capacity, if not the goodwill, of any outside authority to manage their external affairs; and they looked forward to a future in which they should enjoy greater initiative instead of surrendering that which they already possessed to some federal body in which no single colony could ever command a majority. The facts of population were also a bar to federation; under any democratic scheme representation would have to be in proportion to numbers. The people of the British Isles were four times as numerous—they are still three times—as all the other white men in the Empire together. The mother-country would thus have a permanent majority in the federal council against a combination of all the colonies. For these reasons imperial federation, although actively preached at home, never had a great vogue in the dominions. Its advocates realized its difficulties as soon as they faced the task of framing a constitution. Lord Salisbury, although sympathetic, felt bound, as a responsible statesman, to ask for something definite. In

1891 he challenged a formal scheme, and none could be agreed upon. A few years earlier he had aptly compared the federalist proposals to a nebula which in the far future may condense into material form. The Imperial Federation League began to disintegrate in 1893, although its proposals still found advocates during the next ten years.

In spite of this failure, however, there could be no doubt that faith in the Empire was growing, both at home and overseas. In 1870 it was generally held to be moribund, and most people were content that it should be. Twenty-five years later it was patently living and vigorous, and although some were found to deplore the fact they were in a decided minority.

(ii) *The Levant, Egypt, the Canal and the Indian Frontiers.*

The Eastern Question, that is, the disposal of the territories of the decaying Turkish Empire, was a trouble to European peace throughout the nineteenth century, and was one of the causes of the Great War of 1914. It can be approached from so many points of view, and it involved so many diverse interests, that a comprehensive treatment would be outside the scope of this book. But it had a vital bearing on the fortunes of the British Empire overseas, and so must be dealt with here from that aspect alone, with a proviso that it is not the whole story that is being given.

Briefly, the position was that the Turkish hold on many of the provinces was loosening. Egypt became independent in all but the name from 1806, when a soldier named Mehemet Ali seized control and founded a dynasty which endures to this day. At one time Mehemet added Palestine and Syria to his dominions, but from these he was compelled to withdraw. In the European provinces of the Empire the Christian, non-Turkish populations were always ripe for revolt. Most of the Greeks obtained their independence in 1829. The Serbians and Roumanians achieved a state of autonomy under nominal vassalage. The Bulgarians, Albanians and Bosnians sought the same liberty. These Balkan Christians were mostly of Slavonic race and of the Greek Church, and Russia on both grounds considered herself their natural champion and deliverer. But Russia was credited also with designs of occupying Constantinople and becoming a Mediterranean power, and of conquering Asiatic Turkey and reaching southward to the Indian Ocean. Here the British interest was affected. As has been explained, the Mediterranean route to the East was an important artery of the Empire even before the cutting of the Suez Canal, and after that work it was a vital one. Great Britain therefore could not tolerate the idea of a Russian naval power in the Levant, which would be the result of Balkan conquest, or of Russian occupation of Turkish Asia in conjunction with the actual Russian advance in central Asia towards the Indian frontier. Such a southward extension of Muscovite dominion would roll like a lava stream over the main highway of the British

Empire. Hence it came about that the altruistic Russian impulse to rescue fellow Slavs and Christians from oppression was inextricable from the ambition for material aggrandisement. It followed also that England's determination to defend her imperial interests involved her in the policy of bolstering up the corrupt Turkish Empire, an undertaking which to many was indefensible.

In 1853-4 the Czar Nicholas I. thought that the time had come to settle the question, and offered Egypt and Crete to Great Britain as her share in the Turkish partition and her guarantee of the eastern route. The British government refused and in alliance with France fought the Crimean War in defence of the Turkish Empire. Russian power was held back from Constantinople and temporarily destroyed in the Black Sea, although some extension of Balkan autonomy was permitted. Thereafter for twenty years the problem slept.

Meanwhile the French, whose Levant trade dated back to the Middle Ages, and whose special interest in Egypt dated from Bonaparte's expedition of 1798, were taking the lead in that country. From the Khedive Said they obtained a concession to cut the Suez Canal, and opened it after ten years' difficult work in 1869. French investors also contributed largely to Egyptian government projects under Said and his successor Ismail, both of whom were spendthrifts consumed with ambition to make Egypt a great power, with a façade of European civilization built upon a foundation of tyranny and misrule. Ismail in particular exploited his magnetic personality and his friendship with Napoleon III. to raise vast loans on doubtful security. For years he used the principal to pay the interest, and when he came to the end of his tether he had a debt of £91,000,000 and no assets save a half share in the Canal. As a counterpart to his splendour his people were crushed under forced labour, cruel taxation, and the plundering of a crowd of concessionnaires and adventurers. "There was neither limit nor intelligence in his borrowing. He took money wherever it was to be had, and, with oriental largeness of spirit, never haggled about the rate of interest, with the result that harpies robbed him right and left. French financial groups in particular were ever ready to supply the spendthrift with funds."¹

Towards the close of 1875 Ismail was faced with the necessity of another capital sacrifice to pay interest, and he decided to sell his shares in the Suez Canal. Two French groups were in rivalry as prospective purchasers, and the French government had also a chance which it could not decide to take. Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary, was equally hesitant, but his chief, Disraeli, saw more clearly, raised the money from the Rothschilds, and secured the shares, all in less than a fortnight from the first intimation that the matter had arisen. So, for £4,000,000, the British government secured a controlling interest in the waterway four-fifths of whose traffic was in British ships. The French were extremely annoyed, and at home Gladstone tried to represent the unconventional financing of the operation—dictated by

¹ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, 1923, iii. p. 155.

haste and secrecy—as a constitutional misdemeanour. But the country approved, and posterity has agreed that Disraeli's stroke was one of the best services in his record. It is significant that a responsible history can add this rider to the transaction: "What was, however, altogether creditable—and to a later generation, less squeamish in such matters of public duty, incredible—was the fact that no one in the secret used his knowledge for personal gain."¹

At this date, 1875-6, the Eastern Question awoke again in its original form with rebellion among the Balkan Christians and harsh measures, amounting in places to massacre, by the Turkish authorities. Russia grew indignant and declared war on Turkey in April, 1877. The Turkish armies made a heroic resistance, but were outmatched and beaten down, and by the beginning of 1878 Russia swept through the Balkans and drew near to Constantinople. The British government was in a difficult position. It could not decently countenance the Turkish atrocities, and yet to condemn them was to justify the Russian conquest. In England the thing became a party question which divided the nation to its depths. London, where the business element predominated and educated opinion realized the Russian menace to the eastern highway, grew eager for war. There was bragging and vapouring that suited ill with so serious an undertaking, and the term "Jingo" was adopted from a music-hall song to denote the full-mouthed type of patriot. But these manifestations merely cast discredit upon a justifiable attitude—that a Russian Constantinople was a threat which the Empire must resist if it would survive. In the north the emotional appeal of Gladstone carried greater weight. He refused to consider anything but Turkish iniquity and held that at whatever cost the Turk must be expelled "bag and baggage" from his bloodstained provinces. The Queen was for war, but it seems that Disraeli was not.² He took threatening measures and so impressed every one with the belief that he would fight that two of his own cabinet resigned in protest. But it was bluff, so well calculated that it succeeded. Russia refrained from entering Constantinople, but imposed the Treaty of San Stefano, by which a liberated Balkan kingdom of Bulgaria under Russian tutelage should extend down to the Mediterranean shore of European Turkey. This was viewed as too great an accession of Russian power in the Levant, and Disraeli, by astute diplomacy and show of force, secured its reversal at the Congress of Berlin in the summer. By the treaty of Berlin the liberated area was diminished and the vital sea-coast kept in Turkish hands. Moreover, as a balance to Russian annexations on the Asiatic side, Great Britain obtained the Turkish island of Cyprus as a naval base. Thus Disraeli could claim to have brought back "Peace with Honour" from Berlin.

The rancour against Russia, of a section of English opinion, in the crisis above described was largely due to the rapid advance of Russian

¹ *Ibid.* p. 158.

² *Ibid.* iii. chap. ii. §§ iii, iv.

dominion in central Asia during the previous ten years. Province after province was absorbed until by 1876 the Russian jurisdiction was very close to the northern border of Afghanistan. That country had long been regarded as the gate of India, and already, in 1839-42, there had been a disastrous attempt to mould its government to British purposes.¹ Since that failure the policy had been pursued of leaving Afghanistan to itself and impressing upon its rulers that they had nothing to fear from India so long as they lent themselves to no hostile designs. Shere Ali, who became Amir in 1863, desired something more positive by way of friendship. He had domestic difficulties and wished the British to guarantee active protection of his throne and the succession. This proposal was made during the Gladstone ministry of 1868-74, but the government hung back on the advice of its representatives in India. Meanwhile the Russians were growing more pressing and seeking to draw Shere Ali into close correspondence, and he began to think that he must choose between one rival and the other. Those British statesmen who thought seriously of the Russian threat now advocated a forward policy, as it was termed, of gaining increased influence beyond the Indian frontier, of playing, in fact, the same game as the Russians themselves. They had this justification, that Russia had more than once denied any intention of seizing a territory and had shortly afterwards seized it; and they believed that in spite of assurances to the contrary the Russians were now designing to encroach upon Afghanistan. The forward policy would anticipate them.

Disraeli, coming into power in 1874, was attracted by it. He was for a positive imperial policy in general, and the Asiatic side of Empire appealed to him more strongly even than the colonial. He pressed the forward policy upon the Indian government, and accepted the resignation of the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, who, like his predecessors, Lords Mayo and Lawrence, disbelieved in it. The new Viceroy was Lord Lytton, who reached India in 1876 with instructions to prevent Shere Ali from becoming a tool of Russia even by going to the length of deposing him. At this date, it should be remembered, the Balkans were already on fire and an eventual war with Russia was a possibility. There followed an abortive conference with an Afghan emissary on Indian soil, and the establishment of a British protectorate over Baluchistan, the country south of Afghanistan, with the consent of its ruler. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 Great Britain threw obstacles in the Russian path, and Russia, in retaliation, instigated Shere Ali to unfriendliness. A Russian general was received at Kabul and was believed to have made some kind of treaty with the Amir. Lord Lytton sent a British officer on a like mission, and he was refused permission to cross the frontier. At this juncture the Treaty of Berlin had already averted the expected Anglo-Russian war; and the Afghan dispute could have been dropped for the time but for the refusal to receive the envoy, a challenge to British prestige which might have

¹ See above, pp. 138-9.

entailed serious consequences in India if not taken up. The forward policy had thus drawn its authors too far for turning back, and Lord Lytton, with Disraeli's reluctant consent, declared war on the Amir in November.

Three British columns simultaneously invaded the country, and after a poor resistance Shere Ali fled to Russian Turkestan where he died in the spring of 1879. Russia, having decided not to fight, refused to do anything for him. The situation of 1839 now repeated itself. The British forces had been strong enough to depose a recalcitrant Amir, but they were not strong enough to hold the turbulent country in permanence. In these circumstances king-making proved once more a dangerous expedient. The British selected Yakub Khan, a son of Shere Ali, to fill the vacant throne. At the same time they imposed upon him the Treaty of Gandamak whereby he was to allow a British representative to reside at Kabul and control the foreign relations of Afghanistan. Within a few weeks the Afghans grew restless. Yakub played a double game, and the envoy, Sir Louis Cavagnari, was murdered with his connivance in September, 1879. At once the British troops moved in retaliation. Sir Frederick Roberts and Sir Donald Stewart occupied Kabul and Kandahar respectively, and sent Yakub to India. Then followed a pause and some perplexity as to the next move. Meanwhile Ayub Khan, another claimant, made some headway in southern Afghanistan. In July, 1880, he cut up a British brigade at Maiwand, and drove the remnant into Kandahar. Sir Frederick Roberts at once marched with great speed to the rescue and totally defeated Ayub outside Kandahar on September 1st. Politics in England now dictated a change of attitude. The general election of 1880 resulted in a crushing defeat of Disraeli, principally on account of his active foreign policy, and Gladstone had come into power in April with a determination to cut short all adventurous undertakings. The British armies therefore withdrew from Afghanistan just as a strong leader, in the person of Abdurrahman, a nephew of Shere Ali, was coming to the front. Abdurrahman defeated Ayub Khan and rapidly made himself master of the country. This was to the ultimate benefit of British interests, for he showed himself resolute to exclude all foreign influences. The British kept Quetta, commanding the Bolan Pass, and maintained a regular protectorate over Baluchistan.

In the eighties Russia again moved forward in central Asia, and her occupation of Merv brought her into contact with Afghanistan. A commission met in 1885 to determine the frontier, and whilst it was deliberating Russian troops seized Penjdeh, one of the places in dispute. Once more a grave situation developed, and for some weeks war appeared certain. Indian opinion was strongly pro-British, and the princes hastened to offer their contingents for imperial service. Ultimately Russia disavowed the excessive zeal of some of her servants, and the Afghan boundary was peacefully delimited in 1885-6. Renewed Russian activity in the Pamirs in 1891-2 caused fresh anxiety

about the British position on the north-west frontier. In general the Afghan jurisdiction covered the western ends of the passes and the British outposts reached only to their eastern outlets, the intervening region being occupied by independent tribes. These tribes numbered in all about $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions of people, and might, if united, place in the field 300,000 fighting men.¹ The tribes continually gave trouble, and campaigns were necessary to hold them in check. In 1895 the Chitral and in 1897-8 the Tirah campaigns were undertaken for this purpose and for the improvement of the frontier. The latter war necessitated hard fighting and the employment of 40,000 men.

A native state acting as buffer between Great Britain and some other European power was a source of constant anxiety. In 1885 another complication of this sort seemed on the point of developing on India's eastern frontier. France and Britain were not on friendly terms, and France was now gaining a footing in Tongking. Burma, hitherto simply an Asiatic neighbour, thus acquired a new significance. The country had already lost the whole of its coastline in previous wars, and King Thibaw, in addition to misgoverning his subjects, showed hostility towards Britain and intrigued with France. The British authorities acted with promptitude. An expedition occupied Mandalay, deposed the king, and proclaimed annexation on January 1st, 1886. After a period of guerilla warfare the country was reduced to order.

The Afghan question had been opened by Disraeli and closed by Gladstone's reversion to the former policy of non-intervention. During the same years Egypt forced itself into prominence in such a way that the greater share of the work fell to the Gladstone ministry of 1880, which was compelled against its inclination to a "forward" conduct of affairs. Ismail's sale of the Canal shares provided only a momentary relief to his embarrassments. In 1876 he had to suspend payment of interest on his debts, his bankruptcy was no longer capable of concealment, and foreign intervention was inevitable.

Great Britain and France were the Powers most immediately concerned, the latter as constructor of the Suez Canal, the former as the purchaser of Ismail's share in the undertaking and by reason of her predominant interest in communications with the East. Together they forced Ismail to accept the services of two controllers-general of finance, the one British and the other French, and to rule by the aid of responsible ministers. He submitted at first, but soon began to intrigue against the new arrangement. In 1879, therefore, the Powers induced his overlord, the Sultan of Turkey, to depose him and appoint his son Tewfik as Khedive in his place. The Dual Control was once more in operation, hampered by mutual suspicion between its partners. It sought to rule by moral pressure and without calling in European forces. The next move was a revolt of the undisciplined Egyptian army headed by a colonel named Arabi Pasha, with an outcry against foreign control. There was indeed ground for discontent, for the large com-

¹ Lovat Fraser, *India Under Curzon*, London, 1911, p. 39.

munities of foreign traders in Egypt pushed their right of exemption from native tribunals to an extreme, and behaved with scant justice towards native litigants. Arabi forced Tewfik to make him minister for war and to dismiss certain other ministers. But the rebel leader was not of the stuff of which Napoleons are made; the account of his interview with Tewfik, in which he was scarcely able to articulate his terms, and both parties shook with terror, makes ludicrous reading.¹ In 1882 the anti-foreign movement became more pronounced. Riots and murders took place in the streets of Alexandria, and it was apparent that Arabi was bent on making himself master of the country. He continued, in spite of warning, to strengthen the fortifications of Alexandria, and on July 11 the British fleet destroyed the works by a bombardment. The French refused to co-operate and left Great Britain to deal with the problem alone. Their withdrawal from a country which had been proclaimed "the adopted daughter of France" was due to a momentary panic about German designs, and the French afterwards bitterly regretted it. Arabi's forces were now in open revolt, and a British army was landed to restore order. In September, 1882, it defeated Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir, took Cairo, and disbanded the Egyptian regiments.

It was now the British policy, declared by Gladstone's ministry early in 1883, to set the Khedive upon his feet once more and withdraw as early as possible from the control of the country. Events prevented the fulfilment of this promise, which was genuinely intended at the outset. As a first step Englishmen were appointed as servants of the Egyptian state, to take over the administration of the various departments of the public service. The corruption which they found there soon made it evident that years must elapse before they would be able to regard the task of purification as complete. The Egyptian Sudan also blazed into successful revolt under the Mahdi, and the army needed to be reconstituted from the bottom ere Egypt could defend her own southern frontier, to say nothing of reconquering her dependency. To provide some political training in a country where none existed, a constitution was devised in 1883. The administrative authority was placed nominally in the hands of the Khedive and his ministers, subject to Turkish suzerainty. There was also a legislative council and a general assembly, the latter indirectly elected at third hand from the actual voter, and devoid of power save that of vetoing increases in expenditure. For each of fourteen provinces a provincial council was also set up. This was avowedly a merely educative arrangement, always a difficult thing to clothe with the semblance of reality in communities where it is impossible to entrust the populace with actual power. The ultimate authority in the country lay virtually with the British agent and consul-general. Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) was appointed to these offices in 1883, and held them until 1907.

¹ A vivid personal account of Ismail, and of other leading men of the time, occurs in *A History of Egypt*, 1798-1914, by A. E. P. B. Weigall, Edinburgh, 1915.

In the meantime the Sudan had been the scene of tragic events. The Turco-Egyptian claim to rule it was of long standing. The Khedive Ismail had attempted to make that claim a reality and to consolidate an empire stretching down to the equator. Sir Samuel Baker served him in this task for the first ten years of his reign, and was succeeded towards its close by General Gordon, who, as governor-general of the Sudan, carried on vigorous war against slave-traders and sought to cope with the misdeeds of the Egyptian officials. The latter, in Lord Cromer's words, were "slave-hunting, corrupt, and tyrannical Pashas, who were employed by the Egyptian government, and who, themselves but semi-civilized, introduced none of the blessings but some of the curses of civilization amongst the people who, by a cruel fate, were for a time placed under their control."¹ Gordon retired on the fall of Ismail, and no improvement followed. Amid a people ripe for revolt there arose in 1881 a self-appointed deliverer in the person of Mohammed Ahmed, better known as the Mahdi. His claims to a divine mission fell upon ready ears, and in a short time the Sudan was in general revolt. General Hicks went southwards with an Egyptian force in 1883, to be surrounded and killed in the desert. Early in 1884 the Gladstone ministry decided to abandon the Sudan, and sent Gordon to carry out the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons. Gordon, with no force sufficient for the task, was cut off and besieged at Khartum. A considerable military effort was necessary to extricate him. Such an undertaking was repugnant to the government, which for months hesitated to take the step. When at length an expedition was organized it fought its way across the desert and up the Nile only to find its arrival too late. On January 27, 1885, Khartum fell and Gordon was killed. Later in the year the British army withdrew to Egypt, and the Sudan was left to the Mahdi and his successors.

The fate of Gordon marked the end of a long-dying attitude in the British idea of Empire. The new democracy, reinforced by the Third Reform Act of 1884-5, was fired by his heroic personality with the doctrine of "the white man's burden"—to govern peoples who could only misgovern themselves. A storm of resentment burst upon the Gladstone ministry, not for sending Gordon to Khartum, but for having failed to back him when there. Cold statesmanship might plead that Gordon could have withdrawn in time and had disobeyed orders in remaining. Public opinion then and afterwards held that statesmanship was wrong and visited its displeasure upon the statesmen. The permanent result was that the administration of the Empire ceased to be solely an affair of official calculation and had to take into account a positive and enthusiastic national sentiment. √

¹ *Modern Egypt*, London, 1908, vol. ii. pp. 58-9.

(iii) *Malaya and Borneo*

The British Straits Settlements, whose acquisition has been described in an earlier chapter,¹ cover a very small area of the Malay Peninsula. The narrow northern part of that peninsula belongs to the kingdom of Siam. The broader southern part has become since 1874 a protected dependency of the British Empire. It is occupied by a series of Sultanates under Malay princes, whose original subjects were also for the most part Malays, although they are now outnumbered by Chinese immigrants and almost equalled by coolies from India. The peninsula had long been known to abound in tin and other valuable minerals, and Chinese miners were at work by the middle of the nineteenth century. But the conditions precluded any serious development of the resources. The Malay princes and nobles were arbitrary tyrants, chronically at war and recognizing no responsibility to their subjects. They in their turn were so ground down by taxation and forced labour that honest industry was impossible, and brigandage and piracy took its place. The Chinese were turbulent, often at war with the rulers, and given to fighting among themselves.

In 1874 anarchy had become so serious and the coast so unsafe for shipping that intervention was necessary. British Residents were accordingly stationed in the state of Perak, the principal offender, and in Selangor and Sungei Ujong, to reform their administrations. Next year the Perak Resident was murdered, and an armed expedition was needed to bring the criminals to justice. From that date there were, in these states, no serious breaches of order, the chiefs accepted the Pax Britannica, and prosperity grew rapidly with the influx of capital and immigrants. Between 1883 and 1895 a group of small states were brought jointly under supervision as the Negri Sembilan (Nine States); and in 1887-8 Pahang likewise became a British protectorate. The next step was taken in 1895, when Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang agreed to a pooling of their affairs as the Federated Malay States, their government to be advised by a British Resident-General (Sir F. Swettenham) with a Resident in each state. In general control of these officials is the High Commissioner for the Malay States, who is also Governor of the Straits Settlements. For joint discussion it was also agreed that there should be periodical meetings of the British Residents, the Sultans, and other persons of importance. This arrangement was superseded in 1909, when a more regular Federal Council was established.

The important state of Johore, occupying the southern end of the peninsula, has remained outside the Federation. In 1885 its Sultan placed his foreign relations under British control, but continued his internal rule unaided until 1910, when a British Adviser was appointed. In 1914, at the Sultan's request, further British officials were introduced and the scope of the protectorate was brought into line with that

¹ See above, pp. 33-4.

in the Federated States. Meanwhile the British sphere had been extended northwards by a treaty with Siam in 1909, which established protection over Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, states hitherto under Siamese jurisdiction. These units, like Johore, are separate, unfederated protectorates.

For the sake of continuity the political record has been carried beyond the strict limit of this chapter. Economic development has resulted from it, and has been no less rapid and continuous. Until the end of the nineteenth century mining was the chief business: "villages grew like mushrooms, the Chinese flocked in, the tin export mounted steadily, and the revenue from the tin duties also expanded so rapidly that the surpluses provided a system of roads unequalled in the tropics and the indispensable railway."¹ In the twentieth century rubber has become the leading industry. Until 1900 all the rubber on the world's markets was gathered wild in the forests of the Amazon and the Congo basins, with deplorable results to the natives in both regions. From that date plantation rubber has been produced until now it forms more than ninety per cent. of the supply. Malaya is the largest contributor to this output.

Malaya may be cited as the model unit of the dependent Empire. The whole progress of civilization, after the small-scale fighting of 1874-5, has been bloodless, slavery has been abolished, life and property made secure, wealth increased, and social services inaugurated; and at the same time there has been no displacement of the royal and noble castes. From feudal tyrants of a merciless type, they have been led, not driven, to vie with one another as enlightened servants of their people.²

The acquisition of British North Borneo provides a very different story, and one that is of more than local interest, for the British North Borneo Company is the first of the great chartered companies of the eighties which gained for England a share in the tropics greater than would have been obtained by government enterprise alone. In 1872 a Scotsman, W. C. Cowie, was carrying on an illicit trade in arms about the Philippine Islands, then a Spanish possession. In the course of it he obtained from the Sultan of Sulu, an island lying north of Borneo, a concession to trade at Sandakan on the Borneo coast. A few years later he joined forces with an American, Torrey, who also held a concession. Meanwhile in 1877 the Sultan of Brunei had granted these North Borneo territories to a London syndicate, Dent Bros., represented in the East by Baron Overbeck, an Austrian. The Brunei grant was valueless because the lands belonged to Sulu. The Dent and Cowie syndicates therefore united and jointly approached the Sultan of Sulu for a cession of the Borneo coast in full sovereignty. The Sultan was in a tight place, being under the displeasure of Spain, and sold all his Borneo rights for a cash payment. Six months afterwards, in 1878,

¹ Knowles, *Economic Development of the Overseas Empire*, p. 479.

² Knowles, *op. cit.*; Lucas, *Hist. Geog. of Brit. Colonies*, vol. i.; *Colonial Office List*.

the Spaniards conquered his island territory and deposed him. Spain then claimed the Borneo lands ceded to the Dents, but they were already in effective occupation, operating trading stations and ruling the natives, and they refused to be bluffed out by the local Spanish officials.

The argument was then transferred to Europe, where (Sir) Alfred Dent bought out his former partners and formed a new association of influential men to develop North Borneo. In December, 1878, they petitioned the government for a charter. Lord Salisbury, then Foreign Secretary, was sympathetic, but preferred to leave the decision to his successor, since a general election could not be long delayed. He did, however, back the Borneo association against Spain and also against the Dutch. The latter, as holders of south-eastern Borneo, claimed a prior interest in the north, although they had never occupied it. Salisbury's diplomacy repudiated these arguments and left the British merchants in undisputed possession, since no other powers made any objection. The position, however, was anomalous, for subjects of the British Crown were exercising sovereign rights over non-British territory, and difficult legal questions might at any time arise. The solution was for the Crown to grant a charter limiting and defining the powers of the subjects concerned. On November 1st, 1881, the new Gladstone ministry therefore issued the charter. By it the British North Borneo Company was empowered to administer the territory on condition that it should create no monopoly of trade, should prohibit slavery, allow religious liberty and itself remain British in domicile. The Company's foreign relations and its appointment of a governor in Borneo were to be subject to government supervision, although it could make no claim to military assistance. This last proviso, however, endured only until 1888, when North Borneo became fully a British protectorate.

The above account has been given in some detail as illustrating the new mercantile expansion in the period when British governments, both Liberal and Conservative, were reluctant to annex new territory. Private enterprise pushed ahead of state policy, acquired spheres of influence, and applied for recognition of the accomplished fact, which was not too readily given. It is notable that there was no opposition from the humanitarian interest, as there probably would have been forty years before. The untutored native was no longer viewed through rose-coloured glasses, and his best friends now realized that any regular form of British rule was better than none. It should be noticed also that the charter was different in effect from those granted in Tudor and Stuart times in that it expressly denied any monopoly of trade. It conferred, in fact, no privileges except a recognition of title to the soil, and it did very clearly define duties and restraints. Its object was to safeguard the rights both of the natives and of Europeans in general.

In practice the Company has not itself engaged in trade. It has fulfilled a function similar to that of the East India Company in its last years, by acting as the administrative power over the country. It has

drawn its revenues mainly from import duties, land sales to subsidiary trading companies, and royalties on produce exported by them. None of these sources of revenue existed before the advent of the Company, and so it may be described as giving the natives the benefits of civilized government at no expense to themselves except that of a moderate poll-tax. Against the latter may be set off the advantage of employment in the newly introduced industries. The private trading concerns licensed by the Company produce tobacco, rubber, sago, tapioca and valuable forest timbers. The exports go chiefly to Hong-Kong and Singapore, whence they are widely distributed.¹

(iv) *Tropical Africa*

The earliest seats of British power in tropical Africa were naturally the trading stations on the Upper Guinea coast, north of the equator, for it was from them that the supply of slaves to the West Indies was most conveniently carried on. From the abolition of the trade in 1807 there ensued a long period in which these West African settlements were in a stagnant condition and held of little account, for their modern value became apparent only with the later phase of Industrial Revolution which set in after 1870. Before that date their abandonment was more than once considered, and it was probably the missionary interest which proved the deciding factor in their retention. The expansion from mere coast-stations to large inland territories took place during the international competition of the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The settlement at the mouth of the Gambia River is the oldest British possession in Africa, although there have been brief lapses in its tenure in time of war. It was originally founded in the Stuart period, and prospered as a slaving station. At the peace of Versailles in 1783 the French recognized it as a British possession in return for a similar recognition of French rights on the Senegal. During the Napoleonic wars the British occupied the Senegal, but restored it in 1817. The merchants then decided to make the Gambia their headquarters, and founded the town of Bathurst on the island of St. Mary at its mouth, the site of the old seventeenth-century trading fort. For some time the Gambia settlement remained subject to the government of Sierra Leone, having lost much of its importance on the abolition of the slave trade. The limits of the colony were gradually extended on both banks of the river, and the country inland to the extent of the navigable channel now forms a protectorate. During the nineteenth century the French made good their hold upon the coast on either side of the colony, and linked up their possessions by the occupation of the hinterland. The boundary was finally delimited in 1891, and the Gambia has therefore no scope for future expansion. Military expeditions have been necessary in the protectorate to put down slave-hunting

¹Owen Rutter, *British North Borneo*, London, 1922; and Lucas, *op. cit.* vol. i. pp. 259-65.

by Mohammedans from the interior. Slavery of the domestic type lingered until the opening years of the twentieth century. The administration of the colony was finally separated from that of Sierra Leone in 1888, and the protectorate was established in 1894.

Sierra Leone, intermittently used as a slaving station in the sixteenth and following centuries, began its continuous career under the British flag as the scene of a philanthropic experiment. Amongst the United Empire Loyalists who quitted the United States in 1783 were a number of negro slaves who were obviously out of place in such countries as Nova Scotia and Canada. As a reward for their loyalty to their masters or to the flag it was determined to plant them in a free settlement on the African coast. The British government decided to use for this purpose Sierra Leone, of which it obtained the cession in 1787 from its native owners. As the abolition movement gained ground the original negro settlement was augmented by fresh arrivals from the West Indies and by others captured in slave ships at sea. In 1792 the philanthropists at the back of the movement obtained a charter as the Sierra Leone Company, together with full control of the colony, but on the final abolition of the trade in 1807 they handed over their charge to the Crown. For a time Sierra Leone became the headquarters of the Colony of the West African Settlements, including the Gambia, the Gold Coast and Lagos. In 1874 the two latter were separated from it and in 1888 the former. As inevitably happened in all these West African colonies, the exploitation of natural products and the progressive extermination of cannibalism, fetichism, and the native slave trade caused an extension of British rule inland and along the coast; a civilized power could not sit still whilst barbarous practices went on along its borders. The process continued until the British sphere impinged upon that of France, which had extended its power from the Senegal over the interior. Sierra Leone in this manner reached the limit of its expansion as the result of Anglo-French agreements signed in 1882 and 1889. The protectorate over the hinterland was finally consolidated in 1896, the colony proper being limited to the peninsula of Sierra Leone and its immediate neighbourhood. The government consists of nominated executive and legislative councils under a governor who also rules the protectorate.

The Gold Coast, further to the east, consists of the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti (protectorate), the Northern Territories (protectorate), and a portion of Togoland taken from Germany in the late war. On the coast itself English forts and factories dated from the seventeenth century, but they did not, until a much later period, link up as a homogeneous area, being interspersed with others belonging to the Dutch, the Danes, and the Brandenburgers, all occupied mainly for slaving purposes. The Royal African Company, the original owner of the English forts, lost its monopoly in the reign of William III. It continued, however, to exist until 1752, maintaining the stations on the proceeds of fees paid to it by independent traders. In the year

named it was succeeded by the regulated African Company of Merchants which remained in possession until 1821, when the Crown took over the forts and placed them under the administration of Sierra Leone. The abolition of the ocean-borne slave trade, as distinguished from that carried on in the interior by the natives themselves, diminished the value of these possessions. The government therefore reduced their number from twelve to four, and purposed ultimately to abandon even these. The private traders, however, persisted in carrying on business, for gold was still obtainable, although not in great quantities. This situation led to the next step, the handing over of the Gold Coast forts to a committee of London merchants in 1828. Captain George Maclean, appointed by them as governor, extended British rule through the coastal area between the forts and made a treaty of amity with the Ashanti king in the interior. In 1843, as a result of charges of slave-trading brought against the merchants, the Crown once more and finally took over the Gold Coast. The principal deterrent to this step had been the difficulty of raising a revenue to cover expenses, since the presence of other nationalities on the coast rendered it impossible to impose duties without their co-operation. In 1850 this was partially obviated by the British purchase of the Danish forts, and in 1871 the British government also bought out the Dutch and thus became possessed of the historic fortress of Elmina founded by the Portuguese in 1481. Another acquisition was that of Lagos in 1861. Lagos is an island lying to the east of the Gold Coast, and was formerly a headquarters of the slave trade. Its king voluntarily ceded it to Great Britain.

The powerful kingdom of Ashanti, lying inland from the Gold Coast, had always constituted a menace to the European settlements and to the coast tribes which they protected. The transfer of the Dutch forts gave offence, and an Ashanti army invaded the British sphere early in 1873. It was defeated and driven back, being followed up by Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1874 and pursued into Kumasi, the capital town. The King of Ashanti made his submission and promised good behaviour, upon which the British evacuated his country. His successor again gave trouble in 1895-6. Once more a British force occupied Kumasi, deposed the king, and set up a loose protectorate, converted into a more definite supervision in 1901. The Northern Territories, still deeper in the interior, fell under British influence with the conquest of Ashanti. They were made a separate administration in 1897, and their boundaries with the French sphere were delimited in 1898. Since that date they have gradually settled down to a peaceful condition, the British authorities ruling as much as possible through the agency of existing native chiefs. The people of the Northern Territories are for the most part Mohammedans, those nearer the coast being pagans.

Just as in the Far East official action built up the protectorate system of British Malaya whilst private adventurers gained a hold upon

Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo, so in West Africa the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Gold Coast were enlarged to the present limits by government services and the much greater dependency of Nigeria was acquired by mercantile free-lances. Nigeria, as its name implies, developed from the possession of the delta and lower course of the Niger. The delta consists of a network of channels debouching through dense jungle upon some two hundred miles of coastline. These estuaries had been known to Europeans for centuries—it was in one of them that Thomas Wyndham and most of his men had died of fever in 1554,—but it was not until a hundred years ago that they were proved to be the outlets of the mysterious Niger, whose existence had also been rumoured from the earliest days of exploration.¹ The delta proved its value as a trading area in the first half of the nineteenth century, when the other West African colonies were considered hardly worth keeping; for in its forests grew the trees that produced palm-oil, and palm-oil was a necessity for lubricating machinery, and was useful for making soap and candles. Hence the Oil Rivers, as they were called, were the scene of a lively commerce by merchants of various nationalities long before the official scramble for Africa set in. Until after 1870 no government desired the responsibility of administering a pestilent region to which, even at a later time, the shipping companies issued no return tickets because they were hardly ever needed. In those easy days the free trade idea dominated Great Britain and was making progress on the continent, and the Oil Rivers remained open to all. The Europeans seldom penetrated far from their ships, and the trade was conducted through the agency of the coast chiefs who collected the palm-kernels from the interior.

Towards 1879 competition grew keener, and the French government began to promote the consolidation of its subjects' business into large companies with an obviously political purpose. At the date mentioned (Sir) George Taubman Goldie, a shareholder in one of the British firms, visited the delta and came to the conclusion that the British must also amalgamate or be edged out. There ensued a struggle between the two national groups in which the British were victorious. The French were outdone in fair competition, disappointed by fluctuations in the policy of their government, and finally bought out. This result was attained by the time the Berlin Conference met in 1884. The doctrine there evolved by the Powers was that effective occupation of the coastline conferred a right to a "sphere of influence" in the interior. Goldie's combination, the National African Company, was able to prove that it satisfied the condition, and the Niger Coast was therefore allotted to Great Britain. The main course of the Niger was given to the Company, but the coast westward to include Lagos was gradually consolidated into a colony and protectorate under the Crown. The

¹ One early theory was that the Senegal was actually the lower Niger, which was thought to flow *westwards* from the sources of the Nile, and incidentally, from the fabled Empire of Prester John.

Germans, who had similarly secured the Cameroons, made an effort to obtain treaties of cession from native chiefs higher up the Niger, but the British Company was too quick for them, and a treaty of 1886 regulated the two countries' spheres as indicated above. At this juncture the British Company secured the charter for which it had long been agitating, and changed its name to that of the Royal Niger Company. The charter was similar in its terms to that granted for North Borneo, with the same denial of a trading monopoly. But since the Company had been careful to buy up the best trading-places, it was in practice able to freeze out competitors, and many complaints were made that a substantive monopoly existed.

After the coast question was settled the political interest shifted to the middle and upper Niger. Here the geographical conditions were different and had given rise to a different racial situation. For the country is higher in level, drier, and more open, in contrast to the dense wet jungles of the coast. This hinterland had been penetrated from the north by Mohammedan adventurers who had subdued or expelled the negroes and set up powerful kingdoms; but the tsetse fly of the jungle belt had prevented the horse-using Mohammedans from pushing down to the sea. The French in the eighties made a vigorous exploitation of the sphere-of-influence principle on the ground that the upper and middle Niger was the hinterland of the Senegal and even of distant Algeria. There was feverish competition between British and French pioneers advancing from their respective coastlines, armed with powers to make treaties with the native rulers. In 1890 an agreement fixed the north-western corner of Nigeria at Say, on the Niger, and the north-eastern at Lake Chad. But French encroachment nevertheless continued, and in 1898 the western border was stabilized by the withdrawal of the British to Illo, a hundred miles downstream from Say. The Royal Niger Company had done a great imperial work, but the pacification and governance of a territory that was now one-third as large as India was obviously an unsuitable task for a trading body. This was especially so as, unlike the Borneo Company, the Niger Company was itself doing an extensive and profitable trade. In 1899-1900, therefore, the British government bought out all its political rights and took control. The real conquest and civilization of Nigeria then began, and their story belongs to a later phase of the Empire's history.

In East Africa British interests were of generally later development. The early success of the Mahdi's rising in 1881-3 involved the collapse of the Egyptian claims over eastern Africa, which extended well down to the equator. Owing to circumstances already explained, the interior of this great region was for the time left to the Dervishes, but European powers made haste to seize shares of the derelict coastline. In this manner Italy became possessed of Eritrea on the Red Sea, and of Italian Somaliland, stretching from Cape Guardafui southwards to the equator. Between these two lie Obock or French Somaliland, and British Somaliland, facing northwards across the Gulf of Aden towards Arabia. Great

Britain, mainly for strategic reasons, proclaimed a protectorate in 1884, the boundaries being settled by negotiation with Abyssinia and the European countries concerned.

The partition of the East African coast from the equator to the border of the Portuguese province took place some years later than that of Somaliland. Europeans had long been interested in this region, but mutual jealousies delayed a settlement. In making known the interior of Central Africa north of the Zambesi, Dr. Livingstone and his followers were the principal agents. The Mohammedan Sultan of Zanzibar claimed jurisdiction over the whole mainland area, and used it up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century chiefly as a slave-raiding area. From 1885 onwards British and German pioneers began to penetrate inland from the coast and to make treaties with native chiefs. The country was not very promising from the commercial point of view, but there were reasons why Great Britain could not afford to be left out. The heroic work of Livingstone had left as a heritage to his countrymen the duty of suppressing the slave trade in the most sorely ravaged region of Africa. Apart from that, the Sudan was abandoned to the Mahdi from the Egyptian side, and a German advance from the East African coast might lead the Germans to Uganda and thence to the conquest of the sources of the Nile; and it was evident that an engineering power in control of the Nile waters would hold the life of Egypt in its grasp. So, whilst a German agent, Karl Peters, was touring the interior and concluding treaties of cession by the dozen with the native chiefs, British officers were likewise staking a claim from Mombasa inland to Lake Victoria. Peters returned to Berlin and founded the German East Africa Company in 1885 to exploit his treaties, and in the same year steps were taken to form the British East Africa Company, which took shape in 1886 and received its charter in 1888. The Sultan of Zanzibar lost the vast hinterland which he had never attempted to govern and had left a prey to the slave raiders, and his islands became a British protectorate. Finally an Anglo-German treaty of 1890 gave exact boundaries to what had been vague spheres of influence, and the British East Africa Protectorate and German East Africa took very nearly the form which the map indicates for Kenya Colony and Tanganyika Territory to-day. The treaty of 1890 was a commonsense settlement of a difficult African question, but with the British public a different side of it attracted greater attention; for part of the bargain was the cession of Helgoland near the German coast, an island held by Great Britain since the Napoleonic wars.

The British East Africa Company, whose leading spirit was Sir William Mackinnon, was founded for patriotic reasons and without much hope of profit. In the conditions of the scramble for Africa everything turned upon a rapid staking of claims to be used subsequently as counters for bargaining. This was best done by mercantile associations, unhampered by official methods of administration, and

able without loss of national prestige to withdraw from positions which had become untenable. The East Africa Company therefore played a part indispensable to the survival of great British interests. But it did so to its own undoing. Before it had organized its hold upon the country from Mombasa to Lake Victoria it found itself obliged to push on into Uganda, the great country north of the Lake. Here there was a lively conflict of intrigue between British and French missionaries in 1890, complicated by the arrival of Karl Peters with a bundle of treaties all ready for signature. Uganda, as the map shows, was the point of intersection of two lines of interest, that of Great Britain for an ultimate control of the Nile, and that of France for a trans-African belt from west to east. Peters, locally successful, found his efforts nullified by the Anglo-German treaty of 1890 concluded behind his back. The British East Africa Company then undertook the administration of Uganda to protect the missionaries and keep the country out of French or even Mahdist hands. The effort was successful, but it broke the finances of the Company, which had to resign its responsibilities into government hands. Government was by no means eager to assume them, but there was no alternative. In 1894 Uganda became a protectorate under the Foreign Office, and in the same year the British East Africa Company resigned its charter, on repayment of the capital to the shareholders by the state. Once again a chartered company had filled the gap between uncompromising *laissez-faire* and a positive imperial policy.

One more tropical African unit remains to be considered in this section (for Rhodesia is best dealt with in connection with South Africa). The Nyasaland Protectorate (known from 1893 to 1907 as the British Central Africa Protectorate) occupies the western and southern shores of Lake Nyasa. Livingstone first penetrated this country in 1859-63, and missionaries and traders followed his tracks in the succeeding years. The first official recognition of British interest came with the appointment of a British consul in 1883 for the whole area north of the Zambesi. Troubles with Arab slave-raiders in 1889 caused the despatch of Sir H. H. Johnston to investigate. His agreements with native chiefs led to the proclamation of the British protectorate over the region, regularized by the treaty with Portugal in 1891.¹

On a general view it may be said that the British acquisitions in tropical Africa during the period down to 1895 were not much affected by the fortunes of political parties at home. Both Liberal and Conservative ministers were slow to move of their own initiative, but they were accessible to the urgings of men of vision. Out of these two elements, official anxiety to do the right thing and active enterprise by private men with the national interest at heart, there came the

¹ General authorities for this section are: Johnston, *Colonization of Africa*; Lucas, *Partition of Africa*; Lucas, *Hist. Geog. of British Colonies*; Knowles, *Economic Development of Empire*; Muir, *Expansion of Europe*; *Cambridge Hist. of Brit. Foreign Policy*, vol. iii.; Lugard, *Dual Mandate*; *Colonial Office List*; besides monographs on particular colonies.

British share in the partition—by no means a paltry share when compared with those of France and Germany. On the assumption that all comers had an equal claim, England had done well. Of course another assumption was conceivable—that Britain's preponderance in sea-power entitled her to squeeze her competitors whenever she chose. But there was never a hint of that argument, although it would pretty certainly have been used had the big stick been in other hands.

CHAPTER III

THE EMPIRE UNDER DISRAELI, GLADSTONE AND SALISBURY (*continued*)

THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE

(i) *Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*

By 1859 the political map of Australia had taken the shape with which we are now familiar, except that there has been a subsequent change of jurisdiction over the sparsely peopled Northern Territory. The six colonies which are now the constituent states of the Commonwealth were all formed by that date, and all but Western Australia were in the enjoyment of responsible government. In Canada that stage had been followed within a dozen years or so by the movement towards federation which had established the Dominion in 1867. In Australia, on the contrary, there was no real desire for federation until a much later date, and the six colonies preferred to follow their own paths in isolation. The explanation is that, great as the benefits of federation and the dominion status are now seen to be, they were modified in the eyes of the earlier generation by very serious drawbacks; and in both dominions the consolidation was adopted not so much as a blessing in itself as because it offered a means of parrying certain dangers. The earlier federation of Canada was simply due to the fact that its dangers were more pressing. There was internal tension from the rivalry of the French and British nationalities coupled with the geographical circumstance that access to British Ontario was only to be had by passage through French Quebec; and there was an external threat from the vigorous United States with their ambition to expand northwards into the prairie lands that must soon be thrown open to settlement. These things made Canadian federation imperative. In Australia the conditions were different. The nuclei of the several colonies were at widely separated points on a long coastline, and each had an ample hinterland for inward expansion; their mutual jealousies were often keen enough, but never came near the plane of the civil war which had actually occurred in Canada; and until the close of the nineteenth century there was no military power capable of invasion to be seen even on the remote horizon. The foreign threats which did develop were first, peaceful penetration by Asiatic immigrants, and second, the seizure by white nations of the Pacific islands which Australians were prone to regard as

their own future sphere of domination. This last did not become a very urgent matter until the eighties, and meanwhile the colonies were chiefly concerned with their separate affairs.

The keynotes of the forty years following the grant of responsible government have been enumerated as the ballot, manhood suffrage, fiscal protection and land reform,¹ in succession to the transportation, exploration, gold-finding and constitution-making which had been the chief topics of the earlier period. The ballot and the suffrage, together with payment of political representatives, were questions that became prominent earlier in Australia than anywhere else in the overseas Empire, and this was largely due to the emigration of a number of English Chartists at the time of the gold discoveries. In fact, the whole Chartist programme, with the exception of the impracticable annual elections, was realized in Australia long before it was in Great Britain. Victoria instituted vote by ballot in 1856, and the other colonies followed suit. In the succeeding years they abolished plural voting and the property qualification for members, and inaugurated payment of members and manhood suffrage; and as early as 1894 South Australia led a new democratic advance by conferring the vote on women.

In fiscal doctrine Australia differed from, or perhaps anticipated, the mother country. Free trade had been in England an essentially middle-class cult, and the Chartists had shown no marked affection for it. When the Australians became democratic they rapidly became protectionist as well. Victoria led the way under the inspiration of David Syme, a Scottish Radical, and Graham Berry, an English Chartist, and in 1865-6, after an embittered political conflict, the colony adopted a protective tariff. On the assumption, already popular, that a self-governing colony should become a self-sufficing entity and not a mere producing-area of raw material, there was more to be said for protection in Australia than in England, for infant manufactures could not establish themselves unaided against the competition of large-scale industry from without. Again the other colonies followed the example with the exception of New South Wales, which remained anti-protectionist until the end of the century. Different tariff scales implied inter-colonial customs barriers and emphasized the separate development already noted. Victoria was notable in this period for the violence of its constitutional crises. There was another in 1877-8 on the question of payment of members, to which the Legislative Council refused its assent. These struggles brought out the fact that a colonial constitution, based as it is upon a different structure of society, can never exactly imitate the relationships of the two Houses in the English Parliament, and that a colonial governor cannot occupy the same position as the British Crown. New methods and rules had thus to be worked out, and from the heat and recrimination of the Victorian contests there emerged a new contribution to the constitutional lore of the Empire.²

¹ Ernest Scott, *Short History of Australia*, 4th edn. Oxford, 1920, p. 271.

² See Egerton, *British Colonial Policy*, bk. iv. chap. ii.

The peopling of Australia after the cessation of the convict influx involved some important questions of imperial relationships. In each Australian colony there were three zones of population—the urban inhabitants of the capital and its seaport, the farming belt surrounding it and supplying it with foodstuffs, and the squatters and their employees on the great grazing estates of the interior, which supplied the chief export-commodity and set the pace of general economic advance. The goldfields, where they existed, supported an additional population, with interests allied to those of the urban class. Each of these zones reacted on the others. As the squatters thrived and exported more wool there was additional employment for the business element in the towns, and the same result proceeded from the production of gold. Increased capital led to the establishment of manufactures and the growth of an urban artisan class. The expanding cities needed more food, and so the farming zone extended in proportion. But it had to do so by encroachment upon the grazing areas, and a conflict of interest arose between farmers and squatters. A similar conflict proceeded from differing points of view upon immigration. Town-dwellers and farmers objected to the influx of convicts and ticket-of-leave men. Their successful campaign for the ending of transportation gave rise to the idea of regulating any other immigration which might seem undesirable. In the fifties the gold-rush attracted some thousands of Chinese from Hong-Kong. Colonial democracy determined that this influx must be stopped; and a series of colonial measures from 1855 to 1888 achieved first restriction and finally exclusion of the Asiatic invasion. The squatters had objected neither to convicts nor to Chinese, since the labour of both was cheap, and wealthy magnates were in no fear of social contamination from their dependents. The British government gave up transportation with regret and protested against the anti-Chinese measures. Here the policy of the Foreign Office was involved, for it had negotiated treaties with China and had to admit that the exclusion was an infringement of them. But the Australians were determined, and the time was passing when the veto of the Crown could be exercised in a first-class matter. Imperial foreign policy had to bow to colonial autonomy. The prime imperial problem of the present day was taking shape.

In the conflict of the squatters with the farmers the squatters had inevitably to give way. They had not, for the most part, become the owners of their runs, for from the thirties the Wakefield doctrine of land sales to provide an emigration fund had taken hold, and no squatter could purchase all his vast domain at so much an acre. They were therefore in the position of tenants of the Crown with the reservation, more or less clearly stated, that the lease might be terminated whenever the land should be required for closer settlement. The conditions governing the resumption were the subject of much detailed legislation, some of which failed to achieve its object. Laws, for example, which permitted would-be farmers to select holdings on areas thrown open

were defeated by the squatters putting in sham selectors who were their own agents in disguise. Ultimately by improvements of the law and by differential taxation the great estates were broken up at a sufficient rate for the advance of agriculture, and the squatter who desired to purchase a part of his run had sometimes the option of doing so on more favourable terms than the outsider.¹

The early democratic tendencies of Australia bore fruit in the period now under review in many social developments, some of which antedated similar movements in the mother country. Trades unions had fewer legal restrictions from which to emancipate themselves, and from the time of the gold discoveries they became generally established. From them (about 1890) arose the idea of a political Labour Party, although it was not until the twentieth century that it became a serious power. Australia's contribution to problems of employment took the shape of Wages Boards and Arbitration Courts whose decisions had the force of law in settling disputes. In education Victoria led the way in 1870-3 with a system of free, compulsory and secular instruction, and half-a-dozen universities in the capital cities (beginning with Sydney and Melbourne in 1852 and 1853) have provided higher education open to talent without the necessity of wealth.² With public thought flowing in channels of equality and independence, and with statesmen in England proclaiming, as they did until 1870, their indifference to the future cohesion of the Empire, it was natural that some Australians should lean to ideas of separation and republicanism. There was a good deal of this sort of talk in the seventies and eighties, but time has since shown that it did not represent a deeply seated desire. Some features of the Commonwealth Act of 1900, to be considered in a later chapter, do, however, indicate the influence of American institutions.

In communications the period 1855-95 witnessed a continuous advance. On the seas the clipper ships halved the duration of the old-time European passage, and no sooner was this accomplished than the Suez Canal subtracted five thousand miles from the steamer's voyage and again halved the time taken. Mail services improved in conformity, and in 1871 the submarine cable already open to the Far East was connected with Port Darwin in the Northern Territory and thence by transcontinental line with Adelaide. The importance of the telegraph for circulating information of world-demands and world-prices was greater even than that of the mail-steamer and proved an immense stimulus to all kinds of enterprise. Internal communications were less fortunately handled. Railway construction began before the possibilities of trunk-lines were realized. Vision was limited to merely local considerations, and consequently New South Wales built its lines on a different gauge from those of Victoria and South Australia. The

¹ See above, p. 96. For the present section the authority followed is Scott's *History of Australia*, pp. 261-7.

² Scott, pp. 267-8.

decision probably helped to delay the confederation of the colonies into a dominion, for the break of gauge hindered through traffic and promoted separateness of development.

The above sketch of the middle period of Australian history has taken account of broad movements rather than of the fortunes of parties or of individual leaders. In the imperial record these last are matters of local history, and their details must be held subordinate in a view of a national unit in the British Commonwealth. A similar outline treatment of New Zealand will be necessary before turning to the important Pacific questions which both dominions shared in common with the mother country.

From the close of the Maori wars New Zealand advanced at a steady and rapid rate. The departure of Sir George Grey and of most of the imperial troops in 1867 marks the effective end of the Maori period, when political interest had centred in the North Island. Two years later Sir Julius Vogel rose to influence and inaugurated a policy of state loans for public works, assisted immigration, and encouragement of all kinds of mining, industrial and agricultural enterprise. The human, untheoretical radicalism of Grey and the economics of Vogel left a permanent stamp upon the character of New Zealand. The irritation against the mother country caused by the unintelligent native policy of the Gladstone government in 1868-70 soon passed away, and New Zealand developed into the most essentially British of the dominions, not merely in the origin of its inhabitants but also in their attitude towards the imperial connection and in their manners and way of life. The perpetuation of type owed much to environment. The country is insular and the climate temperate, and the sea is nowhere far beyond the horizon.

Gold discoveries in the sixties, coupled with freedom from Maori troubles, caused South Island to attract the greater share of the new immigration. Its population exceeded that of North Island until about 1890, when it fell slightly behind. During the generation which ended at that date the separate settlements of pioneer days were consolidated into a nation, which by the end of the century was over three-quarters of a million strong. The trend of development, as has been said, was southwards, and this led to the shifting of the capital to Wellington in 1865; for Cook Strait was the economic centre of the country. By 1890 consolidation was complete and social organization became the chief interest. In outline the programme followed that already described in Australia, and that pursued by the mother country at a generally later date. The antipodean British, in fact, gave the lead to the older stock at home in demonstrating that social reforms may improve the conditions of the citizen's life without impairing his self-reliance or his patriotism. In economic matters the improvements in transport and communications followed the same course as for Australia, but special mention must be made of one invention which had a paramount effect upon the fortunes of New Zealand. This was

the carriage of meat in cold storage, adopted by the New Zealand Shipping Company in 1882.¹ Thenceforward New Zealand mutton, and subsequently dairy produce, could find a ready market twelve thousand miles away, and a new link of Empire had been forged.

The multitudinous islands of the Pacific Ocean have for the past century formed an arena of competition between the civilized nations. Trade, missionary influence and strategic ambitions have been the chief motives of action; there has been much double-dealing and shifty diplomacy; and if the Great War has summarily abolished some of the problems it has left others outstanding for future solution. In its international aspects the Pacific situation bears some resemblance to that in the West Indies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although the threat of disturbance to peace has never been quite so acute. In the earlier part of the period the leading competitors for influence were Great Britain and France. Later came the United States and Germany, and finally in our own days, Japan. The war eliminated Germany, and the treaties of 1919 assigned her Pacific colonies to the victorious powers upon terms which have every appearance of permanence.

The foundation of the London Missionary Society in 1795 presaged the opening of the period of European settlement in the islands, in succession to that of casual visits by the whalers and explorers of the eighteenth century. In 1797 the British missionaries appeared in Tahiti, the first large island to be encountered south of the equator on the westward passage round Cape Horn. In Tahiti and its neighbours of the Society group² the missionaries did excellent work, putting an end to tribal wars, introducing a code of law, and setting up something approaching constitutional government by a native sovereign. The islanders conceived for them both affection and respect, and in 1825 and 1836 applied for the formal protection of the British Crown. On both occasions the imperial government declined to assume responsibility. France was in a different mood. Louis Philippe was glad to take up a colonial policy wherewith to amuse his restless subjects. A French society sent Catholic missionaries to the Pacific. The Tahitians, with the Protestants already in possession, refused to admit them. In 1838 a French cruiser enforced their reception at the cannon's mouth. This was the beginning of the end of Tahitian independence. In 1842 the French proclaimed a protectorate, which became a virtual sovereignty in the following year. The annexation was formally achieved in 1880. Meanwhile the Marquesas and the Low Archipelago fell under French rule, and a convention of 1888 recognized the whole eastern circle of islands as a French sphere of sovereignty.

Farther west, and close to Australia, the French also established themselves. Forestalled in their half-formed intention of colonizing New Zealand, they landed missionaries in New Caledonia in 1843.

¹ Knowles, *op. cit.* p. 19.

² So named in commemoration of the astronomical mission of the Royal Society conducted thither by Captain Cook.

In the year following the acquisition of Fiji the imperial government appointed a High Commissioner for the Western Pacific with his headquarters in the Fiji islands. The principal duty of this officer was to control irregularities in the recruiting of native labour, and to exercise jurisdiction to that end over British subjects residing in non-British islands.

The French possession of New Caledonia gave rise to a difficult question in the adjacent New Hebrides. French exploiters and missionaries soon became active there, and Australians became intensely irritated at the prospect of another French annexation. Remembering what had already happened, they feared the eviction of Protestant missionaries and the planting of yet another penal settlement to let loose a swarm of criminals in the Pacific. Accordingly Australia became very insistent that some guarantee, preferably that of British annexation, should be obtained. Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary, contented himself with an exchange of assurances with France, either power denying any intention to annex (1878). Five years later it became evident that French subjects, by obtaining land grants from the natives, were bent upon compelling the Republic to a forward move. Australian indignation reached boiling-point, and the unhappy business dragged on until 1887. In that year Britain and France arrived at a compromise by which a joint commission of naval officers was to undertake the duty of preserving order in the islands, without the assumption of sovereignty by either party. The two nations were then by no means on friendly terms, and the somewhat uneasy arrangement continued until the achievement of the *entente cordiale* early in the twentieth century. A fruit of that reconciliation was the Convention of 1906, establishing what is called a Condominium. British and French administrators exercise control over their respective subjects, and there is a joint court for judicial purposes with its president appointed by a neutral third party, the King of Spain. The system is cumbrous and inefficient, and its establishment gave no satisfaction to the Australasian annexationists. But at least it protects missionary interests and precludes a penal settlement.


The Sandwich Islands lie twenty degrees north of the equator, about equidistant between the United States and Japan, and a good deal further from British Australasia. Their natives, of the same Polynesian race as those of the southern islands, showed in the early days of discovery a promising aptitude for self-government and orderly intercourse with the civilized powers. Like the Tahitians, they looked first for British protection, but their proximity to San Francisco caused them to fall within the American orbit as soon as the Californian seaboard became peopled. Under the fiction of a native monarchy the islands were penetrated by American missionaries, traders and sugar-planters. At the end of the nineteenth century less than half of the population (90,000 in all) were natives. The remainder were for the most part Chinese, Japanese and Americans, and the latter wielded all the political

power. In 1898 the inevitable outcome followed, annexation by the United States. That country had shown no indecent haste, and had as good justification for the step as the British in Fiji.

The Germans came late into the Pacific. Nevertheless their first appearance there was a natural movement of commercial expansion, antedating the artificial empire-building forced upon Bismarck a decade after the Franco-German war. In the seventies the firm of Godeffroy of Hamburg, together with other German business houses, acquired trading stations in Samoa and in the clusters of islands near the equator, the Gilbert, Ellice, Marshall, Caroline, Solomon and New Britain groups. About 1880 the Godeffroys fell into bankruptcy, and a new state-promoted company was formed to take over their assets. From this event dates the period of the German aggressive policy.

With the adoption of a forward colonial policy by Germany the fate of the great island of New Guinea became a burning question. Its western portion was without doubt a Dutch possession falling within the circle of the Moluccas and Borneo; but Eastern New Guinea was unoccupied by any power, although formal possession had more than once been declared by British officers. Prescription without occupation gives no valid title, and the occupation of an unhealthy and savage country entailed expenditure. It was this which prevented the acquisition of New Guinea in the pre-German period. The Australian colonies desired annexation but were unwilling to contribute to the cost. The Foreign Office view was that "Great Britain had already black subjects enough." This was the established doctrine expressed by Lord Derby just as the Disraeli ministry came into power in 1874. Disraeli, however, and his Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, were by no means hostile in principle to any expansion for which good reason could be shown. But they had from the outset a bewildering array of "black subjects" in the Kaffir tribes of South Africa, where wars and rumours of wars indicated a great extension of British rule as the solution of difficulties. Ere long, also, the Eastern Question grew pressing, from the Balkans to Afghanistan, and tropical Africa was entering the stage preliminary to the scramble of the eighties. As for the Pacific, Carnarvon assumed responsibility for Fiji without hesitation, and he might reasonably expect the Australians to help pay for any further luxuries they might fancy in that region. Moreover, Carnarvon did not believe there was urgency, although Australia was already nervous about German intentions. When, therefore, Queensland demanded annexation in 1875, the reply was that the Australian colonies must jointly pay the costs. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, who succeeded Carnarvon in 1878, made the same condition, with which Australia would not comply. No government could have done more at a time when the British public was still steeped in the Manchester doctrine that expenditure on the Empire was an economic crime.

The lost opportunity did not remain open. In the early eighties



the colonizing party in Germany converted Bismarck against his will and organized a batch of chartered company projects, including one for New Guinea. Matters came to a head in 1883, when Germany was still officially protesting innocence of any scheme of acquisition. Queensland urged immediate annexation of all New Guinea not claimed by the Dutch, and offered to bear the expense of administration. It was too late. Gladstone was now in power, and with Lord Derby at the Colonial Office declined new responsibilities on any terms. It was a reversal of the Carnarvon policy, but again judgment must be based on a wide view. Egypt was on our hands, the Mahdi was rampant in the Sudan, Africa was about to be cut up, and Russia was in a mischievous mood on the Afghan frontier. France was bitter at her lost chance in Egypt and making trouble over the Newfoundland fishing rights. Ireland was in a state of smothered revolution, having just murdered Lord Frederick Cavendish in Phoenix Park, and scores of law-abiding men elsewhere. With this pack of trouble on its back a government of "Peace, retrenchment and reform" might well plead justification for accepting German assurances and postponing the New Guinea question to a more spacious time.

Australians could see nothing but their own problem—the menace of an unfriendly power establishing itself on their northern horizon—and they grew incensed and insubordinate. In April, 1883, Queensland hoisted the flag in New Guinea without permission. Lord Derby at once disapproved the act and wrote that the German rumours were altogether unfounded. At the close of the year an intercolonial conference of Australian statesmen supported Queensland and begged for annexation. Responsible men expressed loyalty and recognition of imperial difficulties, but uninstructed opinion took a seditious tone. Lord Derby was slowly becoming convinced when in 1884 Germany anticipated his conversion. In August the German flag was hoisted over Northern New Guinea and the adjacent islands (henceforward the Bismarck Archipelago), and only the southern coast was open to the British annexation effected in October. By a general treaty of 1886 this result was ratified and the German sphere of influence was extended to include the Marianne, Marshall, Caroline, and northern Solomon groups of islands, whilst the Gilbert, Ellice and southern Solomon archipelagoes similarly fell under British control. The British New Guinea protectorate became a crown colony in 1888 and a territory of the Australian Commonwealth in 1906. Australia was disappointed, for she had had visions of a Monroe doctrine to forbid any European intrusion into the Pacific south of the equator. But Australia developed too late to assert such a position. In the thirties and forties, when sweeping annexations were possible, she had been nothing but a series of struggling pioneer settlements. In the seventies and eighties she was still a group of colonies and not a dominion, and the blame for that lack of nationhood can fall upon none but the Australians themselves. Out of the disillusionment came at length the will to union, so that

when in 1914 the Pacific properties were once more in the melting-pot an Australian nation did exist to seize the opportunity.¹

At Samoa there arose an entanglement similar to that of New Guinea. The group consists of three fair-sized islands and some smaller ones. It was early a centre of the Godeffroys' enterprise, and from 1871 Germany began to regard it as a prospective possession. The Samoans, like other Polynesian islanders, attempted after adopting Christianity to set up a united monarchy of their own; and here also native dissensions and the impingement of outside ambitions proved fatal to the plan. New Zealand, for commercial and strategic reasons, had her eye upon the group and also upon the Tonga or Friendly Islands. Knowledge of her aspirations caused Germany to make a preventive move. In 1877 the latter country concluded a treaty with the Samoan chiefs debarring them from accepting the protection of another power. Next year the United States acquired a naval base in Tutuila, the smallest of the three considerable islands, and in 1879 Great Britain obtained the option of doing the like. There were thus three treaty powers in competition for the hegemony. In 1883 the German proceedings in New Guinea rendered the New Zealanders apprehensive of some *coup de main*, a fear which was heightened by the oppressive behaviour of the German consul in Samoa. America now took a hand in the dispute and a serious crisis developed in 1889, when more than half-a-dozen warships were congregated at Apia, the principal town of the group. Hostilities, at least between the Germans and the Americans, appeared imminent when a terrible hurricane destroyed both squadrons impartially, whilst the single British vessel present beat her way out to sea. A conference at Berlin then provided a temporary solution whereby a native monarch was to reign under the joint protection of the three powers. This arrangement failed to work smoothly and was superseded by a partition in 1899. America took Tutuila and Germany Upolu and Savaii, the two larger islands, whilst Great Britain withdrew altogether in consideration of a German withdrawal from Tonga. The history of the Tonga group was similar to that of Samoa, but its crises were less intense. The islands came under the protection of New Zealand in 1900.

Thus the Pacific was partitioned as Africa had been, and again, as in Africa, the British share was by no means negligible.

(ii) *South Africa*

With the annexation of the Diamond Fields in 1871 South Africa entered upon a stormy period. Its politics had always been troubled, but hitherto they had been relatively simple, revolving round the conflicting claims of natives and missionaries on the one hand and of

¹ For the New Guinea Question compare Egerton, *British Colonial Policy*; Scott's and other histories of Australia; and Scholefield's *Pacific*, the most detailed authority.

farmers and trekkers on the other. Now the problem grew more complicated. Mining introduced new interests and new types of humanity, rudimentary railways promised to develop into trunk lines that would cross frontiers, and the far interior revealed incentives to enterprise. Europe after the Franco-German War turned its attention to southern as to central Africa, and British imperialism awoke to grasp instead of evading responsibilities. Even the Kaffir changed and became more difficult to deal with. His numbers increased, his chiefs grew instructed and less childlike, he adopted the musket and the horse into his military equipment, and at the diamond diggings he acquired money, firearms and new ideas and took them home to his kraal. The pulse of the new post-1870 world throbbed perceptibly in pastoral, Old-Testament South Africa.

The natives were indeed the core of the South African problem. In the Transvaal there were about a million of them to some 40,000 whites; in the Free State, 350,000 to 27,000. In Natal the disparity was probably greater, and in the Cape Colony rather less; but it was everywhere sufficient to cause perpetual alarm and uncertainty. Nor was this all. For there were large independent or semi-independent native areas without white settlers, where tribal military organization still prevailed: Zululand with its vassal tribes, north of Natal and east of the Transvaal; Kaffraria between Natal and the Cape Colony, where Grey's system of civilization by means of white magistrates had not been universally applied; Basutoland, autonomous under the Crown, and inhabited by an advanced people, more sophisticated than the Zulus and hardly less warlike; Bechuanaland to the west of the Transvaal, with a vast area but a more scanty population of various Bantu tribes; and in the far north Matabeleland, a potential menace, although not yet active. Native wars had hitherto been frequent, almost continuous, but always sporadic; and their cost in time and money had been a heavy burden to the tiny white populations. A general native rising had not occurred, but it was always possible. It would certainly spell disaster and perhaps annihilation to the Europeans of South Africa. In the seventies the possibility came nearer, owing to increasing tension between the races, increasing knowledge of general conditions among the chiefs, and greater facilities for intercourse between them. The white man's strength lay in his organization and his weapons; but his relative superiority was smaller in the seventies than ever before, or since. Moshesh, the great Basuto chief, had shown diplomatic as well as military skill, and had welded his tribes into a nation which had held its own against the trekkers and secured recognition almost as an equal from the British. Cetewayo the Zulu appeared as no mean follower in the same path. In early days the muzzle-loading firearm had placed its owner in a different category from the spear-throwing Kaffir, especially when the firer was mounted and could ride out of range to reload. Now a large proportion of the tribesmen had muskets and horses, and as mounted infantry were little

inferior to the whites, with whom the breech-loader was not yet universal. In a decade or two the machine-gun and magazine rifle would restore the threatened supremacy, but in the seventies South Africa was from the military point of view in a parlous state. It was the common belief that Cetewayo and his Zulus were the focus of mischief and had it in their power to achieve the catastrophe.

A uniform native policy was imperative, but the four white communities followed different policies which they hardly attempted to co-ordinate. The former missionaries' plan of civilization by their own agency without lay interference had been shattered by the Great Trek and the growth of enterprise. Missionaries still laboured, but on a lower scale than of old. Fighting tribesmen paid little heed to their teaching, officials had taken diplomacy out of their hands, and at home even Exeter Hall had to compete with men of business for the ear of authority. The strongest English personality in early South Africa was the Rev. John Philip. In this later time it was to be Cecil Rhodes; and the contrast of prevailing type ran right down the scale. Unity of native policy had thus given place to diversity or even to neglect of policy. In the Boer states there was no pretence of racial equality, and Kaffirs could hold land only as tribes and not as individuals. Their tribal organization and all it implied was thus perforce maintained. Natal had definite Bantu reserves, but tribal distinctions tended to fuse under stricter white control, and the system threatened to break down under the influx of masterless men who were attracted from beyond the borders. In the Cape Colony, where theoretical equality prevailed, the tribes had broken up, and their members had come under European law. They could even obtain the vote by the same property qualification as the whites. But the non-colonized areas were the chief problem. Their frontiers were not clearly defined, and clashes with their neighbours might lead to displacements which would react on other areas. A Free State war with the Basutos would cause turmoil in British Kaffraria. The Zulus were ready for anything, even for invading Kaffraria across Natal. In a country where frontiers were generally mere lines on the map they had little sanctity for the native mind.

To constructive thinkers the only remedy appeared to be the federation of South Africa, as formerly proposed by Sir George Grey. Lord Carnarvon, who as Under Secretary in 1858 had denounced Grey as a dangerous visionary, had been Secretary for the Colonies in 1867 when Canadian federation had been carried. The Canadian success may have changed his views, and when, in February 1874, he took office again as Disraeli's Colonial Secretary, it was with the purpose of creating a Dominion of South Africa within the lifetime of the new ministry.¹

¹ The leading authorities for the following pages are Walker's *History of South Africa* (1928), and Sir A. Hardinge's *Life of Lord Carnarvon*, Oxford, 1925. The *Cambridge Hist. of Br. Foreign Policy* contains a useful section compiled before the appearance of these works.

Cape opinion was largely favourable, and many Free Staters were not hostile. Burgers, the Transvaal President, was also keen for federation, although of an independent South Africa, not as a British dominion. In all views there was at least a common denominator.

Carnarvon is one of the notable colonial secretaries, although he owed the distinction rather to the events he had to deal with than to his own personality. He was capable of large plans, but not of a realistic interpretation of facts; prone to mistake shadow for substance when to do so fell in with his hopes. He was honourable and conscientious, but lacking in sympathy with men who were different from himself. In the Jamaica crisis, for example, his fixity of principle had made him unjust to Eyre, and he had talked rather pompously of the governor having given way to panic.¹ It was a little out of place in view of Carnarvon's remoteness from the scene of action and the relative extent of his and Eyre's experience of handling men. Carnarvon, in short, was too ready to assume that others should and would think as he did. It was not a good omen for his approach to the stubborn and obscure problems of South Africa.

The Diamond Fields decision, whereby Great Britain annexed the richest part of the minefield, had left some soreness both in the Transvaal and the Free State. Carnarvon became convinced that the Boers had received less than justice, but it was too late to withdraw, and he counted on making reparation under the federation scheme. It was not long before the native question produced a trying situation. A chief named Langalibalele had committed disloyal acts but had been unfairly tried for them. Carnarvon stood for strict justice and reversed the decision of the colonial court, in spite of high feeling in Natal and the Cape Colony. He came out of the incident with personal credit and it probably lost him nothing in South Africa. In May, 1875, he proposed a conference in South Africa to consider native policy and, if all went well, federation. The obstacle was the Cape ministry, whose existing difficulties made it unwilling to discuss far-reaching novelties, although popular opinion was favourable. The historian Froude went to South Africa as Carnarvon's unofficial representative, made a speechifying tour for federation, and had almost won over the Cape government when the Colonial Secretary transferred the place of meeting to London. There the conference met in 1876. It was a lame affair. Natal was fully represented, but Burgers of the Transvaal, who had been willing to confer in South Africa, refused to do so in England. The Cape was likewise absent. President Brand of the Free State attended, but only on condition that federation should not be mentioned. His object was to secure monetary compensation for the loss of the diamond area, and this he attained. The conference therefore yielded no advance of the federation project.

It was here that Carnarvon went astray. A realist would have seen that for voluntary federation the game was up. The alternative was

¹ Hardinge, i. 328-33.

to use force, and that he certainly did not contemplate. But he persuaded himself that the object could be attained by taking advantage of the difficulties of the Transvaal, which were now critical. This was to use force in disguise, and yet he hoped that in the outcome the recalcitrant Boers would grow freely willing to enter the Empire. It was to misunderstand their nature.

The condition of the Transvaal under Burgers' presidency had grown steadily worse. Lack of citizenship and public spirit, and the occupation of a far greater area than was necessary for the population, were in brief the causes of the trouble. The latter manifested itself in the following forms: "Trade of all kinds had nearly ceased, there was no money in the treasury, and the farmers . . . were unable or unwilling to meet their obligations to the state, the commando system had utterly broken down, the gold diggers and nearly all the English and German residents in the villages were acting as they chose without paying any regard to the republican officials, and the Bantu tribes could not be controlled."¹ The quotation applies to the year 1876, by which time events were reaching a climax. On the south-east the Transvaal had a territorial dispute of long standing with Cetewayo, whose military preparations were increasing year by year. It was a common belief in South Africa that the Zulu king was only biding his time to carry fire and slaughter through the Transvaal, and that he would have no difficulty in doing so. The impression derived strength from the Boer failure to coerce a much weaker chieftain, Sekukuni, on the north-eastern border. The President led a commando against him in 1876, and was ignominiously defeated in a campaign in which the Boers were charged with horrible atrocities against native non-combatants. In spite of their weakness the disorderly spirit of the Boers led them to aggression against other native tribes on their borders. The Bechuanas and even the far-off Matabele complained to the High Commissioner that new bands of trekkers were seeking to violate their territory.

Carnarvon now took two steps. At the close of 1876 he drafted a permissive Bill whereby Parliament should authorize in advance a South African federation; and at the same time he gave Sir Theophilus Shepstone a commission to enquire into the troubles of the Transvaal and annex that state if he should be satisfied that the inhabitants desired it. Shepstone's instructions were emphatic that there was to be no coercion and no ground for the Boers to say afterwards that force had been used; for Carnarvon was convinced by his informants that the Transvaalers themselves were sick of independence and the hopeless position to which it had led them. Shepstone was evidently not expected to hurry the matter, for in the spring of 1877 Sir Bartle Frere, an official with a brilliant Indian record, was sent out as Governor of the Cape with orders to work for federation. Frere arrived to learn that, almost as he landed, Shepstone had hoisted the flag at Pretoria and proclaimed annexation.

¹ *Theal, History of South Africa, 1873-84*, 2 vols. London, 1919, vol. i. p. 268.

What had happened was that Shepstone had gone out ostensibly to make a decision on the spot, but with the knowledge that the decision had already been predetermined in his chief's mind. He did not wish to be the cause of failure, and he was impelled to see the circumstances as he desired to see them. There was, in fact, no ardent wish for annexation. Shepstone was indeed cordially received, partly because he was personally liked, partly because the Transvaal was in desperate need of British help; but when he broached annexation the discussion was long and opinion divided. In the end some Boer leaders acquiesced, but many withdrew from co-operation. Burgers made an official protest, but he was a failure and did not count for much. Paul Kruger, the real strong man of the country, stood aloof and refused to serve the new government. At best it could be said that there was no resistance, but that hardly fulfilled the conditions Carnarvon had laid down. Had he been on the spot he would probably not have annexed, but he had given Shepstone a free hand and had to stand by the decision.

The annexation had a bad effect. Patience, generous assistance, support of Kruger, who was at that time by no means an Anglophobe, might have done much by arousing gratitude. As it was, the Transvaal remained sullen, the Free State took alarm and lost all hankering for federation, and the Cape Dutch protested. Federation was farther off than ever before. Nevertheless Carnarvon passed the Permissive Act (August 1877) and urged Frere to work in the now hopeless cause.

Frere had something else to occupy him. Federation was to have been a way of approach to the native problem, but now that had to be tackled without delay. He brought to South Africa the Indian tradition of justice coupled with firmness in dealing with fighting races, and he determined to apply it to the Zulus. He fully investigated their boundary dispute with the Transvaal, and his award at the end of 1878 gave a large recognition to their claims. But at the same time he sent to Cetewayo a demand for the disbandment of his army and the reception of a British resident in his country. Civilization could no longer tolerate the existence in South Africa of a military force trained in ideals of conquest and massacre and for ever chafing to exercise its prowess. The Zulus realized that the turning-point between the new and the old order had arrived, and they determined on a last great fight for the traditions they loved. The campaign occupied the first half of 1879. Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand at three different points. Of his own column, temporarily divided for the purpose of a reconnaissance, half was surrounded and massacred in its camp at Isandhlwana. Eight hundred white troops fell, together with five hundred native allies, and a panic broke out in Natal. The heroic defence of Rorke's Drift and its relief by Chelmsford saved the colony. For some months the British forces remained on the defensive; then with the arrival of reinforcements Lord Chelmsford once more advanced into Zululand and finished the war by the victory of Ulundi on July 4. Zululand became a protectorate, and was finally annexed in 1887.

Meanwhile South Africa was becoming an embarrassment to the British government at home. Disraeli had always been doubtful of the federation policy, but had allowed Carnarvon a free hand. The premier's own interest lay with imperial affairs in the Near and Middle East. At the close of 1877 the Balkan question threatened war with Russia. Carnarvon sent word to South Africa that trouble with the Zulus must at all costs be postponed. Shortly afterwards, in January 1878, he resigned owing to his disapproval of Disraeli's provocations towards Russia. His biographer says that he left the Colonial Office feeling that he had laid the foundation of a South African dominion; but events were to show that he deceived himself. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the new Colonial Secretary, likewise ordered caution in South Africa, for the invasion of Afghanistan had followed hard upon the settlement with Russia at Berlin, and the little army of Great Britain was unequal to carrying on two minor wars at once. But Frere looked only to his own sphere and pushed the Zulus to extremities, as described above. The tragedies of the Zulu and the Afghan wars made the ministry unpopular. The new imperialism was yet a tender growth, and when the anti-Russian outburst of jingoism had cooled sober men began to think that England had narrowly escaped an unnecessary calamity and to wonder whether she was not being led into unscrupulous courses. Gladstone exploited the feeling in his Midlothian speeches. He declared that the Transvaal had been annexed "by means dishonourable to the character of this country." He sought afterwards to make a partial retraction, but the Boer leaders pinned him to his words by public thanks.¹ At the general election the ministry suffered total defeat, and in April, 1880, Gladstone took office with Lord Kimberley as his Colonial Secretary.

Kruger and his friends might reasonably expect Gladstone to grant immediate independence, but he did nothing of the sort. Responsible government at least was due to the Transvaal, but there was no sign that it would be forthcoming. The fact was that Exeter Hall was still a power in the Liberal party, and Exeter Hall was convinced that independent Boers could not be trusted to treat the natives fairly.² The Carnarvon policy of federation was therefore tacitly accepted by Gladstone in spite of his election speeches, and responsible government was deferred until a general scheme should be framed. Frere, discredited for his Zulu War, was recalled, and in him there departed the only man who might have held South Africa in hand.

Disappointed by the turn of events, the Boers took up arms. In December, 1880, Kruger and other leaders proclaimed the republic re-established. They attacked the small British detachments in the country and gathered their main force on the Natal frontier to resist a column which Sir George Colley was leading to a re-conquest. In January and February, 1881, Colley, with forces too small for his task,

¹ Hardinge, *Carnarvon*, iii. 50-1.

² Theal, *op. cit.* 111-12, 125; Walker, p. 386.

was foiled at Laing's Nek and Ingogo and defeated at Majuba Hill with the loss of his own life. Large reinforcements were seen to be necessary for the invasion of the Transvaal. Whilst they were yet on their way to the Cape the government decided to yield to the Boers. The dilemma was difficult: to give way seemed like being intimidated by a military defeat; to persist entailed the subjection of a people who were averse from British rule and claimed the right to independence. It was apparent when too late that the course taken with humiliation in 1881 could have been followed with honour in 1880. The Pretoria Convention of 1881 nominally yielded to the Boers something between complete independence and the status of a self-governing colony. They were to elect their President and their Raad and to make their own laws unhindered. But their foreign affairs were to be subject to British control, and the ill-defined "suzerainty" of the Queen was asserted. A further convention of 1884 definitely accorded to the Transvaal the title of the South African Republic.

At the Cape there had been among the Dutch considerable sympathy for the Transvaal Boers. In 1882 the Dutch leaders founded the Afrikaner Bond for the promotion of nationalist ideas and the eventual union of South Africa. The Bond originated as an anti-British organization, but at a later date Cecil Rhodes, who had entered South African politics in 1881, was able to gain influence with it and eradicate some of the anti-British sentiment. A new period of European expansion then began. German traders and missionaries had operated in Damara and Namaqualand, and in 1884 their government declared this region a protectorate under the name of German South West Africa. A single harbour on this coast, Walvisch Bay, remained in British occupation, having been annexed in 1878. The Transvaal was still inclined to extend its territory at the expense of the natives. In 1883-4 bands of Boers trekked westward into Bechuanaland and sought to establish the republics of Stellaland and Land of Goschen. The natives appealed to Great Britain and the new settlers were turned back by force in 1884. Then followed the proclamation of a British protectorate over Bechuanaland, the southern part of which was converted into a crown colony in 1885 and annexed to the Cape ten years later. On the eastern side also the Boers overflowed into Zululand, and by taking advantage of native dissensions obtained large grants of land. Here they set up the New Republic in 1884, claiming ultimately about three-fourths of the country. Great Britain intervened in 1886 and reduced the limits of the New Republic whilst recognizing it as a legitimate state. To avert further aggressions the British annexed Zululand in the following year, and the New Republic became incorporated in the Transvaal.

The next move began in 1888 with a British extension into the vast region north of the Transvaal. To colonize this area was the purpose of Cecil Rhodes, who had risen rapidly to South African leadership since 1881. He had grown rich first in the Kimberley diamond scramble, and had been quick to enter the new Transvaal goldfield revealed on

the Witwatersrand in 1885-6. At the same time he devoted himself to Cape politics as a base from which to pursue vaster schemes than any man had yet dared to consider. For he envisaged not only the federation of South Africa, but the occupation of a great British belt northwards over the Zambesi, to the equator and ultimately to the Sudan and the Nile. It was a task for a giant, for, apart from the South African difficulties that had foiled Carnarvon, the Cape to Cairo plan cut across ambitions for transcontinental belts promoted by Portugal, Germany and France. Rhodes's imperialism differed in method as well as in scale from that which emanated from the British Conservative party. It was to be essentially a South African movement, a home-rule imperialism acting with as much independence as possible from Downing Street leadership. In his aims Rhodes was a reincarnation, attuned to different circumstances, of the Radical imperialists of 1830; in his ethics he was perhaps a Gibbon Wakefield moulded on a gigantic scale. Conservatism had little place in his mentality, and he subscribed to the funds of the Irish Home Rule party. Meanwhile in England another Radical, Joseph Chamberlain, had allied himself to the Conservatives and was meditating a centralized imperialism of a different but no less thorough-going sort; and in the Transvaal Paul Kruger, regularly re-elected President, was making up his mind that Boer nationality was more than ever in danger, and revolving plans of non-British unification with possible aid from the European powers who were now so interested in his continent.

In 1888 an agent of Rhodes went northward to Matabeleland and extracted concessions from King Lobengula and an undertaking not to cede territory to any foreign power. Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister from 1886, entertained no thought of annexation, but permitted the employment of the newly revived method of the chartered company. In 1889 the British South Africa Company received its letters patent for the exploitation of the country soon to be called Rhodesia. The Company pushed forward its pioneers, built forts at Salisbury, Victoria and elsewhere, and endowed settlers with lands that Lobengula regarded as his own. An agreement with Portugal in 1891 defined the frontier with Portuguese East Africa and disposed of the claim to a Portuguese belt across the continent to Angola, and a Boer move to trek northwards over the Limpopo was turned back. The Matabele soon regretted the intrusion of the British and rose in 1893. The Company's troops routed them and took Bulawayo, the royal village, and Lobengula died in the course of his flight. He and his were bloodthirsty tyrants who slaughtered their weaker neighbours, and civilization was bound to deal with them. But the methods of chartered company civilization are not all pleasant reading, for there is no doubt that Lobengula was induced to sign concessions without understanding their meaning and found too late that he had bartered away his sovereignty to those who came in the guise of friendly suppliants.¹ The British conscience had been

¹ Cf. Walker, *op. cit.*, chap. xii., and Basil Williams, *Life of Rhodes*, London, 1921.

more sensitive in earlier times. Or perhaps it is fairer to say that it had not been so sorely tempted; for in the scramble for Africa haste was the condition of success.

In a few years Southern Rhodesia became an orderly territory. The Company introduced settlers, promoted agriculture and mining enterprise, and constructed railways from the Cape system northwards into Central Africa and from Salisbury eastwards to the ocean at Beira. Northern Rhodesia now extends far across the Zambesi River to the borders of the Belgian Congo and the southern end of Lake Tanganyika. The immediate political importance of this expansion was that it encircled the Transvaal on the north with British territory, an encirclement which the extension of Zululand and the protection of Tongaland in 1895 completed on the east. British possessions now marched on two sides with Portuguese East Africa, and the Boers had no prospect of obtaining an outlet to the sea.

In the Transvaal itself economic change in the last decade of the century heralded a new era of trouble. Great discoveries of gold on the Witwatersrand, south-west of Pretoria, took place in 1886. The Boers were incapable of developing mineral wealth, and thousands of outsiders, mostly British subjects, crowded in to work the mines. The new city of Johannesburg became in a short time the richest and most populous in South Africa. This raised a grave political question. The newcomers or Uitlanders enjoyed no political rights, no representation in the Volksraad, and no education for their children, although they paid all ordinary taxation and were bled in addition by special mining duties and oppressive monopolies granted to concessionnaires. The problem was dissimilar from any alien question which has ever arisen in a European state: ten years after the movement had begun it was officially claimed that the Uitlanders outnumbered the Boer citizens of the Republic, and between them contributed more than nine-tenths of its revenues.¹ The Transvaal was in fact no longer a Boer community, although the Boers still claimed its entire control and held the wealth-producing part of the population in political bondage. They had the justification that there was no guarantee of the permanence of the gold boom. The enfranchised miners might outvote the farmers, incur a large state debt for the improvements they desired, and suddenly depart, "leaving the holes in the ground and the public debt to the permanent inhabitants."²

Throughout the nineteenth century, and indeed earlier, the leading characteristic of the British people outside the British Isles had been political sensitiveness. Colonists have been far more passionately attached to political liberty than have their fellow-subjects at home. It was thus inevitable that the Uitlanders in the Transvaal should regard their position as intolerable. As the event was to show, they had no desire to set up British sovereignty. All they demanded was to be granted the rights of citizenship in the South African Republic, and if

¹ Lucas, *Hist. Geog. South Africa*, pt. ii. p. 39.

² Walker, p. 441.

they had obtained that they would have been loyal to its polity. For the Boer, on the other hand, it must be said that he had no desire for the industrial development of his country, although he was ready to profit by its results. He was not grateful to the newcomers for the wealth they produced, and resented their intrusion. For the Transvaal Boer in particular liberty had no connection with progress: it meant rather an unthinking conservatism, the maintenance of a ring-fence against the general movement of the civilized world. It was this fundamental difference of outlook that produced the catastrophe. As was well said during these fateful years, two, four, or six different governments might peacefully co-exist in South Africa, but two different social systems could not, in a country which was economically and geographically a single unit.

The government of the Transvaal, never very clean or efficient, deteriorated rapidly under the new conditions. There was no conception of the value of a party system and the functions of an opposition in criticizing the administration. Paul Kruger expressed the views of the permanent majority. They installed him as President with autocratic powers and left him to work his will with the fortunes of the state. He was an old man, one of the trekkers of 1836, narrow, prejudiced and patriotic, and convinced by past experience that British policy was unstable, blowing hot to-day and cold to-morrow, and safely to be hoodwinked by a man who knew his own mind. On European politics and the new financial and industrial questions of which he knew little, he listened to the advice of Germans and European Dutchmen who were actively jealous of British interests. It was these men whom the Uitlanders blamed for most of the oppression which they suffered. The Uitlanders themselves formed a National Union in 1892 to work for reform by constitutional means. The wealthy magnates of the mines, who have been accused of fomenting the trouble in their own interests, at first gave no countenance to this movement, which was clearly originated by the rank and file of their employees. So, in the summer of 1895, just as the advent of a new government in England presaged a change in the whole tone and method of imperial administration, it was evident that the tension in South Africa was threatening an explosion. The outbreak duly took place in the shape of the Jameson Raid, but since that event is more important as the beginning than as the climax of an important series, it will be dealt with in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE EMPIRE UNDER CHAMBERLAIN

(i) *The Undeveloped Estate*

HITHERTO it has been proper to describe the successive phases of imperial development by the names of the Prime Ministers of British governments—Gladstone, Disraeli, Gladstone again, and Salisbury; for their colonial secretaries were essentially subordinate personalities and the Colonial Office had not been reckoned one of the greater posts in the cabinet. Imperial policy, in fact, except in South Africa, had been more important in its external than its internal aspects and had been largely in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office. Lord Salisbury had ruled from 1886 to 1892, and the Liberals, first under Gladstone and then under Lord Rosebery, from 1892 to 1895. This decade had been the period of the final carving-up of Africa, of the launching of three chartered companies, of growing competition in the East and the Pacific, and of the establishment of Germany as a colonial power, but, still more prominently, it had been the period of the Home Rule struggle, and there had been little attention to spare for details of empire improvement. The general election of 1895 returned a large Conservative majority, times were good in Great Britain, the Irish question was temporarily stilled, and the hour had come for constructive imperialism to appeal to the nation. The hour found the man. Salisbury chose as his Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, the ex-Radical of Birmingham, who had parted from Gladstone on the Home Rule issue and now with the Liberal Unionists supported the Conservatives. Chamberlain's antecedents differed from those of any previous colonial secretary. His training had been in business, not in society and diplomacy, and he viewed the Empire from a new standpoint. The succeeding eight years may justly be described as those of the Empire under Chamberlain.

As a man of business, Chamberlain was aware, as no Whitehall-trained statesman could be, of the true significance of the modern scramble for colonies and possessions—that they were not mere feeders of pride and witnesses to prestige, but that they were vital to the new economic enterprises that made for national power and survival. He had meditated these things for ten years and more, and he came to office with a purpose ready defined. "It seems to me that the tendency

of the time is to throw all power into the hands of the greater empires. But if Greater Britain remains united, no empire in the world can ever surpass it in area, in population, in wealth or in diversity of its resources" (1897). "I have long believed that the future of the colonies and the future of this country are interdependent" (1896). These were more positive statements than had been customary, even from Disraelian colonial secretaries, and they were doubly impressive from the mouth of one whose political apprenticeship had been served in Birmingham under the shadow of John Bright. But the utterance most explicit and prophetic of the new policy had been voiced immediately after the minister's accession to office (Aug. 1895): "I regard many of our colonies as being in the condition of undeveloped estates, and estates which never can be developed without imperial assistance. . . . Cases have already come to my knowledge of colonies which have been British colonies perhaps for more than a hundred years, in which up to the present time British rule has done absolutely nothing, and if we left them to-day we should leave them in the same condition as that in which we found them. . . . I shall be prepared to consider very carefully any case which may occur in which by the judicious investment of British money those estates which belong to the British Crown may be developed for the benefit of their population and for the benefit of the greater population which is outside."¹ For five-and-twenty years men had done little more than mutter against the great god *laissez-faire*; now an iconoclast spoke blasphemy from the high place of the Treasury Bench.

The British West Indies had not merely failed to make progress, they had definitely slipped backwards in the century before Chamberlain spoke. Before the loss of their slaves in 1833 the planters had been in difficulties through their own lack of adaptability and the growth of competition elsewhere. Emancipation was a heavy blow, and just as indentured Asiatic labour offered hopes of recovery another menace attained overwhelming proportions. From 1870 beet-sugar grown in continental Europe challenged the supremacy of the cane. Not only did beet-sugar producers supply their own home markets, but their protectionist governments granted bounties on exports—the converse of preferential duties on imports—and at the end of the century the industrial millions of Great Britain, who had a greater appetite for jam and sweetstuffs than any other people, were drawing their supplies of sugar chiefly from Europe. The West Indies were despairing and their bankruptcy imminent.

The Chamberlain doctrine relied upon fiscal protection where possible, but it taught also the necessity of educating, organizing and stimulating enterprise and of finding government money for investment in works likely to yield a communal return. In the West Indies both aspects are apparent. A Royal Commission sent to the islands in 1897 reported

¹ The quotations are from Knowles, *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions*, pp. 329-30, 342.

that the position was fully as desperate as the people had alleged. To overthrow the foreign sugar-bounties was a work of time, affecting many interests; but, in 1902 Great Britain decided to prohibit the importation of bounty-fed sugar. This action by the greatest consumer caused the continental sugar-growing nations to abandon the policy, and the worst handicap was removed from the planters' enterprise. Meanwhile positive help had been given. In 1898 the government established an Imperial Department of Agriculture in the West Indies. This institution carried out researches which overcame insect pests, popularized new varieties of cane with a higher yield, and reintroduced cotton, which had not been of much account since the seventeenth century. The reward was moral as well as material, for the Department stimulated mental activity and substituted hope for despair. The cost was £12,000 a year. By an Act of 1899 the Crown Colonies were granted loans for transport development at the low rate of $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. Jamaica received £110,000 for railways which brought the interior into touch with the coast and facilitated banana-planting on high grounds unsuitable for sugar. Another measure provided a subsidy for a line of steamers to carry the fruit to British markets, but here American enterprise proved too strong, and the United States attracted the bulk of the supply. Agricultural education led also to the planting of other crops, with the result that whereas sugar composed three-fifths of the islands' exports in 1899, in 1911 the proportion had fallen to three-sevenths. Thus the single-staple tradition dating from the slavery era was in process of breaking down, with a resulting increase in economic security. By 1911 the British West Indies were solvent and more confident of the future than at any time since the eighteenth century.¹

In the West African colonies and protectorates the primary problem was to diminish the pestilences which had hitherto made the coast the white man's grave. Chamberlain created an advisory committee to instruct the Colonial Office on tropical medicine and sanitation, urged the medical authorities of Great Britain to study these subjects, and obtained a grant for the School of Tropical Medicine opened in London in 1899. These encouragements led to the founding of a similar school in Liverpool in the same year. It was thus possible to make quickly effective the discoveries that were then revealing the true methods of attack upon malaria and other scourges. Research proceeded from the preservation of life to the creation of wealth, and the success of the Imperial Department of Agriculture in the West Indies led to a similar establishment in West Africa. The result was to introduce new methods of cultivation, to lessen the dangerous practice of depending upon a single staple, and to produce flexibility in changing over from one crop to another as world demand varied. Single-staple colonies in the tropics had all suffered periods of disaster in the past; either the crop ceased to pay owing to competition elsewhere, as with

¹ Details from Knowles, *Ind. and Com. Revolutions*, 341-9; and *Overseas Empire*, 127-30.

West Indian sugar, or, when much capital was embarked and plantations established, some insect pest would arise and ruin everything, as had happened with cotton and coffee in various regions. Scientific research provided knowledge both for defence and for alternative employment.

The Act of 1899 for financing colonial transport bore fully half its effects in West Africa, where the Gold Coast, Lagos, and Sierra Leone were enabled to build railways, and nearly £150,000 was also spent on harbour improvements. Without railways any large trade was impossible in these colonies, for the motor-car was as yet in its infancy, and the tsetse fly destroyed all transport animals. Nigeria, to-day the greatest of the West African dependencies, hardly began its economic development in the Chamberlain period. The British government bought up all the territorial rights of the Royal Niger Company in 1899, but trade was still confined to the lower reaches of the river, and severe campaigning in the interior was necessary before the new programme could be applied there. British East Africa and Uganda were still under the Foreign Office, but the doctrine of development was taken up, and the period from 1895 saw the construction of the Uganda Railway.¹ It is indicative of the passing of *laissez-faire* that all the lines mentioned in this paragraph were made by the colonial governments concerned. The justification of the policy was that private enterprise was not sufficiently developed to finance them, and that without them it never would have developed. The stage of infancy, in economic communities as in individuals, requires different treatment from that suitable for the adult. The social effects of all these measures were no less remarkable than the commercial, and were as quick to show themselves. Inter-tribal war, fetichism, slavery and crime of all sorts diminished, and in a few years the traditions of blood and filth in which tropical Africa had wallowed for centuries began to fade. Middle-aged chiefs became respectable magistrates who in their youth had been wholesale murderers. Fortunately, the negro memory is short.

The same policy, of railway construction, scientific research and its application, and judicious expenditure of imperial funds (never in extravagant amount) was applied elsewhere in the dependent Empire, notably in Malaya and the Sudan. Everywhere the results have justified it, and would have done so to an even greater extent but for the set-back of the Great War. The Chamberlain policy did not cease when its author left office. It has continued uninterruptedly to the present time. In that respect he ranks with Huskisson and the statesmen of the Restoration as the originator of a long-drawn phase of development. To it we must apply the label of mercantilism, for that, with allowance made for changed conditions, was its essential nature. In the dependent Empire it worked wonders. The attempt to apply new measures, emanating from the same line of thought, to the white Empire of the dominions will be dealt with in later pages.

¹ Knowles, works cited.

(ii) Egypt and the Sudan

The story of Egypt and the Sudan has to be taken up from the period 1883-5, when Lord Cromer began his long tenure of power in the former country, and the reconquest of the latter was postponed, or rather, abandoned. For the next twenty years British officials worked hard in Egypt to introduce honest government and efficient public services. They were hampered in many ways by the fact that the country was not a British possession. Foreign residents had extra-territorial rights, the Sultan of Turkey was nominal suzerain, and finance was shackled by strict arrangements for the satisfaction of the creditors left by Ismail's extravagance. Above all, France was actively jealous and other governments at times not helpful. The British failure to carry out the promise of withdrawal, however justifiable it may have been from the standpoint of Egyptian interests, gave fair ground for complaint. The French had a large stake in the country and were naturally suspicious that it would suffer under alien treatment. British statesmen also were scarcely candid in their utterances. They reiterated the intention to withdraw, but never indicated a likely date for the process, being convinced in their own minds that it would take place, if at all, at a very distant time. The question, more than any other, kept Great Britain and France at odds, and it remained unsolved until after the period covered by this chapter.

In spite of this handicap, the regeneration of Egypt became an accomplished fact, not by means of any spectacular programme of radical change, but by steady improvement of detail and force of personal example on the part of British officers. Lord Cromer, after retiring in 1907, wrote an account of his stewardship, and his own words best summarize its results: "A new spirit has been instilled into the population of Egypt. Even the peasant has learnt to scan his rights. Even the Pasha has learnt that others besides himself have rights which must be respected. The *courbash* may hang on the walls of the *Moudirieh*, but the *Moudir* no longer dares to employ it on the backs of the *fellaheen*. For all practical purposes, it may be said that the hateful *corvée* system has disappeared. Slavery has virtually ceased to exist. The halcyon days of the adventurer and the usurer are past. Fiscal burthens have been greatly relieved. Everywhere law reigns supreme. Justice is no longer bought and sold. The soldier has acquired some pride in the uniform which he wears. He has fought as he never fought before. The sick man can be nursed in a well-managed hospital. The lunatic is no longer treated like a wild beast. The punishment awarded to the worst criminal is no longer barbarous. Lastly the school-master is abroad with results which are as yet uncertain, but which cannot fail to be important."

It was the reward of the men who accomplished this work to be reviled by those who had received these benefits at their hands, and

who quickly forgot the misery from which they had been rescued. But that, it is beginning to be seen, is an almost certain incident of the upward progress of a backward people, whose callowness bears a close analogy to the adolescence of an individual.

For some years after the evacuation of 1885 the Sudan remained outside the British sphere of operations, with the exception that a garrison was kept to hold the port of Suakin on the Red Sea coast. Gladstone, indeed, had rather perversely taken the view that the Mahdi and his warriors were "a people rightly struggling to be free," whom it would be wrong to subdue. Gordon had known better, and gradually the truth filtered through to an England increasingly ready to assume its imperial duties. For in fact Mahdism was a gross tyranny. Wars and massacres, extortionate taxation and neglect of agriculture, and the resulting famines and pestilences reduced the Sudan population by some 75 per cent. in fifteen years,¹ and this by comparison with the previous Egyptian régime which had itself been a disgrace to civilization. But in 1885 Egyptian finances were only at the beginning of convalescence, and the army was in process of training by British officers. Until these matters were more advanced a reconquest of the Sudan was hardly to be thought of.

The Mahdi died soon after his victory at Khartum and was succeeded by the Khalifa. He, in 1889, attempted an invasion of Egypt, but was beaten back by the regenerated army. Still the defence was passive, but seven years later the situation had changed. Uganda had become a British dependency, and Egypt was ripe for further economic development, for which the full control of the Nile waters was essential. Moreover, there were signs that the opportunity might pass if not seized, for France was making great strides from the westward, and there were ambitions for a French belt to stretch right across the Nile to the Red Sea. Egypt could by this time afford some outlay, and the sentiment of the British people had so far changed that there was eagerness rather than reluctance for imperial troops to be employed by the side of Egyptians in the campaign. Lord Salisbury accordingly decided upon reconquest. Sir Herbert Kitchener, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, carried out the task in 1896-8. On September 2 in the latter year he broke the Khalifa's army at the decisive battle of Omdurman and re-entered Khartum. The Khalifa escaped southwards, to be brought to action and killed a year later. Early in 1899 the status of the Sudan was determined. It was declared to be a joint possession of Great Britain and Egypt, under a governor-general to be appointed by the Khedive on the recommendation of the British government. Trade was to be free to all nationalities, but no foreign consuls were to reside without British permission, neither were the extra-territorial rights of Europeans in Egypt to be extended to the Sudan. British military officers, followed by a more permanent service of British civilians, at once began the work of restoring order and prosperity.

¹ Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, London, 1908, ii. 545.

There was much to be done, for if ever barbarism had justified an aggressive war by civilization, it was here. But the work was well and quickly done, and before long it could be said that the Sudan had taken its place in the succession of well-ordered territories stretching from the Nile mouth to the Indian Ocean at Zanzibar.

From the international standpoint Kitchener's success had come none too soon. Some two months before his entry into Khartum there arrived at Fashoda, higher up the Nile, a French expedition commanded by Major Marchand, who had crossed the continent from French West Africa with express instructions to stake a claim for his country on the Upper Nile. There was no doubt that the Nile valley was a geographical unity, and that its upper course formed the hinterland of Egypt; and by the principles agreed on by the nations at Berlin in 1885 the occupation of the coast gave title to the sphere of influence behind it. France, therefore, in the person of Major Marchand, was a trespasser upon Egyptian, if not British, rights. "No longer able, owing to her want of decision and foresight (in 1882), to enter the Nile region by the front door, France tried to enter from the rear; and she did this as part of a deliberate design of obtaining control of the Nile, the very source of Egypt's life."¹ It was a repetition of her seizure of the Upper Niger after the British chartered company had occupied its delta; but here the matter was more serious, for the Nile, as the above quotation implies, was no ordinary river in its relation to the people of Egypt and their livelihood. It was, and is, not a practicable arrangement for two mutually independent powers to share the Nile.

Marchand had been sent to occupy an untenable position. He had taken three years and marched three thousand miles to reach it, facts which sufficiently disproved any claim that it could constitute a hinterland of French West Africa.² Kitchener hastened southward from Khartum and explained the British position, with no discourtesy and no appeal to force. He merely hoisted the British and Egyptian flags side by side with Marchand's tricolour and left Paris and London to argue it out. There was an Anglo-French crisis, with some irresponsible talk of war, but the right was so patently all with one side that no cool-headed Frenchman could desire to fight on the question. After long negotiations Marchand's party withdrew, and the British authorities blotted the unhappy word Fashoda from the map. The place is now Kodok. The incident may be regarded as the end of the scramble for Africa. It was also the culmination of Anglo-French bitterness and misunderstanding, which thenceforward steadily declined until in 1904 it became a thing of the past.

¹ *Camb. Hist. of Br. For. Policy*, III. 250.

² When the French explorer left Fashoda he travelled down the Nile and reached the Mediterranean in a few days.

(iii) *The South African War.*

Egypt and the reconquest of the Sudan were not the affair of the Colonial Office, although Chamberlain's methods of treating "the undeveloped estate" were very thoroughly applied to the Sudan when peace was restored in it. The South African question, on the other hand, which rapidly grew critical from 1895, fell primarily within the province of the new Colonial Secretary. Rhodes and Chamberlain, as has been indicated, were imperialists of different schools. Rhodes was for a South African expansion based upon the initiative of the colonial white population, with a minimum of metropolitan control. Chamberlain desired a more centralized policy and a tightening of the bonds of Empire. A dispute of 1895 drew them together for a season. In August President Kruger, urged by his foreign advisers, closed the drifts or crossings of the River Vaal to the transit of goods from the southwards, his object being to divert overseas traffic to the newly completed railway from Pretoria to Delagoa Bay in Portuguese territory. The action was a breach of the London Convention of 1884, and Chamberlain was firm for its reversal, supported by the opinion of the Cape Colony, which stood to suffer in its trade. Kruger yielded to a threat of war and reopened the drifts. By so doing he averted a struggle in which he would have had Rhodes and Chamberlain and most of South Africa against him.¹

The passing of the crisis removed a promising chance for the federation of South Africa by force. Rhodes had set his heart on federation, economic if not immediately political, and he knew that he had not many years to live. Herein lay the tragedy, for in the course of nature Kruger also could not survive much longer, and with Kruger gone the way would have been clear for new constructive policies on both sides. But Rhodes could not afford to wait, and therefore made the blunder of his life by forcing the situation before it was ripe.

By the close of 1895 the Uitlanders on the Rand were growing restive, having failed in all efforts to secure reforms by peaceful agitation. The mining magnates were also alarmed by Kruger's measures and disposed to support their employees. The reformers therefore hatched a revolutionary conspiracy, holding that the political rottenness of the country justified them; and to this conspiracy Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of the Cape, virtual ruler of the British South Africa Company, and himself a mineowner, became a party. The plan was for the Uitlanders to rise in revolt and hold Johannesburg in anticipation of British mediation. At the same time an irregular force under Dr. Jameson, the administrator of Rhodesia, was to ride over the frontier to co-operate. At the last moment a difference of opinion arose about the flag to be hoisted. The outside members of the plot desired to act under British colours; those at Johannesburg preferred to maintain

¹ Walker, *South Africa*, 452-3.

the independence of the Transvaal as a reformed republic in which they should enjoy the rights of citizenship. Whilst the matter was being debated and enthusiasm at Johannesburg was cooling, Jameson precipitated events by crossing the frontier on his own responsibility. He rode to within a few miles of Johannesburg and was surrounded and captured by a Boer commando at Doornkop (January 2, 1896).

An internal revolution by the oppressed inhabitants of the Transvaal might have been justifiable. An invasion in time of peace led and organized by responsible British officials was not. Apart from morality, the Raid was a blunder. Even if successful it would have placed the reformers hopelessly in the wrong, and it is difficult to see how the British government could have borne up against its handicap in assisting their cause. As it was, it played right into the hands of the reactionary party, and aroused world-wide sympathy for them and denunciation of Great Britain. Chamberlain was wrongly accused of complicity. Rhodes was manifestly guilty, and the Bond party at the Cape, formerly his supporters, repudiated his action and drove him from office. The Orange Free State, with no grievance of its own against Great Britain, was moved by indignation to a whole-hearted support of the Transvaal. The three divisions of Dutch South Africa were thus united as they had never been before. Kruger played his cards well. He was shaken for a moment by the imminence of the danger and uncertainty as to what might lie behind it. But he disarmed the Johannesburgers by fair words, although he afterwards tried and imprisoned their leaders. He would have been within his rights in putting to death the prisoners of Doornkop, but he handed them over for trial to the British government, and they ultimately received very lenient sentences.

From this moment the Boers rapidly armed for war, whilst the British government, as the only hope of peace, pressed reform upon them, and three years of sterile negotiation ensued. In 1898-9 the grievances of the Uitlanders became aggravated and passions inflamed, particularly by the unpunished murder of one of their number by a Boer policeman. Sir Alfred Milner was now High Commissioner at the Cape, and he tried hard to secure the grant of the Transvaal franchise to immigrants after five years' residence. During his absence in England Sir William Butler acted in his place and damaged the consistency of the British position by asserting that the grievances were not genuine and were being exploited for ulterior motives. Milner warned Chamberlain in the spring of 1899 that the position was becoming intolerable, and they agreed that a British hegemony of South Africa was the only way out; although Chamberlain at least still clung to the hope that it might peaceably be won by waiting.¹ In May Milner met Kruger at Bloemfontein, but came to no agreement. The President was then willing to offer a seven years' franchise with conditions which made it

¹ Walker, pp. 475, 481-2.

difficult of attainment. Throughout the summer the haggling continued, either side believing that the other would yield in the end without resorting to force. Towards the end of August Kruger offered substantial concessions to the Uitlanders on condition that the British would refrain from future interference, drop the claim to suzerainty, and submit disputes to arbitration. The wording of the concessions was tricky, that of the conditions plain; and the British authorities felt unable to agree to a settlement whilst pledging themselves to assert no views on its interpretation. The offer, in fact, was hardly genuine; it was more in the nature of a last diplomatic stroke to put the enemy in the wrong in the coming war; and it was at once withdrawn in default of literal acceptance. War soon followed. In September there was an exodus of refugees from the Transvaal. At the same time British troops were crossing the sea to South Africa. They formed the subject of an ultimatum from President Kruger on October 9, and a declaration of war two days later. The Orange Free State, under the leadership of President Steyn, threw in its lot with the South African Republic.

The events of the war are fresher in living memory than the troubles which gave rise to it, and may be read at length in many volumes expressly devoted to the subject. Here it is only possible to give the briefest outline. The struggle divides itself into three well-defined phases. In the first (October 1899 to February 1900) the Boers took the offensive, invaded Natal, and shut up the British forces there in Ladysmith, at the same time besieging Mafeking and Kimberley just outside their western borders, and crossing the frontier between the Free State and Cape Colony. Sir Redvers Buller in Natal attempted to relieve Ladysmith and was beaten at Colenso (December), Spion Kop (January), and Vaal Krantz (February). Lord Methuen led a force to relieve Kimberley, defeated the Boers at Belmont, Graspan and Modder River (November), and was himself defeated and held up at Magersfontein (December). In Cape Colony General Gatacre attacked the Boers at Stormberg and was decisively repulsed. The general failure caused the appointment of Lord Roberts as commander-in-chief, with Lord Kitchener as his principal assistant. With Lord Roberts' movements the second period opens (February 1900 to September 1900). Sir John French with a cavalry force rode round the Boers at Magersfontein and relieved Kimberley (February 15). Then a combined movement resulted in General Cronje being entrapped and captured at Paardeburg (February 27), with 4000 Boers. Two days later Buller relieved Ladysmith after hard fighting. In the middle of March Lord Roberts entered Bloemfontein and a pause in the operations ensued. On May 17 Mafeking was relieved by a force from Rhodesia aided by another from the south. At the end of May, the Free State having in the meantime been annexed, Lord Roberts entered the Transvaal, taking Johannesburg on May 31 and Pretoria on June 5. The British army from Natal also moved forward, and with the surrender of General

Prinsloo and 4000 men in July organized resistance seemed to be at an end. The annexation of the Transvaal was proclaimed on September 1st. The third and longest period of the war now commenced (September 1900 to May 1902). It consisted of the pursuit of various Boer commandos which were more mobile than their opponents, and ranged over a wide area, sometimes invading the Cape Colony. The task was tedious, but Lord Kitchener finally wore down resistance. In the spring of 1902 he held conferences with the Boer generals, Botha, De Wet, Delarey, Hertzog and Smuts, Kruger having retired to Europe in 1900. On May 31 peace was formally concluded with the acknowledgment of British sovereignty over the former South African Republic and Orange Free State. Before that date both Rhodes and Kruger were dead.

The question of sovereignty being settled, the other terms of peace were generous to the losing side, as was fitting at the conclusion of the most humanely waged war in modern history. Representative institutions were to be set up in the two provinces—described as the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony—as soon as possible, to be followed in due course by responsible government; the British government was to make a free grant of £3,000,000 for the resettlement of the Boers upon their farms, supplemented by loans for the same purpose upon very easy terms; the Dutch language was to be safeguarded; and the large questions of native policy were to be reserved until the establishment of self-government. The peace, in fact, was the minimum expression of the object for which the British had fought, equality of the two white races in South Africa. Continued independence of the republics would have meant the triumph of the opposite principle, the ascendancy of one race. That had been Kruger's position before the war, and for that the Free State had joined him, making an otherwise causeless attack upon a nation against which it had no direct ground of quarrel.

Broadly viewed, the war had been the outcome of a hundred years of South African history, and not merely of the disputes of the few years that preceded it. More than this, it had on one side been inspired by the ideals of nationhood which flourished in the dominions of the Empire during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Colonial opinion was generally critical of British policies, but the judgments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand agreed that the cause of unity in South Africa was justifiable, and that true liberty was not endangered when Great Britain appealed to arms. Hence it followed that the Empire acted in unison, and for the first time men of all its units came forward to sacrifice themselves in a common effort. The South African War, it has been said, "stands out as the first war in the New British Empire in which the overseas peoples collaborated with the Mother Country on an appreciable scale."¹ That the scale was appreciable may be seen from the figures quoted by the same authority, from which it appears that Canada, Australia and New Zealand contributed between them 31,000 men and South Africa itself 52,000. The effort strength-

¹ Sir C. P. Lucas, *The Empire at War*, i. 134.

ened not only the sense of dominion nationhood but also the idea of imperial co-operation, which was to develop so rapidly in the twentieth century.

(iv) *The Two Dominions*

As the record of British expansion reaches the years within living memory it becomes increasingly necessary to distinguish between the history of the Empire as a whole and the history of the autonomous nations composing it. The former is primarily the subject of this book; the latter is not, except in those transactions which are of common imperial interest. This bifurcation of subject-matter becomes apparent at different dates in different parts of the Empire. In general it grows noticeable after the attainment of responsible government, and is complete with the consolidation of the small self-governing colonies into the large dominions, definitely nation-states with a life of their own. Canada is the pioneer in the development, for Canada became a nation in 1867. Since that date its history has been full of important movement, happy, and of absorbing interest to Canadians. But its very magnitude would upset the balance of the general survey, and it is therefore necessary for the present purpose to limit its treatment to an inclusion of the outstanding features, and chiefly of those that have a bearing external to the Dominion itself.

The mechanical extension of the Dominion after 1867—the acquisition of the Hudson Bay Company's territories, the admission of new provinces, and the creation of the trunk railway system—has been described in a previous chapter.¹ These were the more material signs of national growth. Parallel with them ran the question of relations with the United States, and the possibility, long insistent to many minds, that Canada would one day unite with her southern neighbour. In earlier days this possibility had sometimes assumed the guise of a military conquest of the smaller population by the greater. In the latter half of the nineteenth century it entered a different plane, that of economic union followed (inevitably) by a peaceful political incorporation. Responsible government, which early came to include fiscal autonomy, seemed to favour the prospects of this destination for the smaller Canada of the St. Lawrence. Dominion status gave rise to a national consciousness which in the end repudiated all ideas of union with the States.

From 1854 to 1866 commerce between the two countries was regulated by a Reciprocity Treaty from which Canada derived great benefits and which the Americans declined to renew on its expiration. Thereafter the conception arose in Canada, as in most new or re-created nations, that the full status of nationhood required the development of all forms of economic enterprise, that it was not enough to be a producer of raw materials and an importer of manufactures, but that

¹ See above, pp. 82-4.

industry must be fostered to create a self-sufficing community. Hence appeared the policy of protection by a tariff, in succession to the previous system of moderate duties for the raising of revenue. Sir John Macdonald, the leader of the Conservatives, declared for protection in 1878 as part of a "National Policy," and won a sweeping victory at the ensuing general election. The National Policy, as its name implies, was more than fiscal in its scope. It contemplated protection as one among many branches of nation-building, and its supporters included those who were enthusiastic for the imperial connection, and those who hoped to see Canada a formally independent country—and it undoubtedly helped to demonstrate to those two groups that nothing but the word "formally" stood between them. The protective tariff adopted, whilst not ostensibly granting preference to imports from Great Britain, did tend to penalize most highly those classes of goods that came from other sources and competed with Canadian industries.¹

The early eighties were a time of acute business depression in Canada as in the mother country, and many began to fear that the National Policy could not be maintained, that Canada was not strong enough to stand apart from the United States. It was, as can now be seen, a period when world-economy was entering a new phase, and the initial processes were painful. Accordingly, a new movement began in Canada for economic union with the States, and patriots tried to still their consciences by arguing that it would favour rather than imperil their political independence by removing all causes of dispute. Again, however, the instinct of the people rejected the proposal, which cut across parties and found support among Liberals and Conservatives alike. Distress was a powerful influence, but nationalism was more powerful. In 1891 the veteran Macdonald, the chief architect of federation, declared his conviction that economic submission meant political annexation and was treason: "My course is clear. A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die. . . . I appeal for the unity of the Empire, and the preservation of political and commercial freedom."² His challenge was answered, but his opponents lost ground, and the Americanizing movement died out in the following years. The way was being prepared for the more positive conception of the Empire which became manifest from 1895. That conception embodied imperial preference as a fiscal policy and will be dealt with later in this chapter. After the lapse of two more decades the question of Canadian-American reciprocity came up once again under altered circumstances. By 1911 the Dominion had grown relatively stronger and the threat to its independence had lost weight. It was now the United States which were eager for a commercial arrangement, and its terms were more favourable to Canada than in the past. The American offer was drafted and fully discussed. It became the issue at a general election, and was so decisively rejected that it has never since been revived.

¹ Lucas, *Hist. Geography, Canada*, pt. ii. (1923 edn.), pp. 304-5

² Quoted, *ibid.* pp. 309-10.

Meanwhile the centre of gravity moved westwards with the steady growth of prairie settlement and the development of enterprise in British Columbia and the North West. The discovery of gold at Klondyke in the Yukon region in 1894 brought the Alaska boundary question into prominence. In 1867 the United States had purchased Alaska from Russia and had acquired the frontier laid down by the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1825.¹ That treaty was open to diverse interpretation on what had hitherto been an unimportant point, whether the boundary of the coastal strip on the Pacific ran round the heads of the estuaries (the American claim), or cut across them (the Canadian claim). The goldfields were in Canadian territory, but access to them was through these estuaries, and if the American claim prevailed that access would be through American soil. A belt of about fifty miles width separated the frontier lines claimed by the disputants, and the decision carried with it the effective control of the Klondyke communications.² After long negotiations a commission of three American and three British representatives met to settle the question in 1903. Two of the British members were Canadians, and the third was Lord Alverstone, the Lord Chief Justice of England. The decision of the majority was to be binding. Lord Alverstone sided with the Americans, whose claim thus secured a substantial recognition. There was much chagrin in Canada and a tendency to believe that imperial statesmen habitually sacrificed Canadian interests in such disputes. Happily the settlement left no more boundary questions outstanding.

The completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, coupled with the granting of free land to those qualified to develop it, led in time to the peopling of the prairies, although the process was slow until the end of the century. After that date it grew more rapid, and the period from 1900 to the opening of the Great War is that of the largest British emigration to Canada. The number of Americans who crossed the border was also considerable, for the American West had already filled up, and Canada alone offered land to the pioneer. Industrial enterprise, particularly in mining and railway construction, attracted eastern Europeans, although the Mediterranean element which moved so freely into the United States found the climate of Canada uncongenial. In the same period Japanese and other Asiatics invaded the Pacific coast, and Canada, like Australia, was troubled to find a means of restricting the flow without giving undue offence. In the twentieth century Canada has been faced, although to a smaller extent, with the same problem as the United States, that of absorbing into her citizenship immigrants of diverse origins and tongues.

The history of Newfoundland has run a separate course from that of Canada. The peculiar difficulties arising from the large migratory population engaged in the fishery and the complicated treaty obligations of the island to foreign countries hindered constitutional growth. A legislature was not established until 1832. Responsible government

¹ See above, p. 81.

² See map in Lucas, *op. cit.* p. 337.

followed in 1855. The present constitution takes the ordinary form of a governor and responsible executive council, a legislative council and a house of assembly.

The troubles of Newfoundland during the past century have arisen, as always, from the fishery. By the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, repeated at each subsequent pacification up to 1814, the French claimed the exclusive right to fish from Cape John on the east coast round by the north to Cape Ray on the west coast—two-fifths of the entire coast-line—and further, by the Declaration of Versailles, 1783, Great Britain undertook to keep the Treaty Shore free from settlement. This condition proved in course of time impossible of maintenance. By 1901 there were 17,000 inhabitants on the forbidden coast. About 1885 great tension developed between England and France on this question, which remained a source of danger until the *entente* of 1904. That agreement recognized that exclusive rights were an anachronism, and France in return for concessions elsewhere waived her claims. A parallel dispute with the United States, of a highly technical nature, also dragged on for many years until resort was made to arbitration in 1910.

In Australia the leading feature of the closing years of the nineteenth century was the achievement of a federation of the six colonies. The project had been long debated but always baulked by sectional interests, and there was lacking that pressure of a strong neighbouring power which had driven the Canadians to consolidate. The imperial government foreshadowed a federation of the several colonial authorities before the days of responsible institutions. In 1850 it created its representative in New South Wales, Sir Charles Fitzroy, governor-general of Australia, and reduced the presiding officers of the other colonies to the rank of lieutenant-governor. This was to attribute to New South Wales the pre-eminence which it claimed as the parent colony, and to make Sydney the capital of Australia. The scheme was premature and tactless, in that it anticipated, instead of awaiting, a colonial demand. A storm of indignation and local jealousy assailed it, and in a few years it was dropped, to be heard of no more. It never was put into effective force. For thirty years the idea of federation slept, discussed occasionally at academic conferences, but not appealing to the mind of the ordinary citizen. During that time each self-governing colony developed on its own lines, erected tariff barriers against its neighbours, and built its railways as an isolated system without even troubling about uniformity of gauge. Melbourne and Sydney knew each other not as friends but as rivals; the Western Australians might without any difference of outlook have been the inhabitants of another continent.

In the seventies and early eighties the pressure from without began to manifest itself in the shape of French designs on the New Hebrides and German intrusion in New Guinea and elsewhere in the Pacific. In spite of the heat engendered by these movements there was no general realization of the advantage which the dominion status would

confer. Nevertheless, a few far-seeing men did revive the idea of federation, and that under more hopeful auspices than in the past; for the new proposals were at least of colonial origin. In 1883, whilst public interest was yet languid, the several legislatures went so far as to delegate members to a federal council. Its contemplated powers were very limited, comprising such subordinate matters as fisheries and legal procedure, and excluding such vital questions as tariffs and national defence. It had no authority to enforce its recommendations, and even membership was not compulsory—New South Wales always declined to join. This body existed in an unregarded state for several years.

Defence became an urgent question in the late eighties, when the great powers began to scramble for territory in all parts of the world. In 1888 a joint delegation in London agreed to contribute towards the expenses of an imperial naval force in Australian waters. Next year a British general was employed to investigate military conditions, and his report, emphasizing the possibilities of invasion and the need for common measures, caused something approaching a scare.

The attitude of New South Wales had hitherto been the principal bar to federation. She could not forget her seniority to the other colonies. She considered also that her prosperity depended upon free trade, whilst all her neighbours were becoming increasingly protectionist. In 1889, however, Sir Henry Parkes, her veteran premier, unexpectedly stood forward as the champion of federation. He realized that future events would render it essential, and that every year of continued particularism would make it more difficult to accomplish. He was himself a free trader, but his subsequent speeches showed that he placed national unity before his fiscal creed. As the result of his avowals a conference met at Melbourne in 1890, and a convention at Sydney in 1891, to draw up a scheme of federal government, and the decisions of this latter body formed the substance of the eventual constitution. Age and infirmity now caused Sir Henry Parkes to retire from public life, a period of commercial depression set in, and the forces of disunion were able to hold up the movement for several years.

It revived again in 1897-8 when delegates elected by the direct votes of the several populations met in conference, first at Adelaide, then at Sydney, then at Melbourne. The conference debated the proposals of 1891, amended them in some details, and solved by a compromise the fiscal and financial difficulties. It then remained to submit the decisions to a referendum of the whole people. Queensland and Western Australia refrained even from voting. New South Wales returned a majority in favour, but not a sufficient one to render acceptance binding. Almost at once, however, opinion began to change in the dissentient states. A conference of premiers met at Melbourne in January, 1899, and decided upon a second referendum. This was everywhere successful. The Bill then went before the British Parliament, and received the royal assent in the summer of 1900—the last great imperial

law of Queen Victoria's reign. On January 1st, 1901, the Commonwealth of Australia formally took its place in the family of British nations.

The Commonwealth Government consists of a Governor-General appointed by the Crown, an executive ministry responsible to the elected representatives of the people, and two chambers named respectively the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate consists of six members from each state, not as in Canada nominated from above, but elected by the people of the state. The numbers of members in the lower house are proportioned to the populations of the several states, but their total is roughly twice that of the senators.¹ As in the British constitution, the ministerial cabinet is dependent upon a parliamentary majority, and the Governor-General plays the same part as the King at home, choosing his ministers on constitutional lines and acting in all public matters in accordance with their advice. If the Senate rejects an important measure passed by the lower house, the ministry recommends a dissolution. If after a general election the houses fail to agree the matter is decided by a joint sitting in which the joint majority carries the day. Since the upper house is elective and is only half as numerous as the lower this arrangement will generally ensure that the real will of the country shall prevail. So far the Australian constitution follows the British model. In its federal aspect it resembles that of the United States, and is dissimilar to that of Canada. The central government enjoys jurisdiction over certain defined questions, all residuary and undefined jurisdiction remaining with the six state parliaments. But the list of subjects committed to the central authority is a lengthy one, including defence both naval and military, commerce, posts and telegraphs, state railways, currency, immigration, foreign affairs, and many others. It also raises the whole of the revenue, but hands over three-fourths to the state parliaments for their own expenditure.² Customs barriers between states have been removed, and those against the outer world have been made uniform. The nomenclature of the Federal Act had a republican flavour, traceable to the admiration for American methods which prevailed in Australia in the last years of the nineteenth century. The preamble expressly states, however, that the Commonwealth is under the Crown of the United Kingdom.

New Zealand watched the movement towards federation among the Australian colonies, but did not accept the offer of inclusion within the Commonwealth. As one of her spokesmen aptly remarked, there were as many reasons for following a separate path as there were miles of stormy water between Sydney and Wellington.

¹ In 1901 New South Wales had 26 members, Victoria 23, Queensland 9, South Australia 7, Western Australia 5, and Tasmania 5. The proportion may be adjusted in accordance with the growth of population.

² This was the effect of the original Act, but in 1910 the clause was succeeded by one providing that the Commonwealth should pay the states 25 shillings per head of population.

It will have been noticed that in the important affairs treated in this section there is little evidence of initiative on the part of the Colonial Office. This was but natural on account of the recognition long since accorded to Canadian and Australian autonomy. Mr. Chamberlain was, however, maturing for the Empire at large a policy in which the dominions would bear a prominent part. His proposals are best approached through a consideration of the history of the Imperial Conference, an institution which has not hitherto received mention.

(v) *The Colonial Conference and the Chamberlain Programme*

The germ of the institution called the Colonial Conference and (from 1907) the Imperial Conference is to be found in a proposal of 1869. At that date New Zealand was indignant at the Gladstone ministry's withdrawal of the regular troops whilst the Maori question was still unsettled, and the advocates of the colonial cause in England were stirring up public discussion of the alleged unsympathetic handling of imperial problems. In these circumstances some members of the Royal Colonial Society addressed a circular letter to the Colonial Office and the governments of the principal colonies, advocating a conference of colonial representatives in London. The suggestion was badly received both at home and overseas, and the matter was allowed to pass into obscurity.¹ Perhaps that was for the best, for in the existing state of irritation a meeting would have produced more dissension than constructive effort.

Seventeen years later the circumstances had changed, and the new imperialism was being much more effectively voiced than by the handful of enthusiasts of 1869. The year 1887 was to be one of imperial festival in celebration of Queen Victoria's Jubilee; and in the previous autumn the Colonial Secretary of the Salisbury ministry sent out an invitation to the diverse units of the Empire to attend a Colonial Conference concurrently with the London ceremonies. "There is," he declared, "on all sides a growing desire to draw closer in every practicable way the bonds which unite the various portions of the Empire."² The omens were indeed auspicious. The partition of Africa was in every mind, the Royal Niger Company had just received its charter, the British East Africa Company was in process of formation, the Pacific, after years of Australian heart-burning, was becoming an important interest with the home government, South Africa was expanding rapidly, and colonial troops (from New South Wales) had served in the Sudan campaign of 1885. The invitation was accepted, and the Jubilee year saw the inauguration of a body destined to develop into an important constitutional organ of the Empire. It began and grew in the British tradition, with no statutory enactment, with no

¹ Sir C. P. Lucas, *The Empire at War*, 1. 137-9.

² *Ibid.*, 139.

cut-and-dried programme, and with a very imperfectly defined notion in the minds of its organizers about the part it was ultimately to play. It was not a mechanism for the achievement of a set policy, such as Colbert might have devised, but an informal meeting of friends for the discussion of common topics. It flourished because there was a place for it amid the jumble of British institutions.

The Conference of 1887 was opened by Lord Salisbury and included the Colonial Secretary, other British ministers, the agents-general and some leading statesmen of the autonomous colonies, and also representatives from less advanced units of the Empire. There was no definition of the status which entitled a member to attend. The agenda were equally tentative. Imperial federation was being much canvassed at home, but no one had evolved a practicable scheme and the colonies were not eager for it; it was therefore omitted from discussion. The subjects that were dealt with were chiefly those concerning imperial defence. It was agreed to work for an extension of the series of coaling stations upon which the navy relied for its mobility. The home government undertook to maintain a strong squadron of cruisers and gunboats in the Western Pacific, and the Australasian colonies promised an annual cash payment towards their support. The War Office acceded to a request to send a general to Australia to advise on military measures. A Dutch representative from Cape Colony, Mr. Hofmeyr, proposed a uniform tax upon imports throughout the Empire to provide an imperial fund for defensive purposes. This last idea fell to the ground, but the other suggestions were carried into effect by means, where necessary, of legislation in the various colonial parliaments whose spokesmen had attended the Conference. The meeting had been a great success, chiefly because it had not attempted to do too much.

The next Conference was called by colonial initiative and met at Ottawa in 1894. It discussed the construction of a cable from Vancouver to Australia and the inauguration of an "all-red" route for mails and passengers from England to Australia across Canada—an interesting foreshadowing of what may one day be a fact, Canada as the economic and strategic centre of the Empire. Further than this, the Ottawa Conference declared itself plainly in favour of preferential trade within the Empire, and recommended that, pending the time when the mother country should see her way to creating a preferential tariff, the various colonies should establish preference amongst themselves. No resentment was expressed against the existing free trade policy of Great Britain. More than one speaker pointed out the difference in situation between a dense industrial population that could not feed itself and a food-producing community with infant industries to foster; and it was a common avowal of colonial protectionists that if they lived in England they would be free traders.¹

Such was the state of overseas opinion when Joseph Chamberlain

¹ Egerton, *Short Hist. of Br. Colonial Policy*, pp. 453-4.

came to the Colonial Office and prepared to make the aspirations of the colonies his own. The Diamond Jubilee of 1897 gave him the opportunity of calling a third Conference, which, like all subsequent ones, met in London. The constitution of the meeting now grew more definite. It was limited to the eleven self-governing colonies, all of whom were represented by their prime ministers. This was, of course, to give the unfederated Australians six voices against the one of the much more populous Dominion of Canada. But since the Conference was for discussion and not legislation, and there was no question of any member being bound by a majority decision, there was no hardship in the disproportion. The agenda combined the imperial defence and the imperial preference which had been prominent in 1887 and 1894 respectively. In the former matter the naval agreement with Australia, which had been made in the first place for ten years, was continued; and the Cape Colony and Natal each agreed to begin naval contributions. The War Office promised to further various forms of military co-operation. Chamberlain, for the home government, undertook to terminate existing treaties with Germany and Belgium, which had the effect of debarring the dominions from giving preference to the mother country. All these, except certain military suggestions, were subsequently carried into effect by the governments and parliaments concerned, and imperial preference began in a one-sided fashion with colonial tariffs discriminating in favour of British over foreign goods. The mother country, having no protective duties, was unable to reciprocate. Imperial federation was mentioned in academic fashion in 1897, but there was no disposition to come to grips with the problem. The most important work of the Conference was undoubtedly that of having made preference a living issue.

Chamberlain's constructive policy proceeded for some years on the lines of developing the dependent Empire and was not able to make much progress with the dominions. After the South African War a fourth Colonial Conference met in 1902. Its personnel was diminished in numbers, for the six Australian colonies had now become the Commonwealth and spoke with one voice. In naval affairs all but one of the autonomous units agreed to continue their financial support of the imperial fleet. The exception was Canada, which, perhaps owing to the French vote of Quebec, showed much sensitiveness about national status and the maintenance of complete self-government. Canada, therefore, declined to support the common navy and proposed to create a particular fleet of her own. Canada and Australia also disapproved of a New Zealand proposal for an imperial military reserve to be available for general service.¹ Meanwhile the question of inter-imperial trade had grown more defined. The Conference recognized that free trade within the Empire was impossible. Separate nationalisms forbade it, for the national policies demanded protection even against Empire goods. The alternative was therefore continued preference—protection,

¹ Lucas, *op. cit.* pp. 149-55.

that is, against fellow-members of the Empire, and rather higher protection against foreigners. The Conference passed resolutions in favour of this policy and urged upon the United Kingdom the expediency of reciprocating by granting the colonies "exemption from or reduction of duties now or hereafter imposed."¹ Existing British duties, as has been mentioned, afforded negligible scope for discrimination, and the significance of the resolution lay in the word "hereafter," which was not lost on Mr. Chamberlain; and Canada thrust the point home by expressing separately her hope that the mother country would shortly adopt a preferential tariff and by reserving her right to revise her own policy if such a result did not ensue. In the discussions as a whole the beginning of a new doctrine of imperial cohesion is to be noted, the doctrine of alliance between equals in supersession of the mother-and-daughters relationship which had satisfied the sentiment of the late nineteenth century. Canada took the lead in this assertion of equality. Her population had now risen to one-eighth that of the British Isles; but a well-founded national consciousness depends on other things than numbers.

In 1903 Chamberlain made a visit to South Africa, in the course of which he spoke not only upon local matters but on the subject of closer imperial union. Defence took a more prominent place than trade in his speeches; in fact he was at pains to make it clear that the Empire could not be preserved by a policy conceived "in a huckstering spirit." This was the sentiment of Adam Smith, who had seen such a policy end in disaster before his eyes. It would seem, however, that with Chamberlain it happened as with many another man, that the very act of proclaiming a belief-crystallized the latent doubts of it that were lurking in his mind. On his return he resigned office and entered upon a campaign to persuade his countrymen to adopt wholeheartedly a policy of imperial preference. Granted that the Empire was in danger as things stood, it was the only course open. Imperial federation was hopeless, and the tendency was against making defence the medium of closer union; only preferential trade could promise that tangible witness of solidarity without which some minds could not maintain their faith.

Preference by the mother country involved the creation of protective duties against foreign products. This in itself was to belie a creed held by the majority of Englishmen. But it meant more than this, for the imports from the colonies were almost all of foodstuffs and raw materials. The policy required, therefore, the taxation of those articles when emanating from foreign sources. To tax raw materials was a thing which even eighteenth-century statesmen such as Walpole had recoiled from doing, and now with all England living by its factory exports it was impossible. Food remained, and the Chamberlain preference narrowed down to a tax upon foreign-grown foodstuffs. The objections were weighty. Not only would the cost of living to the

¹ Egerton, *Col. Policy*, p. 516.

CHAPTER V

FROM THE *ENTENTE CORDIALE* TO THE GREAT WAR

(i) *The Ententes with France and Russia*

THE years which immediately followed the conclusion of the South African War witnessed the grouping of Great Britain and her neighbours—including the United States—in the mutual relationships which determined their action in the Great War of 1914. That struggle, although on the part of the British Empire a war of defence, must certainly be included in a history of British expansion; and the transactions that led to the grouping of the powers were largely imperial in their aspect.

A colonial question had caused great tension between England and the United States in the first year of the Salisbury administration of 1895. When the Dutch settlements in Western Guiana became a British possession in the Napoleonic War, their new owners inherited all the former Dutch claims to the adjacent territory. Similarly, when a decade or two later Venezuela emerged as an independent republic from the wreck of the old Spanish Empire in America, she inherited the Spanish claims. Unfortunately the boundary between Guiana and Venezuela had never been determined, and the divergence of view was so great that had the Venezuelan claim prevailed the area of British Guiana would have been reduced to about two-thirds its present extent. The question, alternately rankling and slumbering through the nineteenth century, became suddenly critical in 1895. The United States took up the cause of Venezuela and invoked the Monroe doctrine, and in scarcely veiled language President Cleveland threatened war if England should persist in her claim to the disputed territory. His Secretary of State, Richard Olney, quite gratuitously threw out an additional hint about the future of Canada in a dispatch which said: "Distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient"; and he subsequently avowed that he deliberately employed words "the equivalent of blows."¹ The language was certainly provocative, and nothing but the consciousness of a good cause enabled Lord Salisbury to turn the cheek to the smiter. As it was, he made a conciliatory answer, and the question was referred to

¹ Morison, *Oxford Hist. of United States*, ii. 403-4.

arbitration. In 1899, after an exhaustive analysis of historical evidence going back to the sixteenth century, the tribunal substantially confirmed the British claim.

Meanwhile Anglo-American affairs had taken a happier turn. In the war which broke out between the United States and Spain in 1898, Great Britain showed in marked fashion her belief in the justice of the American cause, and Americans reciprocated during our South African War by refraining from the denunciation of England that was current on the continent of Europe. Immediately after the war, in 1902-3, another Venezuelan dispute passed off in better fashion. President Castro had committed some high-handed actions against British and German subjects on the Venezuelan coast; Great Britain and Germany exacted reparation by means of a blockade; and the United States under President Roosevelt, admitting that Castro was in the wrong, helped to clear up the affair by a second arbitration. This was also the period of the settlement of the Alaska boundary, the last of the territorial disputes between Canada and the States, and thenceforward good relations prevailed.

The Anglo-German co-operation in Venezuela marked a friendship which was only temporary. Ever since 1888 German financiers had been constructing a railway system through Asia Minor. In 1902-3 they obtained a concession from the Turkish government to extend their line through Syria and Mesopotamia to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, with collateral rights of river navigation and exploitation of minerals. Germany invited the co-operation of Great Britain and France, but Mr. Balfour, Salisbury's successor as prime minister, claimed absolute equality of the three powers in status and control. This the Germans, as the pioneers, were not inclined to grant, and so the co-operation scheme fell to the ground.¹ The Bagdad Railway went forward as a purely German enterprise, viewed with distrust by the British by reason of its obvious threat to their position in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Through communication with Bagdad was not complete by 1914, although a southward line through Syria and Palestine had been opened. Another controversy began in 1903. It arose from the preferential customs rates granted by Canada to British imports from 1897 onwards. Germany had not retaliated at that date, but she now proposed to do so. A constitutional point was raised by the German contention that the British government was responsible to foreigners for the fiscal actions of a British dominion. The British reply was that Great Britain had no control over the tariffs of an autonomous unit of the Empire. It was an aspect of a very large question that has never yet been settled. After a tariff war between Germany and Canada, in which the latter country penalized German in favour of British West Indian sugar, the matter was allowed to drop. In both the Bagdad Railway and the Canadian disagreements both sides were justified from their own point of view, and it was

¹ *Camb. Hist. of Br. Foreign Policy*, iii. 299-301.

hostility in the public opinion rather than in the governments of the two Empires that precluded the tolerance necessary for bridging the gap. That public hostility was deepened by the rapid strengthening of the German fleet in the subsequent years, by British naval construction in reply, and by the nervous counting of battleships which became a feature of numberless articles in the public press of both countries.

We turn now to the great Anglo-French balancing of accounts that was destined to have an incalculable effect upon the fate of nations. The Fashoda affair, bitter as it had been, marked nevertheless the end of a bad period in Anglo-French relations. The competition for shares of Africa had been the cause of hostility, and with the evacuation of Fashoda that competition, so far as it concerned England and France, was over. No sooner was this realized than French statesmen began to work for friendship with England and found their neighbour ready to meet them half-way. It was an obvious course in view of the growing strength and doubtful intentions of Germany under William II. The earlier moves in the new policy were unknown to the public on either side, and were masked by the odium aroused in France by the South African War. After the war the popular view changed with surprising speed. King Edward VII. visited Paris in 1903, and President Loubet visited London. Both made charming speeches and gained the applause of the streets, and their peoples awoke to the belief that there were no barriers to that mutual friendship which seemed to be in the best interests of both. In fact there were barriers, but it was at length possible to remove them.

Of the many outstanding questions between the two countries that of Egypt, for reasons already explained, was the most serious. Next ranked that of Newfoundland, where by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) France had special rights of fishing on the so-called French shore, and by the Treaty of Versailles (1783) England had undertaken not to permit her colonists to reside on that shore. Newfoundland had since become self-governing, and her growing population had refused to be bound by the restriction. In 1885 the dispute had brought England and France to the verge of war, and nothing but the good sense of their respective naval commanders on the station had averted a conflict. The question had then been patched up but not settled. In Madagascar there was a British grievance of some years' standing arising from a discriminating tariff against British trade which, it was contended, France had no right to impose. In the East both powers were pressing on their respective sides of Siam and viewing one another with distrust. In the Pacific the joint abstention from seizure of the New Hebrides was breaking down under pressure of private enterprise.

The stimulus to a settlement of all these questions whilst the two peoples were in a good mood appears to have come from Egypt, where Lord Cromer was anxious to complete his financial reforms and was precluded by certain French interests from doing so. The negotiations were conducted by Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé, the respective

foreign ministers, and issued in the Convention and Declarations signed on April 8, 1904. By these instruments France agreed to view with goodwill the continued British occupation of Egypt and not to hamper the measures which British policy required to take. In return Great Britain recognized France as the paramount power in Morocco and promised to support French policy there. In either region there was to be a maintenance of equal trading facilities for all nations. In Newfoundland France renounced her monopoly of the treaty shore, but retained her right to fish upon it, and in return she received the cession of the Los Islands off the African coast, of a small part of Gambia and of a considerable area on the middle Niger. England also abandoned her protest against the Madagascar tariff. Siam was divided into two spheres of influence with a neutral sphere between them. A commission was appointed to deal with the New Hebrides.¹ This comprehensive bargain closed a period of estrangement of thirty years' duration.

The settlement was received with general enthusiasm and some criticism in both countries. In France the criticism was more marked than in England. Delcassé's opponents declared that in Egypt France had renounced a substantial interest whilst in Morocco England had had nothing to give up, and that elsewhere their country had the worst of the bargain. But the general sense approved. Those who were disappointed had but to wait ten years for satisfaction on a scale that no one then dreamed of. A subsequent Convention of 1906 set up a joint administration and police for the New Hebrides, with a mixed tribunal of three judges whose president was to be nominated by the King of Spain. Another of 1907 recognized the new British protectorate in Siamese Malaya and allowed France to annex a strip on the Cambodian border.

Russia, the recognized ally of France, had also a series of questions in dispute with England, and the *entente* of 1904 prepared the way for a similar Anglo-Russian settlement. This, however, was delayed by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, for Great Britain was the ally of Japan and would have been bound in certain circumstances to go to her assistance. When the war was over the British and Russian statesmen entered on the negotiations which produced the Agreements of 1907. By this bargain Persia was divided, like Siam, into two spheres of influence separated by a neutral sphere; both powers undertook to respect the independence of Afghanistan; and both undertook to abstain from any interference in Tibet. The object here sought after was the safeguarding of the frontiers of India. It was so far attained that British India suffered little further anxiety until the disasters of the Great War inaugurated a completely new phase of Anglo-Russian relationships.

¹ *Camb. Hist. of Br. For. Policy*, iii. 305-18, the authority followed throughout this section; see also Lucas, *Partition of Africa*, 103-4.

(ii) • *Great Britain and the Dominions*

The decade which followed the South African War witnessed the inauguration of two further dominions of the Empire in addition to the existing Dominion of Canada and Commonwealth of Australia. The first of the new creations, the Dominion of New Zealand (1907), represented a change of title rather than of actual status, for the colony had been self-governing for nearly fifty years under a unitary government, and no process of union or federation was required to make it a dominion. Newfoundland, with a longer history and smaller population, has clung to the more ancient and equally honourable title of colony, and with it enjoys the same constitutional status as the dominions. The conversion of South Africa into a dominion involved a definite political change of a different nature from those which took place in Canada and Australia. For the South African provinces did not federate, or transfer some only of their autonomous powers to a central government; on the contrary, they surrendered them all and combined as a unitary state, the Union of South Africa. First it will be necessary to account for the existence of autonomy in the four provinces since at the conclusion of the war in 1902 only the Cape and Natal possessed it, whilst the Transvaal and the Orange Free State¹ were crown colonies.

The political undertakings of the Treaty of Vereeniging came into force with little delay. In June, 1902, crown colony institutions were set up in the two annexed provinces. They comprised nominated executive and legislative councils, and Lord Milner became governor of both units. He hoped to achieve a political federation, but the confusion of the war had left an enormous work of reconstruction to be performed, and the overhaul of institutions had to await more settled times. Economic federation, however, of the type for which Rhodes had worked, was immediately desirable. In March, 1903, Milner called a conference at Bloemfontein which abolished the inter-colonial tariffs and substituted a uniform customs system for the whole of British South Africa, including Southern Rhodesia. The Bloemfontein Conference also considered uniformity of native policy, but decided that the subject should be left to a politically united South Africa for more authoritative treatment.² Another decision of the conference, to employ Chinese indentured labour in the gold mines as a temporary measure of reconstruction, is hardly an imperial question. It is important in the history of South African labour, and very important, strangely enough, in the domestic history of Great Britain; for it contributed, more than any other factor, to the overthrow of the

¹ The annexation title of Orange River Colony remained in use until 1909, but it is convenient to speak of the Orange Free State throughout.

² Walker, *South Africa*, 508-9.

Conservative party in the general election of 1906.¹ But in the imperial perspective it is negligible.

The peace treaty had promised the Boer states responsible government as soon as it should be practicable to introduce it. The tradition of the Empire was that the institution should be preceded by a training period of merely representative government wherein the legislature should be elected by the people and the executive nominated by the Crown.² But representative government had seldom worked well, and although in 1905 it was decided to introduce it into the Transvaal and the Free State, the step was ultimately omitted in favour of immediate responsible government. That institution, therefore, came into force in the Transvaal early in 1907 and in the Free State later in the year. The first elections gave the Dutch element a majority in each, and at the same time the Bond, renamed the South African Party, returned to power in the Cape Colony. The Boer leaders in the late war, and pre-eminently General Botha, now ruled as responsible ministers of the Crown, and racial equality under free institutions was obviously capable of realization.

The existence of four self-governing provinces in a land in which the greatest problems of administration were of universal application emphasized the need for some form of co-operative effort; in a word, for a central South African government. The chief problems in question were those of the natives, the customs, and the railways. The natives outnumbered the whites by five to one and were increasing at a more rapid rate. The outbreak of a black revolt in Natal and the subsequent threat of a new Zulu war in 1906 showed that some uniform policy was essential. The customs question was pregnant with trouble owing to the fact that two provinces had no outlet to the sea save through the territory of the others or through that of Portugal. The coast provinces in the main favoured protection and the Transvaal free trade. The same difficulty had arisen between Upper and Lower Canada in the early nineteenth century, where also geographical factors had placed one province in a position to blackmail the other. Lord Milner had induced the South African units to agree to a customs union and a uniform tariff, but on attaining responsible government the Transvaal threatened to secede from the arrangement. Railways constituted a similarly difficult question. The railway focus of South Africa was the Rand, where three systems converged from the Cape, Natal, and Delagoa Bay. Kruger had favoured the last named as against the two British lines by means of discriminating rates; the railways were state-owned, and each province drew much of its revenue from this source;

¹ The indignation of the voter was aroused by the assertion that slavery had been reintroduced into the Empire, an assertion which its exploiters subsequently admitted to be a terminological inexactitude.

² The exception was Queensland, which had secured full responsible government on becoming a separate colony in 1859. But the Queenslanders had received their political training as members of New South Wales.

there was thus an ever-present danger of an economic war in default of some regulation by a central authority.¹

The remedy for these troubles was plain, and yet by no means easy of accomplishment; for co-operation meant individual sacrifice. Lord Selborne's *Review of the Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies*, published in 1907, analysed the position clearly and educated the public mind in the direction of union. In October, 1908, a convention of delegates from the four parliaments met at Durban and completed its work at Cape Town in the following year. Its draft of a constitution, largely due to the statesmanship of the Transvaal members, then went to the several parliaments for approval. The Transvaal accepted it entire, the Cape and the Orange Free State (henceforward to resume its ancient name) demanded amendments. The Natal legislature was hostile to the whole scheme, but a referendum to the people showed a majority in favour. The amendments entailed the abandonment of proportional representation of minorities in the lower house, but the principle was retained for the senate. On these terms the four provinces accepted the constitution. The Act for the Union of South Africa passed the imperial parliament before the end of 1909, and came into force in 1910.

The Union is not a federation.² The Union parliament, not the constitutional document, is the supreme authority; and the provincial councils enjoy their limited powers at the pleasure of the former and not by virtue of the latter. The parliament may amend the constitution (by a two-thirds majority) if it should see fit; the provincial ordinances only remain valid whilst not repugnant to acts of the central authority. Subject to this limitation the provinces have jurisdiction over purely local affairs and also to a partial extent over education and agriculture. A true federal constitution with inalienable provincial rights was recognized to be unsuitable for South Africa on account of considerations previously discussed—the unity of economic issues, the native question, and others. At the head of the executive is the Governor-General representing the Crown, choosing his executive council or cabinet on the same well-known though unwritten principles as does the sovereign at home. The legislature consists of a Senate and a House of Assembly. The Senate has thirty-two indirectly elected and eight nominated members, four of the latter being chosen for special knowledge of native problems. The assembly contained at the outset 121 members, with provision for the number to increase with the growth of the population. The elected senators are equal in number for each province, and the numbers of representatives in the lower house are proportioned to population, with a slight advantage to Natal and the Orange Free State. The provincial governments consist of an administrator, an executive committee and a provincial council. Provision is made for the future

¹ On these questions see H. R. Brand, *The Union of South Africa*, Oxford, 1909, pp. 15-29.

² For technical reasons, see Brand, *op. cit.* pp. 43-4.

admission of new provinces and for the taking over of native territories from the Crown. Lord Gladstone became the first governor-general of the Union in 1910, and General Botha the first prime minister.

The Colonial Conference of 1902 had recommended that its successors should be held in future at intervals of not more than four years. In 1905 Mr. A. Lyttelton, then Colonial Secretary, proposed in a despatch to the dominion governments that the next conference should style itself the Imperial Council, and further, that a permanent commission with advisory powers should sit in London to work upon the problems raised at the four-yearly meetings. Australia and the Cape Colony approved of his proposal, but Canada objected from a fear that a permanent body might in time arrogate to itself executive powers, and so encroach upon dominion self-government. On this reply the matter dropped.

The Conference which should have been held in 1906 was postponed to 1907 on account of the change of ministry in England. It took the title of Imperial Conference and defined more precisely than before the persons who should by right of office be members. These were in future to be the prime minister and colonial secretary of the United Kingdom and the prime ministers of the self-governing dominions. Other dominion ministers might attend on the understanding that voting should be by countries and not by heads. A newly represented unit was the Transvaal, which had just received self-government and sent its first prime minister, General Botha, as its spokesman. The 1907 Conference discussed the question of imperial preference and, with one dissentient, reaffirmed the resolutions in favour of that policy which had been passed in 1902. The dissentient was Great Britain, whose Liberal ministry held that the country had pronounced against the policy in the general election of the previous year. In the matter of defence important principles were adopted and the way prepared for more. It was agreed that an Imperial General Staff should be created to co-ordinate military effort. On the naval side there was a divergence of opinion. New Zealand was in favour of maintaining the principle of dominion contributions to a single imperial navy, and was willing to increase her own grant. Australia, which had hitherto supported this system, now desired to withdraw from it and to spend her money on a definitely Australian squadron, manned and administered by herself. Canada still denied any obligation, but was also contemplating a separate naval force of her own. On judicial and legal reforms, naturalization, communications and the preparation of trade statistics a good deal of useful discussion took place which resulted in subsequent legislation by the various parliaments. Lord Elgin, the Colonial Secretary, announced a new departure in administration, the creation of a separate Dominions Department of the Colonial Office.¹

¹ Keith's *Responsible Government*, iii. pp. 1463-1558; Lucas, *Empire at War*, 1. 184-92; Egerton, *Twentieth Century*, 136-8; *Colonial Office List* (1923), pp. li-liii.

Immediately after the close of the 1907 Conference the naval situation grew more serious owing to great increases in the German fleet. Public opinion awoke throughout the Empire, and in the spring of 1909 New Zealand offered the gift of a first-class battleship to the navy in addition to her usual contribution. Australia did the like, whilst pressing on with her particular arrangements. Canada at last began to take action on her long contemplated intention of forming a dominion fleet. In consequence of this display of feeling a conference was summoned in London later in the year. It was not a general Imperial Conference, for it was limited to the question of defence, and its effect was to round off and define the policies left incomplete in 1907. The meeting accepted the New Zealand and Australian offers of ships, and approved the formation of Australian and Canadian squadrons, which were thenceforward brought into existence. In 1910 the principle of joint discussion was continued by a useful subsidiary conference on the question of imperial copyright, and uniform laws on this matter were afterwards passed by Great Britain and the dominions.

The next full-dress Imperial Conference was duly held at the expiration of the four-year interval in 1911. The consolidation of the Empire was reflected in the smaller number of its members. In place of the eleven prime ministers of 1897 there were now only six—those of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, united South Africa, and Newfoundland—although they represented a greater area of territory and much larger populations. The meeting was held in grave circumstances, for the situation that was to produce the conflict of 1914 was already defining itself. Looking back, we can see that the Conference of 1911 met under the shadow of war, and there is no doubt that this was realized by its members. The effect was not a public beating of the drum, but the exact contrary. All naval and military discussions were transferred to the Committee of Imperial Defence, whose proceedings were transacted in secret; and it was significant that the Foreign Secretary was brought in for the first time to describe in confidence to this Committee the situation of international affairs.

The open sessions of the Conference reflected the desire for combined imperial action. Sir Joseph Ward, the premier of New Zealand, submitted a scheme for an imperial parliament of defence with jurisdiction over the declaration of war and the making of peace, foreign policy in general, and naval and military policy, with the allotment of the costs of maintaining the imperial forces. His parliament was to consist of an upper chamber of twelve members, two each from the United Kingdom, the Dominions of Canada and New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, and Newfoundland; and of a lower chamber of about 300 elected members apportioned on a basis of population which would give the mother country 220, Canada 37, Australia 25, South Africa 7, New Zealand 6, and Newfoundland 2. An executive council of fifteen was to be responsible to the elected chamber. Neither the mother country nor the dominions

were ready to make the sacrifice of autonomy demanded by the scheme, and it was rejected after a somewhat superficial discussion. It was probably intended more as an educative demonstration than as a practical course of action, but it was characteristic that it should have come from New Zealand, whose sentiment has always emphasized the homogeneity rather than the particularism of the British nations. The Conference decided upon pursuing the end of combined action on the lines already established, "Imperial unity based upon local autonomy"; and it adopted the principle that whenever possible the dominions should be informed of any proposed transactions with foreign countries before they should be concluded. This was the beginning of a modification of the imperial constitution which became of paramount importance during and after the Great War, the admission, that is, of the dominions to a full share in the conduct of foreign policy. The positive contribution of 1911 to this doctrine related only to commercial treaties, and it was agreed that such treaties might be made to apply, when desirable, to particular parts of the Empire and not to the whole. After performing much other detailed work on emigration, trade, merchant shipping, cables and inter-imperial law, most of which resulted in confirmatory legislation, the statesmen of 1911 went their ways, not to reassemble in Imperial Conference until the desperate year 1917.

The ideal of a consolidated Empire had travelled a long road since its first crude formulation in the seventies and eighties. It had reached a stage of achievement that was elusive and undefined but none the less substantial. The method had been to recognize and utilize forces of spontaneous origin with the minimum of theoretical control. It suited the temperament of the British peoples as no other could have done. Its disadvantage was that it was unintelligible to foreign observers, and the cause of peace was endangered by their impression that the Empire was not growing stronger but disintegrating. One may hope, without too much certainty, that in this error history will not repeat itself.

(iii) *Africa*

For ten years after the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 the British administration of Egypt continued along the lines already indicated, to the increasing advantage of the country itself. The control of the Sudan and the freedom from French interference enabled economic reform to proceed with large schemes such as those for the storage and distribution of the Nile waters. By the end of the period the population was approaching twice the numbers of 1882, more than ninety per cent. being Mohammedans of the *fellahin* or peasant stock settled for thousands of years upon the soil. Turkish suzerainty still existed in theory, but became ever more shadowy. When, in 1912, Italy went to war with Turkey for the possession of the neighbouring province of Tripoli, British-controlled Egypt declared a strict neutrality, and it

was evident that for practical purposes she no longer formed part of the Ottoman Empire. Lord Cromer retired in 1907, and was succeeded by Sir John Gorst and afterwards by Lord Kitchener. Under the latter the constitution was modified in the direction of representative government. The powers of the provincial councils were extended, and the old legislative council and general assembly were merged into a new legislative assembly, some of whose members were nominated and others elected by an indirect process. The brake to political progress lay in the nature of the population. The peasant masses were still ignorant, and bound by the servile traditions of long ages. The educated classes, for the most part of Turkish origin, were by no means well affected to the new order, which had curtailed their opportunities of misrule. It was with them that a nationalist movement developed before the close of the nineteenth century, and it spread among the peasantry during the period under review. Student demonstrations, seditious books and incendiary newspapers all attested the fact that a section of the people believed they were now fit to govern themselves and felt not the smallest gratitude to the hand that had lifted them out of bondage. On the whole, it is fair to say that the authorities were forbearing, and were reluctant to avail themselves of the methods of repression which Germans, Italians or Frenchmen would have applied without compunction.

The history of British rule in Nigeria belongs to this period and presents a happier aspect. From the transference, in 1899-1900, of the Royal Niger Company's political jurisdiction to the Crown the territories have been under the control of the Colonial Office. They were at first organized as two protectorates, those of Northern and Southern Nigeria respectively. To Southern Nigeria the older Niger Coast Protectorate was joined from the outset. In 1906 the colony and protectorate of Lagos were also added to it, and the combined region became known as the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, in 1913-14, the two Nigerias were united as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, with its seat of government at Lagos. The first years after 1900 were occupied in the conquest of the powerful Mohammedan states of the north, whose emirs were constantly engaged in war and slave-raiding. The year 1903 witnessed the completion of the heaviest part of the work with the capture of Kano and Sokoto, fortified cities which had been the centres of an evil form of government. The campaigns were carried out by Sir F. Lugard with West African soldiery under British officers, and the success was surprisingly rapid in view of the fact that the country was vast, unhealthy and imperfectly explored. Similar expeditions were needed during the same period to establish order in parts of Southern Nigeria. The contrast between the swift extension of jurisdiction after 1900 and its tardiness before that date illustrates the difference between the positive state imperialism inaugurated by Chamberlain and the less effective private-adventure expansion typical of the chartered company period. "The

assumption by the Crown of the governmental powers . . . involved the substitution of an Empire for the mere project of an Empire ; and so far from commercial greed having brought about expansion, it was not until commercial considerations were shifted to the background that genuine expansion took place.”¹ Expansion, in fact, has two meanings. The chartered company could stake a claim and colour the map ; but the State alone could make effective the Pax Britannica with its implications of moral and material reform.

Reform followed hard upon conquest. Sir Frederick Lugard's system was to preserve native institutions and to take care that they were operated with justice. The great chiefs and the village headmen therefore continued in their functions, under the supervision of British Residents and subordinate officers in each province. Justice demanded that slave-raiding should cease at once, that slavery itself should be more gradually abolished, and that inhuman punishments, bribery and extortion should fade out of memory, as they quickly did. In Northern Nigeria it was not practicable to put an end to slavery at a stroke, for the result would have been considerable distress. Many of the slaves knew no other system whereby they could obtain food and shelter, and had to be educated gradually to the idea of work for wages and of responsibility for their own livelihood. Emancipation was made permissive, on the demand of the slave, and in 1920 it could be reported that “generally speaking, it may be said to-day that there are no slaves in the Moslem states who are not well aware that they can assert their freedom if they choose.” Since no new slaves have been impressed and no children have been slave-born from the date of the conquest, the system is obviously dying out, and its worst drawbacks have been already removed by strict law and impartial justice. In Southern Nigeria, where industry and social life were more simply organized, emancipation was proclaimed outright in 1901 without ill results. These facts are a good illustration of the difference between the methods of the two great phases of the modern Empire. The abolitionists of 1833 would have followed their ideal irrespective of the hardship involved even to their protégés. The trained administrators of the twentieth century deal with cases on their particular merits and make those *ad hoc* decisions which are best suited to the circumstances. The sting is largely drawn from the reproach of countenancing slavery when it is remembered that neither the State nor its officials nor any white employers make use of slave labour, which, on their part, can only be maintained for altruistic reasons.

The system of development, inaugurated by Chamberlain in other dependencies, required the establishment of a revenue to provide the interest on loans for railways, roads and harbours, besides the expenses of government of the older type. Revenue implied taxation in cash instead of in labour, and that in its turn the introduction of a currency with all its stimulus to trade and industry. A population of slaves or

¹ Egerton, *Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century*, p. 217.

serfs living at the caprice of tyrants has thus been transformed into one of communal proprietors and wage-earners, whilst the possibility of saving and advancement arising from a money economy has created new ambitions and a healthier outlook. The change has caused some observers to complain of native arrogance and lack of self-control, but in general it is true that these impressions come from visitors and private employers, whilst officials of wide view are satisfied and hopeful of the future. It must be remembered that the climate of Southern Nigeria is not calculated to produce a high type of humanity under any political system.

Although the Niger is better available for transport purposes than the other great rivers of Africa, it is only open for through transit even by shallow draught steamers for three months in the year; at other seasons the water level falls too low over long stretches of its middle course. Railways were therefore essential for the regular communication demanded by modern trade. A railway from Lagos to a point 125 miles inland had been built under the Chamberlain loan measure between 1899 and 1901, at which period Lagos was not part of Nigeria. Next, a line was carried from Baro on the middle Niger through the northern protectorate to Kano in 1906, and finally the connecting link was constructed when Lagos and Nigeria were consolidated into one dependency. In 1912 the Bonny River, two hundred miles along the coast, east of Lagos, was developed as a seaport, and another railway now pushes from thence into the interior, with the ultimate object of linking up with the northern railway system. Motor road-transport, acting as a feeder of the railways, greatly increases their utility. These transport facilities have already made it possible to work tin and coal mines, and the coal is acting as a life-giving agent to various new enterprises. Thus there is in progress a modern, intelligently controlled repetition of the industrial revolutions of Europe.¹

In the hinterland of the Gold Coast, Ashanti and the Northern Territories, the British conquest was of somewhat earlier date than in Nigeria. The problems of civilization and the methods applied to their solution were very similar, and by 1914 these regions had become equally peaceful and well-disposed. In British East Africa the Foreign Office continued to be the controlling department until 1905, when the Colonial Office took its place. East Africa differed from the regions already considered, in that parts of it were climatically suitable for settlement by white planters. The completion of the Uganda Railway in 1903 brought in the whites, and by 1909 they were some two thousand strong. The problem of government was thus complicated, for it could not take account solely of native interests as in West Africa. Land questions were dealt with by allotting reserves to the tribes for communal ownership, and by placing other areas at the disposal of the government for

¹ For Nigeria see Sir F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*; Knowles, *Overseas Empire*, pp. 485-97; Egerton, *Twentieth Century*, pp. 217-28; *Colonial Office List*.

sale to white men ; there was never, as in early New Zealand, any sale by individual natives, or even by tribes, to private white purchasers. The land question, being firmly handled by the light of past experience, gave less trouble than did that of labour. Planters with their private capital invested in their estates naturally grumbled at a state of affairs in which their crops might spoil for lack of attention whilst the natives refused to work for their wages and lived in pastoral indolence in the reserves. The East African native, in fact, relieved of the appalling tyranny of the Arab slave-raiders, was content with a peaceful life of subsistence-occupation, and showed no ambition to rise into a more complicated social scale by steady wage-earning. The immediate remedy would have been compulsion, or slavery in a mitigated form. Failing that, it has been left to the gradual infiltration of new ideas to provide the solution. Freedom of movement, imports of manufactures, observation of European ways, are instilling new wants into the native mind—wants which can only be satisfied by money, which in its turn can only be obtained by steady work. In the minute interplay of the modern world cigarettes, soap and gramophones play their part in transforming the savage into a working man. East Africa suffered a further complication, political as well as economic, by the presence of a large East Indian element. The coast had been in touch with Asia for centuries, and in the making of the railway Indian coolies were employed. Their extensive settlement has produced an economic clash with native interests and a demand for political equality with the whites, neither of which questions have been definitely dealt with.¹ Uganda, more populous although smaller, is less a white man's country, and European capitalism has assumed rather the guise exhibited in West Africa. In general it may be said that the story of the country is also the same—the preservation and reform of native jurisdictions, and the rapid abolition of tribal warfare, barbarous punishments, cannibalism and slavery.

It remains in this chapter to glance at the final readjustments of African properties between the great powers prior to the outbreak of the general war which African jealousies had done much to prepare. King Leopold's cession of the Congo Free State to Belgium has already been mentioned. It was expected in England that the immediate abolition of his horrible system would ensue, and that the Belgian nation would hasten to remove a blot for which it now became responsible. There was, in fact, considerable delay, for Belgian pride resented the denunciations of the humanitarians. Gradually, however, the system passed. First, the massacre and mutilation of defaulting rubber gatherers were stopped, and then the impressment of labour by more decent methods. In 1913 the British government was so far satisfied as to give its formal recognition to the annexation of 1908. The French penetration of Morocco, which proceeded steadily after the *entente* of 1904, resulted in the virtual addition of that country to

¹ Authorities as above.

the French Empire. Germany showed considerable jealousy, and in 1911 the affair developed into a first-class crisis which very nearly precipitated war. Towards the end of the year, however, a bargain was struck, whereby the French yielded 100,000 square miles of the French Congo in return for recognition in Morocco. This territory was added to the German Cameroons and brought that colony to the right bank of the Congo and in touch with the Belgian possession. The French Congo was thus cut in two, but France retained the right of navigation on the river and so maintained communication.¹

The partition of Africa was rounded off in 1911-12 by the Italian seizure of Tripoli and Cyrenaica from Turkey. Thenceforward there remained only two African units, Abyssinia and Liberia, uncontrolled by European powers.

¹ Lucas, *Partition of Africa*, pp. 105-10 ; *Camb. Hist. of Br. For. Policy*, III. 438-54

CHAPTER VI

THE IMPERIAL ASPECTS OF THE GREAT WAR

FOR several days before the Fourth of August, 1914, it was plain to the world that war was imminent. The dominions of the Empire, in fact, realized the position as early, if not earlier, than did the people of the British Isles. Dominion statesmen, from the time of the 1911 Imperial Conference, were more fully instructed on the circumstances that would produce war than were the general public in England and elsewhere; and when the crisis arose they anticipated the decision of the British cabinet by prompt and uncompromising offers of support. In New Zealand alone of the dominions did it happen that Parliament was sitting as the peril drew near. On July 31 the New Zealand ministry and Parliament unanimously agreed that an expeditionary force should be organized, to serve wherever it should be required. On August 1st Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, cabled to London that the Dominion would make every effort and sacrifice in the coming war. The government of Australia, under Sir Joseph Cook, offered the services of 20,000 men, also before the actual declaration. From South Africa General Botha sent a message, the day before the news of war was known, that the Union would at least undertake its own defence and release the garrison of regular troops.¹ These timely decisions were a testimony to the silent statesmanship of the preceding years, and they showed that, however ill-compacted the Empire might appear when its constitution was set down in black and white, it was remarkably homogeneous in thought and action.

The dependencies did not await the lead of the dominions. India had for years been seething with political unrest, and German observers had found occasion to sneer at the unvirile lack of firmness with which they said that British statesmen met the situation. The German conception of firmness had been demonstrated on a small scale in the massacre of the Hereros in South West Africa. What effect it would have had upon the three hundred millions of inflammable humanity in the Indian Empire can only be imagined; but it would hardly have

¹ These references, and nearly all others for the first part of this chapter, are from the five exhaustive volumes of *The Empire at War*, edited and largely written by Sir Charles Lucas. The present writer must ask excuse for the freedom with which he has drawn upon this work, for the reason that there is no other which so completely covers the ground.

produced the response that India actually made to the call of 1914. The German criticism, and that of the world at large, was indeed founded upon a falsehood; for England never did conquer the peoples of India, as is so often and so loosely asserted. What she had done was to conquer their conquerors and to substitute peace and justice for rapine and oppression. And not only had she conquered those conquerors, but in many cases she had converted them also, so that their descendants in 1914 were the most ardent supporters of that British rule which was the only alternative to chaos. Indians knew this in their hearts, and their attitude became such as to suggest that the rioting and sedition and incendiary talk, and even the murderous outrages of the preceding years, were but the tropical expression of that criticism of the existing order which is universal in intelligent communities.

India, therefore, through its ruling princes, through its native members of the Viceroy's Council, and even through its politicians opposed to the government, spoke with one voice, of which the following words proceeding from a member of the last-mentioned category may serve as an example: "We, the representatives of the Indian people, desire to assure Your Excellency of our unswerving loyalty to the Crown and of our firm resolve to stand by the Empire in this crisis. . . . We are loyal because we are patriotic; because we believe that with the stability and permanence of British rule are bound up the best prospects of Indian advancement. We believe that, under British rule, we are bound to obtain, sooner or later, sooner rather than later, the full rights of British citizenship, and to secure for ourselves a place, I hope an honourable place, among the free States of a great and federated Empire."¹ In the West African colonies and protectorates the story was the same. The peoples of Ashanti and of the inner parts of Nigeria had been brought forcibly and recently within the Empire, but they knew better than to suppose that a German victory offered any prospect of advantage to themselves: "Among the Mohammedan population of Nigeria tranquillity reigned supreme." In East Africa (Kenya Colony) there were local disturbances, but the people were in the main actively loyal, although the military strength of the Germans on their border was a temptation to revolt. The negro population of the British West Indies had no other aim than that of their white fellow-citizens, to help in every way they could; and the black West India Regiment served with credit against the German colonies in East and West Africa.

So much for the expressed attitude of the Empire at the time of the outbreak. To qualify that record, it must be said that there were some units which contained lukewarm minorities, such as the French of Canada, many of whom took the view that the struggle was no concern of theirs, and the extreme though small political groups both in the mother country and elsewhere, who placed their sectional aims before the common weal. These breaches in the general solidarity were

¹ *The Empire at War*, v. 164-5. The Indian section is by Sir Francis Younghusband.

inevitable. No nation which took part in the Great War, or in any other war in modern history, has altogether avoided them. But in only one unit of the overseas Empire was there any forcible attempt to take advantage of the crisis for separatist purposes, and that attempt must here be briefly related.

South Africa was a dominion which Germany had strong hopes of detaching from the Empire. Among the Boers there was a small minority of professed irreconcilables who would seize the slightest chance of reversing the decision of 1902. There was also a larger body of unorganized opinion which would have been ready to countenance a promising movement for independence. But the main strength of the population was equally decided that the past was past and ought not to be revived and that duty pointed to support of the Empire. As in all situations where the circumstances are those of incipient revolution, the personal qualities of leading men were of decisive importance; and here the loyalists were the stronger. General Botha, the prime minister of the Union, showed promptly and clearly that he was for active loyalty, and the respect in which he was held decided many in the same course who might have followed him in its opposite. The disaffected, on the other hand, exhibited no such clearness of decision. Their leaders were for the most part for half measures ranging from passive disloyalty to limited obstruction of the government. Only Commandant Maritz of the Union defence force was at the outset bent upon a determined war against the Empire, and others, such as De Wet and Beyers, declared themselves when it was too late. In September, 1914, Maritz obtained a treaty from the governor of German South West Africa promising independence and the annexation of Delagoa Bay. He marched towards the German frontier with his immediate command, although he could not induce all of them to fight for him.

Botha, who had undertaken at the outbreak of war to hold South Africa without aid from the regular army, used only the dominion forces to crush the rebellion. In doing so he was careful to make the Boer units more prominent and to keep the British in the background in order to avoid any colour of a racial war. In two months he had routed the rebels—very quick work in the geographical circumstances—and in another he could report that all was over (December, 1914).¹ The way was then clear for the conquest of German South West Africa in 1915. A rising in South Africa was the most natural thing to expect in view of that country's recent history. Its small scope was disappointing to those who were confident of something more serious, and the part played by the Boer majority was a revelation of the strength of the imperial ideal which surprised the most optimistic loyalists. Putting aside all sentiment, there can be no doubt that Botha acted in the best interest of his people. A locally successful rebellion would have led to serious ultimate calamity with the general

¹ Walker, *South Africa*, pp. 555-60. The full details are in Lucas, *op. cit.* iv. 377-432.

war resulting in the collapse of Germany ; whilst if Germany had proved victorious there would have been short shrift for independence of any sort in an Africa which would have become from one end to the other a vast field of German imperialism. The interest of South Africa, as of all small free communities, was to support the Empire heart and soul.

The military measures of the dominions, as has been shown, antedated the declaration of war. They proceeded steadily from strength to strength, and by the close they had attained a volume which would have been flatly incredible five years before. Put briefly, it may be said that the fifteen millions of white men, women and children in the four dominions produced among them a million-and-a-quarter soldiers, the vast majority of whom served in the field. These men were not placed at the disposal of the Empire as mere raw material. They were trained, equipped, paid and supplied by dominion organization, and fought as distinct national armies with individual traditions although with a broad conformity to the British military system. The universal khaki with its Australian and New Zealand variations of detail formed a true symbol of the diversity-in-unity of the Empire of 1914.

The Canadian Parliament, specially summoned, met on August 18, and at once Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the leader of the opposition, declared a party truce so that all might concentrate with one mind upon the war. Already the ministry had settled the strength and composition of a first overseas contingent. The enlistment of volunteers had begun, and many more were offering themselves than it was at first possible to accept. To the first complete division of 22,000 men extra units were soon added. In September the expeditionary force numbered 32,000, and on October 1st it sailed from the St. Lawrence to complete its training on English soil. Almost immediately a second contingent was formed, equal in size to the first, and arrangements were made for keeping both up to the proper strength. In the long perspective it appears that this measure also represented a mere beginning. The total Canadian effort is best represented by a quotation of figures at various dates, bearing in mind that the population of the Dominion had been returned by the census of 1911 as 7,200,000, of whom just over two millions were of French-Canadian origin.¹ By April, 1915, there were 35,000 Canadians serving in Europe, and by July 75,000. In October it was decided to send out 250,000 men in all, and at the beginning of 1916 the number was raised to 500,000. This figure was not actually attained, although the total enlistments, including men who did not go overseas, reached 590,000. By March, 1918, 365,000 Canadians had left the Dominion, and 150,000 had already become casualties. It has been noted that these casualties were nearly all killed or wounded ; very few were prisoners of war. The Canadian

¹ There had been no immigration from France since the Seven Years' War. These two million French-Canadians represented the multiplication in 150 years of the 70,000 French colonists of 1760.

statistics, like those of the mother country and the other dominions, represent an achievement much in excess of what military opinion had considered possible for non-militarist peoples. In 1870 France and Germany, militarist countries with populations five and six times as great as that of Canada in 1914, had put into the field armies not greatly exceeding that of this single dominion in the Great War.

The attitude of the French-Canadians produced a flaw in Canadian unanimity. As a people they took the view that it was not their duty to help, and they resented with increasing bitterness the remonstrances of their British-born fellow-countrymen. They continually emphasized their French origin, language and culture, and yet the desperate straits of France made no more effective appeal to their sympathies than did the service of the Empire which had so scrupulously respected all their national peculiarities. Of the 365,000 who had gone overseas by March, 1918—at which date compulsory service became effective—only 16,000 were French Canadians.¹ Sir Wilfrid Laurier, their veteran political leader, indeed took the larger view and lent himself wholeheartedly to the national effort; but he did not share Sir Robert Borden's ambitions, to be considered later, for closer imperial unity, and would not countenance compulsion for military service when volunteering had produced all of which it was capable.

The original Borden ministry held office for the first three years of the war. Its premier took a leading part in the Imperial War Conference of the spring of 1917, and on his return passed an Act for compulsory service in August, an Act which was rendered largely ineffective at first by the number of exemptions permitted. In October of the same year Borden reconstituted the ministry as a National Government by including several of his Liberal opponents. Laurier and others stood aloof, and at the general election in December the National ministry obtained a good majority. It then made compulsion a reality, and the grave military events in France in the spring and early summer of 1918 had the effect of stilling controversies. Canada moved with a more united front through the defeats of the spring to the complete victory which ensued in the latter half of the year.

The people of Australia were almost entirely of British origin—to the extent of 97 per cent. as indicated by the census of 1911. Here there was a possible dividing element, not of race but of political doctrine, in the extreme sensitiveness of organized labour to any measures which might seem to infringe the privileges of the working man. At the outset this produced no breach in unanimity. Mr. Andrew Fisher, the leader of the Labour opposition in the Commonwealth Parliament, declared: "We Australians will help and defend the mother country to our last man and our last shilling." In the closing stages the Labour element, combined with other currents of opinion,

¹ *The Empire at War*, ii. pp. 57-8.

did defeat the proposals for compulsory service. But this was only after voluntary effort had produced a more magnificent achievement than anywhere else, and the country was really growing exhausted.

At the outbreak of war the government at once formed an expeditionary force of 20,000 men and placed the ships of the Commonwealth navy at the disposal of the imperial Admiralty. The troops were volunteers, for although compulsory military training had been instituted before the war, it was only for the purpose of home defence. After a couple of months the main Australian force sailed for Egypt, there to complete its training, whilst a small expedition had already captured German New Guinea and the adjacent islands. The Australian army proved its quality in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915. The terrible losses sustained, and the eventual failure and withdrawal, produced no word of recrimination and merely strengthened the determination of the Commonwealth. By August, 1915, 116,000 men had enlisted and 76,000 had gone overseas. By May, 1916, the corresponding numbers were 251,000 and 189,000. At the close of the war the total enlistments were 416,000, the total number sent overseas 332,000, and the casualties 318,000, from a population which had amounted to just under 4½ millions by the census of 1911. The proportion of enlistments to population was almost the same as in Canada, and of casualties much higher. These figures throw some light upon the spirit in which compulsion was rejected in the two referendums that were taken upon the subject. The Australian public felt that the Commonwealth had voluntarily taken its full share, and the women voters were reluctant to drive men to a duty of citizenship in which they themselves could not bear a part. The Australian soldiers in the field also voted in these referendums, and a large proportion of them cast their votes against compulsion for reasons of honour which can be imagined. It is noteworthy that Great Britain, Canada and New Zealand, which adopted compulsory service, did so by the decision of their parliaments, without holding a referendum on that point as distinct from the general national policy.

In Australia, as elsewhere, party dissensions were dropped at the beginning of the war, revived in modified form as the struggle lengthened, and resolved by the formation of a national, all-party ministry before its close. Mr. W. M. Hughes, a Labour leader of Welsh birth, pressed his way to the leading place in politics owing to his determination to throw the full weight of the country into the war. He became prime minister in 1915 and formed a coalition government of Liberal and Labour elements in 1917. A general election in that year prevented his attendance at the Imperial Conference, where Australia, for the first time, was not represented. His uncompromising views and somewhat unmeasured speech aroused opposition, particularly in his own Labour party, and there were serious strikes and labour troubles in 1917; but his decision and driving power were a great asset to the Empire.

New Zealand in 1911 had a population of just over one million, including about 50,000 Maoris. Of this number it called up 117,000 for foreign service and sent overseas 100,000, a higher proportion than that of any other dominion. This army suffered 58,000 casualties, of whom the almost incredibly small total of 356 became prisoners of war.¹ The active effort began on August 15, 1914, with the despatch of 1400 men to seize the German colony of Samoa. Two months later 8000 more left to join the Australians in Egypt. The united "Anzac" force (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) then served in Gallipoli to the end of 1915, after which New Zealand maintained a division in France and a mounted brigade in Palestine. Political parties co-operated harmoniously from the beginning and united in 1915 to form a National Government which, as Sir Joseph Ward claimed, was something more than a coalition. The flow of voluntary recruits had scarcely diminished when in 1916 New Zealand adopted compulsory service, simply as a measure of justice and of foresight for a struggle of incalculable length. The whole record was one of sane, well-educated and public-spirited democracy.

In the Union of South Africa the story was less pleasant. The rebellion of 1914 had been half-hearted, but the ill-feeling which produced it continued unabated. General Botha remained as prime minister, with a majority composed of his own South African party and of the mainly British Unionists. The Nationalists under General Hertzog did their best to thwart any active measures for the common cause, and a small body of Labour extremists created a maximum of social unrest. In these circumstances there was no possibility of compulsory service or of a united national effort. The recruiting ground for volunteers was limited to about half the white population, and the costs of the South African forces were mainly defrayed by the United Kingdom, whereas the other dominions supported their own armies. After the conquest of German South West Africa a South African Brigade, chiefly of the British element, was raised for service in France, and its casualties were made good to the end of the war. The Dutch came forward more freely for the campaign in German East Africa, where General Smuts took the command for a year from February, 1916. On his departure to attend the Imperial Conference of 1917 his place was taken by another Boer commander, General Van Deventer. The draining-off of loyalists to the front opened up the possibility of another rebellion. But Hertzog, although an avowed republican, preferred to work by constitutional methods, and de Wet made amends for his former action by discouraging the new movement. That the South African situation did not become more critical was due to the courage and activity of Botha and Smuts who, having made their decision to support the Empire, never for an instant looked back. They represented South Africa at the peace conference, and Botha died immediately after his return to his native land in 1919.

¹ *The Empire at War*, iii. 382.

Viewed proportionately, the contribution of India to the war effort was not so great as that of the dominions. Of her population of some 320 millions she put about 1,000,000 men into the field. But the comparison on this basis is quite unjust. The mass of the Indian population was ignorant of imperial and world conditions, so that its vague but undoubted loyalty could not be translated into instant, intelligent action. Large sections of the people were by long tradition unmilitary. Amongst the others religion and caste were dividing forces, whilst spontaneous effort was hampered by diversity of language and by poverty. Moreover, in military affairs British officers had always taken the lead, and the vast number of new officers demanded by a proportionate application of India's military strength was simply unprocurable at a time when unprofessional civilians had to be employed in thousands to command the platoons and companies of the mother country's forces. The native army of India did not exceed 160,000 men at the outbreak of war, and its expansion to the size it reached before the end was an achievement of quite unforeseen magnitude. The whole result was obtained by voluntary service.

The above sketch is of the total war efforts of the greater units of the Empire, viewed from the standpoint of the lands from which these efforts were organized. The record of the service of the Empire troops is the record of the whole war, too huge a subject to be entered into here. It can only be briefly said that the troops of the dominions, of India, and of the smaller colonies and dependencies, down to the very "dust of Empire" scattered through the oceans of the world, performed among them from a quarter to a third of the whole British contribution to the Allied cause. That contribution was chiefly made upon the fields of Europe, and is outside the scope of this book. What is necessary is to give some account of the conquest of the various extra-European possessions of Germany and her Turkish ally, and to show how they were disposed of at the peace settlement.


In the first weeks of the war an Australian expedition captured German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the German units of the Solomon Islands. At the same time the New Zealanders took possession of the German share of the Samoa group. These immediate successes were rendered possible by the preparedness of the Australian navy, which convoyed both expeditions, and their effect was that the German flag disappeared from the Pacific, since the German island-groups to the northward were similarly accounted for by the Japanese.

In Africa, Germany had four distinct holdings: Togoland wedged between the British Gold Coast and French Dahomey; the Cameroons, between Nigeria and French Congo; German South West Africa; and German East Africa. Togoland made little resistance. The natives were disaffected to German rule, and small mobile columns converged from British and French territory. By the end of August, 1914, the colony was a conquest. In the Cameroons the Germans were much stronger, and their territory of vast extent. At the outset they

took the offensive on the Nigerian frontier, and gained some successes. Then a joint Anglo-French attack, assisted by Belgians from the Congo, penetrated the country, and after hard fighting compelled its surrender in February, 1915. The conquest of South West Africa was delayed by the rebellion in the Union of South Africa. It was to some extent the occasion for that rebellion, for a large section of Boer opinion favoured absolute neutrality and resented Botha's determination to take an active part in the war. That determination led to the capture of the port of Luderitz in September, 1914, by an expedition which approached by sea from Cape Town. In the same month a South African force which invaded by land was defeated and driven back by the Germans. The rebellion then put a stop to operations until the following year. In January, 1915, another marine expedition captured the second German port of Swakopmund, and in February Botha arranged for a joint invasion of the interior by himself from Swakopmund, by Smuts from the Orange River, and by another column from Bechuanaland. These measures brought about the surrender of Windhoek, the German capital, in May. Some German troops still kept the field, and the last of these laid down their arms on July 9. The entire campaign had been accomplished by the forces of the Union of South Africa under their own generals. The German had made a courageous and resourceful defence, whose credit, however, they had marred by systematically poisoning wells and springs in defiance of the Geneva Convention.

German East Africa provided the most protracted of the colonial campaigns, still in progress at the conclusion of the armistice in 1918. At the beginning the Germans were stronger than their British neighbours in East Africa, and took the offensive against them without important result. A British attempt to land on the German coast at Tanga was beaten off in November, 1914, and thenceforward the affair paused until the arrival of General Smuts with adequate forces in February, 1916. Smuts and his successor Van Deventer, by operations which, had they stood alone, would have been reckoned in themselves a great war, drove the enemy out of German East Africa in 1916-17, and in December of the latter year the country was declared an Allied protectorate. This, however, was not the end, for the German commander, General von Lettow-Vorbeck, escaped southwards into Portuguese territory. He had a real hold upon the loyalty of his African troops, with whom he eluded pursuit and kept his flag flying until the end of the war.

The conquest of a great part of the Turkish Empire in Asia, constituted two of the greater campaigns of the war. It is hardly to be classed as colonial warfare, but the regions concerned, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, were part of that Near East which had filled a great place in British imperial policy in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In these efforts the Indian Army gave its greatest share of service, in conjunction with British and Australasian forces.



The Versailles Treaties allotted all these areas to their captors in the guise of mandates from the League of Nations. For mandatory as for other purposes the British dominions ranked as full members of the League. In this way Australia took over German New Guinea (renamed Papua) and the neighbouring islands, New Zealand took Samoa, and South Africa became responsible for South West Africa. Great Britain became the mandatory for German East Africa, renamed Tanganyika Territory, after a frontier strip adjoining the Congo had been allotted to Belgium. The two German West African colonies were not taken over as units. Togoland was divided between Great Britain and France, and the Cameroons became almost entirely a French mandate, with a small portion on the Nigerian frontier given to Great Britain. The latter power also accepted the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia, whilst France assumed that for Syria. The mandates were of different categories, varying with the needs of the country concerned and the state of civilization of its inhabitants. Those for comparatively advanced regions such as Palestine and Mesopotamia contemplated the eventual establishment of autonomy under the protection of the mandatory power. Those for Africa and the Pacific Islands involved control in accordance with the colonial systems of the powers undertaking them, subject to general regulations for the well-being of the natives and to reports being rendered to the League.

The constitutional development of the Empire during the Great War now claims attention. The quadrennial Imperial Conference that should have met in 1915 was postponed owing to the war, and no general meeting of imperial statesmen took place until 1917. Individual dominion premiers, however, visited England during 1914-16 and were taken fully into the confidence of the government. In December, 1916, when Mr. Asquith resigned and Mr. Lloyd George formed a new administration, one of the new premier's first announcements was that a full Imperial Conference would be summoned at an early date, to take counsel primarily upon measures for winning the war. The Conference accordingly met in 1917. It was composed, as before, of representatives from the dominions with the exception of Australia, where domestic politics claimed the presence of the prime minister and his chief colleagues; and it included for the first time the representation of India by its Secretary of State and some Indian members. The personnel of the Conference served in a double capacity. They attended the deliberations of the War Cabinet, a select body of the normal and larger British cabinet, which thus became an Imperial War Cabinet with full cognizance of the vital problems of the moment. Its deliberations could not be made public, but the Prime Minister announced that its work had been so fruitful as to warrant the continuance of the experiment, and that it would be summoned annually, or more often if the situation should demand it. At the same time the representatives attended meetings of the Imperial War Conference under the presidency of the Colonial Secretary. Some of this body's

transactions were also confidential, but many of its resolutions, having no special bearing on military matters, were published.

The most important question dealt with was that of the share of the dominions and of India in controlling foreign policy; and this necessarily involved the mechanism of the imperial constitution. The dominions, by declaring war instantly on the decision of the mother country in 1914, had proclaimed their belief in the rightness of that decision. Fully as they approved, it was, however, a decision which they had had no formal share in framing, and to which they were formally bound, whether they liked it or not, by the existing legal state of the imperial constitution. The efforts and sacrifices of the war had now achieved the complete nationhood of the dominions, and they felt that their right to decide questions of peace and war and of the policies that led to them ought to be placed on a satisfactory footing. This involved constitution-building if it was to be compatible with the continued unity of the Empire, and no one had produced an acceptable scheme for securing the desired result. Sir Joseph Ward in 1911 had proposed imperial federation and had found no support. The hearty unity produced by the war had encouraged many people to believe that federation was at last possible, and an organized group of thinkers were devoting themselves to the problem. Two books of this period deserve mention as historical documents, for they show the reaction of war efforts upon political thought in England, and, when compared with the standpoint of the present day, they show also how unreal and impermanent was the impression produced. The books referred to are *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, by Lionel Curtis, and *The Empire on the Anvil*, by W. B. Worsfold, both published in London in 1916. Both are federationist, and the second includes a sketch of a federal constitution to provide representation of the coloured as well as the white units of the Empire.

The Conference of 1917 showed plainly that dominion thought was not working on these lines. Never had pride in nationhood mounted so high, and never had it been more justly based upon achievement. The dominion spokesmen regarded control of foreign policy as the completion of autonomy and were utterly unwilling to yield it to an imperial parliament such as the federationists proposed. At the same time they were anxious to maintain and strengthen imperial unity. The two aspirations were logically incompatible, and how to reconcile them no man could say. Yet the will to reconcile them was universal, and the British habit of mind has always regarded logic as an occasionally useful servant and never as a master. There was, however, no time in 1917 to thrash out the question, and the Conference relegated it to discussion at an *ad hoc* meeting which should be held after the conclusion of the war. The resolution embodying the decision embodied the two aspirations in these words: "Any readjustment of constitutional relations [of the several parts of the Empire], while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control

of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine." Such were the terms of reference for a future constitutional conference; their fate will be described on a later page.

By another resolution the Conference of 1917 at length attained unanimity on an oft-debated matter, that of preferential trade. It agreed "that each part of the Empire, having due regard to the interests of our Allies, shall give specially favourable treatment and facilities to the produce and manufactures of other parts of the Empire." The adhesion of the mother country to this principle was a notable conversion. Whilst it has not been followed by completeness of practice, for reasons that are as weighty to-day as they were in 1903, it has given rise to an increasing number of preferences on the less essential articles of consumption, such as fruit, wine and tobacco, produced in the Empire, and on the few manufactures in which the dominions can compete with foreigners. Other decisions, and the action taken upon them, resembled the characteristic innovations of Chamberlain's development policy. On the recommendation of the Conference an Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau was established in 1918 to develop and utilize mineral wealth, and in the same year an Imperial Bureau of Mycology was founded to study the remedies for fungoid enemies of plantation crops. Similar foundations, not immediately springing from the work of this Conference, were the Imperial Shipping Board (1920) and the Empire Forestry Bureau (1923), whose names indicate the nature of their activities. The Shipping Board, in particular, has done important work on communications, and maintains direct touch with all the governments of the Empire.¹

The same dual meeting, of the Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial War Conference, was repeated in the summer of 1918. The former body disclosed nothing of its proceedings other than that it had concerned itself with the conduct of the war and the making of peace. That consummation had drawn perceptibly nearer by the time the War Cabinet broke up in the middle of August, but even then the military authorities expected to make a final campaign in 1919. The Conference, as before, published part of its transactions. In the main they were resolutions anticipating the post-war reconstruction period. It was determined that the several governments should arrange to control and allocate important raw materials produced within the Empire, and should treat in concerted manner the production of

¹ Knowles, *Overseas Empire*, pp. 43-4; a summary of the work of the Conference is in the *Colonial Office List*, and comments in Egerton, *Twentieth Century*, *passim*.

non-ferrous metals, petroleum and dyestuffs. The resolution that issued in the creation of the Imperial Shipping Board was passed, as were others dealing with cables, posts and news services. An important decision having some bearing upon Indian ambitions was that the citizens of any Empire country, including India, might be admitted to any other for purposes of education, commerce or pleasure. Many other parallel matters were dealt with, to form the subjects of ensuing legislation, and the whole record of the Conference was one of useful if not sensational work. The greater constitutional question was not touched upon in any of the published proceedings. It was an act of faith for statesmen to devote themselves to the peace-time routine of the Empire in the military circumstances of the early summer of 1918; but before they separated their faith was being justified by the presage of victory.

Fighting ended in November, 1918, and yet another Imperial Conference was at once called together. It met this time for the framing of the treaties of settlement, and soon transferred itself to Paris to form part of the great 1919 Peace Conference of all the allied powers. In pursuance, presumably, of decisions previously reached, the British Empire as a whole was represented at Paris by five statesmen, and the four dominions and India were also separately represented as national states. Since, next to the declaration of war, the negotiation of peace is the most important process of foreign policy, this arrangement conceded in practice the dominion share in foreign affairs already determined in theory. But it did so, it should be noted, in advance of those constitutional readjustments which had been adumbrated in the resolution of 1917. The consequences were important and to some extent unforeseen; but they were unavoidable, for it had been impossible to deal with a difficult constitutional problem in the midst of war, and it was out of the question to deny national status at its close to dominions which had proved themselves effective nations. The great Treaty of Versailles was therefore signed by the ministers of the dominions as equals of those of any other country concerned. Not the least significant of the signatures were those of Generals Botha and Smuts for the Union of South Africa. The subsidiary treaties of the following year were likewise accepted separately by the four dominions, and each of them became a full member of the League of Nations incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles, with individual duties and rights in accordance with the terms of the covenant.

The war and its outcome had thus revealed a profound change in the imperial constitution. The British nations had gone into the war as an Empire, its joint destiny controlled in theory and to a large extent in practice by the single government of the United Kingdom. They emerged from it as something different, something that is not quite accurately described as an alliance of independent states; for there is no treaty of alliance, as in other such unions, but only an unwritten working understanding, and there is a formal bond, of quite undefinable

nature, in the common sovereignty of the Crown. The divergence between the legal and constitutional positions was by 1919 wider than ever. Apart from the Crown, the dominion governments were not legally independent, for every one of them owed its existence to an Act of the British Parliament; and what Parliament has passed Parliament can repeal. But constitutionally, that is, practically, independence was complete. Granting this, however, there remained the fact of common citizenship and history, which provides in practice a bond much more effective than any formal instrument between nations that are foreign to one another; and this bond rested on nothing more constitutionally tangible than the sovereignty of the Crown. The position of the Crown in British nations is sufficiently well known. It acts upon the advice of its ministers, who draw their authority from popular approval. Consequently, the Crown was placed in the illogical position of being bound to take a certain action on the advice of its ministers in one unit of the Empire, and perhaps a diametrically opposite action in another.¹ To take the most obvious illustration, the Crown in Great Britain might declare war on Turkey, whilst the Crown in Canada remained at peace (as very nearly happened in 1922). There the matter rested in 1919, and there it rests to this day (1928). It has proved impossible even to find a satisfactory name for the organization above indicated. Great Britain and the non-autonomous colonies and dependencies do form an Empire and are correctly so described. Great Britain and the dominions are no longer an Empire in the same sense of the word. A title for their relationship which has come into official use is The British Commonwealth of Nations; but commonwealth, like empire, is a word whose usual sense suggests something different from the meaning here attached to it.

Speeches by dominion statesmen throw some light upon their trend of thought during and immediately after the war. In May, 1917, General Smuts, who had come to England after his successful campaign against the Germans in East Africa, laid stress upon the reality of dominion nationhood and the necessity for a method of common action: "The question is, How are you going to provide for the future government of this group of nations? . . . You do not want to standardize the nations of the British Empire; you want to develop them into greater nationhood. . . . I think that this is the fundamental fact which we have to bear in mind—that the British Empire, or the British Commonwealth of Nations, does not stand for unity, standardization or assimilation, or denationalization; but it stands for a fuller, richer, and more various life among all the nations that compose it. . . . What you want is to call together the most important statesmen of the Empire from time to time—say once a year, or as often as may be found necessary—to discuss matters which concern all parts of the Empire

¹ H. D. Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations*, London, 1920, p. 192; cf. F. W. Eggleston, "Imperial Unity and the Peace Treaty," *Quarterly Review*, April, 1921.

in common, and in order that causes of friction and misunderstanding may be removed. . . . This Imperial Council or Cabinet will not themselves exercise executive functions, but they will lay down the policy which will be carried out by the governments of the various parts of the Empire. . . . You will find that you will have built up a spirit of comradeship and a common feeling of patriotism, and that the instrument of government will not be the thing that matters so much as the spirit that actuates the whole system in all its parts. . . . Talk about the League of Nations—you are the only league of nations that has ever existed; and if the line that I am sketching here is correct, you are going to be an even greater league of nations in the future.”¹

Sir Robert Borden, prime minister of Canada, also indicated this mechanism of an Imperial Cabinet as the line of constructive advance. Speaking also in 1917, he said: “This proposal does not sacrifice the autonomy which is possessed by each of the dominions. The ministers from overseas go there as the heads of their own governments. They are responsible to their own Parliaments, as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom goes there responsible to his Parliament. . . . They meet there for the purpose of consultation, co-operation and united action; but that action can only be taken with the sanction and authority of the representatives of the various nations of the Empire, assembled in their own Parliaments.”² Mr. Hughes, of Australia, and Mr. Massey, of New Zealand, spoke in the same sense at the Imperial Conference of 1917; and the unanimous resolution of that body in favour of “continuous consultation” has already been quoted.

Then, as has been said, the momentous transactions at Versailles in 1919 forced the situation before any mechanical change in the constitution could be considered. Dominion statesmen had secured the recognition of their voices in foreign policy; they were anxious to disperse to the heavy domestic tasks that awaited them; and again it was no time to discuss constitution-building. The mood of the hour was of thankfulness and relaxation from strain, not of far-sighted preparation for a future which altered its promise from day to day in a world whose shattered elements were to re-combine in what manner no one could tell. Thus the plan of continuous consultation grew very nebulous. We may again quote General Smuts:³ “The dominions have been well launched on their great career; their status of complete nationhood has now received international recognition, and as members of the Britannic League they will henceforth go forward on terms of equal brotherhood with the other nations on the great paths of the world. The successful launching of her former colonies among the nations of the world, while they remain members of an inner

¹ Speech more fully quoted in Egerton, *Twentieth Century*, pp. 153-5.

² *Ibid.* p. 153.

³ July 18, 1919.

Britannic circle, will ever rank as one of the most outstanding achievements of British political genius. Forms and formulas may still have to be adjusted, but the real work is done."

The *nunc dimittis* tone of 1919 is in contrast with the constructive enthusiasm of 1917. The history of the subsequent decade, as will be shown, was destined to follow a middle path between the two.

CHAPTER VII

MODERN INDIA

THE collapse of the Mutiny marked the end of internal warfare in India ; from that time to our own the chief material calamities of the country have arisen from famine and plague, and in politics the chief interest has lain in the development of institutions and of a public opinion finding expression by the western methods of the press and the platform.

The first step in institutional reform was taken in 1861, three years after the assumption of sovereignty by the Crown. By the Indian Councils Act the Governor-General's executive council of five members was to be reinforced by from six to twelve additional members for legislative purposes only. These legislative members were to be nominated, not elected, but at least half of them were to be non-official persons representing various interests both European and native. Their powers were circumscribed, and the executive had always the last word in case of a difference of opinion. That, however, was scarcely likely to arise in view of the composition of the body. At the same time Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the North West Provinces, and the Punjab were given legislative councils for provincial affairs constituted on similar lines to the central body. Under these arrangements India continued to be governed for thirty years to come.

Lord Canning, the Governor-General of the Mutiny, continued as Viceroy until 1862, when he retired, worn out with overwork. His successors were Lord Elgin, of Canadian fame, who died in 1863, and Sir John (afterwards Lord) Lawrence, whose statesmanship had kept the Punjab loyal during the Mutiny. Lawrence ruled from 1863 to 1869, and was followed by Lord Mayo, who was assassinated by a convict in the Andaman Islands in 1872. Then followed Lord Northbrook (1872-6) and Lord Lytton, with whom the question of Afghanistan and the north-west frontier awoke to new life and led to transactions that have been described in a previous chapter.¹

In the present account we are concerned with the internal record of India. For the twenty years that followed the Mutiny it is fairly barren in matters of first-class political importance, and the interest lies chiefly in administration and in social and economic developments. The status of the Indian princes, their right to adopt heirs, and the

¹ See above, pp. 188-9.

integrity of their territories were confirmed in accordance with the Allahabad proclamation. The Indian government constituted itself their adviser, and intervened on occasion to protect their subjects from ill-usage. In 1875, for example, the Gaekwar of Baroda was deposed for flagrant misconduct after his case had been investigated by a tribunal of which some members were his fellow princes. But there was no annexation of his state as there would have been under Wellesley or Dalhousie. A few years later the state of Mysore was restored to its ruling family, who had been dispossessed for misgovernment in 1831.

Under the Company's rule in the first half of the nineteenth century the greater part of the revenue had been expended in military undertakings. These were no longer necessary after 1858 for the maintenance of the internal peace of India, an improvement which was largely due to the expansion of the railway system. Railways rendered small bodies of troops effective over wide areas, and deprived rebellious movements of any hope of success. A further result was the demilitarization of large sections of the population who had formerly had warlike traditions. As the army came to exist more exclusively for the defence of the frontier, it was recruited more and more from the Punjab and other frontier regions, and the one-time fighting peoples of central and southern India became civilian in their way of life. The effect of this upon India's war effort in 1914-18 has already been noted. Indians of to-day resent this change, and talk of remodelling the educational system so as to revive the military spirit.¹

The railways had a further effect in stimulating trade and linking the masses of India with the general economic movements of the world. Here as elsewhere they slowly induced the peasant to produce for distant markets instead of working for his immediate subsistence, always a precarious mode of life. The American Civil War of 1861-5 caused a shortage of cotton and stimulated its production in India. The boom collapsed at the end of the war, but the profits had been considerable, and part of them had been invested in cotton mills at Bombay.² The industry—the beginning of the industrial revolution in India—proved permanent and has greatly extended its scope in the past generation. Other features of modern industrialism began slowly to arise from the use of railway transport. As in England half a century earlier, the peasants became more exclusively cultivators and gave up their domestic handicrafts, for which the purchase of factory-made articles was substituted. But this result in so conservative a land as India was of very slow accomplishment.

The greatest social benefit conferred by the railways has been the mitigation of the death-roll caused by famines. These famines are due to the periodical failure of the monsoon rainfall. They affect areas of large or small extent, but never the whole sub-continent. The huge

¹ J. T. Gwynn, *Indian Politics*, London, 1924, pp. 31-2.

² Knowles, *Overseas Empire*, p. 316.

death-roll of former days was caused by the impossibility of moving foodstuffs in bulk into the stricken regions from those which had a surplus, and also by the fact that before the general pacification no government had sufficient authority to organize such a work. These points were illustrated by the famine which occurred in Orissa in 1866. There was then no railway communication with the regions of comparative plenty in northern and central India, and the Orissa coast had no harbours through which supplies could have been imported by sea. The government also, it is evident, had not yet realized its responsibilities. The result was that from one to two million people perished.¹ Two years later there was a famine in the more accessible area of Rajputana. Here the government acted in time on the formulated principle that its duty was to provide relief, and the calamity was much less extensive. The question of famines may conveniently be followed through to the present day. In 1873-4 there was a crop failure in Bihar and Bengal, where the density of population threatened a great catastrophe. Lord Northbrook, the then Viceroy, imported supplies of rice from Burma and distributed them on a lavish scale. He was criticized for over-expenditure, since the local shortage turned out to be less than had been anticipated, but from the humanitarian standpoint his error was on the right side; only as the state gained greater experience did it become possible to strike a juster balance between the alternatives of waste and want. The next crisis of this kind fairly overwhelmed the government. In 1876-8 the greatest famine in history prevailed over the whole of southern and parts of central India. Lord Lytton, Northbrook's successor, went to work with misjudged caution, inspired by the criticisms of 1873-4. His measures failed, but it is true to say that no expenditure of the resources then available would have been adequate to cope with a calamity so widespread and so prolonged; for the monsoon failed in two successive years. The government ultimately spent £11,000,000 in relief, but 5 million people died.²

The lesson was taken to heart, and Lytton instituted a systematic study of famine conditions leading to the elaboration of a definite technique of relief measures, a work which was continued by his successor, Lord Ripon. The result was the Famine Code whereby £1,500,000 of surplus revenue were to be raised annually, partly for use as a relief fund and partly for expenditure on railways and canals in the threatened areas. Relief measures were also thought out in advance on the principle that the able-bodied were to be relieved only in payment for their labour on public works of the kind which would avert future famines.³ More recent famines have been greatly modified in their severity by the application of this code. In a scarcity of 1896 $\frac{3}{4}$ million people died, but 4 millions were saved by relief. In 1899-1900 the figures were 1 million and 6 millions respectively. In 1908 there was a failure of crops in the United Provinces, which was relieved

¹ *Hist. Geog. of the British Empire, India*, (by P. E. Roberts, 1923), vol. ii. pp. 403-4.

² Roberts, *op. cit.* pp. 452-3.

³ *Ibid.*, and Knowles, p. 353.

without great loss of life by rail-borne wheat from the Punjab. In 1911, 1913-14 and 1918 the record was the same, and the modern mobility of finance and supplies may be reckoned to have conquered the problem in its worst form. Concurrently with the improvement of communications there has been a provision of more ample stocks of grain. The Punjab rivers are fed from the Himalayan snows and do not depend on the monsoon rainfall; and the construction of a vast system of irrigation canals, there and elsewhere, has increased and steadied the output of wheat.¹ None but an administration of the modern European type could have combined all the factors of this great problem, and until it is certain that Indians are capable of maintaining the system thus created we have in this matter alone a complete justification for the continuance of British authority.

In other directions the post-Mutiny administrations did steady progressive work. Lord Canning established examining universities at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, empowered to grant degrees for approved knowledge, although not themselves to provide training. The object was to stimulate educational effort in independent schools and colleges and so to raise the level of instruction in the country at large. The results were not altogether good, for as soon as it was realized that diplomas had a money value in procuring employment, true scholarship was ousted by mere cramming for results. This degradation of learning is to some extent inevitable wherever learning extends beyond the bounds of the leisured classes. It is much in evidence in modern England, but in India it became particularly naked and unashamed and called at a later time for a highly controversial reform. Municipal administration was made more efficient, particularly under Lord Ripon (1880-4), who extended the elective principle in local affairs. His viceroyalty also saw much work done for school education, and in 1881 he passed the first Indian Factory Act to regulate the labour of women and children under new industrial circumstances. Much detailed work on land tenures culminated in this decade with laws to protect tenants in their holdings and to fix rents—the long-delayed complement of Cornwallis's Permanent Settlement in Bengal, which had established the rights of the landowners in relation to the government. Sanitary reform was no less steady and effective. In 1863 Florence Nightingale wrote to Sir John Lawrence: "Pray think of us and of our sanitary things on which such millions of lives and health depend." The prayer was heeded, and the cleansing of Indian cities began. There was much to do, for the sanitary condition of such places as Calcutta and Bombay was terrible. There were no enclosed drains and no organized water supply. The Ganges, in every town through which it flowed, was enriched with sewage and dead bodies, and its waters were the only drink of millions. Administration gradually conquered these conditions and reduced the urban death rate. Among British troops stationed in India the deaths were 20 per thousand

¹ Knowles, pp. 327, 351-67.

Dufferin's policy was "to give quickly and with a good will, whatever it may be possible or desirable to accord; to announce that these concessions must be accepted as a final settlement of the Indian system for the next ten or fifteen years; and to forbid mass meetings and incendiary speechifying."¹ That, boiled down to the formula "concession with repression," has been the policy ever since, except perhaps under Lord Curzon. There is, in fact, no other policy permanently possible unless government is to merge into frank despotism in an India which is continually growing conscious of new abilities and new ambitions. To carry the policy into effect, however, with a just balance between its two aspects, has been a thing more easily said than done. As a first instalment there was passed in 1892, under the viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne, a new Indian Councils Act. By this measure the Governor-General's legislative council was extended to include the executive (six members, including the commander-in-chief) and from ten to sixteen nominated (including some native) members. The provincial legislative councils were in like manner to consist of the several executives with the addition of from fifteen to twenty nominated members, according to the size of the province. All the above bodies were given the new power of discussing and interpellating on financial proposals, but not of voting upon them. It was also placed within the Viceroy's discretion to frame rules for the choice of certain of the additional members by elective methods. All this amounts to very little when compared with European political liberties, but it shows that the government of India, although remaining autocratic, was making a tentative step in the direction of affording a political training to the inhabitants.

Indian life continued outwardly placid for some years longer, although beneath the surface ugly influences were at work which passed with little recognition at the time. The assassination for political motives of two British officials at Poona in 1897 was an early disturbing symptom. Famines, as had been shown, broke out from time to time, and the efforts of the administration alleviated but did not always prevent a terrible mortality. Plague, on the other hand, appeared as a new disease in 1896, and medical science has never been able effectually to stamp it out. An illiterate populace was naturally prone to attribute the calamity to the sins of its rulers, and insistence upon isolation and sanitary measures undoubtedly gave deep offence.

The viceroyalty of Lord Curzon (1898-1905) coincided with the open manifestation of long hidden tendencies in Indian life, marking a definite breach between the India of the nineteenth and the India of the twentieth century. From the period of his rule we may date the opening of the modern cycle of active unrest. It was undoubtedly challenged by his masterful nature, which preferred action to talk and would not gladly pause to reason with unpractical critics. Nevertheless in the opinion of his historian it is unfair to blame Lord Curzon for the

¹ Quoted, Roberts, *op. cit.* p. 498.

ebullitions which ensued, for they would inevitably have occurred under a less resolute ruler.¹ It will be convenient before considering the cause of unrest to summarize the chief events of Curzon's administration. The North-West frontier had for many years been a source of trouble. Afghanistan, it is true, had improved in internal order under the strong rule of Abdurrahman, and when he died in 1901 his successor, Habibullah, mounted the throne without a civil conflict, an unprecedented event in recent Afghan history. Both these princes remained on good terms with India, but between their effective jurisdiction and that of the Punjab lay the mountain belt of independent tribesmen whom neither power had been able to keep permanently in check. Curzon tackled the problem in 1901 by creating the new North-West Frontier Province, partly from Punjab territory and partly from the new acquisitions of preceding years. In doing so he introduced a policy of enlisting tribal levies under British officers and of making them responsible for the peace of the frontier, with the regular forces held in reserve on the edge of the plains. The new province was a military success, with increased efficiency and decreased expenditure; but its creation was resented in the Punjab, some of whose inhabitants were transferred to a less liberal administration than that to which they had been accustomed.

In education Lord Curzon was confronted with abuses of ancient origin and growing powers for evil. Examination tests had become the sole method of attaining official employment. The universities were therefore developing into mere cramming institutions affording no training of character or outlook upon life. The wastage of effort was enormous; in some of them three-fourths of the students failed to take a degree, mainly owing to the inefficiency of the schools in which they received their preliminary education. Lord Curzon after prolonged study of the question passed his Universities Act in 1904, with the object of increasing the real value of the university course and deterring unfit candidates from entering upon it. The details of the measure gave genuine concern to some who failed to understand its objects, and the most bitter offence to large numbers of persons who saw their vested interests threatened. Finally, in 1904-5, the Viceroy carried through the partition of the unwieldy province of Bengal. Its eastern regions had been neglected by the overworked provincial government, and were probably the most backward area in India. The partition made a new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam with the sole object of securing better administration. Meanwhile Lord Kitchener, as commander-in-chief, had been remodelling the Indian army. His labours ultimately brought him into collision with the Viceroy on a fundamental question. Briefly, the issue was whether the military were to be simply the expert advisers of the civil power, or whether

¹ Lovat Fraser's *India under Curzon and After*, London, 1911, *passim*. The second volume of Lord Ronaldshay's *Life of Curzon* (1928) was unfortunately not available before this chapter went to press.

they were, in time of peace, to be uncontrolled by it in policy and expenditure. In England and the white dominions the question had been answered in the former sense from the days of the Stuarts. The imperial government placed India in a different category. They supported Kitchener, and Curzon resigned (1905.)

The causes of modern unrest in India have been variously stated. That which was formerly given the chief place—the spread of western education in a soil unprepared for it—now recedes somewhat into the background. It is true that many Indians educated in Europe or in European institutions in India have eagerly adopted the revolutionary doctrines and methods of propaganda so prevalent in the past twenty years. They have perverted the liberty of the press and the platform by reckless campaigns against all government measures, good and bad, by exalting violence as preferable to law, and by instigating resort to the pistol and the bomb in such general terms as to leave them for the most part immune from the retribution which has fallen upon their unhappy disciples whom they have goaded to translate theory into practice. To this extent western education is to blame; in India, as in Russia and other countries, it has produced a common impulse to destroy liberty in the name of liberty, to substitute the fantastic tyranny of zealots and enthusiasts for the alleged tyranny of those trained administrators who alone can hold our complicated social mechanism together. In the western democracies wherein education is open to all, and with it the opportunity of rising in the social scale, such doctrines spend much of their force in vain; in illiterate and priest-ridden communities they constitute a terrible danger. The gulf between the half-instructed and the uninstructed is immense, and the former, however unbalanced, can impose their will upon the latter. But in India high authorities tell us that the ill-considered education of a minority is not the real cause of revolt.¹ That cause lies rather in the slow but steady swell of resentment through all Asia against western civilization and western dominance. In Abyssinia in 1896 there occurred what may prove to have been one of the decisive events in the world's history, when a disciplined and equipped Italian army was rolled up and slaughtered in the open field by the attack of a native force. The scene was in Africa, but the effect upon Asia was far-reaching. Eight years later came the victories of Japan over Russia, and the fact became patent that neither by land nor sea is the European by virtue of his race invincible. Asia was quick to assimilate the revelation, and in India it gave new life to views which hitherto had been somewhat hopelessly advocated. The conception took shape of an Indian society maintaining itself by western mechanism indeed, but upon principles of caste and religion essentially conservative and native to the soil. High university attainments and the cult of ancient deities were to go hand in hand.

¹ See Sir V. Chirol's *Indian Unrest*, London, 1910; V. A., Smith's *Indian Constitutional Reform*, Oxford, 1919; and J. T. Gwynn's *Indian Politics*, London, 1924.

The regions of India most affected were the western Deccan, Bengal and the Punjab. In the former, memories of the Maratha warrior kings and of Brahman statesmen as the powers behind the throne were still vivid. At Poona, the Peshwa's former capital, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, "the father of Indian unrest," became prominent in the nineties, and carried on an increasingly violent anti-British campaign until his trial and imprisonment for sedition in 1908. His punishment was not an autocratic reprisal for an academic offence, for his newspapers were directly responsible for assassination. The movement spread from the Deccan to Bengal, where Lord Curzon's educational reforms tended to remove university control from incompetent hands. The storm broke in the year following the Act for that purpose, and the projected partition of the province was made its pretext. The Bengalis suddenly discovered that they were a Hindu nation, although they had hitherto taken little care for the eastern region where there were a large number of Mohammedans in the population. Here again a violent newspaper campaign produced a crop of shootings and bomb outrages. Constructively the agitation took two forms, a demand for "swaraj" or self-government and an advocacy of "swadeshi" or the promotion of home industries by the boycott of British manufactures. Mingled with these political considerations was a great deal of religious fervour which leavened the whole. In the Punjab, after half a century of tranquil loyalty, the disturbance broke out in 1907. The province had suffered from famine and plague, and economic changes inevitably depressed the interests of certain classes. These misfortunes gave point to the general movement of revolt against western influence shared with the rest of India. "Arya (*i.e.* India) for the Aryans," became as elsewhere a popular cry, and seditious books and newspapers its methods of exposition. The deportation of Lajpat Rai, a prominent ringleader, checked the agitation, and by 1910 the more violent manifestations of discontent had temporarily subsided throughout India. During all this period the Indian princes had been firmly on the side of the government; some of them indeed had been as bitterly attacked as the British officials. The Mohammedans also had kept aloof from sedition, and of the Hindu population the vast majority had been unaffected. Nevertheless, the importance of such movements is not to be estimated by the number of persons taking part in them. Most revolutions have been carried out by minorities.

In England a Liberal government came into power at the close of 1905, and Lord Morley, a life-long Radical and a deep student of history, took office as Secretary for India. His policy was one of repression of unconstitutional violence, whether in word or deed, accompanied by concession to all legitimate aspirations to reform. His long experience and learning gave peculiar weight to his views. "It is an essential condition of the reform policy," he wrote in 1908, "that the Imperial supremacy should in no degree be compromised"; and in an address to the House of Lords he said, "We are watching a great

and stupendous process, the reconstruction of a decomposed society. . . . We have now, as it were, before us in that vast congeries of people we call India, a long slow march in uneven stages through all the centuries from the fifth to the twentieth. Stupendous indeed, and to guide that transition with sympathy, political wisdom, and courage, with a sense of humanity, duty, and national honour, may well be called a glorious mission.”¹ Lord Minto, the new Viceroy, worked in harmony with these declarations.

By his Indian Councils Act of 1909 Lord Morley completed the first stage of a new series of reforms. They included the appointment of one Indian member each to the Viceroy's executive council, and to the executive councils of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, and of two Indian members to the Secretary of State's council in London. The Act also greatly extended the size and scope of the legislative councils, that for the whole Indian Empire being raised to a maximum of sixty members; and those for the provinces being in general considerably more than doubled. On all these councils except that of the governor-general the non-official members became a majority, and the number of those elected was multiplied by four. The electorates were arranged so as to give representation to various classes, industrial interests and religions, and not on a flat qualification as in Europe. The legislative councils received enlarged powers of criticizing government proposals, both financial and general, but the executive retained the right to disregard their advice should it see fit. The reform was therefore in the direction of a representative, but not by any means of responsible, government. A Press Act followed to give effect to the complementary repressive side of the Morley policy, still unfortunately necessary.

The reforms of 1909, avowedly not to be understood as final, served to separate the sheep from the goats among the Indian Nationalists. Moderate men could work henceforward hand in hand with the government, and irreconcilables who refused to be satisfied with anything short of independence were now clearly distinguished from the mass. An opportunity for the display of Indian loyalty to the throne, often co-existing with hostility towards its servants, was afforded in 1911. King George V. shortly after his coronation journeyed to India, being the first British sovereign to set foot upon its soil. At a great Durbar at Delhi he received the homage of his Indian subjects, and the occasion was taken for announcing that Delhi was to resume its ancient position as the capital of India, and also that certain provincial rearrangements were to be made. The Bengals were reunited under one administration, Assam became a separate province, and Behar, Chota Nagpur and Orissa were united to form another. An unfortunate event marred the state entry of the Viceroy (Lord Hardinge) into Delhi in the following year, when an attempt to assassinate him, although it failed in its main object, caused the deaths of numerous innocent persons.

¹ Quoted in Chirol, *op. cit.* p. 175.

Affairs had reached this stage when the Great War of 1914 strengthened the position and the claims of India. Her soldiers fought not merely for the continuance of Indian progress but for the interests of the Empire as a whole, all equally menaced in the event of defeat. Legislation in 1915 and 1916 extended the previous concessions. In 1917 Mr. Edwin Montagu, Lord Morley's successor, made a notable pronouncement in Parliament to the effect that British policy in India would tend henceforward in the direction of self-government and responsible government within the Empire. In pursuance of this pledge Mr. Montagu, in conjunction with Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy from 1915, drew up a Report upon Indian Constitutional Reforms. The Report, as a basis for subsequent legislation, was published in 1918, and its terms foreshadowed a gradual movement towards responsible government. It evoked much criticism and the restatement of awkward facts concerning racial, religious and caste divisions among the peoples of India, whom it is unsafe to regard as a single nationality.¹ Experience of responsible government throughout the world shows that long training in political forbearance is essential to its favourable working. Lacking that, it may be made an engine of tyranny as effective as an autocratic system. Homogeneity in language, race, religion, social organization and ideals is almost as important, although by resort to the federal device it may survive the want of some at least of these advantages. In Great Britain, where the institution has yielded the most harmonious results, it has depended for its efficiency upon the two-party system, and of this there seems to be little prospect in India. The existence of numerous mutually hostile groups in the legislative assembly renders the executive dependent upon them unstable. Such considerations warned the statesmen of 1918 not to expect an immediate era of peace to proceed from the new policy, even when responsible government should have extended beyond the very limited scope then contemplated. Nevertheless, by publishing the Montagu-Chelmsford Report they took a momentous decision, and one from which there could be no turning back. The essentials of that document are embodied in the preamble to the Government of India Act, which received the royal assent on December 23, 1919. It runs as follows :

"Whereas it is the declared policy of Parliament to provide for the increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian administration and for the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the Empire :

"And whereas progress in giving effect to this policy can only be achieved by successive stages, and it is expedient that substantial steps in this direction should now be taken :

¹ See particularly Ernest Barker, *The Future Government of India*, London, 1919 ; and Smith, *Constitutional Reform*, already cited.

“And whereas the time and manner of each advance can be determined only by Parliament, upon whom responsibility lies for the welfare and advance of the Indian peoples :

“And whereas the action of Parliament in such matters must be guided by the co-operation received from those on whom new opportunities of service will be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence be reposed in their sense of responsibility :

“And whereas concurrently with the gradual development of self-governing institutions in the Provinces of India it is expedient to give to those provinces in provincial matters the largest measure of independence of the Government of India, which is compatible with the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities :

“Be it therefore enacted, etc. ”

The Act proceeds to set up a two-chamber legislature for India, consisting of a Council of State of 60 members, some nominated, some elected, not more than 20 being officials ; and of a Legislative Assembly of 140, of whom 100 are to be elected and 40 nominated, only 26 of the latter being officials. The maximum duration of the Council of State is to be five years, and of the Assembly three, but either may be dissolved sooner by the Governor-General. In case of a disagreement between them the Governor-General may take the vote of a joint sitting. The Governor-General's executive council is to be constituted as under previous Acts, except that the limitation of its numbers is removed. There is no provision for its responsibility to the Assembly, but every one of its members shall be nominated to a seat in one or other chamber of the legislature. In financial matters appropriation proposals must originate with the Governor-General, and certain fixed items of expenditure (salaries, interest on debt, and the like) are reserved from discussion by the Legislative Assembly. Other expenditure is to be submitted to it in the form of demands for grants. But the Governor-General may enforce a grant which has been refused by the Assembly. General legislation will normally pass through both chambers as in the British practice, but in case of emergency the Governor-General may legislate without their consent, and he may also veto the introduction or discussion of a bill on the ground that it affects the safety or tranquillity of British India.

It is in its provisions for the provincial governments that the Act definitely introduces the principle of responsibility. Eight leading provinces (Bengal, Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, Central Provinces, and Assam) are to be governed for local purposes each by a governor, executive council and legislative council. The latter is to consist of the members of the executive council and of members nominated or elected in addition (ranging from 125 in Bengal to 53 in Assam). Not more than 20 per cent. of the whole are to be

officials, and at least 70 per cent. are to be elected. The duration of the legislative council is to be three years, but it may be dissolved earlier. Business is to be divided into reserved subjects and transferred subjects. The former shall be administered by the governor and his executive council; the latter by the governor acting on the advice of ministers who must be elected members of the legislature, must not be members of the executive council, and shall hold office during the governor's pleasure. The transferred subjects, for which responsible administration is thus provided, form at present a limited list, but one which is capable of extension. As in the Australian Commonwealth, a specified list of subjects is reserved to the central government. Provincial governors have the same powers of veto and emergency legislation as the Governor-General.

A final provision of the Act emphasized its provisional and experimental nature. To assist in the future revision and development of the constitution it was enacted that a Commission should sit after the lapse of ten years to examine and report upon the working of the new mechanism and to suggest such changes as should be necessary.

So began the greatest and most difficult undertaking in constructive politics that the world had seen. It began amid unfavourable omens. Conservative opinion, both in England and India, regarded it as reckless and unnecessary. There was much to be said for that view, but its exponents did not fairly face its implications. British rule, by its own methods and policy, had created a new India and had to abide by the consequences. That new India, the product of peace, personal liberty, education, sanitation and industrial development, would not willingly submit to undiluted external authority. It was therefore a question of admitting Indians to share authority or of governing them by despotic force, not decently veiled and lying in reserve, but actively and continuously applied. The second alternative might be materially possible, but morally it was impossible. The people of England would have given no mandate for it; the whole national genius, from the close of the eighteenth century, has revolted against any suspicion of playing the tyrant. It will support firm measures of justice, but if the measures fail to secure justice and degenerate into cruelty it will not support them. To put down an armed rebellion like the Mutiny of 1857 was allowable, for it could be definitely accomplished by an adequate use of force, and there was an end of the matter. To coerce a population resisting by inchoate civil methods offered no prospect of finality but only of crime and misery illimitable, in which the characters of rulers and ruled would alike deteriorate. That could not be faced, and so a measure of political concession had to be granted. The measure actually given seemed to strike a fair balance between the claims of order and liberty.

The condition of India had changed for the worse between the Report of 1918 and the passing of the Act in 1919. The close of the war, as everywhere, brought disillusionment, discontent and the play of lower


motives. No man is more thoroughly disgusted with his government and resentful of civil authority than the returned soldier whose loyalty under arms has been exemplary. In the Punjab there were many such, and its mixed population of Mohammedans, Sikhs and Hindus became the storm-centre of 1919. Mohammedans were indignant at the conquest and prospective partition of Turkey, for which they blamed British policy, oblivious of the fact that Great Britain would have been only too thankful to remain at peace with Turkey had the Turks permitted it. In the spring of 1919 there was a short though sharp war with Afghanistan, which further unsettled Moslem opinion. The Sikhs, proud of their martial traditions, were also unruly and inclined to magnify their military importance. The Punjab in consequence was in a state of incipient revolt, government was challenged, and its servants could not perform their duties in security. So arose the tragedy of Amritsar, where a mass meeting was held in defiance of prohibition and refused to disperse; whereupon the military commander, General Dyer, opened fire and cleared the ground with the loss of many lives. His critics have argued that he was needlessly severe, his defenders, that he nipped a revolution in the bud. It is a matter of opinion, incapable of proof. The general was censured and his career blighted, but no one can be sure that his action had not saved many thousands of lives through the length and breadth of India.

Events such as this did not augur well for the smooth working of the constitution. The Nationalists, in fact, refused to be satisfied with it. They did not, however, act in the manner of a European opposition, by seeking election to the councils and pushing their cause in them. Neither did they adopt a course of violent resistance. Instead they listened to a new doctrine of non-cooperation, preached by Mr. Gandhi, an Indian recently returned from South Africa. Gandhi forbade his followers to take any part in the government as established by the Act of 1919; he urged them also to boycott its works as far as possible, its schools, its law courts, its railways; and above all he denounced any resort to violence. He was a man of high personal character, sincere and simple-minded, although his creed was perhaps too exalted for the ordinary man to follow. His doctrines were more enthusiastically acclaimed than practised, but he did India a service by seeking to lift Nationalism to a higher plane than that of riot and bloodshed. The non-cooperation movement did not prevent many moderate politicians from serving on the councils, and after three years it gradually subsided. Since that time public order has improved, and opposition has taken constitutional forms. At the present date (1928) the Commission provided by the Act of 1919 is studying the question of government, but its report is not yet available.


In writing of modern India, it is hardly possible to avoid error, for authoritative opinions are completely at variance on almost every important question. A valuable symposium of views expressed by all sorts and conditions of men in India is to be found in Mr. J. T. Gwynn's

Indian Politics, already cited. The general impression derivable from it is that the Nationalists (in 1922-3) were resolute for complete swaraj or home rule, but not for separation from the Empire; that they admitted the grave difficulties and dangers attending the change, but were prepared to risk them; and that they resented the idea that they were asking for favours, considering rather that they were demanding rights. The risks of complete autonomy admit of little doubt. The strifes of religions, castes and economic interests are too intense to be held in check by democratically elected politicians, and the administrative machine is directly responsible for the lives of millions to an extent unknown in countries that have a higher standard of social comfort. There is in fact every indication that if the British government were to lay down its trust the result would be calamitous, and that not only to the peoples of India but to the world at large. The results of Asiatic swaraj approached by way of democratic theory are evident in China, where the overthrow of autocracy has created misery for the victims of the experiment and a chronic nuisance to the world. Reform must be realistic and combine the lessons of China with those of Japan.

INDIAN EMPIRE, INCLUDING FEUDATORY STATES, 815 MILLIONS



The Growth of Populations in the British Empire and the United States 1600-1920



CHAPTER VIII

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

THE purpose of this final chapter is to survey the general development of the Empire and the rapid transformation of its constitution in the decade that has followed the close of the Great War. It will be convenient first to give some statistics of population representing the latest figures available in the summer of 1928. The Dominion of Canada had a total population in 1901 of 5,371,000; of 7,206,000 in 1911; and of 8,788,000 in 1921. That date is that of the last census, but an estimate of June, 1927, gives 9,159,000. Australia in 1901, 1911 and 1921 had populations of 3,773,000, 4,455,000, and 5,436,000 respectively—and an estimate for December, 1927, is 6,234,000. South Africa took its first census as a dominion in 1911. There were then 1,276,000 people of European descent, and 4,697,000 natives. A census of Europeans only in 1921 gave a total of 1,521,000; the latest estimate (for May, 1926) is of 1,672,000 Europeans and 5,862,000 natives. New Zealand contained 772,000 people in 1901; 1,065,000 in 1911; 1,275,000 in 1921; and (by estimation) 1,438,000 in December 1927.¹ These figures include the Maoris, who number not many more than 50,000. The four trans-oceanic dominions thus have a combined white population of 18,503,000, of which Canada accounts for nearly half. In addition to this Newfoundland had in 1921 a population of 262,000. The white man elsewhere in the Empire, of whom the majority are not permanent residents, probably amount to about a quarter of a million. India had in 1921 a total of 319 millions, of whom nearly one-fourth were in the native states. The British dependencies in tropical Africa contain between them some 38,000,000 native inhabitants, the most populous unit being Nigeria with 19,000,000. Ceylon had in 1921 a population of 4,500,000, and the British West Indies a combined total of slightly over 2,000,000, for the most part black or coloured.

The period under review is so recent that its history is not yet written and it is not possible to discern the permanent significance of events. So far as it concerns the domestic record of the dominions there are, however, some tendencies that may be broadly indicated. Canada since the war has rapidly expanded its population, its agriculture and

¹ The figures for 1926-7 have been supplied by the several Dominion Government Offices in London.

its industrial activities in a proportioned manner which fulfils its early promise of growing into a completely equipped modern nation. In its recruitment of inhabitants from without, Canada is following the nineteenth-century example of the United States by admitting masses of immigrants of different blood and speech from those of the existing community. The immediate need is of new hands to labour, and from the purely economic standpoint it seems desirable to open the country to those who will not be fastidious or insistent upon a high standard of comfort. Hence the Slavonic element among the newcomers is large, and the total of non-British exceeds the total of British immigrants. For the eight years 1919 to 1926 the average annual number of new arrivals in Canada was as follows: British, 51,000; from United States, 27,000; from other countries, 32,000. But these averages do not reveal the whole truth, for at the beginning of the period the American immigrants greatly exceeded those from other foreign countries, whilst at its close the reverse was true. For the eight months, April-November 1926, for example, the arrivals were: British, 41,000; from U.S.A., 16,000; from other countries, 51,000.¹ The conclusion is that Canada is allowing herself to become a second melting-pot of mixed European elements, just when the United States is realizing that she has carried that policy too far for her own well-being. In both countries the temptation was economic, for big business requires easily handled labour. In both the penalties are, or are likely to be, social and political; Americans of the original stock are awaking to the fact that they have failed to assimilate the incoming multitudes and are now a minority in their own country. French and British Canada are heading in the same direction. That these facts are widely known constitutes the best ground of hope for a change of policy ere it is too late. The economic tendency since the war has been for Canadian trade with the United States to increase and for that with Great Britain relatively to decrease, whilst a very great proportion of the new capital required for rapid development has been supplied by American investors. It does not follow, however, that political affinities run on economic lines. The observed facts of the modern world show that there is far less connection between the two than was formerly believed, by the Chamberlain school, for example, of thirty years ago. Canada's political trend is not that of fusion with the United States. It is that of national autonomy, and in her relations with the Empire since the close of the war she has been prominent among the dominions for insistence upon every jot and scruple of autonomous observance. Canadian insistence upon the solidarity of the British Commonwealth has not been so pronounced, but in this matter it is doubtless felt that actions are weightier than words.

Australian national development has run on quite different lines from that of Canada. Canadian political thought is individualist, Australian is socialist. Government action has reflected the national

¹ Sir J. A. R. Marriott, *Empire Settlement*, Oxford, 1927, pp 67-8.

predilection, and Australia has therefore refused to become a melting-pot for new elements which would lower the high standard of comfort demanded by her democracy. Further than that, she has been at pains to discourage the immigration of British people who would be likely to compete in urban industries and has welcomed only those who will work upon the land, where native Australians are not so eager as formerly to establish themselves. Australia is an outstanding example of a world-wide tendency among civilized peoples, that of deserting the countryside and congregating in cities. For the wage-labourer the superior comfort and freedom of city life has obvious attractions, but even in countries which offer good prospects of landownership the lure of the city often proves superior. It is possible that this phase has now reached its zenith, for rapid transport and telephonic communication bid fair to revolutionize the amenities of country residence. Australia realizes that the matter is vital for her. She is determined to remain white and select. In the long run she can only do so by occupying her territory, failing which others will challenge her right to it. Up to the present, immediate comfort has outweighed future security, and immigration since the war has been scanty. That is as far as the record now runs, but it is evidently in an unfinished chapter. In another respect Australia offers a contrast to Canada; her maritime interests are much more prominent. Inhabited Australia is essentially a coastline, whilst Canada is continental. Australia therefore gives play to inherited British instincts in developing sea-borne trade and linking herself with her own immediate dependencies and the island units of the Empire in the Pacific. The instinct is sound, for sea-power is the ultimate defence of white Australia, and the time may come when she will have to provide the greater part of it herself.

In each of the dominions it is noticeable that the cataclysm of the war has failed to modify the corporate character and the national attitude towards the Empire; if anything the effect has been to intensify such characteristics. Canada, since the war as before it, has been individualistic, markedly unsentimental, and very jealous of the sanctity of the dominion status—the reaction of the British temperament to the most rigorous climate to which it has been called upon to adapt itself. Australia entered the war as a state of socialist tendencies and emerged from it more socialistic than ever. In peace, Australian citizenship is apt to emphasize rights rather than duties, but war demonstrated that the sense of duty was unimpaired. Australia has in general been more disposed than Canada to seek close economic relations with Great Britain, but always on the understanding that business is business and that its essence is bargaining. New Zealand in like manner emphasizes, as she has always done, the community of ideals and loyalties that runs effective but unexpressed elsewhere. She glories in being the Britain of the South and, trusting to her identity of outlook with the mother country, has not been insistent upon constitutional hair-splitting or a too exact *quid pro quo* in mutual exchange of facilities.

As a recent writer puts it: "Whether we regard her lovely and home-like scenery, her splendid sons and daughters, the magnificent contribution they made to the victory won in the Great War, the sacrifices they gladly make to maintain a New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, the preferences they give to English trade, the welcome they offer to English settlers—one conclusion emerges: New Zealand is 'British to the core.'"¹ Such a country is rightly jealous of the quality of those she admits to her citizenship, and her post-war immigration policy has been to accept British settlers carefully selected for type and age, and with their characters vouched for by a system of nomination by established New Zealanders. Having admitted them, she provides for their welfare until they have had time to adapt themselves to fulfil their parts in the life of the nation. This, of course, applies to those who receive assisted passages. To others immigration is open under conditions normal elsewhere.

The post-war politics of the three older dominions have been chiefly domestic in their aspect. Those of South Africa, on the other hand, have been of interest to the Empire as a whole, for in that dominion alone there was at the close of the war a political party advocating separation from the Empire as its programme. This was the Nationalist Party under the leadership of General Hertzog. Against them stood the South African Party, led after Botha's death by General Smuts, and the Unionist Party composed more exclusively of British-born elements. Between the two sides thus divided on the question of allegiance was the Labour Party under Colonel Creswell, interested primarily in social and economic change. The dominion had been uneasy and factious throughout the war and during the peace-making year that followed it. The loss of Botha was a blow to those who believed that the country's future should lie within the Commonwealth, but Smuts at once took the place of his dead chief. On the eve of the general election of 1920 he declared: "I urge the electors to stand by the twin cause of the British Empire and racial peace and unity in South Africa." The result was not decisive, there were many Labour gains, and Smuts retained office with a precarious composite majority. During the ensuing months he effected a fusion of his own party with the Unionists, and then appealed again to the country in 1921. On this occasion the enlarged South African Party gained a decisive victory, and Smuts remained premier until 1924. His Labour and Nationalist opponents followed his example by combining their forces, not indeed in complete fusion, but in a pact for mutual co-operation. The pact secured a victory in the general election of 1924, when General Hertzog became prime minister at the head of a composite majority in which his Nationalists were not sufficiently numerous to work without the assistance of the Labour members. Thus, although the separatist leader was at the head of the state, the country had given no mandate for separation. That policy was therefore postponed and has since

¹ Marriott, *op. cit.* p. 90.

been definitely expunged from the programme of the Nationalist Party. Hertzog and his supporters now avow that development within the Commonwealth is their aim, although they take somewhat extreme views of the extent to which independent action may go and of the limitations of imperial co-operation. The controversy over the Flag Bill in 1926-7 was symbolic of South African opinions, and perhaps its outcome—the adoption of the Union Jack and the new South African flag in equality—may be regarded as symbolic of future co-operation. The change in Nationalist policy was rendered easier by the constitutional pronouncement of the Imperial Conference of 1926, to be dealt with below.¹ General Hertzog attended the Conference as South Africa's premier, and expressed his satisfaction with its result. The Union of South Africa to-day is, in its promise at least, the South Africa which Cecil Rhodes devoted his life to creating. It may also be said, without straining the truth, that it is the South Africa that Paul Kruger would have accepted in his best days, before suspicion took firm hold of his ageing mind.

For the Empire as a whole the three principal problems since the war have been those of the constitution, of the promotion of inter-imperial trade, and of migration from the populous mother country to the scantily peopled dominions. The last-mentioned matter may conveniently be considered first. At the close of the war the British Isles suffered from a severe industrial depression, and it grew evident that for various reasons some of the greatest trades could not expect to recover their pre-war position. It was not altogether the war that was responsible for the change; its part had been to precipitate a state of affairs that would have developed in any event, although doubtless its onset would have been more gradual. In the mid-nineteenth century Great Britain had been in truth the workshop of the world, able to employ its population in supplying the needs of other peoples for manufactured goods. From that time forward the rest of the world had been busily industrializing itself and growing independent of British supplies. But so great had been the all-round expansion of markets that British employment had still been able to continue in spite of increasing competition. With the opening of the twentieth century the circumstances began to change. High-grade coal, our greatest natural asset, ceased to be indispensable as a source of power. Means were devised for utilizing the low-grade coal supplies found in other countries, the use of oil fuel increased, and water-power was harnessed to produce electric energy. At the same time a political tendency became pronounced. The smaller nations learned from the greater that industrial enterprise spells national strength and independence. They were determined to manufacture at all costs, and strengthened their tariff defences to foster their own infant industries. Canada and Australia provide instances of this policy, India has hankered strongly after it, and there are other examples. The mid-nineteenth century

¹ See below, p. 303.

world, organized to consume British manufactures and supply food-stuffs and raw material in exchange, was rapidly passing away. The war destroyed many things that were already declining, and promoted others that were in the incipient stage. Its aftermath revealed an industrial England lacking markets and with no great prospect of supplying the deficiency.

As a consequence men began to believe that the dense British population, formerly regarded as an asset, was in fact a disability and even a danger. It was too large to be fed from the produce of its own soil, and if it could not sell manufactures it could not buy food from without. In another respect the growth of industrialism elsewhere threatens to hasten that result, for there is everywhere a movement towards a local balance between agriculture and manufacture, and the great food-producing regions consume a larger proportion of their own supplies. The United States, from which we formerly imported great quantities of corn and meat, is approaching this balance, and its margin of food for export is diminishing. Canada is still a great and growing granary, for it has not reached its limit of production, but Canadian industry is also forging ahead, and the future may see the local balance established there. These considerations pointed to the desirability of mass-emigration from the British Isles before a real crisis should arise.

Concurrently with the need for greater emigration, actual emigration has fallen off. Social conditions largely account for it. Townsmen are unwilling to work on the land, and that is the only kind of work which they find open to them in the dominions. If they remain unemployed in England they do not starve, for the community supports them in a kind of fools' paradise which may collapse in the next period of national misfortune. Real agricultural workers are welcomed in the dominions, and they are precisely the class which Great Britain can ill spare. The urban population therefore increases in spite of efforts to disseminate it over the Empire. Those efforts, to be effectual, call for some sacrifice of present comfort for ultimate security both in Great Britain and in the dominions, but democratic politicians find it hard to recommend distasteful policies to their electors. Yet it is a matter of vital interest at home and abroad. Australia is the outstanding case of a dominion whose future is imperilled for lack of population, but the like need exists in all. To remedy this state of affairs the British Parliament passed the Empire Settlement Act in 1922. Its terms empowered the Secretary of State to make arrangements with the dominion governments for assisted emigration. Canada, Australia and New Zealand responded to a limited extent,¹ on conditions, that is, that they should accept only the very restricted categories of settlers who would be immediately useful to them. South Africa declared herself unable to participate, since she could find openings only for newcomers possessed of considerable capital. The Act provided a sum of £3,000,000 annually as the British share of expenditure on the project, and the amount has

¹ For details of the several schemes see Marriott's *Empire Settlement*, Appendices.

never in a single year been spent. It is a tragedy that the soundest piece of legislation for social betterment, offering a cure instead of a palliative, should be the only one whose scope of operation has not exceeded the initial estimate.

In 1922 the most recent dominion was added to the list in the shape of the Irish Free State, that part of Ireland which lies outside the six counties of Ulster. The Act which established its constitution provided that its status should be regulated by the precedent of the Dominion of Canada. Southern Ireland is therefore an autonomous unit of the Empire, and its representatives attend the Imperial Conference. Apart from the constitutional aspect, however, the new state is obviously not comparable to the other dominions, and its domestic affairs do not fall within the scope of a work dealing with modern British expansion. The colonization which added considerable elements to its population took place in ancient times—in the Middle Ages and in the Tudor period; and its modern function has been rather that of a mother country to the trans-oceanic dominions. If we include residents in England and Scotland, it is probably true to say that there are as many Irishmen in other parts of the Empire as there are in the Irish Free State.

The period since the war has witnessed the holding of three general Imperial Conferences and of several others devoted to special topics. Three of this minor category met in 1920, the Imperial Statistical, Entomological, and Forestry Conferences, and in the following year an Imperial Customs Conference was held. The general effects of such activities were to co-ordinate administration and to provide means for the collection and exchange of knowledge.

More important was the full Imperial Conference of 1921, attended by the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and the dominions and by representatives of India. This was not the constitutional conference contemplated by the resolution of 1917.¹ In view of the developments of 1918-19 it was decided that there would be no advantage in holding such a discussion, but the assembled statesmen did once more affirm the importance of providing some means of continuous consultation on imperial affairs. At the confidential meetings much time was devoted to foreign policy and defence. The question of foreign policy was ostensibly simplified by the dominions' membership of the League of Nations, for in certain eventualities the dominions were pledged by the covenant to take similar action to that of their fellow-member the United Kingdom. Indeed, as a commentator of 1920 pointed out, the dominions had bound themselves to do more for the assistance of foreign states than they had ever promised to do for their own Empire.² This consideration leads another critic to hail the League as "the *deus ex machina* of the Empire," since it absorbs and solves the difficult problem of foreign policy.³ The League, however,

¹ See above, pp 272-3.

² *The Round Table*, March, 1920, p. 238.

³ A. Zimmern, *The Third British Empire*, Oxford, 1926, Lecture ii.

claims jurisdiction only over the relationships of its own members, which do not include the United States and Russia. The two authorities above cited may be again compared on the actual significance of League obligations. Mr. Zimmern says that membership was enthusiastically approved in England, and that "the British popular instinct which acclaimed the League from the very first was thoroughly sound." The *Round Table*, on the other hand, remarked: "It is almost needless to observe that none of the democracies of the British Empire has grasped the extent of its obligations to the League of Nations or would hesitate to repudiate them at once, if put to the test." The latter statement is probably unjust; it certainly does not square with the national record. But the ignorance of obligations was undoubtedly a fact at the time the sentence was written, and is one still. The League covenant was never a major issue at a British general election, and it was accepted without reflection at a time when the people were intent chiefly upon ending the war, hanging the Kaiser, and searching his subjects' pockets. Subsequent transactions will throw further light upon the question whether the League is a uniting or dividing force in the politics of the British Commonwealth. On an imperial domestic matter the Conference of 1921 passed a resolution, South Africa dissenting, that Indian subjects of the Crown domiciled in other parts of the Empire ought to enjoy the rights of citizenship.¹ This, of course, referred to persons already established and did not affect the question of free migration.

Whilst the Imperial Conference of 1921 was sitting, the President of the United States invited the chief sea-powers of the world to confer at Washington on the question of limiting naval armaments. The Washington Conference led to important transactions in the sphere of foreign policy, and in it the constitutional right of the dominions to be consulted was fully recognized, for representatives attended on behalf of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India. It was said that Canadian initiative played a part in the decision not to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which expired shortly after the holding of the Conference.

The constitutional position was now to the effect that general policy was the concern of all the units of the Commonwealth represented in the Imperial Conference. It was possible, however, that decisions on foreign affairs might have to be taken too quickly to admit of consultation. In such a case the British Foreign Office would be obliged to act alone, but its measures would not be binding upon the dominions.² In spite of this, the legal position from the international point of view still remained that if the Crown declared war all its subjects would automatically be at war. The dilemma nearly became active in 1922, when there was for a moment a likelihood of hostilities with Turkey, and Canada let it be known that she would not participate. Fortunately the crisis passed off, and no similar misfortune has since been threatened.

¹ *Colonial Office List* (1927), p. lxvi.

² *Round Table*, June 1923, pp. 464-5.

The Imperial Conference again met in the autumn of 1923, when the Irish Free State was represented for the first time. Although this Conference gave much attention to foreign policy it did not publish any resolution modifying the position above described. In the negative sense this was important, for it showed that the trend of thought on imperial relationships continued to run on the lines of informal co-operation rather than of devising a new mechanism. The resolution of 1917 was thus left still in abeyance.

Concurrently with the Imperial Conference of 1923 there was held an Imperial Economic Conference. This body adopted a variety of resolutions on economic matters, both of trade and of migration and settlement. Their effect was to pledge the various ministries to recommend to their legislatures a system of preferential trade and the establishment of a standing Imperial Economic Committee. In Great Britain the Conservative ministry under Mr. Baldwin then dissolved Parliament and appealed to the country on this issue. The general election went against them, and a Labour ministry took office under Mr. MacDonald. The new government at once announced that it would not proceed with the preferential tariff proposals or the Economic Committee. The transaction illustrates the constitutional position of the Imperial Conference. Its resolutions express the convictions of the various executives in power; but in all the autonomous states of the Commonwealth the executive is responsible to the elected representatives of the people, and the decisions of the Conference have no binding force unless ratified by them. What took place in 1923 was that the newly elected House of Commons did not comprise a majority in favour of the tariff resolutions of the Conference, and there was no alternative but for the British government to drop them.

The decision was partially reversed by the result of the next British general election, that of 1924. Mr. Baldwin and the Conservatives were returned with a majority, and the nature of their election pledges enabled them to establish the Imperial Economic Committee and to incorporate in their budget so much of the preferential tariff scheme as did not involve an increase of existing duties. This was accordingly done in 1925, when a number of customs duties were maintained as they affected foreign produce but lowered as they affected the produce of the Empire. So at length the Chamberlain proposals of twenty years before came into active, if limited, practice. That practice, it should be noted, did not extend to the more bulky and necessary foodstuffs and the staple raw materials, all of which Great Britain continued to import duty free from any country which could supply them. To give a preference in these trades would still have involved, as in Chamberlain's time, the imposition of new duties and an increase in the cost of living.

Meanwhile the activities of the League of Nations were again involving the question of imperial foreign policy. In 1924 the MacDonald government suggested an inquiry with a view to formulating a more definite system of consultation. The dominions agreed, but the

motion was not proceeded with owing to the fall of the ministry. The League then promulgated a general scheme for the settlement of international disputes, and adherence would have involved new military obligations on the part of its members. This proposal, known as the Protocol of 1924, was considered by correspondence between the ministries of the British Commonwealth, a feasible method for a non-urgent matter, and they unanimously decided not to support it. This was a practical example of equality in consultation producing a united decision. Next year, however, the principle of unity suffered a reverse. In 1925 certain of the European members of the League conferred at Locarno on the means of stabilizing the western frontiers of Germany by placing beyond challenge the decisions of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. The Pact of Locarno ensued, whereby, amongst other obligations, Great Britain pledged herself to go to war in defence of certain of the signatory powers if their territory should be invaded by the unprovoked aggression of the others. The decision was hurriedly taken, and there was no time to consult the dominions, which were not represented at the Conference. They were, therefore, not bound by the British obligations, unless they should subsequently assume them, and this they did not do. So long, therefore, as the Locarno Pact stands unmodified and unextended,¹ the unity of the British Commonwealth stands threatened, for if the contemplated circumstances arise, Great Britain is pledged to fight, and the dominions are not. It should be emphasized that discussion of the European aspects of the Locarno Pact is not within the scope of this chapter, which is solely concerned with its bearing upon imperial relationships.

The year 1924 produced an innovation in the mechanism of administration, in accordance with the constitutional changes of previous years. The Colonial Office was limited to the control of the non-autonomous colonies and dependencies of the Empire, exclusive of India. For dealings with the autonomous states of the Commonwealth a new Dominions Office, under a Secretary of State, was created, an extension of the principle long existing by which there had been a separately organized dominions' department of the Colonial Office. For the present the same minister, Mr. Amery, is Secretary for the Colonies and for the Dominions, but it is probable that in future two Secretaries of State will be appointed. In 1926 the Dominions Office, having been entrusted with the administration of a fund for the promotion of imperial trade, established the Empire Marketing Board to supervise that activity.

The nine years that had elapsed since the war-time Conference of 1917 had witnessed a very deep change in imperial relationships. The principle of co-operation between the autonomous states of the Commonwealth had been re-established, and the principle of federation and the

¹ The Locarno Treaty is indefinite in duration, and not concluded for a term of years. It is, therefore, open to its signatories to give notice of withdrawal at any time, although this could not honourably be done when once the *casus foederis* had arisen. The text is printed in the *Annual Register* for 1925.

creation of a super-government was dead. Hitherto, however, there had been no attempt at formal definition of the constitution, which could be interpreted by different minds in different ways; and the lack of such definition might cause misunderstandings. The Imperial Conference therefore met once more in 1926 and dealt with the question. It succeeded in defining the existing position, although it did not proceed to solve the practical problems, chiefly of foreign policy, which were implicit in its definition. Its resolution was to the effect that Great Britain and the Dominions are "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." It was further recognized that in the spheres of foreign affairs and of defence, "the major share of responsibility rests, and must for some time continue to rest, with His Majesty's Government in Great Britain." It will be seen that these pronouncements contain nothing new; like most British constitutional documents, they place on formal record a state of affairs already in existence, and they evade the question of creating new constitutional mechanism. That is in accordance with the national political methods, which distrust cut-and-dried schemes and prefer to leave institutions to evolve under pressure of circumstances. The whole history of the Imperial Conference is an illustration of the process.

At this point we leave the organic evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Can it be considered satisfactory to those who love the British way of life, and desire its continuance in the world? From the narrow point of view there is ground for doubt, for the authority of the mother country in the Commonwealth is in practice and in theory at an end; and without a central authority, it may be argued, there can be no strength to resist hostile forces from without and disintegrating forces within. Some foreign observers express that view. They regard the Empire as already dissolved within its attenuated husk. Logically they may be right, but human history defies logic, for its operating factors defy definition and quantification. Foreign observers formed the same conclusions before 1914, and their syllogisms shrivelled in the blast of reality. To the realist the events recorded in these chapters constitute not a break-down but a fulfilment, a steady growth with no element of decay other than that of outworn functions, and with a sturdy life for future development. For the essence of the British tradition, as it has taken shape since 1783, is not authority and dominance but liberty and co-operation. Its aim has been to create, not an edifice of stone and steel peopled by unchanging automata, but a manner of living in which human beings may dwell in contentment and grow unhampered in accordance with natural instincts. Modern history is the record of one long contest between freedom and dominance. Both principles are still as evident as day

and night in the world around us, although their forms are always changing. The British Commonwealth has steadily and with never a backward glance taken the lead for freedom, and its present position marks the farthest advance achieved along that path. Which of us would have it otherwise ?

AUTHORITIES FOR PARTS V AND VI

(i) GENERAL ¹

(a) Chiefly Political: European colonization in the modern period is comprehensively dealt with in P. Leroy-Beaulieu's treatise *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, latest edn., Paris, 1921. *The Expansion of Europe*, by J. Ramsay Muir, 3rd edn., London, 1922, is a suggestive essay which emphasizes the part played by colonial rivalries in causing the Great War. A. G. Keller's *Colonisation*, New York, 1908, is useful for information on the colonies of continental Europe. The British Empire and Commonwealth, treated in its separate units, is fully covered in *The Historical Geography of the British Empire*, Oxford, various dates, the whole edited and several of the volumes written by Sir C. P. Lucas. Ramsay Muir's *Imperial Commonwealth*, vol. ii., London, 1922, relates the history of the Empire to the domestic affairs of the mother country. Policy for the period is dealt with in H. E. Egerton's *Short History of British Colonial Policy*, 6th edn., London, 1920, and *British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1923; and in C. H. Currey's *British Colonial Policy, 1783-1915*, Oxford, 1916. The leading authority on constitutional matters is A. B. Keith's *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, 2nd edn., Oxford, 1928. A number of more detailed works cover shorter periods. Three older books have become classics of the subject: Sir G. Cornwall Lewis, *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*, London, 1841; Herman Merivale, *Lectures on Colonization and Colonies*, 2nd edn., London, 1861; and E. Gibbon Wakefield, *A View of the Art of Colonization* (1849), modern edn., London, 1914. The theories and achievements of the Wakefield School receive notice in works on Australia and New Zealand, named below, and in *Lives of Wakefield* by R. Garnett, London, 1898, and by A. J. Harrop, London, 1928; a useful sketch of the subject is E. M. Wrong's *Charles Buller and Responsible Government*, Oxford, 1926. For the mid-nineteenth century two important works have recently appeared: C. A. Bodelsen, *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism*, London, 1924, a conspectus of contemporary opinion; and Paul Knaplund, *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy*, London, 1927, which makes the best of a rather poor case for the statesman's services to the Empire. Imperial transactions of the past thirty years may be studied in Richard Jebb's *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*, London, 1905; *The Imperial Conference*, London, 1911; and *The Britanic Question*, London, 1913, which between them illustrate the growth of the ideas of imperial alliance and co-operation. Later phases of the same topics are covered by A. B. Keith's *Imperial Unity and the Dominions*, Oxford, 1916; H. D. Hall's *The British Commonwealth of Nations*, London, 1920, an exposition of the post-war constitutional position; and A. Zimmermann's *The Third British Empire*, Oxford, 1926, which shows the relation of the Commonwealth to foreign affairs and the League of Nations in a manner which, although optimistic in intention, affords ground for certain misgivings. Imperial defence and warlike undertakings are fully described in *The Empire at War*, Oxford, 1921, etc., edited and largely written by Sir C. P. Lucas, of which the first volume

¹ Many of the works noted in this section are indispensable for the subjects treated in the following sections, but their titles are not there repeated.

extends to 1914, and the succeeding four cover the period of the Great War. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* (from 1783), 3 vols., Cambridge, 1922, etc., is very valuable for the diplomatic contacts of the Empire, and those with the United States are narrated with impartial plain-speaking in S. E. Morison's *Oxford History of the United States*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1927. For the question of inter-imperial migration the best survey is that of Sir J. A. R. Marriot, *Empire Settlement*, Oxford, 1927, which gives the most recent legislation and statistics on the subject. *The Round Table*, a quarterly periodical (from 1910) contains articles devoted to all phases of current imperial affairs. The annual *Colonial Office List* is invaluable for statistics, and its Introductions provide an official record, without comment, of the transactions in and following upon the Colonial and Imperial Conferences.

(b) Chiefly Economic: M. C. Buer's *Health, Wealth and Population*; London, 1926, throws much new light on life in the British Isles during the period of the Industrial Revolution; it is a valuable basis for a study of the conditions that led to the emigration of the early nineteenth century. Two works by the late Mrs. L. C. A. Knowles largely supersede earlier treatments of their subjects: *The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century*, 3rd edn., London, 1924, containing a section on colonial affairs; and *The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire*, London, 1924, which deals in detail with India and the dependencies. Two mutually complementary books should be consulted for the history of Free Trade: *The Free Trade Movement and its Results*, by G. Armitage-Smith, 2nd edn., London, 1903; and *The Rise and Decline of the Free Trade Movement*, by W. Cunningham, 2nd edn., Cambridge, 1905. The controversies arising from the Chamberlain programme produced a multitude of works of which the following may be compared: H. H. Asquith, *Trade and the Empire* (speeches), London, 1903; and W. Cunningham, *The Case against Free Trade*, London, 1911. Shipping and its operations are treated in A. W. Kirkaldy's *British Shipping*, London, 1919; and A. J. Sargent's *Seaways of the Empire*, London, 1918.

(c) The Humanitarian Movement: The following will be found illustrative: R. Coupland, *Wilberforce*, Oxford, 1923; W. L. Mathieson, *British Slavery and its Abolition*, London, 1926; K. L. P. Martin, *Missionaries and Annexation in the Pacific*, Oxford, 1924; and W. A. Young, *Christianity and Civilization in the South Pacific*, Oxford, 1922. The majority of the works enumerated below on regions of the Empire inhabited by native races bear upon the humanitarian aspect.

(ii) BRITISH NORTH AMERICA

The most elaborate work is W. Kingsford's *History of Canada*, 10 vols., London, 1887-98, of which the last six deal with the British period. Sir J. G. Bourne's *Canada under British Rule, 1760-1900*, Cambridge, 1900, gives a clear and well-balanced account in which the maritime provinces receive a full share of attention. Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies* contains a volume by H. E. Egerton solely devoted to Canadian history from 1763 to 1921, and another by J. D. Rogers on Newfoundland, which gives the best account of that colony's affairs. The Canadian volume is especially valuable for the various boundary questions. G. Bryce's *Short History of the Canadian People*, 2nd edn., London, 1914, is useful for social life and biographical details. A good American history is *Canada and British North America*, by W. B. Munro, Philadelphia, 1905. For special periods see three works by Sir C. P. Lucas: *History of Canada, 1763-1812*, Oxford, 1909; *The Canadian War of 1812*, Oxford, 1906; and *Lord Durham's Report*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1912, the first volume being an historical introduction giving the antecedents of the rebellions of 1837, and also an analysis of the Report. A valuable recent study of this period is Miss Aileen Dunham's *Political Unrest in Upper Canada, 1815-36*, London, 1927. For the next period the best authority

is J. L. Morison's *British Supremacy and Canadian Self-Government*, 1839-54, Glasgow, 1919. Western expansion is described in *The History of the North-West*, by A. Begg, 3 vols., Toronto, 1894-5, and in the latter part of *Canada in the Twentieth Century*, by A. G. Bradley, London, 1906. The earlier history of the West is covered in Beckles Willson's *The Great Company*, 2 vols., London, 1900, and G. Bryce's *Remarkable History of the Hudson's Bay Company*, London, 1900. For constitutional questions see *Canadian Constitutional Development*, by H. E. Egerton and W. L. Grant, London, 1907, a collection of speeches, despatches and other documents, with explanatory matter; and the lectures by Prof. G. M. Wrong and others in *The Federation of Canada*, 1867-1917, Toronto, 1917. The biography of eminent Canadians has given rise to a large number of works, prominent among which are those included in the *Makers of Canada Series*, Toronto, 1904, etc.

(iii) AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC

The large-scale *History of Australia* and *History of New Zealand*, each 3 vols., by G. W. Rusden, London, 1883, are now out-of-date, but have had no successors of equal bulk. There are, however, a number of smaller works in which the subject may be studied. General histories include: Ernest Scott, *Short History of Australia*, 3rd edn., Melbourne, 1918, a well-balanced and impartial account; R. P. Thomson, *National History of Australia*, New Zealand, etc., London, 1917; E. Jenks, *History of the Australasian Colonies*, 3rd edn., Cambridge, 1912, especially good for political and constitutional questions; J. D. Rogers, *Australasia* (in Lucas's *Historical Geography*), revised edn., Oxford, 1925, particularly for geographical and economic aspects, and A. Wyatt Tilby, *Australasia*, (vol. v. of that author's *English People Overseas*), London, 1912, valuable for social conditions especially in the penal settlements. There are also many books of more limited scope and greater detail, among which may be mentioned: R. C. Mills, *Colonization of Australia* (1829-42), London, 1915, a careful study throwing new light on the Wakefield theories and their application; two works similarly covering the formative period of New Zealand, namely, *The Colonization of New Zealand*, by J. S. Marais, Oxford, 1927, and *England and New Zealand*, by A. J. Harrop, London, 1926; J. S. Battye, *Western Australia*, Oxford, 1924, an exhaustive history; and R. W. Giblin, *The Early History of Tasmania* (to 1804), London, 1928. For the formation and working of the federal constitution see B. R. Wise, *The Making of the Australian Commonwealth*, 1889-1900, London, 1913, dealing largely in biographical matter and written by one having a personal knowledge of the statesmen concerned; and W. Harrison Moore, *The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia*, 2nd edn., Melbourne, 1910, a legal exposition based upon the text of the Act and judicial decisions thereupon, with a preliminary account of the movement towards federation. There are many works on Australian and Pacific discovery; the best general account is contained in E. Heawood's *Geographical Discovery in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, Cambridge, 1912. Missionary activities in some of the Pacific islands are treated in the books by Martin and Young mentioned above (§ i. (c)). The whole story of the islands from the international point of view is excellently told in G. H. Scholfield's *The Pacific, its Past and Future*, London, 1919.

(iv) SOUTH AFRICA

The most voluminous treatment of South African history is contained in the works of G. McC. Theal. They include a volume on the Portuguese discoveries and the Portuguese in East Africa, followed by three volumes on Dutch South Africa prior to 1795. For the British period they comprise five volumes on *The History of South Africa*, 1795-1872, London, 1908, and two volumes on *The History of South Africa*, 1873-84, London, 1919. The author has aimed at being exhaustive

and his success entails some lack of emphasis and blurring of outlines. Another large-scale *History of South Africa*, is that of Sir G. E. Cory, which has at present reached the year 1846 with its fourth volume. Shorter general histories are by Sir C. P. Lucas, in his *Historical Geography*, etc., vol. iv., pts. i. and ii., Oxford, 1913 and 1915; F. R. Cana, *South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union*, London, 1909, a well-written and interesting volume; and E. A. Walker, *History of South Africa*, London, 1928, a very compact and informative account based upon wide research. On a more limited period, that of 1874-8, a valuable recent contribution is furnished by Sir A. Hardinge's *Life of Lord Carnarvon*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1925, which follows in detail the minister's attempts to achieve a federation. Certain topical or controversial works may be mentioned as throwing light on South African problems: *A Century of Wrong*, by F. W. Reitz, London, 1900, gives a vigorous presentation of the Boer case; *The Afrikaner Rebellion*, by J. K. O'Connor, London, 1915, relates from local knowledge the events of 1914; *An Undivided South Africa*, by G. R. Hofmeyr, Capetown, 1917, indicates the acuteness of the racial feud and the difficulty of finding a solution; *The South African Commonwealth*, by Manfred Nathan, Capetown, 1919, is a non-partisan survey of current social, political and economic problems. Three other special works fall into a different category: *The Times History of the War in South Africa*, 6 vols., 1900-09 (there are also British and German official histories of the war); *The Reconstruction of the New Colonies under Lord Milner*, by W. B. Worsfold, 2 vols., London, 1913, which deals adequately with repatriation, Chinese labour, and political problems; and the Hon. H. R. Brand's *Union of South Africa*, Oxford, 1909, a clear account of the circumstances necessitating the union and an analysis of the Act. For Rhodesia and its founder see the *Lives of Rhodes*, by Sir L. Mitchell, London, 1910, and by Basil Williams, London, 1921.

(v) INDIA AND THE FAR EAST

Two general histories of India cover the whole modern period, V. A. Smith's *Oxford History of India*, Oxford, 1919, and the two volumes by P. E. Roberts in Lucas's *Historical Geography* (1916 and 1923 respectively). These works are short surveys, and no large-scale treatment of the whole of British Indian history is yet available. On the other hand, biographical works are numerous, and a *Life* of almost every great figure has been written. Short biographies occur in the *English Men of Action* Series, and in the *Rulers of India* Series (Oxford, 1893, etc.). For the period of conquest Sir A. C. Lyall's *Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India*, 5th edn., London, 1910, conveys a wide view of general principles. The standard constitutional authority is Sir C. P. Ilbert's *Government of India*, 3rd edn., Oxford, 1915, which sets forth the various charters and Acts bearing upon the subject. For the modern period of unrest and political reform the best introduction is furnished by Sir M. V. Chirol's *Indian Unrest*, London, 1910, which is indispensable for its illumination even of events subsequent to the date of its publication. Lovat Fraser's *India Under Curzon and After*, London, 1911, covers the period of transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. An exhaustive *Life* of Lord Curzon is now in process of publication (1928). Two books may be selected from the more or less polemical literature dealing with the reforms of 1917-19: V. A. Smith's *Indian Constitutional Reform*, Oxford, 1919, and Ernest Barker's *Future Government of India*, London, 1919. Light is thrown upon the post-reform period by J. T. Gwynn's *Indian Politics*, London, 1924.

Four books provide between them an extended outline of British operations in south-eastern Asia and its islands: the first volume of Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, for the Straits Settlements and Malaya; R. Coupland, *Raffles*, Oxford, 1926, for the foundation of Singapore; Owen Rutter, *British North Borneo*, London, 1922; and Sir R. K. Douglas, *Europe and the Far East*, 2nd edn., Cambridge, 1913, for relations with China and Japan.

(vi) TROPICAL AFRICA

The acquisition and development of the tropical African possessions is told in Sir H. H. Johnston's *History of the Colonization of Africa*, 2nd edn., Cambridge, 1913, and in the West and East African volumes of Lucas's *Historical Geography*. Livingstone's *Last Journals*, London, 1874, should be read for the humanitarian aspect. *The Partition and Colonization of Africa*, by Sir Charles Lucas, Oxford, 1922, gives a clear account of the shaping of frontiers and the international agreements that produced them. *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, by Lord Lugard, 2nd edn., Edinburgh, 1923, is a masterly statement of the aims, methods and results of British administration. Miss E. C. Martin's *British West African Settlements, 1750-1821*, London, 1927, traces in detail the political history of a hitherto obscure period.

(vii) EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

A good summary of British proceedings in Egypt and the Sudan is in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. xii., ch. xv. Detailed works written from the official point of view are Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, 2 vols., London, 1908, and *Abbas II.*, London, 1915. The former covers Sudan affairs to the date of its publication, and Egyptian to 1892; the latter continues the Egyptian narrative to 1895. Lord Milner's *England in Egypt*, first published in 1892, has been brought up to date in various subsequent editions. *The History of Events in Egypt, 1798-1914*, by A. E. P. B. Weigall, Edinburgh, 1915, is largely biographical and written by one having a personal knowledge of some of the men concerned. W. B. Worsfold's *The Future of Egypt*, London, 1914, includes a brief but comprehensive review of the history of the country to the outbreak of the Great War. *England in the Sudan*, by Yacoub Artin Pasha, London, 1911, is descriptive rather than historical. *Trente-cinq ans de domination britannique en Egypte*, by Ibrahim Bey, Lausanne, 1919, is a fair example of the Nationalist point of view.

(viii) THE WEST INDIES

The West Indian volume in Lucas's *Historical Geography* provides the best all-round survey. The economic affairs of the islands must be read in the main in general works. Hume Wrong's *Government of the West Indies*, Oxford, 1923, gives a sketch of the constitutional history. Mathieson's work on slavery, noted above in § i. (c), is chiefly concerned with the West Indian Colonies.

Addendum. Merivale's *Lectures on Colonization and Colonies* have been reprinted by the Oxford University Press, 1928

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